;-NRLF 


EX  L 


R  I  S 


Robert  W.  Brokaw 


\ 


HISTORY 


OF    THE 


ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND 


ITS 


ORGANIZATION,  CAMPAIGNS,  AND  BATTLES 

WRITTEN    AT    THE    REQUEST   OP 

MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS 

CHIEFLY    FROM    HIS    PRIVATE     MILITARY    JOURNAL   AND    OFFICIAL    AND   OTHER 
DOCUMENTS   FURNISHED  BY    HIM 

BY 

THOMAS  B.  VAN  HOENE,  U.  S.  A. 

ILLUSTRATED    WITH 

CAMPAIGN  AND   BATTLE   MAPS 

COMPILED  BY 

EDWAKD    EUGEE 

LATE    SUPERINTENDENT    TOPOGRAPHICAL    ENGINEER'S    OFFICE,     HEADQUARTERS 
DEPARTMENT    OF   THE    CUMBERLAND 


TWO   VOLUMES  AND  ATLAS 


VOL.   II 


CINCINNATI 
EGBERT   CLAEKE  &   CO 

1875 


Entered   according   to   Act   of  Congress,  in   the   year    1875, 

THOS.  B.  VAN  HOKNE  AND  EDWAKD  KUGER. 
In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  "Washington. 

Stereotyped  by  OGDEN,  CAMPBELL  &  Co.,  Cincinnati. 


E 
413.5 

MZ5 


CONTENTS   VOL.  II. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

CAMPAIGN  IN  EAST  TENNESSEE,  AND  MINOR  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  DEPART- 
MENT OF  THE  CUMBERLAND 1 


CHAPTEE  XXIV. 

GENERAL  VIEW  OF  THE  STATUS  OF  THE  CONFLICT  AT  THE  CLOSE  OF  1863.      8 

CHAPTEE  XXV. 

OPERATIONS  IN  THE  DEPARTMENT  DURING  JANUARY,  FEBRUARY,  AND 

MARCH,  1864,  AND  PREPARATIONS  FOR  AGGRESSION 13 

CHAPTEE  XXVI. 
THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON , 44 

CHAPTEE  XXVII. 
BATTLE  OF  EESACA ~~    64 


CHAPTEE  XXVIII. 

ADVANCE  TO  THE  ETOWAH  EIVER — THE  TURNING  OF  ALATOONA — BAT- 
TLES NEAR  NEW  HOPE  CHURCH , 71 

CHAPTEE  XXIX. 

OPERATIONS  NEAR  KENESAW  MOUNTAIN.  INCLUDING  THE  BATTLE  AT 
KULP'S  HOUSE,  ASSAULT  OF  THE  MOUNTAIN,  AND  THE  FLANK  MOVE- 
MENT   86 

(iii) 


IV  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTEK  XXX. 

ADVANCE  UPON.  ATLANTA — BATTLE  OF  PEACHTKEE  CREEK 109 

CHAPTER  XXXI. 
SIEGE  or  ATLANTA 123 

CHAPTEK  XXXII. 

THE  FLANK  MOVEMENTS,  CULMINATING  IN  THE  BATTLE  OF  JONESBORO  AND 

THE  FALL  OF  ATLANTA 140 

CHAPTEK  XXXIII. 

THE  MARCH  OF  THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES  TO  THE  NORTH,  AND  THE  EVOLU- 
TION OF  NEW  CAMPAIGNS 155 

CHAPTEK  XXXIV. 

THE  RESISTANCE  TO  GENERAL  HOOD'S  ADVANCE  FROM  THE  TENNESSEE 

RlVEH,  CULMINATING  IN  THE  BATTLE  OF  .FRANKLIN.... 186 

CHAPTER  XXXY. 
BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE,  AND  PURSUIT  OF  THE  ROUTED  ENEMY 222 

CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

MINOR  OPERATIONS  HAVING  RELATION  MORE  OR  LESS  INTIMATE  WITH 

THOSE  OF  THE  MAIN  ARMY  DURING  NOVEMBER  AND  DECEMBER  ....  270 

CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  AND  THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  CITY  OF  SAVANNAH, 
GEORGIA 278 

CHAPTER  XXXVIII. 

MARCH  THROUGH  THE  CAROLINAS,  FROM  SAVANNAH  TO  GOLDSBORO  AND 

RALEIGH — THE  BATTLES  OF  AVERYSBORO  AND  BENTONVILLE...,    ..  306 


CHAPTER  XXXIX. 

GENERAL  GEORGE  STONEMAN'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE  AND 

NORTH  CAROLINA...  ..  337 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   XL. 

GENERAL  J.   H.  WILSON'S    CAVALRY  OPERATIONS    IN  ALABAMA  AND 

GEORGIA  ... 347 


CHAPTEK  XLI. 
CAPTURE  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  PRESIDENT 362 

CHAPTER  XLII. 
THE  DISSOLUTION  OF  THE  ARMY — SUMMARY  OF  ITS  ACHIEVEMENTS 369 

CHAPTER  XLIII. 
THE  DEAD  AND  THEIR  DISPOSITION...  ..  377 


APPENDIX. 

ORGANIZATION  OF  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND 381 

ORGANIZATION  OF  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OHIO 385 

LIST  OF  OFFICERS  OF  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND  WHO  WERE  KILLED 

IN  ACTION  OR  DIED  OF  WOUNDS  OR  DISEASE  DURING  THE  WAR...  386 
THE  ENGINEER  SERVICE  IN  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND...,         ..  439 


HISTORY 


OF   THE 


ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

CAMPAIGN  IN    EAST    TENNESSEE    AND    MINOR    OPERATIONS    IN    THE 
DEPARTMENT   OF   THE   CUMBERLAND. 

GENERAL  BURNSIDE  had  been  informed  that  he  should  have 
help  as  soon  as  practicable,  when  first  it  was  known  that  Gen- 
eral Longstreet  had  been  sent  against  him.  General  Grant 
said  to  him  that  he  could  hardly  conceive  the  necessity  of  re- 
treating from  East  Tennessee.  But  as  the  issue  at  Chatta- 
nooga, though  glorious  in  its  coming,  had  been  delayed,  it 
became  imperative  at  once  to  make  effort  to  raise  the  siege  of 
Knoxville. 

November  29th,  General  Howard  marched  from  Parker's 
Gap  to  Cleveland,  taking  the  lead  in  the  movement  upon 
Knoxville.  He  was  followed  immediately  by  General  Sher- 
man's three  divisions,  under  General  F.  P.  Blair,  and  General 
Davis'  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps.  On  the  30th,  Gen- 
eral Granger  left  Chattanooga  with  two  divisions  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  for  the  same  destination. 

Brigadier-General  Elliot,  who  had  recently  been  appointed 

chief  of  cavalry  in  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland,  and 

who  had  concentrated  the  troops  of  his  first  division  at  Sparta,. 

moved  in  conjunction  with  the  infantry  forces.      Colonel 

VOL.  n — 1 


2  CAMPAIGN   IN  EAST   TENNESSEE,   ETC. 

Long's  brigade  moved  to  the  head  of  the  column,  and  on  the 
2d  of  December,  the  Fifteenth  Pennsylvania  and  Tenth  Ohio 
Cavalry  left  Chattanooga  ^or  Kingston.  Colonel  Spears'  bri- 
gade, that  had  been  previously  stationed  on  the  north  bank  of 
the  Tennessee  river  above  Chattanooga,  also  moved  toward 
Knoxville.  General  Sherman's  command  embraced  more  than 
eight  divisions  of  infantry,  while  five  were  left  to  garrison 
Chattanooga.  Supplies  for  the  troops  in  motion  were  sent  up 
the  river  on  the  steamer  Dunbar,  but  the  main  dependence 
was  upon  the  country. 

On  the  30th,  General  Howard  advanced  from  Cleveland  to 
Charleston,  on  the  Hiawassee  river.  As  he  approached  the 
town,  the  enemy's  cavalry  retreated  toward  Athens.  They 
had  previously  partially  destroyed  the  railroad  bridge,  and  had 
made  effort  to  destroy  the  pontoons  also.  But  a  large  num- 
ber of  the  boats  were  saved,  and  during  the  following  night 
the  railroad  bridge  was  repaired  and  planked  over,  so  that  in 
the  morning  the  Eleventh  Corps  passed  over,  followed  by  the 
rear  forces.  The  head  of  column  reached  Athens  the  next 
evening.  The  march  of  the  infantry  was  resumed  on  the  2d 
and  Colonel  Long  hurried  on  to  London  to  save  the  bridge,  if 
possible.  He,  however,  found  the  enemy  in  such  force  that  he 
could  not  make  a  dash,  as  had  been  anticipated.  The  town 
was  well  fortified,  and  was  held  by  infantry  and  artillery,  un- 
der General  Yaughan,  and  he  could  only  skirmish  until  Gen- 
eral Howard  should  get  up.  The  latter  reached  the  position 
on  the  3d,  but  the  enemy  had  evacuated  it  the  night  previous, 
having  first  destroyed  the  bridge,  three  locomotives,  and  from 
sixty  to  seventy-five  cars  containing  commissary  stores,  cloth- 
ing, and  ammunition.  The  pontoon  bridge  had  also  been 
partially  destroyed.  Notwithstanding  the  immense  destruc- 
tion of  supplies,  three  days'  rations  were  found  uninjured. 
From  this  point,  Colonel  Long  was  sent  with  picked  men 
to  communicate  with  General  Burnside.  On  the  4th,  Colonel 
Hecker's  brigade  crossed  the  river,  skirmished  with  the  cav- 
alry, and  took  possession  of  four  rifled  cannon,  which  the 
enemy  could  remove,  and  captured  a  flag.  Here  General 
Howard  found  about  thirty  wagons  partially  destroyed, 
which  he  repaired  for  use  in  forming  a  temporary  bridge, 


CAMPAIGN    IN   EAST   TENNESSEE,    ETC.  3 

in  anticipation  of  crossing  the  Little  Tennessee  river  at  Davis' 
ford.  The  route  by  this  ford  was  not  the  one  which  had  "been 
designated,  but  it  was  ascertained  that  time  could  be  saved, 
and  the  march  shortened  by  advancing  upon  it  rather  than 
upon  the  road  to  Morgantown,  and  General  Sherman  permit- 
ted General  Howard  to  use  it. 

Before  leaving  Loudon,  General  Howard  received  an  order 
to  command  the  left  wing  of  the  army,  while  the  center  and 
righ  twere  placed  respectively  under  Generals  Granger  and 
Blair.  These  divisions  of  the  army  were  to  act  independently, 
but  to  march  to  each  other's  support  when  called  by  the  noise 
of  battle. 

December  5th,  General  Howard  crossed  the  Little  Tennes- 
see river,  at  Davis'  ford,  by  means  of  an  extemporized  bridge 
formed  of  wagons  and  movable  trestles,  and  reached  Louis- 
ville at  dark.  At  night,  the  three  heads  of  column  communi- 
cated at  Marysville.  Here  information  was  received  that 
Longstreet  had  raised  the  siege  of  Knoxville,  and  retreated 
eastward.  He  assaulted  Fort  Sanders,  the  key  to  the  position, 
on  the  29th,  and  was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  Aware,  sub- 
sequently, of  the  proximity  of  Sherman's  army,  he  sought 
safety  in  timely  retreat.  All  the  forces  were  now  ordered  to 
halt,  and  the  day  following,  General  Sherman  met  General 
Burnside  at  Knoxville.  It  was  then  agreed  that  the  Fourth 
Corps  should  remain  and  the  other  forces  return  to  Chatta- 
nooga. 

The  countermarch  was  commenced  on  the  7th.  A  halt  was 
made  at  Athens,  with  the  various  columns  so  disposed  as  to 
cover  a  movement  of  Colonel  Long,  who  had  gone  toward 
North  Carolina  to  cut  off  one  of  Longstreet's  trains.  Upon 
his  return,  the  infantry  forces  marched  to  Chattanooga.  How- 
ard's corps  and  Davis'  division  resumed  their  old  relations  in 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and  Sherman's  divisions  returned 
to  the  West. 

Though  the  march  to  East  Tennessee  involved  no  serious 
fighting  with  Longstreet's  command,  which  was  lost  to  Gen- 
eral Bragg  in  his  emergency  at  Chattanooga,  it  nevertheless 
thoroughly  accomplished  its  object,  as  it  forced  the  former 
from  Knoxville  toward  the  East,  in  what  proved  to  be  per- 


4  CAMPAIGN   IN   EAST   TENNESSEE,    ETC. 

petual  separation  from  the  Confederate  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 
It  was  a  hard  march,  as  the  troops  commenced  it  immediately 
after  a  series  of  engagements,  and  Sherman's  forces  after  a 
long  march  from  the  West.  The  latter  had  "  stripped  for  the 
fight "  at  Bridgeport,  and  they,  with  many  from  other  com- 
mands, were  destitute  of  suitable  clothing  for  a  winter  cam- 
paign. Besides,  their  supplies  were  drawn  mainly  from  the 
country,  and  in  a  hurried  movement  this  source  is  exceed- 
ingly precarious.  Supplies  were  sent  up  the  river  in  boats  it 
is  true,  but  the  army  was  not  always  near  the  river;  and,  on 
the  whole,  the  circumstances  were  such  as  none  but  veteran 
soldiers  would  easily  overcome.  The  mills  were  seized  in  ad- 
vance, and  run  night  and  day ;  and  a  broad  belt  of  country  in 
the  march  and  countermarch  paid  exhaustive  contributions. 
There  were  some  excesses  which  were  reprehensible,  especially 
as  the  march  was  through  a  region  whose  inhabitants  were 
mainly  loyal.  General  Davis'  division,  by  its  order  on  the 
march  and  its  restraint  from  pillage,  elicited  special  praise 
from  General  Sherman.  In  this  commendable  and  conspicu- 
ous bearing,  this  division  represented  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland, which,  throughout  its  existence,  was  systematically 
restrained  from  pillage  and  irresponsible  foraging. 

The  objects  now  were  to  hold  all  the  territory  which  had 
been  gained,  to  maintain  and  perfect  communications,  rein- 
force, recuperate,  and  reorganize  the  army,  and  accumulate 
supplies  and  material,  all  looking  to  offensive  movements,  as 
early  as  practicable.  The  enemy  was  in  no  condition  for  ag- 
gression on  a  grand  scale,  but  great  vigilance  and  skillful  dis- 
positions were  necessary  to  maintain  communications  and  pre- 
vent cavalry  raids  and  guerrilla  depredations. 

Upon  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  from  Binggold,  General 
Hooker  resumed  the  occupation  of  Lookout  valley.  General 
Cruft  was  directed,  with  his  two  brigades,  to  stop  on  the  way 
and  bury  the  national  dead  on  the  battle-field  of  Chicka- 
mauga,*  and  then  to  take  position  on  the  railroad  between 

*  War's  visage,  despite  the  glory  of  heroism  and  victory,  and  all  the 
gentle  courtesies  which  enemies  may  extend  at  all  times,  except  when 
the  rage  of  battle  brooks  no  restraint,  is  grim  and  forbidding;  but  when 
the  ordinary  usages  of  civilized  and  Christian  nations  in  the  conduct  of 


CAMPAIGN   IN   EAST   TENNESSEE,    ETC.  5 

"Whitesides  and  Bridgeport.  Colonel  Watkins'  brigade  of 
the  First  division  of  cavalry  was  directed  to  take  post  at  Ross- 
ville ;  and  the  Ninety-second  Illinois  Mounted  Infantry  was 
sent  to  Caperton's  ferry,  to  guard  and  observe  at  that  point. 
A  pioneer  brigade,  composed  of  detachments  from  various 
regiments,  Colonel  G-.  P.  Buell  commanding,  was  employed  in 
the  construction  of  a  double-track  macadamized  road  over  the 
nose  of  Lookout  Mountain,  to  serve  as  a  communication 
between  Lookout  valley  and  Chattanooga,  without  depend- 
ence upon  pontoon  bridges.  Beyond  this  primary  use,  this 
road  was  essential  to  overland  communications  with  Bridge- 
port. The  repair  of  the  railroad  commanded  immediate  atten- 
tion, but  as  two  long  and  high  bridges  were  to  be  built — one 
over  the  Tennessee  river  at  Bridgeport,  and  the  one  over  Fall- 
ing Water,  near  Whitesides — much  time  was  required. 

When  the  army  returned  from  East  Tennessee,  the  Eleventh 
Corps  went  into  camp  at  Whitesides ;  two  brigades  of  Davis' 
division,  east  of  Missionary  Ridge,  near  Rossville;  and  the 
third  at  the  mouth  of  the  North  Chickamauga.  General  Elli- 
ott was  ordered  to  establish  his  headquarters  at  Athens,  and 
post  pickets  at  Calhoun,  Columbus,  and  Tellico  Plains. 

During  the  months  of  November  and  December,  there  were 
several  brilliant  contests  in  resisting  the  enemy's  cavalry,  re- 
pressing guerrillas,  and  scouting  to  the  front  to  ascertain  the 
strength  and  movements  of  the  enemy.  And  in  most  cases  the 
national  troops  were  victorious. 

November  2d,  Brigadier-General  R.  S.  Granger,  command- 
war  are  ignored,  then  are  its  features  forbidding  in  the  extreme.  The  car- 
nage and  suffering  are  appalling  when  cool  reflection  and  the  kindly 
sympathies  have  play ;  but  all  strong  terms  are  inadequate  to  express  the 
wanton  barbarities  of  war,  either  in  cruelty  to  the  living  or  dishonor  to 
the  dead,  and  on  both  counts  the  leaders  of  the  rebellion  must  be  con- 
victed. Andersonville  and  other  prisons,  where  starvation  and  want  of 
room  for  captives  entailed  the  intensest  suffering  and  fearful  mortality, 
.and  Chickamauga,  with  its  hundreds  of  unburied  dead,  give  proof  of  the 
most  revolting  inhumanity.  General  Bragg  accepted  an  exchange  of  pris- 
oners who  were  wounded,  but  he  denied  burial  to  multitudes  of  the  slain. 
The  national  dead  upon  that  part  of  the  field  occupied  by  General  Long- 
street  were  buried ;  but  very  many  on  their  right,  where  General  Polk 
commanded,  lay  upon  the  ground  for  two  months. 


6  CAMPAIGN    IN   EAST   TENNESSEE,    ETC. 

ing  at  Nashville,  sent  a  mixed  command,  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Sculley,  First  Middle  Tennessee  Infantry,  to  look 
after  Hawkins,  and  other  guerrilla  chiefs,  near  Piner's  fac- 
tory. Sculley  met  them,  and  having  routed  the  party,  pur- 
sued to  Centerville.  At  this  point,  as  he  was  crossing  the 
river,  Hawkins  attacked  in  turn,  but  was  again  routed,  and 
his  partisans  were  dispersed.  His  loss  was  from  fifteen  to 
twenty  killed,  and  sixty-six  prisoners. 

November  4th,  Major  Fitzgibbon,  of  the  Fourteenth  Mich- 
igan Infantry,  fought  near  Lawrenceburg  the  guerrilla  bands 
of  Cooper,  Kirk,  Williams,  and  Scott.  After  a  hand-to-hand 
contest,  Fitzgibbon  defeated  them,  killing  eight,  wounding 
seven,  and  capturing  twenty-four  men.  Among  the  captured 
were  a  captain  and  two  lieutenants.  The  victor  had  three- 
men  slightly  wounded,  and  eight  horses  killed. 

On  the  13th,  Captain  Cutler,  with  one  company  of  mounted 
infantry  from  the  garrison  at  Clarksville,  and  a  section  of 
Whitmore's  battery,  had  a  contest  with  Captain  Gray's  com- 
pany of  guerrillas,  near  Palmyra.  He  killed  two,  wounded 
five,  and  captured  one.  The  same  day,  fifteen  prisoners  were 
captured  near  Lebanon,  and  forty  by  Missener,  near  Columbia. 

On  the  16th,  General  Payne  sent  parties  from  Gallatin  and 
La  Yergne.  Five  guerrillas  were  killed,  and  twenty-six  were 
captured,  also  horses,  cattle,  sheep,  and  hogs,  which  had  been 
collected  for  the  Confederate  army. 

The  next  day,  Colonel  Coburn  sent  an  expedition  from 
Murfreesboro  against  the  enemy's  irregular  cavalry.  A  de- 
tachment of  the  Fourth  Tennessee  Cavalry  captured  nineteen 
guerrillas  and  twenty  horses,  without  loss. 

On  the  21st,  an  expedition  was  sent  down  the  Tennessee 
river,  which  destroyed  nine  boats  for  local  use,  some  of  them 
being  sixty  feet  long.  They  were  wrested  from  the  enemy. 

On  the  26th,  the  First  Tennessee  Cavalry  and  Ninth  Penn- 
sylvania Cavalry,  under  Colonel  Brownlow,  attacked  Colonel 
Murray,  at  Sparta.  He  killed  one  man,  wounded  two,  and 
captured  ten.  Extensive  salt-works  were  destroyed,  and  some 
horses  and  ammunition  were  taken. 

The  same  day,  Captain  Brixie's  scouts  encountered  a  party 


CAMPAIGN   IN   EAST   TENNESSEE,    ETC.  7 

of  guerrillas  near  Bathsheba  Springs,  capturing  fifteen  or 
twenty,  and  dispersing  the  remainder. 

December  12th,  Colonel  Watkins,  with  two  hundred  and 
fifty  men,  from  the  Fourth  and  Sixth  Kentucky  Cavalry,  made 
a  dash  upon'  Lafayette,  Georgia,  and  captured  a  colonel  of  the 
Georgia  home  guard,  six  officers  of  the  signal  corps,  and 
thirty  horses  and  mules,  and  returned  to  his  camp  at  Rossville, 
without  loss.  On  the  27th,  the  colonel  sent  Major  Willing, 
with  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  from  the  same  regiments,  to 
McLemore's  Cove  and  Lafayette.  The  major  captured  one 
lieutenant,  sixteen  men,  and  thirty-eight  horses  and  mules. 

On  the  15th,  General  Dodge  captured  a  small  party  of  cav- 
alry, under  command  of  Major  Joe  Fontaine,  General  Eoddy's 
adjutant,  not  far  from  Pulaski,  Tennessee.  This  party  had 
made  a  reconnoissance  on  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  and 
Nashville  and  Decatur  railroads,  which  doubtless  had  some 
relation  to  projected  movements  or  raids.  It  suggested  greater 
vigilance  along  these  important  roads. 

December  27th,  General  "Wheeler,  with  fifteen  hundred 
men,  appeared  at  Calhoun,  Tennessee,  with  evident  expecta- 
tion of  capturing  a  train  under  escort  of  Laiboldt's  brigade. 
Colonel  Laiboldt  charged  this  force,  and  routed  it  speedily, 
and  Colonel  Long,  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  men,  having 
come  from  the  opposite  side  of  the  river,  in  support,  moved 
in  pursuit,  believing  that  a  small  force  had  been  cut  off  from 
the  main  body.  By  a  saber  charge,  this  force  was  scattered  in 
all  directions.  One  hundred  and  thirty-one  prisoners  were 
taken,  including  five  officers,  one  a  division  inspector  and  one 
a  surgeon.  The  number  of  killed  and  wounded  was  not  as- 
certained. Colonel  Long  lost  two  killed,  twelve  wounded, 
and  one  missing.  Wheeler  commanded  in  person,  and  an- 
ticipated rich  booty  with  slight  trouble,  but  failed  in  his  object, 
with  heavy  loss. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

GENERAL  VIEW  OF  THE  STATUS  OF  THE  CONFLICT  AT  THE  CLOSE 

OF  1863. 

THE  year  1863  was  crowded  with  disaster  to  the  insurgents. 
They  were  victorious  in  some  of  the  great  battles  in  Virginia, 
but  lost  fearfully  in  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  So  that,  at  the 
East,  where  only  they  had  been  at  all  successful,  their  strength 
was  relatively  less  than  at  the  beginning  of  the  year.  In  the 
"West,  their  losses  in  men,  material  of  war,  and  territory  were 
immense.  In  their  effort  to  maintain  their  hold  upon  the  Mis- 
sissippi river,  they  lost  two  armies,  and  when  subsequently 
the  "  Father  of  Waters  "  flowed  "  un vexed  to  the  sea,"  and  the 
supremacy  of  the  national  navy  upon  this  great  river  and  its 
tributaries  was  unquestioned,  all  contiguous  portions  of  the 
insurgent  states  were  at  the  mercy  of  the  national  armies. 
At  the  close  of  the  year  the  central  offensive  line  was  resting 
upon  the  northern  limits  of  Alabama,  Georgia,  and  North  Car- 
olina. The  loss  of  so  much  territory,  the  complete  division 
of  what  remained  by  the  navy  moving  at  pleasure  upon  the 
Mississippi  river,  and  the  immense  diminution  of  men  and 
means,  gave  new  conditions  to  the  campaigns  of  the  next 
year. 

Besides  the  effect  of  numerous  defeats  during  the  year,  two 
proclamations  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  greatly 
alarmed  the  insurgents.  On  the  1st  day  of  January,  1863,  he 
proclaimed  freedom  to  all  the  slaves  in  the  revolted  states,  and 
in  the  last  month  he  promised  pardon  to  all  below  a  given 
grade,  in  the  insurgent  armies. 

As  a  sequence  of  the  freedom  of  the  slaves,  and  as  a  war 
measure  of  great  moment,  arms  were  soon  put  in  their  hands. 
(8) 


GENEEAL   VIEW  AT   THE   CLOSE   OF   1863.  9 

At  first,  however,  the  enrollment  of  the  freedmen  as  soldiers 
was  only  occasionally  undertaken  by  individual  department 
commanders  in  absence  of  any  general  plan  or  explicit  author- 
ity from  Washington.  Though  slavery  directly  and  indirectly 
was  the  dominant  cause  of  the  war,  there  was  manifest  reluc- 
tance for  nearly  three  years  to  lay  hands  upon  it,  and  after  its 
abolition  was  decreed,  the  national  authorities  hesitated  to 
make  soldiers  of  those  whose  bondage  they  had  broken.  The 
slaves  had  aided  the  enemy  not  only  by  their  productive  labor, 
but  also  by  the  construction  of  defenses,  and  contributed  to 
the  strength  of  the  rebellion  in  greater  measure,  than  they  had 
previously  given  political  weight  to  the  Southern  States,  in 
Congress.  The  more  moderate  and  far-seeing  men  of  the 
.South  anticipated,  from  the  first,  that  sooner  or  later  the 
African  race  would  be  involved  in  the  war.  And  later  than 
many  of  this  class  anticipated,  and  a  growing  party  in  the 
North  demanded,  the  President  pronounced  the  freedom  of  the 
negroes  in  the  seceded  states.  Their  enlistment  as  soldiers 
was  so  plainly  a  legitimate  consequent  that  it  was  not  long 
delayed.  Both  measures  were  repugnant  to  the  traditional 
and  inveterate  prejudices  of  the  Southern  people,  and  of  many 
in  the  North  as  well.  In  the  official  utterances  of  the  Confed- 
erate President,  the  reprehension  of  the  civilized  world  was 
invoked  upon  those  who  proposed  these  measures,  and  the 
total  destruction  of  the  Africans  in  America  was  predicted. 
But  the  argument  in  their  support  was  so  simple  and  forcible 
that  serious  opposition  to  either  soon  ceased  in  the  North.  As 
the  slaves  were  a  source  of  strength  to  the  rebellion,  the  logic 
of  war  first  declared  them  contraband,  and  then  demanded 
their  employment  as  soldiers.  The  fact  that  their  freedom 
was  contingent  upon  the  overthrow  of  the  Southern  Confed- 
eracy, not  only  justified  their  grasp  of  the  musket,  but  enforced 
its  obligation.  And  the  results  vindicated  the  policy,  as  colored 
regiments  greatly  augmented  the  national  armies  for  the  cam- 
paigns of  1864. 

The  President's  offer  of  pardon  to  the  masses  in  the  Con- 
federate armies,  had  marked  effect.  It  gave  assurance  that 
peace  could  ensue  without  the  entailment  of  penal  criminality 
upon  those  in  arms  against  the  government  below  the  rank  of 


10  GENERAL   VIEW  AT   THE   CLOSE   OF   1863. 

brigadier-general,  and  hence  removed  the  necessity  that  mere 
desperation  should  keep  them  under  the  standards  of  treason. 
And  as  this  promise  of  amnesty  involved  no  hard  conditions, 
and  was  made  at  a  time  of  general  despondency  in  the  South, 
and  when  such  was  the  depreciation  of  Confederate  money, 
that  no  poor  man  could  give  even  partial  support  to  a 
family  from  his  pay  as  a  soldier,  it  prompted  numerous  de- 
sertions. Desertion  being  added  to  the  drain  of  active  cam- 
paigns, the  diminution  of  the  insurgent  armies  became  alarming 
to  the  leaders.  But  they  still  claimed  that  the  independence 
of  the  Southern  States  was  assured,  and  on  this  ground,  in  part 
justified  a  conscription  of  widest  compass.  The  people  did 
not  bear  this  patiently.  Murmurs  of  discontent  became  gen- 
eral. Occasionally  there  was  open  protest  and  severest  criti- 
cism. But  as  nothing  but  counter-revolution  could  remedy 
the  evil,  and  as  this  step  plainly  led  through  anarchy  to  sub- 
mission to  the  general  government,  the  relentless  conscription 
of  young  and  old,  and  the  sweeping  appropriation  of  private 
property  was  endured.  As  a  result,  sullenness  and  discour- 
agement took  the  place  of  cheer  and  hope  in  their  armies,  and 
outward  restraint  rather  than  moral  force  kept  multitudes  in 
the  ranks ;  while  the  certainty  of  pardon,  in  the  event  of  the 
failure  of  the  rebellion,  induced  those  not  ready  to  desert  to 
weigh  the  cost  of  protracting  a  contest  when  success  was  ex- 
tremely doubtful.  But  the  leaders,  after  a  year  of  gigantic 
reverses,  standing  upon  the  threshhold  of  new  campaigns 
with  diminished  armies,  as  boldly  as  ever  declared  that  subju- 
gation was  impossible.  President  Davis,  in  his  annual  mes- 
sage to  his  congress,  announced  that  "  grave  reverses  had  be- 
fallen the  Confederate  armies,"  and  that  the  hope  of  a  speedy 
termination  of  the  war,  entertained  at  the  beginning  of  the 
year,  had  not  been  realized,  and  yet  asserted  that  peace  could 
only  come  with  the  acknowledgment  of  the  independence  of 
the  Confederate  States.  Even  after  General  Lee's  defeat  at 
Gettysburg,  the  fall  of  Yicksburg  and  Port  Hudson,  and  the 
retreat  of  General  Bragg's  army  over  Cumberland  Mountains, 
M.  T.  Maury  assured  the  world,  in  a  paper  published  in  the 
"  London  Times,"  that  the  prospect  of  success  to  the  South 
was  brighter  than  at  any  former  period  of  the  war.  Whether 


GENERAL   VIEW  AT   THE   CLOSE   OF   1863.  11 

this  assurance  was  real  or  assumed,  on  the  part  of  the  leaders, 
and  whether  they  had  to  any  great  extent  the  sympathy  of 
the  masses  in  their  avowed  hopes,  such  was  the  power  of  the 
Confederate  government  and  the  momentum  of  the  rebellion, 
that  armies  of  fair  defensive  proportions  were  maintained,  and 
some  of  the  Southern  generals  even  entertained  projects  of 
aggression. 

The  events  of  the  year  as  affecting  the  national  cause,  viewed 
from  a  military  or  political  stand-point,  were  cheering  in  the 
extreme.  The  victories  of  the  national  armies  and  the  support 
of  war  measures  as  evinced  by  the  elections,  equally  indicated 
that  the  crisis  of  the  nation's  destiny  had  been  safely  passed. 
The  strength  of  the  rebellion  had  culminated,  and  the  general 
situation  gave  encouragement  to  the  government  and  those  who 
supported  it,  to  strike  blow  after  blow  until  the  final  one  should 
be  given.  The  elections  declared  the  nation's  approval  of  the 
President's  proclamation  of  freedom  to  the  slaves,  and  the  pol- 
icy of  making  them  soldiers,  and  universal  freedom  was  now 
as  firmly  established  as  a  condition  of  peace  as  the  surrender 
of  the  Confederate  armies. 

The  maintenance  of  the  full  strength  of  the  national  armies 
was  now  the  grand  problem.  The  term  of  enlistment  of 
very  many  regiments  would  expire  early  in  1864.  Their  re- 
tirement during  active  operations  would  endanger  the  success 
of  all  plans  of  aggression  which  might  be  formed.  In  fact, 
the  speedy  suppression  of  the  rebellion  turned  upon  their  re- 
tention in  the  service,  and  yet  there  was  no  law  to  hold  them. 
Fortunately  for  the  country  her  citizen  soldiers  were  equal  to 
the  emergency,  and  their  voluntary  re-enlistment,  more  strin- 
gent drafting,  and  the  enrollment  of  the  freedmen,  gave  prom- 
ise of  adequate  armies. 

It  was  evident  at  the  close  of  the  year  that  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  was  again  to  confront  its  old  enemy,  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee.  After  its  defeat  at  Chattanooga,  this  army  took 
position  at  Dalton,  with  a  heavy  detachment  at  Buzzard's  Roost, 
and  forces  also  at  the  strong  positions  between  Dalton  and  At- 
lanta. The  "Western  and  Atlantic  railroad  courses  through  the 
hills  and  mountains  of  Northern  Georgia,  which  give  marked 
advantage  to  an  army  acting  on  the  defensive,  against  another 


12  GENERAL   VIEW  AT   THE   CLOSE   OF    1863. 

dependent  upon  the  railroad  for  supplies.  And  before  the  ex- 
act character  of  the  next  central  campaign  could  be  determined, 
the  Confederate  generals  exerted  themselves  to  give  additional 
strength  to  the  fortresses  which  nature  had  provided.  Whether 
they  should  be  able  to  take  the  offensive  or  not,  their  past  ex- 
perience suggested  the  propriety  of  making  provision  for  de- 
fense as  far  to  the  rear  as  practicable,  while  maintaining  a  strong 
defensive  front. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

OPERATIONS  IN  THE  DEPARTMENT  DURING  JANUARY,  FEBRUARY, 
AND  MARCH,  1864,  AND  PREPARATIONS  FOR  AGGRESSION. 

AT  the  beginning  of  the  year  1864,  and  during  the  first 
months  of  the  year,  the  troops  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
were  disposed  from  Kaoxville  to  Bridgeport,  and  on  the  rail- 
road from  the  latter  place  to  Louisville,  Kentucky.  The  atti- 
tude of  the  army  was  mainly  defensive.  In  fact,  it  was  in  no 
condition  for  aggression.  At  least  ten  thousand  animals  had 
died  during  the  siege  of  Chattanooga,  and  those  which  survived 
were  so  reduced  in  strength  as  to  be  unfit  for  service.  The 
army,  too,  was  temporarily  weakened  by  the  absence  of  numer- 
ous regiments  that  had  been  granted  furloughs  upon  re-enlist- 
ment ;  and  previous  to  the  completion  of  the  railroad  between 
Chattanooga  and  Bridgeport,  it  was  hardly  possible  to  supply 
the  troops  at  rest  on  the  defensive  line,  including  the  Army  of 
the  Ohio  in  East  Tennessee.  Thus  restrained  from  active  op- 
erations, its  chief  duty  was  preparation  for  future  aggression. 

As  the  primary  step,  it  was  imperative  to  make  Chattanooga 
a  reliable  proximate  base  of  supplies  for  an  army  advancing 
toward  Atlanta.  The  Confederate  army  being  in  winter-quar- 
ters in  Northern  Georgia,  could  destroy  all  the  productions  of 
that  region  which  it  did  not  consume  or  transport.  So  that 
the  accumulation  of  supplies  at  Chattanooga,  and  the  continued 
maintenance  of  railroad  communications  with  Nashville  and 
Louisville,  were  conditions  of  a  southward  advance ;  and  the 
practicability  of  making  Chattanooga  a  base  for  offensive  op- 
erations, hinged  upon  the  capacity  of  a  single  railroad. 

Two  railroads  from  Nashville  meet  at  Stevenson,  Alabama, 
but  from  their  junction  to  Bridgeport,  and  thence  to  Chat- 

(13) 


14        OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864. 

tanooga,  there  is  only  a  single  track.  As  the  bridges  at  Bridge- 
port and  Falling  Waters  were  not  completed  until  the  14th  of 
.January,  half  the  winter  was  gone  before  there  was  the  slightest 
accumulation  of  supplies ;  and  though  subsequently  this  single 
railroad  was  pressed  to  its  utmost  capacity,  such  were  the  im- 
mediate wants  of  the  armies,  and  so  numerous  were  the  vet- 
eran regiments  passing  over  the  road,  that  the  large  store- 
houses which  had  been  built  at  Chattanooga  were  very  slowly 
filled. 

During  the  first  half  of  January,  the  enemy  was  not  active. 
General  Thomas  sent  scouting  parties  in  all  directions,  but  no 
indications  of  aggression  were  discerned.  Apart  from  the  ex- 
haustion which  the  preceding  campaigns  had  produced,  a 
change  of  commanders  was  doubtless  one  cause  of  inaction. 
Soon  after  his  defeat  before  Chattanooga,  General  Bragg  had 
been  removed  from  command  in  Georgia,  and  General  Joseph 
E.  Johnston,  while  charged  with  the  administration  of  a  mili- 
tary division  corresponding  in  extent  to  the  one  which  had 
been  created  for  General  Grant,  assumed  personal  command  of 
the  forces  immediately  south  of  Chattanooga.  His  presence 
at  Dalton  indicated  his  appreciation  of  the  importance  of  the 
center  of  his  line,  either  to  regain  what  had  been  so  recently 
lost,  or  to  neutralize  Chattanooga,  as  far  as  possible,  as  a  base 
for  aggressive  operations. 

By  this  time,  the  foreshadows  of  the  campaign  which  Gen- 
eral Grant  had  projected  began  to  appear.  Mobile  was  his 
next  objective,  with  Atlanta  and  Mongomery  as  important 
intermediate  points.*  Not  being  ready  to  advance  upon  the 
direct  line  to  his  objective,  he  proposed  a  movement  from 
his  right  flank  by  General  Sherman,  while  General  Thomas 
should  make  effort  to  hold  Johnston's  forces  at  Dalton,  and 
General  Foster,  commanding  in  East  Tennessee  in  room  of 
General  Burnside,  should  neutralize  Longstreet's  army.  The 
objects  proposed  for  General  Sherman  were  the  destruction  of 
the  railroads  from  Vicksburg  to  Meridian,  and  the  capture  of 
Mobile,  should  its  practicability  be  developed  as  he  advanced. 
But  before  he  was  ready  to  move,  rumors  were  current  that 

*  Statement  of  plan  by  General  Badeau,  in  "  Life  of  General  Grant." 


OPERATIONS  FEOM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864.        15 

Longstreet  was  receiving  reinforcements  from  Virginia.  This 
deranged  the  plans  with  regard  to  the  center  and  left.  Gen- 
eral Thomas  was  desirous  of  recalling  his  troops  from  East 
Tennessee,  to  be  able  to  demonstrate  strongly  against  Dalton ; 
but  it  now  became  necessary  that  he  should  have  regard  to  the 
contingency  of  sending  additional  troops  to  General  Foster. 

General  Longstreet's  attitude  had  been  ambiguous  since  his 
abandonment  of  the  siege  of  Knoxville,  upon  the  approach  of 
General  Sherman,  in  December.  His  presence  was  a  menace, 
even  in  absence  of  operations  of  direct  offense ;  and  as  it  was 
possible  for  reinforcements  to  reach  him  from  Dalton  and 
from  Virginia,  an  effort  to  regain  the  mountain  fortresses  of 
East  Tennessee  was  probable,  especially  if  General  Johnston 
could  entertain  the  hope  of  keeping  the  war  out  of  Georgia  by 
carrying  it  to  the  North.  Any  plan  of  aggression  on  his  part 
would  involve  the  possession  of  a  route  to  the  northeast  of 
Chattanooga,  and  for  a  time  such  a  course  was  plainly  indi- 
cated or  feigned. 

When,  on  the  15th  of  January,  General  "Wood  advanced  to 
Dandridge  and  drove  the  rebel  cavalry  from  the  town,  an 
offensive  return  was  provoked,  which  for  a  time  threatened  to 
change  General  Grant's  plans  very  materially.  Though  Gen- 
eral Wood  was  joined  by  General  Sheridan's  division  and 
McCook's  cavalry  at  Dandridge,  it  was  not  deemed  safe  to 
hazard  a  general  engagement.  For  two  days  there  was  skir- 
mishing, and  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  18th,  there  was  a 
brisk  conflict  mainly  between  McCook's  cavalry  and  Long- 
street's  advance.  Three  Ohio  regiments — the  First,  Mnety- 
third,  and  One  Hundred  and  Twenty-fifth — were  holding  the 
front  as  pickets,  and  were  severely  pressed  by  a  tentative  ad- 
vance of  the  enemy,  but  they  fought  bravely  to  cover  the  prep- 
arations for  a  retreat.  McCook,  by  a  saber  charge,  cleared 
the  field  and  captured  two  steel  rifle-guns,  and  over  one  hun- 
dred prisoners.  This  action  and  the  darkness  permitted  the 
safe  retreat  of  the  national  troops.  They  fell  back,  first  to 
Strawberry  Plains,  and  subsequently  to  Marysville,  followed 
by  Longstreet. 

Simultaneously  with  this  movement,  General  Roddy  crossed 
the  Tennessee  river  near  Florence,  Alabama,  with  two  brigades 


16        OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864. 

of  cavalry.  General  Dodge,  commanding  troops  of  General 
Sherman's  army  at  Pulaski,  Tennessee,  received  information 
on  the  20th,  that  he  was  preparing  boats  and  concealing  them 
with  the  evident  purpose  of  crossing  his  command  for  a  raid 
upon  the  railroads.  General  Grant  at  once  advised  General 
Thomas  of  the  fact,  and  directed  him  to  organize  an  expedi- 
tion to  drive  Roddy  back,  and  destroy  his  boats  and  all  ma- 
terial which  could  be  used  in  effecting  the  passage  of  the  river. 
But  he  was  across  two  days  before  these  instructions  were 
communicated,  and  General  Thomas  could  only  make  arrange- 
ments to  defeat  his  purpose.  He  directed  the  detachments 
guarding  the  roads  to  watch  against  attacks,  and  ordered  Gen- 
eral Crook  commanding  cavalry  at  Huntsville,  Alabama,  to 
advance  against  Roddy  and  drive  him  across  the  river. 

Colonel  H.  0.  Miller,  Mnety-second  Indiana,  commanding 
one  expedition,  defeated  Johnson's  brigade  near  Florence  on 
the  26th,  killing  fifteen,  and  wounding  and  capturing  a  large 
number.  Among  the  prisoners  were  three  officers.  His  own 
loss  was  ten  wounded.  General  Gillem  also  sent  parties  from 
the  line  of  the  Northwestern  railroad  against  Roddy,  as  soon 
as  he  heard  that  he  had  crossed  the  river.  These  parties 
returned  on  the  30th  with  Lieutenant- Colonel  Brewer,  two 
captains,  three  lieutenants,  and  twenty  men  as  prisoners.  Hav- 
ing thus  met  forces  between  him  and  the  railroad  in  all  di- 
rections, Roddy  recrossed  the  river,  having  effected  no  damage 
that  compensated  for  his  losses. 

January  27th,  the  cavalry  under  General  Elliott,  in  a  brilliant 
action  at  Mossy  Creek,  East  Tennessee,  defeated  General  Mar- 
tin, commanding  two  divisions  of  cavalry,  Morgan's  and  Arm- 
strong's, and  followed  his  routed  forces  until  darkness  ter- 
minated the  pursuit.  Campbell's  and  La  Grange's  brigades 
were  engaged,  and  they  put  the  enemy  to  rout  by  a  saber 
charge,  capturing  one  hundred  and  twelve  prisoners,  including 
two  regimental  commanders  and  seven  other  officers,  two  rifled 
guns,  eight  hundred  small  arms,  Morgan's  battle-flag,  and  two 
regimental  flags,  which  the  enemy  had  previously  captured 
from  the  national  troops,  and  killed  and  wounded  over  two  hun- 
dred men,  exclusive  of  prisoners.  Morgan's  division  was 
thoroughly  broken,  and  Armstrong's  was  thrown  into  rapid  re- 


OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864.        17 

treat.  Guerrillas  were  also  active.  January  20th,  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  guerrillas  attacked  Tracy  City,  and  having  three 
times  summoned  the  garrison  to  surrender,  were  handsomely 
repulsed. 

The  next  day,  Colonel  T.  J.  Harrison,  Thirty-ninth  Indiana 
Mounted  Infantry,  sent  two  hundred  men  on  an  expedition  to 
Sparta,  Tennessee,  to  look  after  the  guerrillas  infesting  that 
region.  This  party  in  five  subdivisions  scoured  the  country 
occupied  by  the  bands  of  Curtis,  Ferguson,  Bledsoe,  and  Mur- 
ray. Remaining  out  several  days,  they  killed  four  men, 
wounded  five  or  six,  and  captured  fifteen,  including  a  captain 
and  lieutenant.  They  also  captured  thirty  horses  and  twenty 
stand  of  arms. 

On  the  24th,  Colonel  Boone,  commanding  the  Twenty- 
eighth  Kentucky  Mounted  Infantry ,  with  four  hundred  and 
forty-six  men,  moved  through  McLemore's  Cove,  crossed  to 
Broomtown  valley,  and  proceeded  through  Summerville,  across 
Taylor's  ridge,  to  Dirt  Town.  Beyond  the  latter  place  he  de- 
stroyed a  camp  of  the  Georgia  militia,  captured  fifteen  men, 
including  Captain  Hubbard,  and  returned  without  loss. 

Upon  the  completion  of  the  railroad  from  Bridgeport  to 
Chattanooga,  General  Thomas  transferred  the  working  parties 
to  the  road  leading  to  Knoxville,  and  on  the  24th  directed 
General  Stanley,  commanding  the  First  division  of  the 
Fourth  Corps,  to  dispose  his  command  from  Chickamauga 
Station  to  the  Hiawassee  river,  to  protect  the  workmen  on  the 
road.  As  it  had  been  suggested  that  troops  might  be  sent  to 
East  Tennessee  to  support  Foster  against  Longstreet,  these 
troops  were  thus  in  readiness  to  meet  this  contingency  while 
guarding  the  railroad,  and  watching  against  the  direct  move- 
ment of  troops  from  Dalton  to  Longstreet. 

As  deserters  concurred  in  asserting  that  General  Johnston 
was  sending  troops  south  from  Dalton,  General  Thomas  di- 
rected General  Palmer  to  make  a  reconnoissance  with  a  por- 
tion of  his  command  to  ascertain,  if  possible,  whether  these 
representations  were  true.  The  latter  having  accomplished 
his  office  by  developing  a  strong  force  at  Tunnel  Hill,  returned 
to  Chattanooga. 
VOL.  H — 2 


18        OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864. 

February  10th,  General  Grant  directed  General  Thomas  to 
prepare  for  an  advance  to  Knoxville,  with  such  forces  as  could 
be  spared  from  the  protection  of  Chattanooga  and  its  commu- 
nications, to  assist  General  Foster  to  drive  Longstreet  from 
East  Tennessee.  Such  a  movement  was  no  part  of  the  orig- 
inal plan,  but  concurrent  reports  had  convinced  General  Grant 
that  there  had  been  a  heavy  concentration  of  troops  under 
Longstreet  to  secure  East  Tennessee,  and  he  determined  to 
prevent  it,  and  relieve  that  flank  from  pressure.  General 
Foster  had  prepared  to  assume  the  offensive  if  he  could  get  at 
least  ten  thousand  men  from  General  Thomas.  It  was  deemed 
safe  to  diminish  the  forces  at  Chattanooga,  as  there  was  reason 
to  believe  that  Johnston  had  detached  heavily  from  Dalton  to 
reinforce  Polk  against  Sherman  in  Alabama,  as  well  as  to 
strengthen  Longstreet  for  offense  against  Foster  in  East  Ten- 
nessee. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  not  in  condition  to  enter 
upon  a  winter  campaign,  and  General  Thomas  found  it  diffi- 
cult to  make  such  preparations  as  he  deemed  essential.  His 
army  was  greatly  diminished  by  the  absence  of  regiments 
having  re-enlisted  as  veterans.  Artillery  horses  and  train 
animals  had  not  been  supplied  in  room  of  the  thousands  that 
had  died  from  starvation  during  the  siege,  and  he  advised  a 
postponement  of  the  movement  until  the  railroad  would  be 
in  running  order  to  Loudon.  On  the  12th,  however,  the  day 
previous  to  the  one  designated  for  starting,  he  was  informed 
by  General  Grant  that  a  conversation  with  General  Foster,, 
who,  on  account  of  ill-health,  had  been  superseded  by  General 
Schofield,  and  dispatches  from  the  latter,  induced  him  to  doubt 
the  propriety  of  moving  against  Longstreet,  and  suggested 
that  should  he  not  be  required  to  go  into  East  Tennessee,  he 
should  make  a  formidable  reconnoissance  toward  Dalton,  and 
if  possible  occupy  that  place,  and  repair  the  railroads  to  it. 
This  order  was  given  on  the  17th,  and  at  the  time  there  was 
some  probability  that  it  might  be  successful,  as  it  was  sup- 
posed that  Johnston  had  weakened  his  center,  especially  to 
strengthen  Polk  against  Sherman.  Two  days  later,  however. 
General  Thomas  received  information  that  Johnston  had  in, 
hand  six  divisions,  comprising  from  thirty  to  forty  thousand 


OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864.        1£> 

men,  and  that  no  troops  had  been  sent  away,  except  one  bri- 
gade of  infantry.  This  intelligence  did  not,  however,  induce 
General  Grant  to  recall  the  movement,  though  it  rendered 
General  Thomas  hopeless  of  success. 

The  troops  were  put  in  motion  toward  Dalton,  February 
22d.  General  Thomas  threw  General  Stanley's  division,  Gen- 
eral Cruft  commanding,  with  such  cavalry  as  he  could  safely 
withdraw  from  Calhoun,  Tennessee,  forward  on  the  Spring 
Place  road,  and  Johnston's  and  Baird's  divisions,  with  cavalry 
in  advance  and  on  the  right  flank,  directly  to  Ringgold.  At 
night,  Cruft's  division  was  at  Red  Clay,  with  Long's  cavalry 
in  advance,  having  been  instructed  to  observe  the  enemy  well 
toward  Dalton,  and  give  timely  warning  of  any  effort  to  turn 
Cruft's  left  flank,  or  to  notify  him  to  advance  should  Johnston 
retire.  The  other  divisions  were  at  Ringgold,  in  position  on 
the  ridge  west  of  East  Chickamauga,  with  a  regiment  of 
mounted  infantry  on  each  flank,  and  Carlin's  brigade  thrown 
toward  Taylor's  ridge. 

During  the  evening,  General  Palmer  advised  General 
Thomas  that  he  had  received  intelligence  that  Johnston  had 
dispatched  Cheatham's  and  Cleburne's  divisions  to  reinforce 
General  Polk,  who  was  falling  back  before  General  Sherman, 
in  Alabama.  All  available  troops  were  now  moved  up  to  dis- 
lodge General  Johnston,  should  this  report  prove  to  be  true. 
Davis'  division  advanced  to  Ringgold  on  the  23d,  and  General 
Matthias  was  directed  to  send  six  regiments  from  Cleveland  to 
support  General  Cruft,  at  Red  Clay.  Colonel  Long  advanced 
toward  Dalton,  on  the  Spring  Place  road ;  first  drove  in  the 
enemy's  videttes,  and  when  within  four  miles  of  Dalton,  at- 
tacked and  routed  from  camp  a  regiment  of  infantry.  The 
enemy  then  forming  in  force,  he  withdrew  to  Russell's  Mills. 
Cruft's  division  advanced  to  Lee's  house,  on  the  road  from 
Red  Clay  to  Tunnel  Hill.  The  four  divisions  were  now  well 
concentrated  in  the  vicinity  of  Ringgold,  and  after  a  thorough 
reconnoissance  on  each  flank,  General  Palmer  advanced,  on 
the  24th,  to  develop  the  enemy's  strength  at  Tunnel  Hill. 
After  skirmishing  three  or  four  miles  with  Wheeler's  cavalry, 
he  gained  possession  of  the  town,  when  the  enemy  formed  a 
new  line,  and  opened  with  his  batteries  from  a  hilla  one  mile 


20        OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864. 

beyond.  General  Palmer  then  withdrew,  and  encamped  three 
miles  to  the  northwest.  The  following  morning  he  decided 
to  feel  the  enemy's  position  more  fully.  Baird's  division  was 
south  of  Taylor's  Ridge  near  Ringgold,  and  Cruft's  was  well 
closed  up  on  its  left.  Davis'*  and  Johnson's  divisions  were  in 
the  advance  toward  Tunnel  Hill,  with  Harrison's  mounted 
infantry  in  front,  and  Boone's  on  the  left  flank,  and  Long's 
brigade,  supported  by  Grose's  brigade  of  Cruft's  division,  was 
at  Varnell's  station,  on  the  Dalton  and  Cleveland  railroad. 
These  pairs  of  divisions  were  ordered  to  advance  on  different 
lines,  the  former  upon  Tunnel  Hill,  and,  if  practicable,  directly 
upon  Dalton ;  the  latter,  with  Long's  cavalry,  to  move  down 
the  valley,  along  the  eastern  base  of  Rocky  Face  Ridge,  to 
threaten  the  right  and  rear  of  the  enemy. 

In  compliance,  the  troops  on  the  right  advanced  in  three 
columns.  After  the  right  and  left  had  moved  some  distance, 
the  center  advanced,  but  was  soon  checked  by  a  battery  of 
Parrott  guns  planted  on  the  summit  beyond  the  town  of 
Tunnel  Hill,  and  skillfully  handled.  The  right  and  left  col- 
umns, Morgan's  and  Hambright's  brigades,  again  advanced, 
and  flanking  this  battery,  forced  its  retirement.  Davis'  di- 
vision, with  Johnson's  in  support,  pursued  and  found  the 
enemy  at  Buzzard's  Roost,  a  gap  in  Rocky  Face  Ridge,  whose 
precipitous  acclivities  and  salient  summits  forbade  assault. 
Baird  and  Cruft  also  encountered  the  enemy  as  they  moved 
down  Rocky  Face  valley.  Giving  ground  at  first,  he  soon 
offered  resistance  upon  a  central  hill.  An  attack  was  here  nec- 
essary to  develop  his  strength ;  and  General  Turchin,  with 
four  regiments,  the  Eleventh,  Eighty-ninth,  and  Ninety-second 
Ohio,  and  the  Eighty-second  Indiana,  was  directed  to  advance. 
Advancing  boldly,  these  troops  pressed  back  the  enemy  and 
reached  the  summit,  but  were  unable  to  hold  it,  as  the  routed 
troops  met  reinforcements,  and  returned  in  overwhelming 
force.  The  conflict  was  sharp,  but  it  was  too  unequal  to  be 
maintained,  and  Turchin  yielded  the  hill.  Spirited  skir- 
mishing and  cannonading  were  continued  until  nightfall,  when 
the  national  troops  were  withdrawn.  Colonel  Harrison  spent 

*  General  Davis'  division  had  previously  closed  up  from  the  rear. 


OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864.        21 

the  night  at  a  gap  six  miles  south  of  Buzzard's  Roost,  nearly 
opposite  Dalton,  whence  he  was  driven  the  following  morning 
by  Cleburne's  division,  one  of  the  two  that  had  been  dis- 
patched to  Alabama. 

As  it  had  been  ascertained  that  General  Johnston  was 
holding  his  strong  positions  with  forces  superior  to  his  own, 
General  Thomas  deemed  it  futile  to  attempt  to  dislodge  him, 
and  that  it  was  even  impracticable  to  maintain  his  threatening 
attitude.  The  country  was  stripped  of  provisions,  and  his 
transportation  was  not  sufficient  to  supply  his  command.  He 
therefore  advised  General  Grant  of  his  embarrassment,  and 
suggested  the  abandonment  of  the  enterprise.  In  reply,  Gen- 
eral Grant  urged  him  to  maintain  his  position,  and  make  the 
impression  upon  Johnston  that  an  advance  into  the  heart  of 
the  South  was  intended,  until  the  fate  of  General  Sherman 
should  be  known.  Compliance,  however,  was  not  considered 
practicable,  and  as  it  was  known  that  Johnston  had  recalled 
his  divisions  from  Folk's  support,  orders  were  issued  for  the 
withdrawal  of  the  troops.  Baird's  division  was  posted  on  a 
line  of  hills  north  of  the  town  of  Tunnel  Hill,  to  cover  the  re- 
tirement of  Johnson  and  Davis,  and  then  took  permanent  post 
at  Ringgold.  Davis'  division  returned  to  his  former  position 
near  Rossville.  Two  brigades  of  Johnson's  division  were 
posted  at  Tyner's  Station,  and  the  third  atGraysville,  with  a 
strong  guard  at  Parker's  Gap,  to  protect  Baird's  left  flank. 
Graft's  division  returned  to  Ooltawah  and  Blue  Springs,  the 
commander  sending  a  detachment  to  Cleveland  to  guard  his 
supplies,  where  Colonel  Long  also  took  post  to  patrol  the  left 
flank  of  the  army.  Colonels  Harrison  and  Boone  were 
stationed  at  Leet's  tanyard,  to  observe  the  enemy  toward 
Lafayette. 

This  movement  to  Dalton  involved  a  loss  of  more  than  three 
hundred  men  killed  and  wounded.  Among  the  wounded 
was  Colonel  Mihalotzy,  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Illinois,  who 
died  a  few  days  later  at  Chattanooga.  The  enemy's  loss  was 
probably  two  hundred.  As  a  reconnoissance  it  was  successful, 
though  there  were  no  such  results  as  General  Grant  mentioned 
as  probable.  It  seemingly  recalled  the  two  divisions  that 
General  Johnston  had  sent  against  General  Sherman,  but  as 


22        OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864. 

the  latter  had  retreated  from  Meridian  on  the  20th,  six  days 
previous  to  their  return,  the  demonstration  had  no  effect  upon 
their  movements.  The  chief  advantages  were  the  develop- 
ment of  the  strength  of  General  Johnston's  position  before 
Dalton,  and  the  suggestion  to  General  Thomas  of  a  plan  to 
turn  it  by  a  movement  through  Snake  Creek  Gap.  He  was 
.so  impressed  with  the  feasibility  of  this  plan,  that  upon  his 
return  to  Chattanooga,  he  requested  permission  from  General 
Grant  to  make  preparation  to  accomplish  it. 

Having  disposed  his  troops  for  defense,  General  Thomas  ad- 
dressed himself  to  preparation  for  the  spring  campaign.  He 
ordered  General  Butterfield  to  make  a  careful  examination  of 
the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  railroad,  and  Captain  Merrill, 
chief  engineer  of  the  department,  to  examine  other  roads,  to 
ascertain  the  minimum  force  necessary  to  hold  them  securely. 
He  also  ordered  a  thorough  examination  of  the  railroad  to 
Tunnel  Hill,  with  a  view  to  its  repair,  as  an  important  step  iii 
provision  for  an  advance. 

These  examinations  resulted  in  a  more  economical  pro- 
tection of  railroad  communications,  by  means  of  a  system  of 
block-houses  at  the  bridges  and  other  important  points,  which 
became  an  element  of  power  to  the  close  of  the  war.  And 
the  conclusion  having  been  reached  that  six  thousand  infantry 
and  two  thousand  cavalry  could  hold  securely  the  railroads  to 
Nashville,  General  Thomas  recommended  that  the  railroad 
guards,  as  far  as  practicable,  should  be  drawn  from  the  local 
Tennessee  militia. 

The  month  of  February  closed  with  the  military  situation 
by  no  means  developed.  General  Sherman  destroyed  rail- 
roads extensively  in  Mississippi,  but  otherwise  his  expedition 
was  not  compensative.  It  was  not  known  what  Longstreet 
would  do,  whether  give  further  trouble  in  East  Tennessee,  re- 
turn to  Virginia,  or  join  Johnston.  Neither  were  General 
Johnston's  plans  at  all  indicated.  One  day  would  bring  ru- 
mors from  deserters,  and  from  sources  more  reliable,  that  he 
was  under  orders  to  withdraw  his  army  from  Dalton,  followed 
on  the  next  by  contradictions  from  sources  equally  entitled  to 
credence.  But  ignorance  of  the  purposes  of  the  enemy  did 
not  prevent  preparation  for  aggression.  Reconstruction  of 


OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864.        23 

railroads  was  pressed  westward  and  southward,  and  material 
and  supplies  were  accumulated  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Steam- 
boats and  large  storehouses  were  built.  Horses  were  provided 
for  the  artillery,  and  efforts  were  made  to  recuperate  those  of 
the  cavalry  worn  down  by  hard  winter  service.  Eight  com- 
panies of  the  First  Michigan  Engineers  and  Mechanics,  and 
two  regiments  of  colored  troops,  were  ordered  to  commence 
the  construction  of  block-houses  and  other  defenses  along  the 
line  of  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  railroad,  and  the  first 
Missouri  Engineers  and  Mechanics  were  detailed  for  similar 
duty  on  the  Nashville  and  Decatur  railroad.  In  anticipation 
of  a  campaign  designed  to  bisect  the  Gulf  States  east  of  the 
Mississippi  river,  the  secure  defense  of  railroad  communi- 
cations from  Chattanooga  to  the  North  with  the  least  pos- 
sible draft  upon  the  strength  of  the  aggressive  columns,  was 
a  matter  of  great  moment.  With  strong  block-houses  at  all 
the  bridges,  and  with  earthworks,  in  addition,  at  all  of  the 
more  important  points,  a  comparatively  small  force  could  hold 
the  roads  securely — at  least,  could  prevent  all  damage  that 
could  not  be  quickly  repaired.  One  of  the  greatest  embarrass- 
ments to  Generals  Buell  and  Rosecrans,  had  been  the  neces- 
sity of  scattering  their  troops  in  heavy  detachments  on  their 
lines  of  supply.  The  plan  now  adopted  promised  better  se- 
curity, both  to  the  railroads  and  to  the  troops  guarding  them, 
while  employing  a  small  portion  of  the  force  formerly  assigned 
to  this  service.  Besides,  it  transferred  the  cavalry  almost  en- 
tirely from  the  rear  to  the  front,  and  relieved  the  veteran 
infantry  from  guard  duty,  as  new  regiments  and  local  militia 
could  be  trusted  to  hold  the  block-houses  and  earthworks. 

At  the  beginning  of  March  there  were  indications  that  General 
Johnston  was  receiving  reinforcements  at  Dalton,  and  General 
Grant  was  not  free  from  apprehension  that  Longstreet's  army 
might  join  him,  in  addition  to  other  forces,  for  an  attack  upon 
Chattanooga.  To  provide  against  such  a  contingency,  the 
two  divisions  of  the  Fourth  Corps  in  East  Tennessee  were 
ordered  to  be  constantly  ready  for  quick  movement  to  support 
General  Thomas.  On  the  3d,  "Wagner's  brigade  of  Sheridan's 
division  was  moved  to  Calhoun,  Tennessee,  to  relieve  the  first 
brigade  of  the  first  division  of  cavalry,  Colonel  Campbell 


24        OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864. 

commanding,  that  it  might  take  post  at  Cleveland.  Five  days 
later,  Colonel  Daniel  McCook,  commanding  second  brigade 
of  Davis'  division,  was  ordered  to  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mills,  to 
give  strength  to  the  front,  and  observe  the  enemy  upon  a  line 
of  former  approach.  The  same  day,  Colonel  Harrison  was 
driven  from  Leet's  tanyard  hy  a  strong  force  of  cavalry.  This 
advance,  coupled  with  rumors  that  Johnston  had  been  joined 
by  ten  thousand  men  from  South  Carolina  and  by  Roddy's 
cavalry,  that  Longstreet's  cavalry  was  in  motion  toward  him, 
and  that  his  troops  were  under  orders  to  carry  three  days' 
rations  on  their  persons,  intensified  somewhat  the  apprehen- 
sion that  an  offensive  movement  was  meditated.  There  were 
no  changes  of  troops,  however,  except  that  McCook's  division 
of  cavalry  was  ordered  to  Cleveland,  since  it  was  not  yet 
deemed  safe  to  withdraw  the  Fourth  Corps  from  East  Ten- 
nessee, as  Longstreet's  action  was  still  uncertain. 

On  the  17th  of  March,  General  Grant,  having  been  appointed 
lieutenant-general,  in  command  of  the  entire  army,  advised 
General  Thomas  that  Major-General  "W.  T.  Sherman  had  been 
assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi. The  assumption  of  general  command  by  General 
Grant  gave  the  contemplated  campaign  into  Georgia  a  closer 
relation  to  operations  against  General  Lee's  army  in  Virginia 
than  had  previously  existed  between  movements  east  and 
west. 

Soon  after  his  assignment  to  the  command  of  the  military 
division,  General  Sherman  went  to  Chattanooga  to  confer  with 
General  Thomas  with  regard  to  future  movements.  At  this 
conference,  General  Thomas  suggested  that  the  armies  of  the 
Tennessee  and  Ohio,  under  the  respective  commands  of  Major- 
Generals  McPherson  and  Schofield,  should  demonstrate  against 
Johnston's  position  before  Dalton,  by  the  direct  roads  to  Buz- 
zard's Roost,  and  from  Cleveland,  while  he  should  throw  the 
entire  Army  of  the  Cumberland  through  Snake  Creek  Gap, 
which  he  knew  to  be  unguarded,  and  fall  upon  Johnston's 
communications  between  Dalton  and  Resaca,  and  thereby 
turn  his  position  completely,  and  either  force  him  to  retreat  to- 
ward the  east,  through  a  difficult  country  poorly  supplied  with 
provisions  and  forage,  with  a  strong  probability  of  the  total 


OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864.        25 

disorganization  of  his  army,  or  attack  him,  in  which  event  he 
felt  confident  of  being  able  to  beat  him,  especially  as  he  hoped 
to  gain  position  in  his  rear  before  lie  should  be  aware  of  his 
movement.  General  Sherman  objected  to  this  suggestion,  for 
the  reason  that  he  desired  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to 
form  the  reserve  of  the  united  armies,  and  to  serve  as  a  rally- 
ing point  from  which  the  two  wings,  the  armies  of  the  Ten- 
nessee and  Ohio,  could  operate. 

The  union  of  the  armies  of  the  Cumberland,  Tennessee, 
and  Ohio  in  a  campaign  from  Chattanooga  as  a  base,  having 
been  determined  upon,  preparations  of  the  grandest  dimen- 
sions possible  were  at  once  inaugurated  with  vigor.  The  most 
difficult  problem  was  that  of  supplies.  Its  solution  turned 
upon  the  capacity  of  a  single  railroad  track  from  Stevenson  to 
Chattanooga,  and  thence  toward  Atlanta.  There  was  steam- 
boat transportation  from  Bridgeport  to  Chattanooga;  but 
there  was  dependence  alone  upon  the  track  from  the  former 
place  to  Stevenson.  As  the  accumulation  of  supplies  at  Chat- 
tanooga had  hitherto  been  slight,  General  Sherman  restricted 
railroad  transportation  to  dead  freight,  and  forbade  passage  to 
citizens  or  private  property.  He  also  forbade  the  further  issue 
of  rations  to  the  destitute  citizens  of  the  country.  The  peo- 
ple complained  of  these  measures ;  but  such  was  the  necessity 
for  the  accumulation  of  supplies,  that  he  persisted  in  their 
maintenance,  against  the  protests  of  the  citizens,  remon- 
strances from  Washington,  and  what  under  other  circum- 
stances would  have  been  the  demands  of  humanity. 

During  the  month  of  April,  again,  as  before  the  battles  in 
November,  Chattanooga  was  the  scene  of  the  greatest  activity. 
Troops  were  constantly  coming  up  from  the  rear  and  moving 
to  position  in  the  front.  The  quartermaster  and  commissary 
departments  were  pressed  to  extreme  exertion  building  steam- 
boats, erecting  and  filling  vast  storehouses,  bringing  forward 
artillery  and  cavalry  horses,  mules,  and  cattle ;  while  the  rail- 
way was  almost  constantly  trembling  under  the  long  trains 
heavily  loaded  with  supplies  and  munitions. 

General  Johnston,  in  the  meantime,  was  not  idle,  though  he 
was  restrained  in  his  preparation  for  an  offensive  movement, 
which  it  was  expected  in  the  South  he  would  be  able  to  make 


26        OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864. 

in  such  force  as  to  change  the  theater  of  war  again  to  the 
North.  He  waited  for  preparation  for  well-sustained  aggres- 
sion, and  thus  lost  an  opportunity  for  partial  success.  Cleve- 
land was  the  weak  point  in  the  national  line.  General  Thomas 
could  not  hold  this  vital  point  strongly  while  the  Fourth  Corps 
remained  with  General  Schofield,  and  this  corps  could  not  be 
safely  withdrawn  until  it  was  known  that  Longstreet  had 
abandoned  East  Tennessee.  But  before  Johnston  was  well 
prepared  even  for  defense,  the  opportunity  was  lost  for  forcing 
any  concentration  of  troops  which  was  not  required  by  Gen- 
eral Sherman's  plan  of  operations.  General  Johnston  was 
fully  alive  to  the  importance  of  successful  aggression  to  change 
the  tone  of  feeling  in  the  South,  and  sought  such  reinforce- 
ments as  he  thought  were  necessary.  A  little  later  he  learned 
that  he  needed  more  troops  than  were  available  in  all  the 
.South,  upon  the  plan  of  defense  which  was  adopted.  In  the 
light  of  subsequent  events,  it  is  plain  that  in  failing  to  give 
.adequate  reinforcements  to  Johnston,  while  General  Grant's 
armies  were  widely  separated  and  weakened  by  the  temporary 
absence  of  veteran  regiments,  the  Confederate  authorities  at 
Richmond  rendered  impossible  the  aggression  for  which  they 
subsequently  clamored.  In  December  previous,  General  Beau- 
regard  suggested,  as  the  only  hope  of  success,  that  Eichmond 
and  other  important  places  should  be  fortified  and  garrisoned 
for  defense,  and  that  an  immense  army  should  be  concentrated 
against  Grant,  at  Chattanooga,  or  thrown  in  bold  offense  from 
Knoxville.  Later,  General  Johnston's  suggestions  were  some- 
what similar,  but  were  unheeded,  by  Mr.  Davis  and  his  advis- 
ers. The  Western  army  remained  in  diffusion,  until  concen- 
tration, as  a  necessity  of  defense  rather  than  a  condition  of 
aggression,  was  hurriedly  effected.  Longstreet's  army  was 
sent  to  General  Lee,  and  from  all  of  the  troops  that  so  long 
menaced  Knoxville,  only  Martin's  division  of  cavalry  joined 
General  Johnston ;  while  almost  all  the  national  troops  that 
wintered  in  East  Tennessee  were  free  to  join  the  combination 
against  him.  The  impracticable  President  had  entertained 
visions  of  successful  aggression  from  Dalton,  but  had  been, 
from  choice  or  necessity,  so  sparing  in  provision  for  such  enter- 
prise, that  the  thought  of  it,  except  in  wildest  vagary,  could 


OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864.        27 

not  be  entertained.  To  require  Johnston  to  advance  with  less 
than  fifty  thousand  men  against  a  combination  of  armies, 
which  in  defense  would  greatly  exceed  one  hundred  thousand, 
was  to  exact  defeat.  The  fact  that  the  Confederate  President 
did  not  discern  this,  revealed  his  incapacity  as  a  revolutionary 
leader,  and  his  subsequent  criticisms  of  his  ablest  general,  for 
the  non-accomplishment  of  a  palpable  impossibility,  manifested 
the  inveteracy  of  his  self-conceit  and  his  utter  misapprehen- 
sion of  the  situation  in  Georgia.  His  general  had  no  choice 
of  methods,  but  was  confined  to  the  defense  of  his  positions 
between  his  enemy  and  the  campaign  region  south  of  Resaca. 
Had  he  been  able  to  assume  the  offensive,  he  could  not  have 
reached  any  vital  point  in  the  rear  of  Chattanooga,  without  a 
long  detour,  in  dependence  for  supplies  upon  a  devastated 
-country,  or  on  wagon  transportation  from  a  remote  base.  In 
his  weakness  and  his  restriction  from  movement  by  mountain 
Carriers  right  and  left,  he  could  make  no  flank  movements  or 
threatening  dashes,  with  infantry  or  cavalry ;  and  any  expec- 
tation of  a  general  advance  from  Dalton,  except  with  an  im- 
mense army,  through  East  Tennessee  or  Northern  Alabama, 
Bridgeport  or  Decatur — was  groundless. 

Having  now,  from  necessity,  accepted  the  defensive,  General 
Johnston  could  only  make  effort  to  embarrass  Sherman's  com- 
munications with  his  cavalry,  and  await  the  approach  of  the 
armies  combining  against  him.  He  threw  his  cavalry  into 
Northern  Alabama,  in  constant  menace,  but  accomplished  no 
interruption  to  communications.  General  Thomas  sent  Gen- 
eral Geary,  with  two  regiments  and  one  piece  of  artillery,  on 
a  steamboat,  to  destroy  the  boats  used  by  the  cavalry  in  cross- 
ing and  recrossing  the  river,  as  far  to  the  west  as  possible. 
General  Geary  was  only  partially  successful ;  he  destroyed  a 
great  many  boats  in  going  and  coming,  but  was  prevented  by 
forces  on  each  side  of  the  river  from  going  a  great  distance. 

On  the  29th  of  April,  a  tentative  advance  was  made  by  Gen- 
eral Baird,  having  reference  to  the  general  movement  of  the 
united  armies.  He  sent  three  hundred  cavalry,  under  General 
Kilpatrick,  supported  by  Vanderveer's  brigade,  to  feel  the  ene- 
my's position  at  Tunnel  Hill.  These  troops  encountered  the 
•enemy  and  drove  him  some  distance,  when  developing  a  greatly 


28        OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864. 

superior  force,  they  were  compelled  to  withdraw.  At  Davis' 
house  the  enemy  pressed  th^m,  when  they  turned  and  repulsed 
him  handsomely.  The  day  following,  General  Johnston  gave 
indications  of  greater  strength  in  front  of  Ringgold,  and  Gen- 
eral Thomas  instructed  General  Baird  to  call  upon  General 
Johnson  for  help  in  the  event  of  an  advance  against  his  posi- 
tion. 

During  the  month,  important  changes  were  made  in  the 
Army  of  the  Cumherland.  The  reorganization  of  the  Fourth 
and  Fourteenth  Corps  having  been  of  recent  date,  they  remained 
intact,  except  some  changes  in  general  officers.  On  the  llth, 
the  cavalry,  under  the  general  command  of  Brigadier-General 
W.  L.  Elliott,  was  organized  into  four  divisions;  Colonel  Ed- 
ward McCook,  and  Brigadier-Generals  Kennard  Garrard,  Jud- 
son  Kilpatrick,  and  A.  C.  Gillem,  commanding  respectively,  ac- 
cording to  numerical  designation.  There  were  three  brigades 
in  each  division,  and  an  average  of  three  regiments  in  each 
brigade.  On  the  15th,  orders  were  received  from  Washington, 
requiring  the  consolidation  of  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Corps 
as  the  Twentieth,  under  the  command  of  Major-General 
Hooker.  Major-General  Gordon  Granger  was  relieved  from 
the  command  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  Major-General  0.  0. 
Howard  assigned,  and  Major-General  P.  H.  Sheridan  having 
been  transferred  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Major-General 
John  Newton  was  assigned  to  the  position  made  vacant  by  his 
vacation  of  the  command  of  the  Second  division,  Fourth  Corps. 

There  were  now  in  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  a  large  num- 
ber of  re-enlisted  troops.  During  the  winter  and  spring  there 
re-enlisted  eighty-eight  regiments  of  infantry,  three  of  mounted 
infantry,  sixteen  of  cavalry,  eighteen  batteries  of  artillery,  and 
twenty-six  detachments  of  all  arms,  and  eight  thousand  one 
hundred  and  thirty-six  recruits  in  the  aggregate  were  added  to 
these  organizations  while  on  furlough.  The  importance  of  the 
re-enlistment  of  these  troops  can  not  be  overestimated.  With- 
out them  and  the  "  veterans  "  of  the  other  two  co-operative 
armies,  the  Atlanta  campaign  could  not  have  been  safely  un- 
dertaken ;  the  war  would  have  been  greatly  postponed,  and  its 
issue  might  have  been  different.  The  slow  movement  of  the 
draft,  and  the  provisional  measure  of  short  enlistments  could 


OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864.        29 

not  have  furnished  such  troops  as  were  demanded  in  the  spring 
of  1864.  Without  the  veterans,  aggression  could  not  have 
been  entertained,  and  the  feeble  armies,  during  the  summer, 
might  have  been  compelled  to  relax  their  grasp  upon  the  heart 
of  the  rebellious  states.  It  is  then  the  plainest  duty  of  the  his- 
torian to  mention  the  regiments  and  other  organizations,  whose 
members,  in  whole  or  in  part,  re-enlisted  as  "  veteran  volun- 
teers," and  ever  after  bore  the  grandest  name  which  the  war 
originated.  Of  the  regiments  and  batteries  whose  organization 
was  maintained  under  re-enlistment,  were  the  Thirteenth,  Fif- 
teenth, Seventeenth,  Nineteenth,  Twenty-first,  Twenty-sixth, 
Thirty-first,  Thirty-third,  Thirty-sixth,  Fortieth,  Forty-first, 
Forty-ninth,  Fifth-first,  Fifty-fifth,  Sixty-first,  Sixty-fifth, 
Sixty-ninth,  Seventy-first,  Seventy-fourth,  and  Eighty-second 
Ohio  Infantry ;  the  First,  Third,  and  Fourth  Ohio  Cavalry,  and 
batteries  "  B,"  "  0,"  "  F,"  and  "  G,"  First  Ohio  Artillery ;  the 
Twenty-second,  Thirtieth,  Thirty-first,  Thirty -fifth,  Fortieth, 
Forty-second,  Forty-fourth,  Fifty-first,  Fifty-seventh  and 
Fifty-eighth  Indiana  Infantry ;  Seventy-ninth  Mounted  Infan- 
try, and  Thirteenth  Indiana  battery ;  the  Tenth,  Twenty -first, 
Thirty-sixth,  Thirty-eighth,  Forty-second,  Forty-fourth,  Fifty- 
first,  Fifty-ninth,  and  Sixtieth  Illinois  Infantry,  and  batteries 
« II  "and  "  I,"  Second  Illinois  Artillery ;  the  Fourth,  Eighteenth, 
Twenty -first,  and  Twenty -third  Kentucky  Infantry ;  'the  Sec- 
ond, Third,  Fourth,  and  Sixth  Kentucky  Cavalry,  and  the 
Twenty-eighth  Kentucky  Mounted  Infantry ;  the  Forty-sixth, 
Seventy -third,  Seventy-ninth,  and  One  Hundred  and  Ninth 
Pennsylvania  Infantry,  and  the  Seventh  Pennsylvania  Cavalry ; 
the  Forty-fifth,  Fifty-eighth,  and  Sixtieth  New  York  Infantry, 
and  the  New  York  Independent  Battery ;  the  Tenth  and  Thir- 
teenth Michigan  Infanty ;  the  Fourteenth  Michigan  Mounted 
Infantry,  and  the  First  Michigan  battery ;  the  Thirteenth  Wis- 
consin Infantry,  and  the  Fifth  Wisconsin  battery;  the  Fif- 
teenth Missouri  Infantry,  and  battery  "  G,"  First  Missouri 
Artillery;  the  Second  Minnesota  Infantry;  the  Fifth  Iowa 
Cavalry ;  the  Eighth  Kansas  Infantry,  and  Third  Maryland  In- 
fantry. Of  the  detachments,  there  were  representatives  in  greater 
or  less  numbers  from  the  Fifth,  Seventh,  Eleventh,  Eighteenth, 
and  Twenty -fourth  Ohio  Infantry,  and  the  Tenth  Independent 


30        OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864. 

battery ;  the  Tenth,  Fifteenth,  Twenty-seventh,  and  Thirty- 
seventh  Indiana  Infantry;  the  Twenty -first,  Twenty-second,, 
and  Twenty-seventh  Illinois  Infantry,  and  battery  "  C,"  First 
Illinois  Artillery ;  the  Eighth  Kentucky  Infantry ;  the  Seventy- 
ninth  Pennsylvania  Infantry ;  batteries  "  F  "  and  "  M,"  New 
York  Artillery;  the  First  Michigan  Engineers,  and  battery 
"  E,"  First  Michigan  Artillery ;  the  Third  Wisconsin  battery ;: 
the  First  Missouri  Engineers ;  the  Tenth  Maine  Infantry,  and 
battery  "  3,"  Maine  Artillery ;  battery  "  F,"  Fourth  United 
States  Artillery,  and  battery  "  K,"  Fifth  United  States  Artil- 
lery. 

On  the  1st  of  May,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  well 
in  hand,  awaiting  orders  to  advance.  The  Fourth  Corps,. 
Major-General  0.  0.  Howard  commanding,  was  at  Cleveland, 
The  Fourteenth,  Major-General  J.  M.  Palmer  commanding,, 
was  before  Chattanooga,  and  the  Twentieth  Corps,  Major- 
General  Joseph  Hooker  commanding,  was  mainly  in  Lookout 
valley.  The  divisions  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  in  numerical 
order,  were  commanded  by  Major-Generals  D.  S.  Stanley  and 
John  Newton  and  Brigadier-General  T.  J.  Wood  ;  those  of  the- 
Fourteenth,  Brigadier-Generals  E.  W.  Johnson,  J.  C.  Davisr 
and  A.  Baird,  and  those  of  the  Twentieth,  Brigadier- General 
A.  S.  Williams  and  J.  W.  Geary  and  Major- Generals  D.  But- 
terfield  and  Lovell  H.  Rousseau.  The  division  of  the  latter,, 
and  other  troops  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  assigned 
as  garrisons,  comprising  thirty -two  regiments  of  infantry,  nine 
of  cavalry,  and  thirty-nine  batteries,  were  disposed  at  all  im- 
portant points  from  Chattanooga  to  Nashville,  on  the  direct 
road,  and  at  Clarksville  and  Fort  Donelson.  The  cavalry 
comprised  four  divisions,  under  Brigadier- General  W.  L.  Elli- 
ott— the  first,  Colonel  McCook  commanding,  was  with  the- 
Fourth  Corps,  at  Cleveland ;  the  second  under  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Garrard,  was  ordered  to  report  to  General  McPherson,, 
commanding  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee ;  the  third  under  Brig- 
adier-General Kilpatrick,  was  at  Ringgold,  and  the  Fourth,, 
under  Brigadier- General  Gillem,  was  at  Nashville.  The  army 
for  the  field  comprised  54,568  infantry,  3,238  cavalry,  and  2,37T 
artillery,  with  130  guns;  total,  60,773  effective  men. 


OPERATIONS  FEOM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864.        31 


Organization  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  Major-  General  George 
H.  Thomas  commanding,  April,  1874. 

Fourth  Army  Corps. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  O.  O.  HOWARD  COMMANDING. 


First  Division. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  D.  S.  STANLEY  commanding. 

Second  Brigade. 

GEN.  "W.  C.  WHITTAKER  commanding* 
21st  Kentucky  Infantry. 


First  Brigade. 

GEN.  CHARLES  CRTJFT  commanding. 
1st  Kentucky  Infantry. 
2d          "  " 

21st  Illinois  Infantry. 
38th       "  « 

31st  Indiana        " 
81st        "  " 

90th  Ohio  " 

101st     "  " 


35th  Indiana 
84th        " 
40th  Ohio 
51st     " 
99th    « 
96th  Illinois 
115th     " 


Third  Brigade. 

COLONEL  WM.  GROSE  commanding. 
9th  Indiana  Infantry. 
30th       «  " 

36th       «  " 

59th  Illinois        « 
75th      «  « 

80th       «  « 

84th       «  « 

77th  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 

Artillery. 
6th  Indiana  Battery.  Battery  "  B,"  Independent  Penn. 

Second  Division. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  NEWTON  commanding. 

Second  Brigade. 

GEN.  G.  D.  WAGNER  commanding. 
40th  Indiana  Infantry. 
57th      "  " 

26th  Ohio  « 

97th     «  « 

100th  Illinois     « 


First  Brigade. 

COL.  F.  T.  SHERMAN  commanding. 
2d  Missouri  Infantry. 
15th       "  « 

24th  Wisconsin  « 
28th  Kentucky  « 
36th  Illinois  « 
44th  «  « 

73d         «  « 

74th        «  « 

88th        «  « 


32        OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864. 

Third  Brigade. 

COLONEL  C.  G.  HARKER  commanding. 
3d  Kentucky  Infantry. 
64th  Ohio  « 

65th     «  « 

125th    "  « 

22d  Illinois  « 

27th      «  « 

42d       «  « 

61st       «  « 

79th      «  " 

Artillery. 
Battery  "  G,"  1st  Missouri.  Battery  «  M,"  1st  Illinois. 

Third  Division. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  T.  J.  WOOD  commanding. 

First  Brigade^  Second  Brigade. 

GENERAL  A.  WILLICH  commanding.  GENERAL  W.  B.  HAZEN  commanding. 
8th  Kansas  Infantry.  1st  Ohio  Infantry. 

15th  Wisconsin  Infantry.  6th     «  " 

15th  Ohio  "  41st    "  " 

49th     "  "  93d    «          " 

82d  Indiana  "  124th  Ohio  " 

25th  Illinois  "  5th    Kentucky  Infantry. 

85th      «  «  6th  "  " 

89th      "  "  23d  "  " 

6th  Indiana  " 

Third  Brigade. 

GENERAL  SAMUEL  BEATTY  commanding. 
9th  Kentucky  Infantry. 
17th        «  « 

13th  Ohio  " 

19th     «  « 

59th     «  " 

79th  Indiana         « 
86tk        «  « 

Artillery. 
6th  Ohio  Battery.  Bridge's  Illinois  Light  Battery. 

Fourteenth  Army  Corps. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  M.  PALMER  COMMANDING. 

First  Division. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  R.  W.  JOHNSON  commanding. 


OPERATIONS  FKOM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864.       33 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

GENERAL  W.  P.  CARLIN  commanding.        GENERAL  J.  H.  KING  commanding. 

2d  Ohio  Infantry.  15th  U.  S.  Infantry,  1st  Battalion. 

33d    «  «  15th      «        .    "         2d          « 

94th  "  "  16th     «  "         1st          " 

10th  Wisconsin  Infantry.  18th     "  "         1st          « 

15th  Kentucky          "    '  18th      «  "         2d          « 

38th  Indiana     '         "  19th      "  "         1st          " 

42d          «  «  llth  Michigan  Infantry. 

88th        «  "  19th  Illinois  " 

104th  Illinois  «  69th  Ohio  Infantry. 

Third  Brigade. 

COLONEL  JAS.  M.  NEIBLING  commanding. 
1st  Wisconsin  Infantry. 
21st         "  « 

21st  Ohio  « 

74th    «  « 

24th  Illinois  " 

37th  Indiana          " 
78th  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 
79th  «  « 

Artillery. 
Battery  "A,"  1st  Michigan.  Battery  "  C,"  1st  Illinois. 

Second  Division. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JEFF.  C.  DAVIS  commanding. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

GEN.  J.  D.  MORGAN  commanding.  COL.  JOHN  G.  MITCHELL  commanding 

10th  Illinois  Infantry.  98th  Ohio  Infantry. 

16th        "  "  108th   "  « 

60th        «  "  113th    "  " 

10th  Michigan      «  12 1st    «  « 

14th        «  «  34th  Illinois     « 

78th       "          « 

Third  Brigade. 

COLONEL  DAN.  McCooK  commanding. 
52d  Ohio  Infantry. 
85th  Illinois  Infantry. 
86th       «  « 

110th     "  « 

125th     "  « 

22d  Indiana        " 

VOL.  n — 3 


34        OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864. 

Artillery. 

2d  Minnesota  Battery.*  Battery  "  I,"  2d  Illinois. 

6th  Wisconsin  Battery. 

Third  Division. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  A.  BAIRD  commanding. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

GEN.  J.  B.  TURCHIN  commanding.  COL.  F.  VANDERVEER  commanding* 

llth  Ohio  Infantry.  2d  Minnesota  Infantry. 

17th     "  "  9th  Ohio  Infantry. 

31st      "  "  35th   «  " 

86th      «  "  105th  Ohio     " 

89th      "  "  75th  Indiana  Infantry. 

92d       "  "  87th         «  « 

82d  Indiana  Infantry.  101st       «  « 

Third  Brigade. 

COLONEL  GEO.  P.  ESTE  commanding. 
4th  Kentucky  Infantry. 
10th        «  " 

18th        «  « 

10th  Indiana          " 
74th        "  « 

14th  Ohio  « 

38th    «  « 

92d  Illinois  « 

Artillery. 
7th  Indiana  Battery.  19th  Indiana  Battery. 

Twentieth  Army  Corps. 

MAJOK-GENERAL  JOSEPH  HOOKER  COMMANDING. 
Company  "  K,"  15th  Illinois  Cavalry. 
Independent  Company,  8th  N.  Y.  Infantry. 

First  Division. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  A.  S.  WILLIAMS  commanding. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

GEN.  JOSEPH  KNIPE  commanding.  GEN.  THOS.  H.  RUGER  commanding 

3d  Maryland  Infantry.  2d  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

20th  Connecticut  Infantry  (5).  3d  Wisconsin  " 

46th  Pennsylvania      "  13th  New  Jersey          " 

123d  New  York  "  27th  Indiana  " 

141st    "        "  «  107th  New  York          « 

150th      "        «  « 

- 

*  Absent  on  veteran  furlough. 


OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864.        35 


Third  Brigade. 

GENERAE  H.  TYNDALE  commanding. 
61st  Ohio  Infantry. 
82d      "  " 

45th  New  York  Infantry. 
143d     "          "          « 
82d  Illinois  Infantry. 
101st     "  « 

Artillery. 
Battery  «  M,"  1st  New  York.        Battery  « I,"  1st  New  York. 

Second  Division. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  W.  GEARY  commanding. 

Second  Brigade. 
COL.  A.  BUSCHBECK  comm 
27th  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 


First  Brigade. 

COL.  CHARLES  CANDY  commanding. 
6th  Ohio  Infantry. 


7th    " 

29th  «  " 

66th  " 

28th  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 

147th         "  " 


73d 

109th          « 
33d  New  Jersey 
119th  New  York 
134th     «        « 
154th     «        « 


Third  Brigade. 

COLONEL  D.  IRELAND  commanding. 
29th  Pennsylvania  Infantry, 
lllth  "  « 

60th  New  York  « 

78th      "        «  « 

102d     «        "  " 

137th   "        «  " 

149th  «        «  « 

Artillery. 
Battery  "B,"  Independent  Pennsylvania,    13th  New  York  Battery. 

Third  Division. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  D.  BUTTERFIELD  commanding. 

First  Brigade. 

GENERAL  W.  T.  WARD  commanding. 
70th  Indiana  Infantry. 
79th  Ohio  « 

102d  Illinois         " 
105th     "  " 

129th     «  " 


Second  Brigade. 

COLONEL  JOHN  COBURN  commanding. 
5th  Connecticut  Infantry. 
20th        "  « 

19th  Michigan  " 

22d  Wisconsin  « 

33d  Indiana  " 

85th       "  « 


36        OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864. 

Third  Brigade. 

COLONEL  J.  WOOD,  JR.,  commanding. 
26th  Wisconsin  Infantry. 
33d  Massachusetts     « 
55th  Ohio  « 

73d      "  " 

136th  New  York       « 

Artillery. 
Battery  «  0,"  1st  Ohio  Artillery.         Battery  "I,"  1st  Michigan  Artillery. 

Fourth  Division. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  L.  H.  ROUSSEAU  commanding. 

First  Brigade. 

GENERAL  R.  S.  GRANGER  commanding. 
10th  Tennessee  Infantry 
13th  Wisconsin        " 
18th  Michigan          " 
73d  Indiana  " 

102d  Ohio  « 

Not  Brigaded. 

68th  New  York  Infantry.  83d  Illinois  Infantry. 

68th          «  "  71st  Ohio  " 

75th  Pennsylvania    «  106th  «  " 

28d  Missouri  «  115th  «  « 

31st  Wisconsin 

Artillery. 

9th  Ohio  Battery.  20th  Indiana  Battery. 

Cavalry. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  W.  L.  ELLIOTT  COMMANDING. 
15th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  attached  to  Department  Headquarters. 

First  Division. 

COLONEL  E.  M.  McCooK  commanding. 
First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

COL*  A.  P.  CAMPBELL  commanding.  COL.  O.  H.  LA  GRANGE  commanding. 

1st  Tennessee  Cavalry.  1st  Wisconsin  Cavalry. 

2d  Michigan        "  2d  Indiana  " 

8th  Iowa  "  4th      "  « 

Third  Brigade. 

COLONEL  L.  D.  WATKINS  commanding. 
4th  Kentucky  Cavalry. 
6th         «  " 

7th         "  " 

18th  Indiana  Battery. 


OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864.        37 

Second  Division. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  K.  GARRARD  commanding. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

COL.  WM.  B.  SIPES  commanding.  COLONEL  K.  H.  G.  MINTY  commanding. 

4th  TJ.  S.  Cavalry.  1st  Ohio  Cavalry. 

7th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry.  3d      "          " 

4th  Michigan  Cavalry.  4th    "          « 

Third  Brigade. 

COLONEL  A.  O.  MILLER  commanding. 
17th  Indiana  Mounted  Infantry. 
72d        "  «  " 

98th  Illinois          «  " 

123d      «  "  " 

Chicago  Board  of  Trade  Battery. 

/  t 

Third  Division. 
COLONEL  "W".  "W.  LOWE  commanding. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

5th  Iowa  Cavalry.  8th  Indiana  Cavalry. 

9th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry.  2d  Kentucky     " 

8d  Indiana  Cavalry  (1  battal.)  10th  Ohio          " 

Third  Brigade. 
3d  Kentucky  Cavalry. 
5th       «  » 

Fourth  Division. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  A.  C.  GILLEM  commanding. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

2d  Tennessee  Cavalry.  5th  Tennessee  Cavalry. 

3d          "  "  *10th        "  " 

4th        "  "  *12th        «  « 

Third  Brigade. 
*8th  Tennessee  Cavalry. 
*9th         «  " 

*13th       "  « 

Unassigned  Troops. 

10th  Ohio  Infantry,  Department  Headquarters. 
1st       "      Sharpshooters,  " 

9th  Michigan  Infantry. 
1st  Michigan  Engineers  and  Mechanics ;  headquarters  at  Bridgeport,  Ala. 

*  Not  mustered. 


38       OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864. 

Garrison  of  Chattanooga,. 
GENERAL  JAS.  B.  STEEDMAN  commanding. 

First  Separate  Brigade. 

8th  Kentucky  Infantry.  3d  Ohio  Infantry. 

15th  Indiana          «  24th  "  " 

29th        "  "  44th  Indiana  Infantry. 

61st        "  "  68th        "  « 

Engineer  Brigade.  Pioneer  Brigade. 

18th  Ohio  Infantry,  Chattanooga.  Tenn.          1st  Battalion,  Chattanooga,  Tenn. 
13th  Michigan  «  "  "  2d  "  «  " 

21st         "  "  "  "  Pontoon «  "  " 

22d         "  «  "  "  58th  Indiana  Infantry. 

Artillery. 

Reserve  Artillery. 
First  Division.  Second  Division. 

Battery  "F,"  4th  U.  S.  Art.  Battery  "  A,"  1st  Ohio  Art. 

«       "G"       "  "  i!       "F"       "  u 

«          «H"         "  "  "          "Gr"         "  " 

"        « ]\£ "       <(  «  n        « ]yj "       it  « 

«       "H,"  5th  U.S.    «  18th  Ohio  Battery. 

«       "K,"      «  "  1st  Kentucky  Battery. 

Garrison  Artillery. 

Chattanooga,  Tenn 

4th  Indiana  Battery.  3d  Wisconsin  Battery. 

8th        «  "  20th  Ohio  " 

10th      "  «  Battery  « I,"  1st  Ohio  Artillery. 

llth      «  «  «        «C,"  1st  Wisconsin  Heavy  Art. 

Battery  "  K,"  1st  Michigan  Artillery. 

Bridgeport,  Ala. 
Battery  "  E,  1st  Ohio  Artillery.        Battery  "  B,"  1st  Ohio  Artillery. 

Stevenson,  Ala. 
Battery  "  K,"  1st  Ohio  Artillery. 

Murfreesboro,  Tenn. 

Battery  «  D,"  1st  Michigan  Artillery.  12th  Ohio  Battery. 

8th  "Wisconsin  Battery. 

Nashville,  Tenn. 

12th  Indiana  Battery.  Battery  "  C,"  1st  Tennessee  Artillery. 

Battery  « E,"  1st  Michigan  Artillery.  "        « D,"      «  " 

"        "I,"  4th  U.S.  Artillery.  "        "F,"      «  « 

Fort  Donelson,  Tenn. 
Battery  "  C,"  2d  Illinois  Artillery. 

Clarksville,  Tenn. 
Battery  "H,"  2d  Illinois  Artillery. 


OPERATIONS  FEOM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864.        39 

Detached  Artillery. 

10th  Wisconsin  Battery,  Calhoun,  Tenn. 
13th  Indiana  Battery,  Gallatin,  Tenn. 
21st  Indiana  Battery,  Columbia,  Tenn. 

1st  Kansas  Battery,  Waverly,  Tennessee  (K.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.) 
2d  Kentucky  Battery,  Tullahoma,  Tenn. 
Battery  "A,"  1st  Tennessee  Artillery,  La  Vergne,  Tenn. 

Colored  Troops. 

12th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops,  Waverly,  Tenn.  (1ST.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.) 
13th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops,  Waverly,  Tenn.  (N.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.) 
14th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops,  Chattanooga,  Tenn. 
15th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops,  Nashville,  Tenn. 
16th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops,  Chattanooga,  Tennesee  (en  route). 
17th  TJ.  S.  Colored  Troops,  Murfreesboro,  Tenn. 
42d  U.  S.  Colored  Troops,  Chattanooga,  Tenn. 
44th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops,  Chattanooga,  Tenn. 
Battery  "A,"  1st  U.  S.  Colored  Light  Artillery. 


KNOXVILLE,  January  31,  1864 — 2  p.  M. 
General  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  Chattanooga : 

I  am  preparing  to  take  the  offensive.  To  do  do  this  with  effect,  in  the 
face  of  Longstreet's  reinforcements,  will  require  at  least  ten  thousand 
infantry  from  you.  In  addition,  that  you  place  working  gangs  on  the 
road  to  the  Hiawassee  bridge,  so  as  to  increase  our  supplies,  which  may 
be  boated  over  the  Tennessee,  at  Loudon,  and  afterward  sent  by  rail  to 
this  place.  I  also  require  a  pontoon  train  of  twelve  hundred  feet 
length.  Colonel  Babcock  will  come  down  in  the  first  boat,  to  attend  to 
this.  The  cavalry  from  Atlanta  is  reported  to  be  moving  into  East 
Tennessee,  through  North  Carolina.  Seven  regiments  started  on  the 
13th  instant.  Please  telepraph  what  is  the  extent  of  the  assistance  you 

can  give  me 

J.  <J.  FOSTER, 

Major-General  Commanding. 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  February  6,  1864 — 2.30  p.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas  : 

Reports  of  scouts  make  it  evident  that  Joe  Johnston  has  removed 
most  of  his  force  from  your  front,  two  divisions  going  to  Longs treet. 
Longstreet  has  been  reinforced  by  troops  from  the  East.  This  makes  it 
evident  that  they  intend  to  secure  East  Tennessee,  if  they  can,  and  I 
intend  to  drive  them  out,  or  get  whipped  this  month.  For  this  purpose, 
you  will  have  to  detach  at  least  ten  thousand  men,  besides  Stanley's 
division  (more  will  be  better).  I  can  partly  relieve  the  vacuum  at  Chat- 
tanooga t?y  troops  from  Logan's  command.  It  will  not  be  necessary  to 


40       OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864. 

take  artillery  or  wagons  to  Knoxville,  but  all  the  serviceable  artillery 
horses  should  be  taken  to  use  on  artillery  there.  Six  mules  to  each  one 
hundred  men  should  also  be  tai  <m,  if  you  have  them  to  spare.  Let  me 
know  how  soon  you  can  start. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  GRANT. 

NASHVILLE,  February  10,  1864. 
Major-General  Thomas : 

Prepare  to  start  for  Knoxville  on  Saturday.  I  will  order  Logan  to 
send  to  Chattanooga  all  the  troops  he  can,  and  still  hold  his  line  of  the 
road.  The  number  will  probably  be  about  five  thousand  men.  One 
division  of  your  command  will  have  to  move  out  to  hold  the  road  to  the 

Hiawassee. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  GRANT. 

NASHVILLE,  February  17,  1864. 
Major-General  Thomas: 

Longstreet  can  not  afford  to  place  his  force  between  Knoxville  and  the 
Tennessee.  If  he  does,  it  will  then  be  time  to  move  against  him.  The 
work  of  a  raid  on  the  road  can  soon  be  repaired,  if  it  can  not  be  pre- 
vented. Make  your  contemplated  move  as  soon  as  possible. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  GRANT. 


CHATTANOOGA,  TENN.,  February  19,  1864. 
Major-General  Grant,  Nashville,  Tenn. : 

Assistant  Surgeon  Jacob  Miller,  Sixth  Missouri  Volunteer  Infantry, 
arrived  here  yesterday,  from  Dalton.  He  was  captured  at  Lebanon, 
Alabama,  when  General  Logan  sent  out  an  expedition  toward  Rome. 
He  reports  Cleburne's  division  at  Tunnel  Hill,  Stewart's  division  between 
Tunnel  Hill  and  Dalton;  Walker,  two  miles  out  from  Dalton,  toward 
Spring  Place;  Cheatham  at  Dalton;  and  Stevenson's  and  Bate's  divisions 
to  the  west  of  Dalton  two  miles.  He  saw  all  of  the  camps,  and  estimates 
their  force  between  thirty  and  forty  thousand.  He  moreover  states  that 
no  troops  have  been  sent  away,  except  one  brigade  of  infantry,  which 
went  to  Rome,  about  the  1st  of  this  month. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  V. 

TUNNELL  HILL,  February  26,  1864 — 7£  P.  M. 
Major-General  U.  S.  Grant,  Nashville: 

I  arrived  here  last  night.  Davis  and  Johnson  occupy  the  pass  at 
Buzzard's  Roost.  They  have  a  force  equal  to  theirs  in  their  front,  who 
outnumber  them  in  artillery.  It  is  not  possible  to  carry  this  place 
by  assault,  general  Palmer  made  the  attempt  to  turn  yesterday,  with 
Baird's  and  Gruff  s  divisions,  but  was  met  by  an  equal  force,  exclusive  of 
their  cavalry,  and  in  an  equally  strong  position  as  at  Buzzard's  Roost. 
After  expending  nearly  all  of  his  ammunition,  he  retired  during  the 
night,  to  Catoosa  Platform.  Our  transportation  is  poor  and  limited ;  we 


OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864.        41 

are  not  able  to  carry  more  than  sixty  rounds  per  man.  Artillery  horses 
so  poor,  that  Palmer  could  bring  but  sixteen  pieces.  The  country  is 
stripped  entirely  of  subsistence  and  forage.  The  enemy's  cavalry  is 
much  superior  to  ours.  Prisoners  taken  yesterday  report  that  a  portion 
of  Cleburne's  division  has  returned.  I  will  wait  the  development  of  this 
day,  and  advise  you  further. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  8.  V. 

NASHVILLE,  February  27,  1864. 
Major-General  Geo.  H.  Thomas: 

It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  the  enemy  should  be  held  in  full 
belief  that  an  advance  into  the  heart  of  the  South  is  intended,  until  the 
fate  of  General  Sherman  is  fully  known.  The  difficulties  of  supplies 
can  be  overcome  by  keeping  your  trains  running  between  Chattanooga 
and  your  position.  Take  the  depot  trains  at  Chattanooga,  yours  and 
General  Howard's  wagons;  these  can  be  replaced  temporarily,  by  yours 
returning.  Veterans  are  returning  daily.  This  will  enable  you  to'  draw 
reinforcements  constantly  to  your  front.  Can  General  Schofield  not  also 
take  a  division  from  Howard's  corps?  It  is  intended  to  send  Granger  to 
you  the  moment  Schofield  is  thought  to  be  safe  without  him. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Major- General. 

NASHVILLE,  February  27 — 6  p.  M. 
Brigadier-General  Whipple,  Chief  of  Staff: 

Information  has  reached  Washington,  that  orders  have  been  given  for 
Johnston's  army  to  fall  back.  General  Thomas  should  watch  any  such 
movement  and  follow  it  up  closely.  Can't  you  draw  teams  from  Bridge- 
port and  Stevenson,  to  send  supplies  to  the  front?  They  have  teams  in 
great  numbers  at  those  places.  Every  energy  should  be  exerted  to  get 
supplies  and  reinforcements  forward.  Troops  will  leave  here  at  the 
rate  of  two  or  three  thousand  a  day,  for  the  front.  Many  of  them  go  to 
Chattanooga. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Major-  General. 

CHATTANOOGA,  March  5,  1864 — 11  p.  M. 
Major-  General  Schofield,  Knoxville  : 

I  have  just  received  reliable  information  that  Johnston  has-  been  rein- 
forced by  ten  thousand  men  from  South  Carolina,  and  by  Roddy,  and 
that  he  contemplates  making  an  offensive  movement  in  this  direction. 
Can  you  spare  Granger's  corps  ?  If  so,  please  direct  them  to  concentrate 
at  Cleveland,  leaving  a  brigade  of  infantry  and  battery  at  Calhoun,  to 
guard  the  railroad  at  that  place. 

GEORGE  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  V. 


42        OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  MARCH,  1864. 

CHATTANOOGA,  March  5,  18G4. 
Major-General  John  M.  Schofield,  Knoxville : 

It  has  been  reported  to  Major-General  Thomas  to-day,  and  also  two  days 
since,  that  the  enemy  were  heavily  reinforcing  at  Dalton.  General  Grant 
thinks  it  is  not  improbable  that  he  may  advance  against  us  here.  In 
that  case  we  shall  need  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  wish  you  to  hold  it  in 
readiness  to  send,  if  it  be  needed.  Can  not  send  you  any  assistance 
while  this  contingency  is  hanging  over  us. 

WILLIAM  D.  WHIPPLE, 
Brigadier- General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

EXTRACTS  FROM  THE  OFFICIAL  REPORT  OF  GENERAL  JOS.  E. 

JOHNSTON. 

On  the  17th  of  February,  the  President  ordered  me,  by  telegraph,  to 
detach  Lieutenant-General  Hardee  with  the  infantry  of  his  corps,  except 
Stevenson's  division,  to  aid  Lieutenant-General  Polk,  against  Sherman 
in  Mississippi.  This  order  was  obeyed  as  promptly  as  our  means  of  trans- 
portation permitted. 

•*-*##-*-**#-* 

On  the  27th  of  February,  I  suggested  to  the  executive  by  letter,  through 
General  Bragg,  that  all  preparations  for  a  forward  movement  should  be 
made  without  delay.  In  a  letter,  dated  4th  of  March,  General  Bragg 
desired  me  "  to  have  all  things  ready  at  the  earliest  practicable  moment, 
for  the  movement  indicated."  In  replying,  on  the  12th,  I  reminded 
him  that  the  regulations  of  the  war  department  do  not  leave  such  prep- 
arations to  commanders  of  troops,  but  to  officers  who  receive  their  orders 
from  Richmond. 

On  the  18th,  a  letter  was  received  from  General  Bragg,  sketching 
a  plan  of  offensive  operations,  and  enumerating  the  troops  to  be  used 
in  them  under  me.  I  was  invited  to  express  my  views  on  the  subject. 
In  doing  so,  both  by  telegraph  and  mail,  I  suggested  modifications,  and 
urged  that  the  additional  troops  named  should  be  sent  immediately,  to 
enable  us,  should  the  enemy  advance,  to  beat  him,  and  then  move  for- 
ward; or,  should  he  not  advance,  do  so  ourselves.  General  Bragg  replied, 
by  telegraph,  on  the  21st:  "Your  dispatch  of  19th  does  not  indicate 
acceptance  of  plan  proposed.  Troops  can  only  be  drawn  from  other 
points  for  advance.  Upon  your  decision  of  that  point,  further  action 
must  depend. 

I  replied,  by  telegraph,  on  the  22d:  "In  my  dispatch  of  the  19th, 
I  expressly  accept  taking  offensive,  only  differ  with  you  as  to  details.  I 
assume  that  the  enemy  will  be  prepared  for  an  advance  before  we 
are,  and  will  make  it  to  our  advantage.  Therefore  I  propose,  both 
for  offensive  and  defensive,  to  assemble  our  troops  here  immediately." 
This  was  not  noticed.  Therefore,  on  the  25th,  I  again  urged  tho 
necessity  of  reinforcing  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  because  the  enemy 
was  collecting  a  larger  force  than  that  of  the  last  campaign,  while  ours 
was  less  than  it  had  been  then. 


OPERATIONS  FROM  JANUARY  TO  -MARCH,  1864.        43 

On  the  8th  of  April,  Colonel  B.  S.  Ewell,  A.  A.  G.,  was  sent  to  Richmond, 
to  represent  to  the  President  my  wish  to  take  the  offensive,  with  proper 
means,  and  to  learn  his  views.  A  few  days% after,  Brigadier-General  Pen- 
dleton  arrived  from  Richmond,  to  explain  to  me  the  President's  wishes 
on  the  subject.  I  explained  to  him  the  modification  of  the  plan  com- 
municated by  General  Bragg,  which  seemed  to  me  essential,  which  re- 
quired that  intended  reinforcements  should  be  sent  to  Dalton.  I  urged 
that  this  should  be  done  without  delay,  because  our  present  force  was 
not  sufficient  even  for  defense,  and  to  enable  us  to  take  the  offensive,  if 
the  enemy  did  not. 


BY  TELEGRAPH  FROM  CHATTANOOGA,  February  28,  1864. 
Major-General  Grant,  Nashville: 

General  Butterfield,  by  my  direction,  has  recently  examined  the  line 
between  here  and  Nashville,  and  reports  that  he  thinks  six  thousand  men 
will  be  sufficient  to  guard  that  line,  two  regiments  of  which  force  should 
be  cavalry.  From  what  I  know  of  the  road  between  Nashville  and  De- 
catur,  two  thousand  infantry  and  two  thousand  cavalry  will  be  sufficient  to 
protect  that  line.  One  thousand  infantry  will  be  sufficient  to  protect  the 
line  from  Athens  to  Stevenson.  Probably  both  lines  of  communication 
can  be  guarded  by  six  thousand  infantry  and  two  thousand  cavalry,  a 
great  portion  of  which  should  be  made  up  from  the  local  militia  of  Ten- 
nessee, or  troops  organized  especially  for  the  preservation  of  order  in  the 
state.  I  believe  if  I  can  commence  the*  campaign  with  the  Fourteenth  and 
Fourth  Corps  in  front,  with  Howard's  corps  in  reserve,  that  I  can  move 
along  the  line  of  the  railroad  and  overcome  all  opposition  as  far  at  least 
as  Atlanta.  I  should  want  a  strong  division  of  cavalry  in  advance.  As 
soon  as  Captain  Merrill  returns  from  his  reconnoissance  along  the  railroad 
lines,  I  can  give  you  a  definite  estimate  of  the  number  of  troops  required 
to  guard  the  bridges  along  the  road. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General  U.  S.  V. 


EXTRACT    FROM   GENERAL    THOMAS'    REPORT    TO   THE  COM- 
MITTEE ON  THE  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR. 

The  above  proposition  was  submitted  to  General  Grant  for  his  approval, 
and  if  obtained  it  was  my  intention  (having  acquired  by  the  reconnoissance 
of  February  23d,  24th,  and  25th,  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  approaches 
direct  upon  Dalton  from  Ringgold  and  Cleveland)  to  have  made  a  strong 
demonstration  against  Buzzard's  Roost,  attracting  Johnston's  whole  atten- 
tion to  that  point,  and  to  have  thrown  the  main  body  of  my  infantry  and 
cavalry  through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  upon  his  communications,  which  I  had 
ascertained  from  scouts  he  had  up  to  that  time  neglected  to  observe  or 
guard.  With  this  view,  I  had  previously  asked  for  the  return  to  me  of 
Granger's  corps  and  my  cavalry  from  East  Tennessee,  and  had  already 
initiated  preparations  for  the  execution  of  the  above  movement  as  soon 
as  the  spring  opened  sufficiently  to  admit  of  it. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

THE   TUKNING   OF   DALTON.  . 

THE  first  of  May,  1864,  was  a  crisis  of  the  war.  Two  of  the 
largest  armies  hitherto  assembled  East  or  West  were  in  read- 
iness to  move  against  the  enemy  at  the  bidding  of  the  Lieu- 
tenant-General. The  local  objectives  of  these  armies  were 
distinct,  but  the  common  general  object  was  the  immediate 
suppression  of  the  rebellion.  It  was  proposed  to  accomplish 
this  grand  aim,  by  crushing  General  Lee's  army  covering 
Eichmond  and  General  Johnston's  standing  before  Dalton. 
These  two  armies  embodied  the  life  of  the  rebellion. 

Generals  Grant  and  Sherman  were  to  move  on  lines  too  re- 
mote to  admit  direct  co-operation,  but  they  proposed  to  be 
mutually  helpful  by  simultaneous  aggression.  General  Grant 
was  to  forbid  the  transfer  of  troops  from  Virginia  to  Georgia, 
.by  vigor  of  attack,  and  General  Sherman  was  to  engage  John- 
ston in  such  a  manner  that  he  could  not  send  supporting  col- 
umns from  Georgia  to  Virginia.  Volunteers  were  invited  for 
one  hundred  days,  to  hold  the  important  points  in  the  rear  of 
the  two  great  armies,  that  all  the  available  veteran  troops 
East  might  be  massed  against  General  Lee,  and  all  in  the  West 
concentrated  at  Chattanooga,  that  General  Sherman,  with  three 
armies  in  one,  should  dash  upon  General  Johnston  at  Dalton. 
Campaigns,  East  or  West,  had  never  been  undertaken  under 
conditions  of  similar  promise,  and  the  loyal  people  were  hope- 
ful of  early  and  complete  success. 

The  conditions  of  the  Georgia  campaign  were  exceedingly 
favorable  to  General  Sherman,  as  compared  with  the  ruling 
features  of  all  preceding  campaigns  in  the  central  theater  of 
war.  The  superiority  of  the  national  army  at  Chattanooga 

(44) 


THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON.  45 

had  been  far  greater  than  in  any  previous  battle  in  this  region, 
and  in  some  of  the  anterior  engagements,  as  at  Chickamauga, 
the  enemy  had  been  superior.  But  General  Sherman's  pre- 
ponderance of  strength  was  greater  than  General  Grant's  when 
General  Bragg  was  hurled  from  Lookout  Mountain  and  Mis- 
sionary Ridge.  Then  the  strength  of  the  opposing  armies  was 
perhaps  as  three  to  two  ;  it  was  now  to  be  as  two  to  one.  Be- 
sides, General  Johnston  could  not  now  have,  as  his  predecessor 
had  always  had,  when  on  the  defensive,  the  advantage  of  inte- 
rior lines.  The  possession  of  Chattanooga  and  Cleveland, 
with  roads  converging  at  Dalton,  gave  direct  lines  for  General 
Sherman's  first  advance,  and  with  the  railroad  and  river  from 
Knoxville  to  Decatur  well  guarded,  and  a  fortified  line  of  sup- 
ply from  the  north,  he  could  move  southward  without  endan- 
gering flank  or  rear,  so  long  as  he  could  so  engage  the  enemy 
as  to  keep  him  before  him.  In  the  projected  campaign,  neither 
General  Sherman  nor  General  Johnston  could  have  the  ad- 
vantage of  interior  lines,  only  so  far  as  the  defensive  could 
give  to  either,  shorter  lines  for  maneuver  and  array,  within  a 
limited  range  only.  The  general  line  of  maneuver  being 
north  and  south,  forbade  great  advantage  of  lines  to  either. 

But  General  Johnston  had  other  advantages.  He  had 
choice  of  positions  and  could  always  resist  behind  battlements 
with  good  management,  and  in  giving  ground  would  be  con- 
stantly gathering  to  him  his  reserves  ;  while  General  Sherman, 
in  advancing,  would  be  compelled  to  detach  more  and  more 
from  his  offensive  forces  to  guard  his  constantly  lengthening 
line  of  supply.  So,  therefore,  the  relative  conditions  of  the 
campaign  were  by  no  means  expressed  by  the  comparative  pro- 
portions of  the  opposing  armies. 

The  2d  day  of  May  was  first  named  by  General  Grant  for 
the  advance  of  the  great  armies,  but  finally  the  5th  was 
announced  in  orders.  General  Thomas,  however,  commenced 
his  dispositions  and  movements  on  the  2d.  On  this  day,  Gen- 
eral t)avis'  division  joinecj.  General  Baird's  at  Ringgold,  and 
General  Butterfield's  advanced  from  Lookout  valley  to  Lee 
and  Gordon's  Mills.  During  the  day,  General  Baird  sent 
infantry  and  cavalry  detachments  to  reconnoiter  toward  Tun- 
nel Hill,  and  developed  the  enemy  in  force  at  that  point. 


46  THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON. 

May  3d,  General  Johnson's  division  closed  upon  the  other  two 
of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  at  Binggold.  On  the  day  following, 
the  Fourth  Corps,  with  McCook's  division  of  cavalry  on  its 
left  flank,  advanced  to  Catoosa  Springs,  and  Butterfield's 
division  advanced  to  Pleasant  Grove,  and  General  Williams' 
division  to  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mills.  The  next  day,  General 
Geary's  division,  having  marched  across  the  mountain  from 
Bridgeport,  closed  up  on  the  other  divisions  of  the  Twentieth 
Corps  at  Leet's  tanyard,  completing  the  concentration  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

General  Sherman  originally  designed  that  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  Major-General  McPherson  commanding,  should  ad- 
vance from  Decatur  hy  Gunter's  Landing  and  Lebanon,  Ala- 
bama, to  Lafayette,  Georgia ;  but  subsequently,  he  ordered  it  to 
move  upon  Chattanooga.  This  army  was  not  as  strong  as  had 
been  anticipated,  as  two  of  its  veteran  divisions  under  General 
A.  J.  Smith  were  detained  by  the  protraction  of  General  Banks' 
expedition  west  of  the  Mississippi  river.  With  two  corps, 
General  McPherson  attained  position  at  Lee  and  Gordon's 
Mills  on  the  6th,  and  the  same  day  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  Ma- 
jor-General Schofield  commanding,  reached  Red  Clay.  At  the 
close  of  this  day  the  armies  representing  the  controlling 
strength  of  the  contending  powers  in  the  West,  lay  confronting 
each  other  on  the  eve  of  one  of  the  greatest  campaigns  of  a 
war,  made  memorable  in  the  annals  of  the  world  by  the 
magnitude  of  armies,  the  frequency  of  great  battles,  and  im- 
mense compass  of  military  operations. 

General  Sherman's  three  armies  for  offense  now  numbered 
nearly  one  hundred  thousand  men.  There  were  sixty  thou- 
sand seven  hundred  and  seventy-three  men  in  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland ;  twenty-four  thousand  and  sixty-five  in  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee ;  and  thirteen  thousand  five  hundred 
and  fifty-nine  in  the  Army  of  the  Ohio.  The  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  comprised  fifty -four  thousand  five  hundred  and 
sixty-eight  infantry,  two  thousand  three  hundred  and  seventy- 
seven  artillery,  three  thousand  two  hundred  and  twenty-eight 
cavalry,  and  one  hundred  and  thirty  guns ;  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  twenty-two  thousand  infantry,  one  thousand  four 
hundred  and  four  artillery,  six  hundred  and  twenty -four  cav- 


THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON.  47 

airy,  and  ninety-six  guns  ;  and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  eleven 
thousand  one  hundred  and  eighty-three  infantry,  six  hundred 
and  seventy -nine  artillery,  one  thousand  six  hundred  and 
ninety-seven  cavalry,  and  eighty-two  guns.  The  grand  aggre- 
gates were  eighty-eight  thousand  one  hundred  and  eighty- 
eight  infantry,  four  thousand  four  hundred  and  sixty  artillery, 
five  thousand  five  hundred  and  forty-nine  cavalry,  and  two 
hundred  and  fifty-four  guns.  General  Johnston's  army  em- 
braced forty-four  thousand  nine  hundred  infantry,  artillery, 
and  cavalry  ;  two  corps,  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Generals 
Hardee  and  Hood,  and  four  thousand  cavalry,  by  Major-Gen- 
eral  Wheeler. 

General  Sherman  proposed  first  to  carry  Tunnel  Hill,  and 
then  threaten  a  direct  attack  upon  Johnston's  main  position 
before  Dalton,  while  McPherson's  army  should  move  through 
Snake  Creek  Gap  to  operate  against  Resaca.  He  accordingly 
gave  orders,  May  6th,  requiring  General  Thomas,  on  the  day 
following,  to  move  his  center,  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  directly 
upon  Tunnel  Hill ;  his  right,  the  Twentieth  Corps,  to  Trickum, 
and  his  left,  the  Fourth  Corps,  to  Lee's  house,  in  support  of  the 
Fourteenth :  General  McPherson  to  advance  with  his  army 
first  upon  Ship's  Gap  and  Villanow,  and  thence  to  Snake  Creek 
Gap,  and  through  it  as  soon  as  practicable ;  and  General  Scho- 
field  to  move  forward  to  Catoosa  Springs,  feeling  toward  Gen- 
eral Thomas'  left  flank. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  moved  on  the  7th,  in  com- 
pliance with  orders.  The  enemy  made  a  show  of  resistance  to 
General  Palmer,  with  infantry  and  artillery,  at  Tunnel  Hill, 
but  on  the  appearance  of  General  Howard's  corps  upon  his 
left,  his  troops  fled  to  Buzzard's  Roost.  General  Hooker,  upon 
reaching  Trickum,  threw  out  detachments  toward  Buzzard's 
Roost  on  the  left,  and  Villanow  on  the  right,  to  observe  the 
enemy.  General  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  remained  at  Gordon's 
Springs,  in  readiness  to  establish  communications  with  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  expected  at  Villanow  on  the  morning 
of  the  8th. 

The  next  day,  Harker's  brigade  of  ]STewton's  division  of 
the  Fourth  Corps  advanced  along  Rocky  Face  ridge  to  a 
point  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  the  enemy's  signal  station. 


48  THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON. 

Meeting  here  with  obstructions  forbidding  farther  advance, 
Harker  made  preparations  to  hold  the  position.  Skirmish 
lines  were  then  thrown  forward  from  Wood's,  Davis',  and 
Butterfield's  divisions,  and  the  enemy  was  pressed  into  his  in- 
trenchments  at  Buzzard's  Roost,  or  "  Mill  Creek  Gap,"*  and 
the  three  divisions  advanced  to  the  entrance. 

As  General  McPherson  was  now  moving  upon  Snake  Creek 
Gap,  it  was  imperative  that  a  strong  feint  should  be  made,  to 
create  the  impression  that  it  was  the  intention  to  carry  the 
position  by  assault.  Accordingly,  General  Geary  was  directed 
to  scale  Chattooga  Mountain  with  his  division,  if  practi- 
cable, at  the  point  known  as  Dug  Gap,  where  the  road  from 
Lafayette  to  Dalton  ascends  from  Mill  Creek  valley.  Chat- 
tooga Mountain  is  separated  from  Rocky  Face  ridge  by  Mill 
Creek  at  Buzzard's  Roost,  and  from  that  point  trends  south- 
ward. 

At  the  point  selected  for  Geary's  ascent,  the  mountain  side 
is  steep  and  rough,  and  the  summit  is  crowned  with  a  palisade 
of  rocks,  with  occasional  openings  that  admit  passage  to  the 
top.  With  the  One  Hundred  and  Nineteenth  New  York  de- 
ployed as  skirmishers,  and  Buschbeck's  and  Candy's  brigades 
formed  on  right  and  left,  in  two  lines  of  battle,  Geary  moved, 
up  the  mountain.  Midway,  his  skirmishers  became  hotly  en- 
gaged, but  the  enemy  was  pressed  upward  until  the  main  lines 
reached  the  base  of  the  palisades.  After  resting  for  a  few 
minutes,  to  recover  from  the  exhaustion  produced  by  excessive 
heat  and  protracted  exertion,  an  effort  was  made  to  reach  the 
summit.  A  few  men  only  succeeded,  and  they  were  either 
killed  or  forced  back.  The  position  was  such  that  defense 
was  easy,  even  by  rolling  stones  from  the  summit.  A  second 
attempt,  however,  was  made,  soon  after  the  first  failed,  but 
with  similar  issue.  General  Geary  then  brought  McGill's 
rifled  battery  to  bear  upon  the  enemy  in  his  front,  to  cover  an 
effort  of  the  Thirty-third  New  Jersey  to  reach  the  summit  a 
half  mile  to  the  right,  where  the  enemy  made  less  show  of 
strength.  As  in  the  other  cases,  a  few  men  gained  the  crest, 
and  their  shouts  invited  the  advance  of  the  whole  line,  but 

*  So  designated  by  General  Johnston. 


THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON.  49 

again  there  was  emphatic  failure.  By  this  time,  General 
Hardee  was  present  with  reinforcements,  and  further  effort 
would  have  been  madness.  Geary  ^ost  heavily,  but  his  action 
being  regarded  by  the  enemy  as  the  initiative  to  carry  the  po- 
sition by  assault,  it  was  in  some  degree  compensative,  as  such 
impression  was  the  object  of  the  movement.  Night  and  the 
third  repulse  coming  together,  the  division  was  withdrawn  to 
the  valley,  out  of  reach  of  the  enemy's  guns. 

During  the  afternoon,  Johnson's  and  Baird's  divisions  were 
advanced  to  Davis'  support,  and' Butterfield's  was  ordered  to 
join  General  Hooker.  General  Kilpatrick  communicated  with 
General  McPherson,  and  then  moved  to  Trickum.  McCook's 
division  was  thrown  on  Schofield's  left  flank,  to  cover  the  ex- 
tremity of  the  general  line,  until  General  Stoneman  should 
come  up.  The  position  for  General  Garrard's  cavalry  division 
was  to  be  with  General  McPherson,  but  it  was  yet  in  the  rear, 
en  route  from  Pulaski,  Tennessee. 

The  next  day,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  somewhat 
heavily  engaged  on  the  east,  north,  and  west  of  Buzzard's 
Roost.  The  action  was  intended  as  a  feint,  unless  it  should 
be  ascertained  that  General  Johnston  was  withdrawing  his 
army.  Such,  however,  was  the  position,  by  nature  and  art, 
that  emphatic  feints  subjected  the  national  forces  to  great  ex- 
posure, and  there  was  considerable  loss  throughout  the  line. 
The  character  of  the  feints  may  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that 
General  Johnston  reported  that  five  assaults  upon  "  Rocky 
Face  Mountain "  were  repulsed  on  the  9th  of  May.  His 
troops  holding  Buzzard  Roost  were  Stewart's  and  Bate's  di- 
visions, supported  by  Stevenson's  and  Anderson's.  The 
defenses  for  infantry  were  at  right  angles  to  the  roads,  and 
batteries,  covered  with  abatis,  were  placed  on  the  adjacent 
summits  to  throw  a  converging  fire  upon  the  valley,  which 
was  flooded  by  means  of  well-concealed  dams.  Carlin's  bri- 
gade, supported  by  the  remainder  of  Johnson's  division,  felt 
the  enemy's  lines  on  the  west;  Morgan's  brigade  of  Davis' 
division,  on  the  north,  and  Grose's  brigade  of  Stanley's  divis- 
ion, on  the  east.  The  loss  in  killed  'was  slight,  but  a  great 
many  were  wounded.  The  heaviest  loss,  in  comparison  with 
VOL.  n — 4 


50  THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON. 

the  number  of  troops  engaged,  was  in  McCook's  division  on 
the  extreme  left.  Under  instructions  from  General  Schofield, 
Colonel  McCook  made  demonstrations  on  all  the  roads  lead- 
ing to  Dalton  on  the  east.  Colonel  La  Grange,  commanding 
his  second  brigade,  encountered  Wheeler,  with  twenty-two 
hundred  men,  on  the  road  from  "Varnell's  Station.  He  was  at 
first  successful,  and  pressed  "Wheeler  back  to  intrenchments 
near  Poplar  Place,  but  was  there  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  He 
and  fourteen  officers  were  captured,  and  one  hundred  and 
thirty-six  of  his  men  were  either  killed,  wounded,  or  captured. 
Wheeler's  loss  was  supposed  to  be  greater.  During  the  day, 
Hooker's  corps  was  at  Trickum  to  support  McPherson  in  pass- 
ing through  Snake  Creek  Gap. 

The  action  the  next  day  was  less  severe,  though  the  feint 
was  vigorously  maintained  with  a  view  to  prevent  any  con- 
centration against  General  McPherson.  To  give  him  support, 
Kilpatrick's  cavalry  was  ordered  to  join  him,  and  Williams' 
division  of  the  Twentieth  Corps  was  sent  to  his  rear.  In  the 
evening,  General  Hooker  was  directed  to  send  a  division  on 
the  following  day  to  widen  the  road  through  the  gap,  to  facili- 
tate the  passage  of  troops  and  trains. 

General  McPherson  passed  through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  and 
reached  the  vicinity  of  Eesaca  at  2  p.  M.  on  the  9th.  Finding 
the  place  "  fortified  and  manned,"  and  no  roads  through  the 
forest  to  the  railroad,  while  his  flank  was  exposed  to  attack 
from  the  direction  of  Dalton,  he  withdrew  to  the  debouche  of 
the  gap  through  which  he  had  passed.  During  the  afternoon 
of  the  9th,  General  Johnston  learned  that  two  corps  of  the 
national  army  were  in  the  gap,  and  sent  General  Hood  to 
Resaca  with  three  divisions. 

When  General  Sherman  learned  that  McPherson  had  not 
touched  Johnston's  communications  and  had  withdrawn  to 
the  gap,  he  made  a  change  of  plan.  He  desired,  from  the  first, 
to  hold  Johnston  at  Dalton,  and  entertained  the  hope  that 
McPherson's  movement  would  so  interrupt  his  communica- 
tions that  he  would  be  forced  to  give  battle  at  Dalton — an 
issue  that  was  preferred  to  operations  "  far  down  into  Georgia." 
His  instructions  to  General  McPherson  were  to  secure  Snake 
Creek  Gap,  and  from  it  make  a  bold  attack  on  the  enemy's 


THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON.  51 

ilank  or  his  railroad  at  any  point  between  Tilton  and  Dalton. 
He  said :  "  I  hope  the  enemy  will  fight  at  Dalton ;  in  which 
case  he  can  have  no  force  there  that  can  interfere  with  you ; 
but  should  his  policy  be  to  fall  back  along  the  railroad,  you 
will  hit  him  in  flank.  Do  not  fail  in  that  event  to  make  the 
most  of  the  opportunity,  by  the  most  vigorous  attack  possi- 
ble, as  it  may  save  us  what  we  have  most  reason  to  appre- 
hend— a  slow  pursuit,  in  which  he  gains  strength  as  we  lose  it. 
In  either  event,  you  may  be  sure  the  forces  north  of  you  will 
prevent  his  turning  on  you  alone.  In  the  event  of  hearing 
the  sounds  of  heavy  battle  about  Dalton,  the  greater  necessity 
for  your  rapid  movement  on  the  railroad.  If  broken  to  an 
extent  that  would  take  some  days  to  repair,  you  can  with- 
draw to  Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  come  to  us  or  await  the  devel- 
opment, according  to  your  judgment  or  the  information  you 
may  receive."  As  soon  as  he  learned  that  General  McPherson 
had  failed  to  accomplish  any  of  these  objects,  except  to  attain 
position  at  the  debouche  of  the  gap,  he  determined  to  attack 
with  his  armies  through  the  gap,  and  issued  orders  for-the 
movement. 

It  was  plain  to  General  Sherman,  as  it  had  been  to  General 
Thomas,  in  February,  that  no  effort  should  be  made  to  dis- 
lodge the  enemy  from  Buzzard  Roost,  by  direct  attack ;  but 
he  continued  the  feint,  in  order  to  still  hold  Johnston  at  Dal- 
ton, that  he  might  throw  his  armies  upon  his  rear.  Snake 
Creek  Gap  made  it  easy  to  turn  Dalton,  by  an  army  strong 
enough  to  uncover  its  communications,  or  to  detach  sufficient 
forces  to  risk  an  engagement  with  the  enemy's  whole  army. 
Through  this  gap  all  the  fortresses  north  of  Dalton  could  be 
-evaded,  and  the  army  in  passage  be  under  the  cover  of  the 
mountains.  Had  Johnston's  army  been  strong  enough  for 
division  to  hold  the  positions  north  of  Dalton,  and  the  lower 
mouth  of  the  gap,  he  could  have  defied  a  hundred  thousand 
men.  But  as  his  safety  demanded  the  concentration  of  his 
army  on  his  lines  of  retreat  and  supply,  he  was  compelled  to 
leave  the  passage  undefended,  and  make  roads  for  the  quick 
transfer  of  his  army  from  Dalton  to  Reseca,  should  his  antag- 
onist use  the  gap  for  a  flank  movement.  General  Sherman's 


62  THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON. 

orders  to  effect  this  measure  required  the  concentration  of  his 
armies  in  Snake  Creek  Gap,  on  the  12th. 

When  General  Johnston  first  learned  that  General  McPher- 
son  had  retired  from  Resaca,  he  recalled  Hood's  three  divis- 
ions, and  on  the  llth  his  army  was  again  concentrated  at 
Dalton.  On  the  morning  of  the  12th,  he  was  confronted  by 
Howard's  corps  and  Stoneman's  cavalry,  the  remainder  of  the 
national  forces  being  in  motion  to  concentrate  in  Snake  Creek 
Gap.  Stanley's  division  was  before  Buzzard's  Eoost  Gap ; 
Newton's  was  holding  the  north  end  of  Rocky  Face  ridgey 
and  the  roads  around  it ;  Wood's  was  in  reserve  on  Tunnel 
Hill,  and  Stoneman's  troopers  were  on  Newton's  le'ft  flank. 
From  the  signal  station  on  the  ridge,  the  movements  of  the . 
enemy  were  plainly  visible.  About  10  A.  M.  a  heavy  column 
was  seen  to  advance  toward  Newton's  left,  as  if  to  turn  it. 
The  menace  was  of  such  positive  expression  that  "Wood's  di- 
vision moved  to  Newton's  support.  But  the  enemy,  after 
driving  back  Newton's  skirmishers,  withdrew.  General  John- 
ston's object,  doubtless,  was  to  ascertain  whether  the  national 
forces  had  withdrawn  from  his  front,  as  he  had  heard  the  day 
previous  that  Resaca  was  again  threatened.  The  evening 
before,  he  had  ordered  General  Polk,  who  had  just  arrived 
with  Loring's  division,  to  defend  the  place  with  that  division, 
and  Canty's  brigade.  But  as  his  safety  depended  upon  his 
knowledge  of  General  Sherman's  movements,  his  reconnois- 
sance  was  directed  to  this  end.  During  the  day,  he*  was  so 
fully  assured  of  the  flank  movement,  that,  by  a  night  march, 
he  transferred  his  infantry  and  artillery  to  Resaca,  leaving  his 
cavalry  to  cover  his  rear. 

This  result  was  not  in  harmony  with  the  plans  and  expecta- 
tions of  General  Sherman,  his  object  being  to  hold  John- 
ston's army  at  Dalton,  until  his  own  armies  could  pass  through 
Snake  Creek  Gap ;  but  the  opportunity  to  accomplish  it  was 
lost  Between  the  9th  and  the  morning  of  the  13th.  On  the 
9th,  Resaca  was  held  by  Canty's  brigade.  The  day  following, 
General  Hood  was  there  with  three  divisions.  On  the  llth, 
Canty's  brigade  again  held  the  place,  and  from  the  evening 
of  the  llth  until  the  morning  of  the  13th,  General  Polk  was 
there  with  Loring's  division  in  addition  to  Canty's  brigade. 


THE  TUENING  OF  DALTON.  53 

General  McPherson  passed  through  Snake  Creek  Gap  on  the 
9th,  and  was  on  that  day  with  his  army  within  a  mile  of  Res- 
aca, and  from  the  9th  to  the  13th,  he  was  south  of  the  gap.  On 
the  llth,  Hooker's  corps  was  in  supporting  distance,  and  on 
the  12th,  Palmer's  corps  and  Schofield's  two  divisions  were 
close  in  the  rear  of  Hooker. 

Johnston  remained  in  ignorance  of  Sherman's  grand  flank 
movement  until  the  evening  of  the  12th,  and  then  he  was  at 
Dalton  with  his  army.  After  the  national  armies  had  gained 
Snake  Creek  Gap,  he  was  unable  to  ascertain  how  many  troops 
passed  through  it.  An  army,  there,  could  pass  as  secretly  as  a 
brigade.  He  said  in  his  official  report,  that  "Kocky  Face 
Mountain,  and  Snake  Creek  Gap,  at  its  south  end,  completely 
covered  for  the  enemy  the  turning  of  Dalton."  His  ignorance, 
then,  of  the  movement  until  the  evening  of  the  12th,  was  a 
condition  of  its  success.  Had  McPherson's  army  and  the 
forces  in  his  rear,  on  that  day,  moved  rapidly  into  position 
between  Resaca  and  Tilton,  Johnston  would  have  been  thrown 
from  his  communications,  or  been  compelled  to  give  battle 
upon  conditions  of  great  disadvantage. 

It  was  unfortunate  that  Resaca  was  not  gained  at  the  same 
time  that  Dalton  was  turned,  as  the  campaign  did  not  furnish 
a  similar  opportunity  to  defeat  Johnston,  or  press  him  from 
his  communications.  The  grandest  possibility  between  Tun- 
nel Hill  and  Lovejoy's  Station  invited  a  prompt  advance  in 
force  from  the  debouche  of  '  Snake  Creek  Gap.  General 
Thomas'  plan  differed  from  the  one  adopted  by  General  Sher- 
man. He  proposed  that  the  Armies  of  the  Tennesse  and  the 
Ohio  should  hold  General  Johnston  at  Dalton,  by  a  feint  upon 
his  position  at  Buzzard's  Roost,  while  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland, sixty  thousand  strong,  should  pass  rapidly  through 
Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  fall  upon  Johnston's  communications 
between  Dalton  and  Resaca,  and  thus  cut  him  off  from  his 
communications,  and  either  drive  him  eastward  into  a  moun- 
tain region,  or  force  him  to  give  battle  on  unequal  conditions. 
General  Sherman's  first  plan  proposed  to  demonstrate  against 
Resaca,  so  as  to  hold  him  at  Dalton  to  give  battle,  or  induce 
General  Johnston  to  abandon  Dalton,  and  then  strike  his 
army  in  flank,  while  in  motion  between  that  place  and  Resaca. 


54  THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON. 

This  first  series  of  operations  in  offense  and  defense  gave 
the  types  of  the  campaign.  The  offensive  compelled  a  choice 
between  the  direct  attack  of  fortified  positions  and  the  flank 
movement.  The  adopted  methods  of  defense  were  the  main- 
tenance of  fortified  positions  as  long  as  practicable,  a  constant 
outlook  for  opportunities  to  strike  insulated  columns,  and  re~ 
treat  when  necessary  to  save  communications.  General  John- 
ston's leading  idea  was  to  fight  under  cover,  and  thus  reduce 
the  national  army  until  he  could  meet  it  on  equal  conditions 
of  battle,  and  at  Dalton,  and  almost  daily  while  he  held  com- 
mand, he  gave  it  revelation.  General  Sherman's  leading  ob- 
ject was  to  entrap  or  force  his  enemy  into 'battle  under  .cir- 
cumstances which  would  not  neutralize  his  superior  strength, 
and  of  this,  his  zigzag  lines  of  aggression  were  the  expression.. 


EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  GRANT'S  OFFICIAL  REPORT  OF 

OPERATIONS  FROM  MARCH,  1864,  TO  JULY,  1865. 
The  enemy  had  concentrated  the  bulk  of  his  forces  east  of  the  Missis- 
sippi into  two  armies,  commanded  by  Generals  R.  E.  Lee  and  J.  E.  John- 
ston, his  ablest  and  best  generals.  The  army  commanded  by  Lee  occupied 
the  south  bank  of  the  Rapidan,  extending  from  Mine  run  westward, 
strongly  intrenched,  covering  and  defending  Richmond,  the  rebel  capital, 
against  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  army  under  Johnston  occupied 
a  strongly  intrenched  position  at  Dalton,  Georgia,  covering  and  defend- 
ing Atlanta,  Georgia,  a  place  of  great  importance  as  a  railroad  center, 
against  the  armies  under  Major-General  Sherman. 

#•#'•  *'#•,«•.'..*;*..     jH  ..# 

These  two  armies  and  the  cities  covered  by  them  and  defended  by  themr 

were  the  main  objective  points  of  the  campaign. 

*  **.****** 

General  Sherman  was  instructed  to  move  against  Johnston's  army  to- 
break  it  up,  and  to  go  into  the  interior  of  the  enemy's  country  as  far  as 
he  could,  inflicting  all  the  damage  he  could  upon  their  war  resources.  If 
the  enemy  in  his  front  showed  signs  of  joining  Lee,  to  follow  him  up  to- 
the  full  extent  of  his  ability,  while  I  would  prevent  the  concentration  of 
Lee  upon  him,  if  it  was  in  the  power  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to> 
do  so. 

CULPEPPER,  April  25—10.30  A.  M. 
Major- General  Sherman  : 

Will  your  veterans  be  back  to  enable  you  to  start  on  the  2d  of  May  ? 
I  do  not  want  to  delay  later.  U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  GeneraL 


THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON.  55 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

NASHVILLE,  April  27,  1864. 
Lieutenant- General  Grant,  Culpepper  : 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  I  will  have  to  take  the  initiative  with  twenty 
thousand  less  men  in  McPherson's  army  than  I  estimated,  I  intend  to 
order  all  McPherson's  disposable  force,  twenty  thousand  (^0,000),  and 
Garrard's  cavalry,  five  thousand  (5,000),  to  Chattanooga,  to  start  from  a 
common  center.  I  go  forward  to-morrow. 

W.  T.  SHEEMAN, 

Major-  General. 


CULPEPPER,  VA.,  April  2S,  1864. 
Major- General  Sherman : 

Get  your  forces  up  so  as  to  move  by  the  fifth  (5th)  of  May. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  TUNNEL  HILL,  GA.,  May  8,  1864. 
Major-General,  Halleck%  Washington,  D.  O.  : 

*•»******* 

I  have  been  all  day  reconnoitering  the  mountain  range  through  whose 
gap  the  railroad  and  common  road  pass.  By  to-night,  McPherson  will 
be  in  Snake  Creek  Gap,  threatening  Resaca,  and  to-morrow  will  move  to 
the  attack.  Army  in  good  condition.  I  hope  Johnston  will  fight  here, 
instead  of  drawing  me  far  down  into  Georgia. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  TUNNEL  HILL,  GA.,  May  9,  1864 — 8  p.  M. 
General  Halleck,  Chief  of  Staff,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

We  have  been  fighting  all  day  against  precipices  and  mountain  gaps  to 
keep  Johnston's  army  busy,  whilst  McPherson  could  march  to  Resaca  to 
destroy  the  railroad  behind  him.  I  heard  from  McPherson  up  to  two  (2) 
p.  M.,  when  he  was  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  the  railroad.  After  break- 
ing the  road  good,  his  orders  are  to  retire  to  the  mouth  of  Snake  Creek 
Gap,  and  be  ready  to  work  on  Johnston's  flank  in  case  he  retreats  south. 
I  .will  pitch  in  again  early  in  the  morning.  Fighting  has  been  mostly 
skirmishing,  and  casualties  small.  McPherson  has  the  Army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee, twenty-three  thousand  (23,000),  and  only  encountered  cavalry, 
so  that  Johnson  did  not  measure  his  strength  at  all. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 


56  THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  TUNNEL  HILL,  GA.,  May  10,  1864—7  A.  M. 
Major-General  Halkck,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

I  am  starting  for  the  extreme  front  in  Buzzard  Roost  Gap,  and  make 
this  dispatch  that  you  may  understand  Johnston  acts  purely  on  the  de- 
fensive. I  am  attacking  him  on  his  strongest  fronts — viz.,  west  and  north 
— till  McPherson  breaks  his  line  at  Resaca,  when  I  will  swing  round 
through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  interpose  between  him  and  Georgia.  I 
am  not  driving  things  too  fast,  because  I  want  two  columns  of  cavalry 
that  are  rapidly  coming  up  to  me  from  the  rear — Stoneman  on  my  left 
and  Garrard  on  my  right — both  due  to-day.  Yesterday  I  pressed  hard  to 
prevent  Johnston  detaching  against  McPherson,  but  to-day  I  will  be  more 
easy,  as  I  believe  McPherson  has  destroyed  Resaca,  when  he  is  ordered 
to  fall  back  to  the  mouth  of  Shake  Creek  Gap,  and  act  against  Johnston's 
flank  when  he  does  start.  All  are  in  good  condition. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  TUNNEL  HILL,  May  10,  1864. 

GENERAL: — I  propose  to  leave  hereabouts  one  (1)  of  your  corps — say 
Howard's — the  cavalry  of  Colonel  McCook,  and  the  cavalry  of  General 
Stoneman,  to  keep  up  the  feint  of  a  direct  attack  on  Dalton  through  Buz- 
zard Roost,  as  long  as  possible,  and  with  all  the  remainder  of  the  three 
armies  to  march  to  and  through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  attack  the  enemy 
in  force  from  that  quarter. 

You  may  at  once  commence  your  preparations,  and  give  orders  that 
the  force  left  here  is  to  be  under  the  command  of  the  senior  officer,  who 
will  strip  his  command  light,  sending  all  spare  wagons  to  Ringgold ;  that 
the  cars  run  daily  to  this  point  with  daily  supplies,  but  the  main  stores 
to  be  at  Ringgold ;  that  the  cavalry  watch  well  the  passes  north  of  Tunnel 
Hill,  and  at  Ray's  Gap;  and  that  in  case  the  enemy  detect  the  diminu- 
tion of  force,  and  attack,  gradually  withdraw  in  the  direction  of  Ring- 
gold,  but  defend  that  point  at  all  costs ;  that  a  locomotive  and  construc- 
tion train  be  kept  here  with  orders,  and  prepared,  if  this  retrograde 
movement  be  made  necessary ;  that  the  party  shall  take  up,  at  intervals, 
rails,  so  as  to  make  a  repair  train  necessary  to  replace  them — this,  that 
the  enemy  may  not  have  the  track  to  facilitate  hte  movement  in  pursuit. 
A  few  rails  should  at  once  be  removed  at  some  point  east  of  the  tunnel, 
that  can  again  be  put  down  when  we  want  it  done. 

The  pass  at  Snake  creek  is  represented  as  very  narrow.  Please  instruct 
a  division  to  be  there  to-morrow,  provided  with  axes  and  spades,  so  as  to 
widen  the  road  as  to  enable  the  passage  of  wagons ;  also  to  facilitate  the 
march  of  troops  by  roads  and  paths  outside  the  wagon  track. 

General  Stoneman  will  be  at  Varnell's  to-night,  and  by  to-morrow  night 
all  his  command  will  be  in,  so  that  we  will  calculate  all  to  go  to  Snake 


THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON.  57 

creek,  and  close  up  on  General  McPherson  during  the  day  after  to-morrow. 
As  soon  as  General  Stoneman  comes,  I  will  cause  him  to  relieve  Colonel 
McCook  on  that  flank,  so  that  you  may  send  him  to  replace  General 
Geary  at  Ray's  road.  Let  the  troops  move  as  much  under  cover  as  possi- 
ble ;  wagons  going  round  by  Villanow,  and  troops  by  Mill  Creek  road. 

General  Schofield  will  either  go  round  by  Villanow  or  follow  General 
Newton. 

I  am,  etc., 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major- General  Thomas,  Commanding  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  TUNNEL  HILL,  May  10,  1864. 

GENERAL: — I  think  you  are  satisfied  that  your  troops  can   not  take 
Rocky  Face  ridge,  and  also  the  attempt  to  put  our  columns  into  the  jaws 
of  Buzzard  Roost  would  be  fatal  to  us. 
Two  plans  suggest  themselves : 

1.  By  night,  to  replace  Schofield's' present  command  "by  Stoneman's 
cavalry,  which  should  be  near  at  hand,  and  to  move  rapidly  your  entire 
army,  the  men  along  the  base  of  John's  Mountain  by  the  Mill  Creek  road 
to  Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  join  McPherson  while  the  wagons  are  moved 
to  Villanow.     When  we  are  joined  to  McPherson,  to  move  from  Sugar 
valley  on  Resaca,  interposing  ourselves  between  that  place  and  Dalton. 
Could  your  army  and  McPherson's  surely  whip  Joe  Johnston  ? 

2.  I  cast  loose  from  the  railroad  altogether,  and  move  the  whole  army 
on  the  same  objective  point,  leaving  Johnston  to  choose  his  course. 

Give  orders  for  all  your  troops  to  be  ready  with  three  days'  provisions, 
and  to  be  prepared  to  march  to-night.  I  expect  to  hear  from  McPherson 
and  Schofield  as  to  their  situation,  also  as  to  the  near  approach  of  Stone- 
man.  He  was  at  Charleston  yesterday,  and  is  apprized  of  the  necessity 
for  haste.  Do  you  think  any  danger  to  McPherson  should  make  us  de- 
lay one  day  ? 

Please  give  me  the  benefit  of  your  opinion  on  these  points. 

Yours,  etc., 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 
Major- General  Thomas,  present. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  TUNNEL  HILL,  GA.,  May  10,  1864. 
Major-General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

General  McPherson  reached  Resaca,  but  found  the  place  strongly  forti- 
fied and  guarded,  and  did  not  break  the  road.  According  to  his  instruc- 
tion*, he  drew  back  to  the  debouche  of  the  gorge,  where  he  has  a  strong 
defensive  position,  and  guards  the  only  pass  into  the  valley  of  the  Oosta- 


58  THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON. 

naula,  available  to  us.  Buzzard  Roost  Gap,  through  which  the  railroad 
passes,  is  naturally  and  artificially  too  strong  to  be  attempted.  I  must 
feign  on  Buzzard  Roost,  but  pass  through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  place 
myself  between  Johnston  and  Resaca,  where  we  will  have  to  fight  it  out. 
I  am  making  the  preliminary  move.  Certain  that  Johnston  can  make 
no  detachments,  I  will  be  in  no  hurry.  My  cavalry  is  just  approaching 
from  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  detained  by  difficulty  of  getting  horsesr 
and  even  now  it  is  less  than  my  minimum. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  TUNNELL  HILL,  GA.,  May  11,  1864. 

GENERAL: — I  received  by  courier  in  the  night  yours  of  5  and  6.30  p.  M. 
of  yesterday.  You  will  also,  during  the  night,  come  to  the  same  con- 
clusion. 

You  have  now  your  twenty- three  thousand,  and  General  Hooker  is  close 
in  support,  so  that  you  can  hold  all  Joe  Johnston's  army  in  check  should 
he  abandon  Dal  ton.  He  can  't  abandon  Dalton,  for  he  has  fixed  it  up  so 
well  for  us,  and  he  observes  we  are  close  at  hand,  waiting  for  him  to  quit. 
He  can't  afford  a  detachment  strong  enough  to  fight  you,  as  his  army  will 
not  admit  of  it. 

Strengthen  your  position,  fight  anything  that  comes,  and  threaten  the 
safety  of  the  railroad  all  the  time.  But  to  tell  the  truth,  I  would  rather 
he  would  stay  in  Dalton  two  more  days,  when  he  will  find  a  larger  party 
than  he  expects,  in  an  open  field.  At  all  events  we  can  then  choose  our 
ground,  and  he  will  be  forced  to  move  out  of  his  works.  I  do  not  intend 
to  put  a  column  into  Buzzard  Roost  Gap  at  present. 

See  that  you  are  in  easy  communication  with  me  and  all  headquarters^ 
After  to-day  supplies  will  be  at  Ringgold. 

Yours, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding  * 

Major-General  McPherson,  Commanding  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  Sugar  Valley,. 
Georgia. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,. 

IN  THE  FIELD,  TUNNELL  HILL,  G A.,  May  11,  1864. 

GENERAL: — The  indications  are  that  Johnston  is  evacuating  Dalton. 
In  that  e^7ent,  Howard's  and  the  cavalry  will  pursue,  and  all  the  rest  will 
follow  your  route.     I  will  be  d6wn  early  in  the  morning. 
Try  to  strike  him,  if  possible,  about  the  forks  of  the  roads. 
Hooker  must  be  with  you  now,  and  you  might  send  General  Garrard  by 
Somerville,  to  threaten  Rome  and  that  flank.     I  will  cause  all  the  lines  to 
be  felt  at  once. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General  Commanding 'r 
General  McPherson,  Sugar  Valley. 


THE   TURNING   OF   DALTON.  59 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO  3.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  SNAKE  CIIEEK  GAP,  GA.,  May 12,  1864. 

The  object  of  the  movement  for  to-morrow  is  to  interpose  between  the 
enemy  and  Resaca,  and  to  break  his  communications. 

I.  Major-General  McPherson  will  move  his  column  directly  on  Resaca, 
occupying  in  force  the  hills  on  this  side  of  Camp  creek,  and  his  left  ex- 
tending along  up  Camp  creek.     He  will  prepare  to  advance  a  part  of  his 
force  from  his  left  to  the  railroad,  and  break  it,  and  then  fall  back  to  his 
line. 

II.  Major-General  Thomas  will  follow  close  to  General  McPherson,  and 
when    he  reaches  a  main  road  crossing  to  the  Resaca  road,  about  two 
miles  this  side  of  town,  viz. ,  the  Dalton  and  Calhoun  road,  he  will  turn 
to  the  left  toward  Dalton,  prepared  to  deploy  forward  and  connect  on  his 
right  with  General  McPherson's  left,  choosing  strong  positions  to  cover 
the  movement  on  the  railroad. 

III.  Major-General  Schofield  will  follow  General  Thomas,  and  at  the 
first  Dalton  road,  known  as  the  Dalton  and  Rome  road,  will  turn  to  the 
left  and  advance  to  abreast  of  General  Thomas,  and  connect  with  him. 
General  Schofield  will  leave  one  brigade  in  Snake  Creek  Gap,  about  five 
miles  east  of  Villanow,  and  the  balance  of  the  one  division  in  General 
McPherson's  intrenched  camp  at  this  point. 

IV.  The  cavalry  of  General  Garrard  will  picket  all  roads  to  our  rear 
and  in  case  of  being  threatened  from  the  north,  will  come  into  Snake 
Creek  Gap,  and  cover  the  rear  of  the  army  and  the  wagon  train.     The 
cavalry   of   General   Kilpatrick  will  move  south  of  the  main  road   to 
Resaca,  and  be  held  in  reserve  near  the  forks  of  the  road,  and  be  sub- 
ject to  the  orders  of  the  commander-in-chief. 

V.  All  trains  will  be  brought  in  Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  be  placed  in 
convenient  order  off  the  road.     Great  care  must  be  observed  in  keeping 
the  road  clear,  and  ambulances  and  wagons  when  not  traveling  the  road, 
must  invariably  turn  out  and  leave  all  the  road  clear.      Each  army  com- 
mander will  leave  his  own  wagon  guards,  and  the  men  should  leave  their 
knapsacks  in  camp. 

VI.  The  movement  will  begin  at  six  (6)  o'clock  A.  M.  to-morrow. 
By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman.  L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  RESACA,  May  13,  1864 — 2.15  p.  M. 
General  Thomas,  Commanding  Army  of  the  Cumberland : 

Until  I  hear  that  Joe  Johnston  is  south  of  the  Oostanaula,  I  would  not 
cross  at  Lay's.  We  must  first  interpose  between  Dalton  and  Resaca, 
threatening  the  latter  all  the  time.  I  want  Hooker's  right  and  McPher- 
son's left  strong,  until  we  encounter  Johnston,  who  has  not  yet  got  below 
Resaca,  I  think.  If  he  retreat  east,  we  have  the  advantage.  I  want  the 


60  THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON. 

pontoons  up,  and  to  secure  the  railroad  on   Hooker's  right.     Palmer 
should  join  on  to  Hooker,  and  Hooker  should  be  strong. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General  Commanding. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  SNAKE  CREEK  GAP,  May  13,  1864. 
General Stoneman,  Commanding  Cavalry: 

Your  note  of  to-day  was  received.  Yery  good,  indeed.  Press  down  the 
valley  strong,  and  communicate  with  me.  Your  messenger  will  find  me 
where  there  is  most  noise  of  artillery,  or  near  Resaca.  You  can  safely 
move  on  parallel  roads,  by  brigades.  Let  your  packs  follow  on  the  heels 
of  the  column.  Pick  up  whatever  of  provisions  and  plunder  you  can. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General  Commanding. 

EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  SHERMAN'S  REPORT. 

Speaking  of  the  demonstration  against  Rocky  Face  ridge,  he  says : 
"  This,  however,  was  only  designed  as  a  demonstration,  and  worked  well, 
for  General  McPherson  was  thereby  enabled  to  march  within  a  mile  of 
Resaca  unopposed.  He  found  Resaca  too  strong  to  be  carried  by  assault, 
and  although  there  were  many  good  roads  from  north  to  south,  endanger- 
ing his  left  flank  from  the  direction  of  Dalton,  he  could  find  no  road  by 
which  he  could  rapidly  cross  over  to  the  railroad,  and  accordingly  he  fell 
back  and  took  strong  position  near  the  west  end  of  Snake  Creek  Gap.  I 
was  somewhat  disappointed  at  the  result ;  still,  appreciated  the  advantage 
gained,  and  on  the  10th  ordered  General  Thomas  to  send  General  Hook- 
er's corps  to  Snake  Creek  Gap  in  support  of  General  McPherson,  and  to 
follow  with  another  corps,  the  Fourteenth,  General  Palmer's,  leaving  Gen- 
eral Howard,  with  the  Fourth  Corps,  to  continue  to  threaten  Dalton  in 
front,  while  the  rest  of  the  army  moved  rapidly  through  Snake  Creek 
Gap.  On  the  same  day  General  £5chofield  was  ordered  to  follow  by  the 
same  route,  and  on  the  llth  the  whole  army,  excepting  General  Howard's 
corps  and  some  cavalay  left  to  watch  Dalton,  was  in  motion  on  the  west 
side  of  Rocky  Face  ridge,  for  Snake  Creek  Gap  and  Resaca.  The  next 
day  we  moved  against  Resaca,  General  McPherson  on  the  direct  road, 
preceded  by  General  Kilpatrick's  cavalry ;  General  Thomas  to  come  up 
on  his  left,  and  General  Schofield  on  his.  General  Kilpatrick  met  and 
drove  the  enemy's  cavalry  from  a  cross-road  within  two  miles  of  Resaca, 
but  received  a  wound  which  disabled  him  and  gave  the  command  of  his 
brigade  to  Colonel  Murray,  who  according  to  his  orders  wheeled  out  of  the 
road,  leaving  General  McPherson  to  pass.  General  McPherson  struck 
the  enemy's  infantry  pickets  near  Resaca,  and  drove  them  within  their 
fortified  lines,  and  occupied  a  ridge  of  bald  hills,  his  right  on  the 
Oostanaula,  about  two  miles  below  the  railroad  bridge,  and  his  left 
abreast  the  town.  General  Thomas  came  up  on  his  left,  facing  Camp 
creek,  and  General  Schofield  broke  his  way  through  the  dense  forest  to 
General  Thomas'  left.  Johnston  had  left  Dalton,  and  General  Howard 
entered  it,  and  pressed  his  rear.  Nothing  saved  Johnston's  army  at 


THE   TURNING   OF   DALTON.  l 

Resaca  but  the  impracticable  nature  of  the  country,  which  made  the  pas- 
sage of  troops  across  the  valley  almost  impossible.  This  fact  enabled  his 
army  to  reach  Resaca  from  Dal  ton  along  the  comparatively  good  roads 
constructed  beforehand,  partly  from  the  topographical  nature  of  the 
country,  and  partly  from  the  foresight  of  the  rebel  chief.  At  all  events 
on  the  14th  of  May,  we  found  the  rebel  army  in  a  strong  position  behind 
Camp  creek,  occupying  the  forts  of  Resaca,  and  his  right  on  some  high 
chestnut  hills  to  the  north  of  the  town." 


EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  THOMAS'  REPORT  TO  THE  "  COMMIT- 
TEE OF  CONGRESS  ON  THE  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR." 

Shortly  after  his  assignment  to  the  command  of  the  Military  Division 
of  the  Mississippi,  General  Sherman  came  to  see  me  at  Chattanooga,  to 
consult  as  to  the  position  of  affairs,  and  adopt  a  plan  for  a  spring  cam- 
paign. At  that  interview,  I  proposed  to  General  Sherman  that  if  he 
would  use  McPherson's  and  Schofield's  armies  to  demonstrate  on  the 
enemy's  position  at  Dalton,  by  the  direct  roads  through  Buzzard  Roost 
Gap,  and  from  the  direction  of  Cleveland,  I  would  throw  my  whole  force 
through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  which  I  knew  to  be  unguarded,  fall  upon  the 
enemy's  communications  between  Dalton  and  Resaca,  thereby  turning 
his  position  completely,  and  force  him  either  to  retreat  toward  the  east, 
through  a  difficult  country,  poorly  supplied  with  provisions  and  forage, 
with  a  strong  probability  of  total  disorganization  of  his  force,  or  attack 
me,  in  which  latter  event,  I  felt  confident  that  my  army  was  sufficiently 
strong  to  beat  him,  especially  as  I  hoped  to  gain  position  on  his  commu- 
nications before  he  could  be  made  aware  of  my  movement.  General 
Sherman  objected  to  this  plan,  for  the  reason  that  he  desired  my  army  to 
form  the  reserve  of  the  united  armies,  and  to  serve  as  a  rallying  point  for 
the  two  wings,  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  and  that  of  the  Tennessee,  to 
operate  from. 

EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  THOMAS'  OFFICIAL  REPORT. 

General  Hooker  was  directed  to  send  another  division  of  his  command 
to  Snake  Creek  Gap,  with  instructions  to  •  repair  the  road  through  the 
gap,  so  as  to  facilitate  the  passage  of  infantry  and  wagons.  On  the  llth, 
it  was  decided  to  leave  one  corps,  Howard's,  supported  by  Stoneman's 
and  McCook's  divisions  of  cavalry,  and  move  to  Snake  Creek  Gap  with 
the  balance  of  the  army,  attacking  the  enemy  in  front  from  that  quarter, 
whilst  Howard  was  keeping  up  the  impression  of  a  direct  attack  at 
Buzzard's  Roost.  This  movement  was  to  commence  on  the  12th.  In- 
structions were  given  to  corps  commanders  to  provide  their  commands 
with  ten  days'  rations  and  a  good  supply  of  ammunition,  sending  all 
surplus  wagons  back  to  Ringgold.  At  9  A.  M.  on  the  13th,  General  How- 
ard's command  occupied  Dalton,  it  having  been  evacuated  by  the  enemy 
on  the  evening  of  the  12th.  Concentrating  his  troops  in  Dalton,  General 
Howard  pursued  the  enemy  along  the  railroad,  in  the  direction  of  Resaca. 


62  THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON. 

capturing  a  considerable  number  of  prisoners.  The  concentration  of  the 
balance  of  the  army  in  Snake  Creek  Gap  having  been  completed  by  the 
night  of  the  12th,  at  8  A.  M.  on  the  13th,  Hooker's  corps,  preceded  by 
Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  moved  out  on  the  Resaca  road  in  support  of  Mc- 
Pherson's  troops  threatening  Resaca. 


EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  HOWARD'S  EEPORT. 

May  llth,  the  troops  of  the  corps  were  disposed  as  follows:  General 
Stanley  to  hold  the  gap;  General  Newton  to  hold  Rocky  Face,  and  the 
roads  leading  around  the  north  end  of  it,  with  General  Stoneman's 
cavalry  covering  his  left  flank ;  and  General  Wood  in  reserve  on  Tunnel 
Hill.  During  the  evening  of  this  day,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  12th, 
the  general  movement  was  progressing,  and  the  Fourth  Corps  found  itself 
alone  confronted  by  the  whole  rebel  army. 


EXTRACTS  FROM  GENERAL  JOS.  E.  JOHNSTON'S  REPORT. 

At  Dalton,  the  great  numerical  superiority  of  the  enemy  made  the 
chances  of  battle  much  against  us,  and  even  if  beaten,  they  had  a  safe 
refuge  behind  the  fortified  pass  of  Ringgold,  and  in  the  fortress  of  Chat- 
tanooga. Our  refuge,  in  case  of  defeat,  was  in  Altanta,  one  hundred  miles 
off,  with  three  intervening  rivers.  Therefore,  victory  for  us  could  not 
have  been  decisive,  while  defeat  would  have  been  utterly  disastrous. 

On  the  5th  of  May,  this  army  was  in  line  between  Ringgold  and  Tun- 
nel Hill,  and  after  skirmishing  on  that  day  and  the  following  day,  on  the 
7th,  pressed  back  our  advanced  forces  to  Mill  Creek  Gap.  On  the  same 
day,  Canty  reached  Resaca  with  his  brigade,  and  was  halted  there.  On 
the  8th,  at  4  P.  M.,  a  division  of  Hooker's  corps  attacked  Dug  Gap,  which 
was  bravely  held  by  two  regiments  of  Reynolds'  Arkansas  brigade  and 
Grigsby's  brigade  of  Kentucky  cavalry,  fighting  on  foot,  until  the  arrival 
of  Lieutenant-General  Hardee,  with  Granbury's  brigade,  when  the  enemy 
was  put  to  flight.  On  the  9th,  five  assaults  were  made  on  Lieutenant- 
General  Hood's  troops  on  Rocky  Face  Mountain.  All  were  repulsed.  In 
the  afternoon,  a  report  was  received  that  Logan's  and  Dodge's  corps  were 
in  Snake  Creek  Gap.  Three  divisions,  under  Lieutenant-General  Elood, 
were  therefore  sent  to  Resaca.  On  the  10th,  Lieutenant-General  Hood 
reported  the  enemy  retiring.  Skirmishing  to  our  advantage  continued 
all  day,  near  Dalton.  Major-General  Bate  repulsed  a  vigorous  attack 
at  night.  On  the  llth,  Brigadier-General  Canty  reported  that  the  enemy 
was  again  approaching  Resaca.  Lieutenant-General  Polk  arrived  in  the 
-evening  with  Loring's  division,  and  was  instructed  to  defend  the  place 
with  those  troops  and  Canty' s.  The  usual  skirmishing  continued  near 
Dalton. 

Rocky  Face  Mountain  and  Snake  Creek  Gap,  at  its  south  end,  com- 
pletely covered  for  the  enemy  the  operation  of  turning  Dalton.  On  the 


THE  TURNING  OF  DALTON.  63 

12th,  the  Federal  army,  covered  by  the  mountain,  moved  by  Snake  Creek 
Gap  toward  Resaca.  Major-General  Wheeler,  with  2,200  of  ours,  attacked 
and  defeated  more  than  double  that  number  of  Federal  cavalry,  near 
Varnell's  Station.  At  night,  our  artillery  and  infantry  marched  for  Re- 
saca. The  cavalry  followed  on  the  13th.  On  that  day,  the  enemy  ap- 
proaching on  the  Snake  Creek  Gap  road  was  checked  by  Loring's  troops, 
which  gave  time  for  the  formation  of  Hardee's  and  Hood's  corps,  just 
arriving.  As  the  army  was  formed,  the  left  of  Folk's  corps  was  on  the 
Oostanaula,  and  the  right  of  Hood's  on  Connasauga.  There  was  brisk 
skirmishing  during  the  afternoon  on  Folk's  front  and  Hardee's  left. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

BATTLE   OF   KESACA. 

EARLY  on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  General  Howard  dis- 
covered that  General  Johnston  had  withdrawn  from  Dalton, 
and  he  at  once  occupied  the  town,  having  driven  his  cavalry 
from  it.  He  then  moved  in  pursuit,  and  skirmishing  as  he 
advanced,  encamped  eight  miles  toward  Resaca.  In  the 
morning,  General  Johnston  reached  Resaca,  Loring's  division 
having  moved  out  to  check  General  McPherson  and  give  time 
for  the  formation  of  Hood's  and  Hardee's  corps  upon  their 
arrival  from  Dalton.  He  formed  his  army,  now  stronger  hy 
several  thousand  men  than  at  Dalton,  with  Folk's  corps  on 
the  left,  resting  on  the  Oostanaula  river  below  the  town,  Har- 
dee's in  the  center,  and  Hood's  on  the  right,  his  right  flank 
resting  on  the  Connasauga  river. 

At  8  A.  M.,  Hooker's  corps,  preceded  hy  Kilpatrick's  cavalry, 
moved  out  upon  the  Resaca  road,  in  support  of  McPherson, 
who  was  advancing  against  the  town.  Kilpatrick  encountered 
Wheeler  and  drove  him  nearly  to  the  town,  when,  being 
wounded,  he  turned  over  the  command  to  Colonel  Murray. 
Palmer's  corps  moved  from  Snake  Creek  Gap,  two  miles 
northeast  of  Hooker,  and  then  moved  parallel  with  the  Resaca 
road,  under  orders  to  proceed  as  far  as  the  railroad.  On  reach- 
ing the  vicinity  of  the  railroad,  his  skirmishers  encountered 
those  of  the  enemy,  strongly  posted  on  the  hills,  immediately 
west  of  the  railroad,  and  warmly  engaged  them  until  night- 
fall. Butterneld's  division  of  Hooker's  corps  moved  forward 
to  support  Palmer's  right.  Schofield's  two  divisions  advanced 
upon  Palmer's  left.  Howard  advanced  to  the  vicinity  of  Re- 
saca, and  when  communications  were  established  throughout 
(64) 


BATTLE   OF   RESACA.  65 

the  line,  it  was  found  that  his  right  was  but  a  mile  from  Scho- 
field's  left. 

General  Johnston's  position  was  a  strong  one,  with  Camp 
creek  in  front,  and  heavy  intrenchments  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  town — the  strongest  to  defend  the  bridges  across 
the  Oostanaula,  and  cover  the  retreat  of  his  army.  His  outer 
defenses  consisted  of  detached  redoubts,  and  extensive  rifle- 
trenches,  and  the  ground  beyond  was  favorable  for  defense. 
His  army  was  disposed  partly  in  the  inner  defenses,  but  mainly 
on  the  high  hills  north  and  west  of  the  town,  which  were  for- 
tified. 

Before  delivering  battle,  General  Sherman  ordered  a  pon- 
toon bridge  to  be  thrown  across  the  Oostanaula  at  Lay's  ferry, 
in  the  direction  of  Calhoun,  Sweeny's  division  of  the  Fif- 
teenth Corps  to  cross  and  threaten  that  place,  and  Garrard's 
division  of  cavalry  to  move  from  Villanow  toward  Eome,  to 
cross  the  Oostanaula,  and  if  possible  break  the  railroad  below 
Calhoun  and  above  Kingston.  On  the  14th,  General  Mc- 
Pherson  crossed  Camp  creek,  near  its  mouth,  and  forced 
Folk's  corps  from  the  hills  commanding  the  railroad  bridges 
from  the  west,  and  secured  a  lodgment  close  to  his  works. 
This  done,  it  became  necessary  to  swing  round  the  whole  line 
formed  the  previous  evening,  from  Hooker's  left  to  the  extreme 
left.  This  movement  was  made  with  the  right  of  Johnson's 
division,  which  was  the  right  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  as  a 
pivot,  and  each  division  advanced  until  it  encountered  the 
enemy. 

As  Johnson's  right  was  in  proximity  to  the  enemy,  the  di- 
visions to  the  left  met  the  enemy  in  succession.  Baird's 
division  was  in  line  on  Johnson's  left,  and  Davis  in  reserve. 
General  Howard,  in  compliance  with  orders  from  General 
Thomas,  moved  in  the  morning,  to  form  his  corps  on  the  left 
of  Schofield,  and  advance  upon  the  main  roads  to  Resaca. 
Newton's  division,  followed  by  Wood's,  moved  toward  Scho- 
field's  left,  and  Stanley's  toward  the  enemy's  extreme  right, 
on  the  Fulton  and  Eesaca  road.  When  Newton  gained  Scho- 
field's  left,  Wood  changed  direction  to  the  left,  upon  a  road 
between  Newton  and  Stanley. 
VOL.  n — 5 


66  BATTLE   OF   RESACA. 

Carlin's  brigade  of  Johnson's  division  was  the  first  to  en- 
counter the  foe.  General  Carlin  crossed  Camp  creek  and 
advanced  some  distance  over  the  open  ground  in  front  of  the 
enemy's  position,  under  a  severe  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry. 
The  passage  of  the  creek  disordered  his  lines  somewhat,  and 
being  hopeless  of  holding  the  enemy's  works  should  he  suc- 
ceed in  an  assault,  he  withdrew,  and  found  shelter  and  a  par- 
apet at  the  bank  of  the  stream.  Here  he  maintained  position 
all  day,  and  delivered  a  desultory  but  destructive  fire.  Gen- 
eral King,  perceiving  Carlin's  repulse,  halted  his  brigade  to 
the  left  and  rear.  The  ground  over  which  the  left  of  Baird's 
division  and  the  right  of  Schofield's  line  advanced,  was  thickly 
wooded,  rendering  it  difficult  to  maintain  lines,  and  the  troops 
farther  to  the  left  having  gained  ground,  those  having  been 
delayed  moved  forward  rapidly  as  they  emerged  from  the 
woods  upon  the  open  space  before  the  enemy's  intrenchments ; 
but  such  was  the  severity  of  the  musketry  and  artillery  fire 
to  which  they  were  exposed,  that  they  were  soon  compelled 
to  retreat.  Some  isolated  squads  had  passed  Camp  creek,  and 
were  driven  back ;  others  were  so  delayed  by  the  miry  banks 
that  they  could  not  withdraw  with  the  main  line,  and  were 
compelled  to  seek  cover  at  the  stream.  To  cover  the  retreat 
and  re-formation  of  Turchin's  brigade,  and  Schofield's  right, 
Mitchell's  brigade  of  Davis'  division,  in  reserve,  moved 
quickly  to  the  left,  and  was  severely  engaged,  while  the 
broken  lines  were  reformed  upon  the  high  ground  west  of  the 
creek.  As  the  lines  of  advance  of  Howard's  corps  were  con- 
verging, the  three  divisions  made  close  connection  before 
reaching  the  enemy's  position,  and  as  the  convergence  of  the 
roads  shortened  the  battle  front  continually,  the  greater  por- 
tion of  Newton's  division  fell  in  rear  of  Schofield's  right,  in 
reserve,  and  when  his  left  carried  the  position  in  its  front, 
Newton  moved  to  the  relief  of  his  left  center,  and  grasped 
firmly  all  the  ground  that  had  been  gained.  In  the  meantime, 
Wood  came  abreast  of  Newton,  and  drove  the  enemy  from 
his  rifle-pits,  and  Stanley  formed  his  division  on  "Wood's  left, 
with  one  brigade  across  the  Fulton  road,  to  protect  his  flank. 
These  movements  were  all  slowly  made,  in  consequence  of 
dense  woods  and  rough  ground,  and  the  resistance  of  the 


BATTLE   OF   EESACA.  67 

-enemy.  But  an  advanced  line  was  gained,  and  from  it  artil- 
lerists poured  a  fire  so  .destructive  as  in  some  cases  to  drive 
the  enemy  temporarily  from  his  works. 

General  Johnston,  fearing  that  the  lines  of  investment  were 
closing  around  him,  determined  to  assume  the  offensive,  and 
if  possible  turn  General  Sherman's  left  flank.  General  Stan- 
ley soon  observed  indications  of  the  movement.  As  General 
Howard  had  no  reserves  to  direct  to  the  endangered  flank,  he 
communicated  in  person  with  General  Thomas  and  secured 
immediate  assistance  from  the  Twentieth  Corps.  In  compli- 
.ance  with  orders,  General  Hooker  promptly  dispatched  Wil- 
liams' division,  under  the  guidance  of  Colonel  Morgan,*  of  the 
Fourteenth  Colored  regiment,  and  preceeded  it  to  the  point  of 
danger.  "Williams  moved  rapidly  on  the  most  direct  route, 
and  arrived  on  the  extreme  left  just  as  that  flank  had  been 
turned  and  pressed  back.  Stanley  had  exhausted  all  his  re- 
serves in  extending  his  line  against  the  overlapping  of  the 
enemy.  Simonson's  battery,  by  effective  execution,  was  re- 
tarding the  advance  of  the  enemy  to  double  up  the  line,  when 
Williams  deployed  his  division  and  advanced  to  the  support 
of  the  battery.  His  terrific  fire  first  checked  and  then  routed 
the  enemy,  and  completely  defeated  this  attempt  at  flanking. 
The  other  divisions  of  the  Twentieth  Corps,  Geary's  and  But- 
terfield's,  followed  Williams,  later  in  the  evening,  and  Mc- 
Cook's  cavalry  passed  to  Hooker's  left. 

The  enemy's  troops  engaged  against  the  left  flank  were 
Stevenson's  and  Stewart's  divisions  and  two  brigades  of  Walk- 
er's— a  strong  column  in  view  of  the  length  of  Johnston's  lines 
and  the  relative  inferiority  of  his  army.  Another  fact  evinced 
his  estimate  of  the  importance  of  the  movement.  After  its 
failure  he  gave  orders  for  its  repetition  the  next  morning,  but 
was  subsequently  led  to  revoke  them,  when  he  learned  that 
the  national  infantry  were  crossing  the  Oostanaula  river,  near 
Calhoun,  on  a  pontoon  bridge.  To  provide  against  this  men- 
ace to  his  rear,  he  dispatched  General  Walker  to  Calhoun. 

Such  advantages  had  been  gained  during  the  day  as  prom- 
ised success  in  forcing  Johnston  to  abandon  his  position,  and 

*  Colonel  T.  J.  Morgan  was  volunteer  aid  to  General  Howard. 


68  BATTLE  OF  KESACA. 

orders  were  issued  for  a  general  advance  the  next  morning. 
Notwithstanding  this  aggressive  purpose,  the  troops  covered 
themselves  with  the  usual  defenses.  There  was  no  change  in 
the  line,  except  that  Schofield  was  directed  to  withdraw  from 
the  center  and  pass  to  Hooker's  left. 

There  was  delay  in  making  the  attack  in  the  morning, 
to  await  the  result  of  a  reconnoissance  by  General  Geary,  from 
the  left  flank.  Full  preparations  were  not  completed  until 
noon.  At  this  hour  the  Twentieth  Corps  advanced — Geary 'on 
the  right,  Butterfield  on  the  left,  and  Williams  in  reserve. 
Before  the  enemy's  works  were  reached,  General  Hooker  di- 
rected General  Williams  to  deflect  to  the  left  to  cover  and 
protect  that  flank,  again  threatened  by  the  enemy,  as  Gen- 
eral Johnston,  having  learned  that  there  was  no  immediate 
danger  from  infantry  at  Calhoun,  had  repeated  his  order  to 
General  Hood  to  advance  against  the  national  left.  Facing 
to  the  east,  Williams'  division  moved  to  the  point  menaced — 
Knipe's  brigade  on  the  right,  Ruger's  in  the  center,  and  Rob- 
inson's on  the  left.  The  ground  traversed  by  the  advancing 
columns  was  hilly,  with  woods  and  open  spaces  alternating. 
Williams'  brigades  formed  lines  on  a  series  of  hills  west  of  the 
railroad  and  running  parallel  to  it;  batteries  were  planted 
with  supports  to  command  the  ground  in  front  of  the  line. 

The  enemy  before  Hooker,  occupied  intrenched  hills,  having 
spurs  extending  in  all  directions,  and  batteries  were  so  placed 
on  the  higher  points  as  to  enfilade  assaulting  lines.  Geary's 
and  Butterfield's  divisions  advanced  with  spirit,  and  though 
receiving  a  heavy  fire  from  artillery  and  musketry,  carried  the 
nearest  hills.  Then  Butterfield's  division — Ward's,  Coburn's, 
and  Wood's  brigades — supported  by  Ireland's  brigade  on 
Geary's  left,  drove  the  enemy  from  a  battery,  which  from  a 
ruling  position  was  pouring  an  exceedingly  destructive  fire ; 
but  another  line  of  intrenchments  was  so  near  that  the  cap- 
tors could  neither  remove  the  guns  nor  remain  with  them. 
But,  withdrawing  to  tenable  ground,  they  covered  the  guns 
so  fully  with  their  fire  that  the  enemy  could  not  approach 
them,  and  during  the  remainder  of  the  day  the  guns  remained 
between  the  lines.  They  were  taken  during  the  night  by  a 
detachment  of  the  Fifth  Ohio  under  Colonel  Kilpatrick. 

In  the  meantime,  the  entire  line  became  engaged,  from  How- 


BATTLE    OF   RESACA.  69 

ard's  right  to  Hooker's  left ;  while  throughout  the  whole  front 
of  the  "  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  heavy  skirmishing  and 
artillery  action  was  maintained.  General  Howard,  being 
nearest  the  assaulting  corps,  kept  up  a  constant  fire  of  artil- 
lery and  musketry,  and  in  one  instance  made  a  positive  attack, 
and  although  he  did  not  succeed  in  holding  any  point  of  the 
enemy's  line,  he  prevented  the  diversion  of  troops  from  his 
front,  to  sustain  their  comrades  before  General  Hooker,  against 
whose  left  they  were  maintaining  the  offensive  with  great  de- 
termination. Near  the  railroad,  in  front  of  "Williams,  he 
massed  his  forces  and  advancing  as  much  as  possible  under 
<;over,  made  repeated  assaults,  but  was  unable  to  disturb  the 
line.  Williams'  artillery  was  used  with  most  destructive  effect 
in  the  repulsion  of  these  assaults.  In  front  of  Williams'  right 
and  Geary's  left,  there  was  a  long  cleared  field,  compassing 
two  hills  and  a  ravine,  and  extending  to  a  wooded  hill,  upon 
which  rested  the  enemy's  main  line.  This  field  was  flanked 
on  the  right  by  wooded  hills,  which  extended  to  the  captured 
battery.  About  5  p.  M.  Stevenson's  division  left  the  main  line 
and  charged  in  column  to  gain  possession  of  these  lateral  hills. 

This  movement,  if  successful,  would  have  insulated  one- 
half  of  Geary's  division,  which  had  been  concentrated  under 
Colonel  Cobham,  in  the  rear  of  the  guns  wrested  from  the 
enemy.  But  Stevenson  was  repulsed  mainly  through  the  con- 
centration of  fire  from  Williams'  right  and  Geary's  left.  His 
leading  regiments  were  almost  annihilated.  On  both  sides, 
artillery  charged  with  canister  and  schrapnel  was  freely  used. 
Stevenson's  repulse  closed  the  general  contest.  This  attack 
of  Stewart's  and  Stevenson's  divisions  was  made  after  General 
Johnston  had  decided  to  evacuate  Resaca,  but  his  order  for- 
bidding the  assault  was  not  received  in  time  to  prevent  it. 

During  the  night  of  the  15th,  General  Johnston  abandoned 
Resaca.  It  was  observed  by  those  on  the  outlook  the  preced- 
ing day,  that  he  was  sending  his  material  to  the  rear.  He 
had  lost  positions  on  his  right  and  left,  and  had  been  pressed 
throughout  his  lines  by  two  days  of  fighting,  and  the  exposure 
of  his  communications  in  the  event  of  a  flank  movement, 
which  had  been  foreshadowed,  made  his  retreat  necessary.  He 
had  attacked  the  brigade  across  the  river  below  Resaca  on  the 


70  BATTLE    OF    RESACA. 

15th,  and  had  been  repulsed,  and  as  General  Sherman's  front 
now  presented  defenses  as  well  as  his  own,  the  transfer  of 
heavy  forces  across  the  river  was  plainly  practicable.  He 
therefore  retreated  before  embarrassments  crowded  upon  him. 

The  action  at  Kesaca,  though  presenting  different  features 
from  the  one  before  Dalton,  was  not  essentially  different  in 
type  or  result.  In  the  latter  one,  the  two  armies  more  fully 
confronted  each  other,  and  there  was  more  fighting  and 
heavier  losses.  The  champaign  region  of  Georgia  was  now  be- 
fore General  Sherman,  offering  freedom  for  maneuver  and 
strategy,  which  the  mountain  region  had  denied. 

As  the  aggregate  monthly  losses  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland were  reported  by  General  Thomas,  it  is  impossible  to 
ascertain  definitely  the  casualties  at  Resaca.  The  Twentieth 
Corps  lost  seventeen  hundred  and  forty-six  men,  and  the  other 
two  corps  lost  nearly  as  many  in  the  aggregate.  General 
Johnston's  losses  were  also  heavy,  especially  when  he  assumed 
the  offensive. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

ADVANCE  TO  THE  ETOWAH  RIVER,  THE  TURNING  OF  ALLATOONA, 
BATTLES  NEAR  NEW  HOPE  CHURCH. 

EESACA  was  occupied  by  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  on 
the  morning  of  May  16th,  and  General  Sherman  gave  orders 
for  rapid  pursuit.  There  was  delay,  however,  in  passing  the 
river,  as  it  was  necessary  to  throw  a  pontoon  bridge  at  Resaca 
and  at  points  above.  During  the  day,  the  Army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee crossed  at  Lay's  ferry,  and  Howard's  corps  at  Resaca. 
As  in  the  pursuit  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  to  follow 
the  enemy's  line  of  retreat,  General  Howard  moved  forward 
toward  Calhouu.  His  progress  was  slow,  as  stubborn  resist- 
ance was  offered  by  the  rear-guard  of  Johnston's  army. 

The  next  day,  the  three  armies  advanced.  Palmer's  corps 
followed  Howard's ;  Hooker's  having  crossed  above,  moved  on 
the  left.  On  his  left,  was  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  and  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  advanced  on  lines  on  the  right  of  the 
central  army.  Stoneman's  cavalry  was  on  the  extreme  left, 
and  Garrard's  on  the  extreme  right,  under  instructions  to 
reach  the  enemy's  rear  if  practicable. 

Early  in  the  day,  General  Howard  found  the  rear-guard 
of  the  enemy,  formed  of  cavalry  and  artillery,  and  at  times 
supported  by  infantry.  Three  lines  were  presented  at  short 
intervening  distances,  and  generally  behind  barricades  in 
woods,  with  open  ground  in  front.  When  the  first  line  was 
pressed  from  position,  the  troops  forming  it  passed  to  the  rear 
of  the  third  and  reformed.  Thus,  not  only  was  the  rear  of 
the  army  covered,  but  two  of  the  three  lines  of  the  rear-guard 
itself.  The  Fourth  Corps  advanced  in  two  columns  abreast, 
and  pressed  the  enemy  so  strongly  in  the  evening  that  a  bat- 

(71) 


72        ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW   HOPE    CHURCH. 

tie  seemed  imminent.  The  skirmish  lines  were  reinforced 
until  they  had  the  weight  of  lines  of  battle,  and  artillery  was 
freely  used.  The  action"  terminated  as  darkness  approached, 
and  during  the  night,  General  Johnston  abandoned  a  position 
which  he  had  intrenched.  His  reasons  were,  that  a  portion 
of  Folk's  corps  was  yet  in  the  rear ;  that,  as  he  thought,  the 
expiration  of  service  of  the  regiments  in  the  national  armies 
confronting  him  that  had  not  re-enlisted,  would  soon  reduce 
their  strength,  and  he  hoped  that  some  blunder  would  give 
him  an  opportunity  to  strike  a  blow  without  risking  a  general 
battle,  or  to  enter  such  a  contest  with  advantages  to  counter- 
balance the  inferiority  of  his  army. 

General  Sherman's  object  now  was  to  compel  Johnston  to 
fight  north  of  the  Etowah  river,  divide  his  army,  or  give  up 
Rome  or  Allatoona.  In  the  event  of  his  attempt  to  hold  both 
these  places,  he  proposed  to  break  his  line  at  Kingston ;  or 
should  he  concentrate  at  Kingston,  to  break  his  railroads  right 
and  left,  and  "  fight  him  square  in  front."  To  give  support  to 
the  cavalry  on  the  right,  he  directed  General  Thomas  to  send 
a  division  from  Resaca  toward  Rome,  and  Davis'  had  been  put 
in  motion. 

On  the  18th,  the  armies  moved  forward  without  change  of 
order,  and  at  night  the  Fourth  and  Fourteenth  Corps  encamped 
near  Kingston.  At  8  A.  M.  the  next  day,  the  central  column, 
Stanley's  division  leading,  advanced  toward  Cassville.  Midway 
to  that  place  the  enemy  opened  upon  Stanley  with  a  six-gun 
battery,  from  an  eminence,  but  yielded,  under  the  pressure  of 
an  attack  with  infantry  and  artillery.  Moving  in  pursuit  nearly 
four  miles,  Stanley  was  again  arrested.  This  time  there  was  a 
formidable  combination  before  him,  and  the  enemy  was  ob- 
served to  be  advancing  in  two  lines  of  battle.  General  Howard 
promptly  deployed  his  corps — Stanley's  and  Wood's  divisions 
in  front,  and  Newton's  in  support  of  the  left.  As  soon  as  the 
enemy  observed  these  dispositions,  his  lines  were  halted  and 
their  front  covered  with  barricades.  When  Howard's  artillery 
opened,  the  first  line  retreated  in  some  confusion,  and  the 
Fourth  Corps  advanced  and  occupied  the  position.  Here  a 
junction  with  Hooker's  corps  was  made,  which  had  engaged 
the  enemy  during  the  day  on  the  direct  road  from  Adairsville 


ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW  HOPE   CHURCH.         73 

to  Cassville.  Skirmishing  was  maintained  until  dark,  when 
the  three  corps  bivouacked  in  close  proximity.  During  the  day, 
General  Schofield  approached  Cassville,  and  General  McPher- 
son  moved  from  Woodland  to  Kingston. 

As  reports  had  reached  General  Sherman  that  General  John- 
ston had  been  reinforced,  he  thought  it  probable  that  he  would 
now  give  battle  in  the  vicinity  of  Cassville,  and  in  such  expec- 
tation he  threw  his  armies  from  their  parallel  lines  of  march, 
toward  the  head  of  the  central  column.  His  cavalry  was  on 
right  and  left,  in  effort  to  break  the  railroad  in  Johnston's  rear 
to  force  him  to  battle,  or  to  subject  a  portion  of  his  army  and 
trains  to  capture,  before  he  could  cross  the  Etowah  river.  Gen- 
eral Schofield  was  under  instructions  to  support  the  cavalry  on 
the  left,  in  the  accomplishment  of  this  object,  and  during  the 
•day,  McCook's  division  of  cavalry  had  a  brilliant  passage  of 
arms  with  Stevenson's  division  of  infantry. 

It  was  General  Johnston's  purpose  to  give  battle  at  Cassville. 
He  had  been  joined  by  French's  division  of  Folk's  corps,  and 
the  lines  which  Howard  first  encountered  were  Hood's,  who 
had  orders  to  attack.  His  lieutenant,  however,  under  the  im- 
pression that  the  columns  on  the  east  had  turned  his  position, 
refrained  until  it  was  too  late  to  overpower  the  head  of  column. 
Even  after  this  failure,  General  Johnston  meditated  delivering 
battle,  but  was  dissuaded  by  his  lieutenants,  Polk  and  Hood, 
though  General  Hardee  gave  counter  advice.  During  the  night 
he  crossed  the  Etowah  with  all  his  trains,  and  moved  to  his 
strong  position  at  Allatoona  Pass.  This  step  was  a  matter  of 
subsequent  regret  to  him,  though  it  is  probable  that  his  sorrow 
would  have  been  more  profound,  had  he  engaged  Sherman's 
three  armies  at  Cassville. 

Pending  these  greater  movements,  General  Davis  with  his 
division  captured  Rome.  His  orders  did  not  require  him  to  go 
.so  far  from  the  line  of  march,  but  as  circumstances,  in  his  judg- 
ment, justified  the  step,  and  having  advised  General  Thomas 
of  his  purpose,  he  passed  beyond  all  co-operation  with  the  cav- 
alry, and  hurried  Mitchell's  brigade  in  advance,  on  the  17th, 
drove  back  the  rebel  cavalry,  and  deployed  within  range  of  the 
artillery,  on  De  Soto  hill,  on  the  west  side  of  the  Oostanaula. 
McCook's  brigade  and  Morgan's  moved  forward,  and  the  enemy, 


74        ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW   HOPE   CHURCH. 

at  first  assuming  the  aggressive,  was  driven  within  his  fortifi- 
cations. The  next  morning  the  city  was  abandoned  in  too 
much  hurry  to  destroy  machine-shops  and  iron-works  of  great 
value,  and  vast  quantities  of  stores  and  cotton,  and  six  pieces 
of  artillery.  General  Davis  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  one 
hundred  and  fifty  men. 

BEYOND   THE   ETOWAH. 

General  Sherman  did  not  pursue  beyond  the  Etowah.  The 
rough  hills  and  gorges  around  Allatoona  presented  such  ob- 
stacles to  maneuver  and  attack  as  to  deter  him  from  a  direct 
advance.  He  chose  rather  to  make  a  detour  to  the  risrht,  to 

O         " 

turn  Allatoona,  or  throw  his  armies  upon  Johnston's  com- 
munications at  Marietta  or  the  Chattahoochee  river.  He  ac- 
cordingly gave  orders  for  a  few  days  of  rest,  and  time  to  repair 
the  railroad  to  Cassville,  and  accumulate  supplies  at  Resaca. 

At  this  period,  General  Johnston  was  calling  to  him  in- 
fantry from  the  Southwest  and  cavalry  from  Mississippi,  and 
General  Sherman  was  making  effort  to  maintain  his  relative 
superiority.  His  losses  and  constantly  lengthening  line  of 
supply  were  reducing  his  offensive  strength,  and  he  called  all 
available  troops  from  the  rear.  May  23d,  he  ordered  General 
Blair,  with  two  divisions  of  infantry  of  the  Seventeenth 
Corps,  and  Long's  brigade  of  cavalry  of  Garrard's  division,  to 
move  on  Rome  and  Kingston,  from  Huntsville,  Alabama. 

On  this  day,  he  put  his  armies  in  motion  south  of  the 
Etowah.  The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  crossed  the  river  at  the 
mouth  of  Conasene  creek,  on  a  bridge  which  had  been  saved 
from  destruction,  and  advanced  toward  Dallas  by  Van  "Wert. 
General  Thomas  crossed  four  miles  south  of  Kingston,  and 
moved  through  Euharley  and  Stilesboro.  General  Schofield 
crossed  near  Etowah  cliffs,  and  kept  on  the  left  of  General 
Thomas.  Each  army  had  supplies  for  twenty  days  in  wagons. 

McCook's  division  of  cavalry  preceded  the  central  columns, 
and  reached  Stilesboro  in  the  afternoon,  and  finding  the  enemy 
there  in  force,  with  cavalry  and  infantry,  skirmished  until 
dark.  Hooker,  Howard,  and  Palmer  encamped  south  of 
Euharley  creek.  Kilpatrick's  division,  Colonel  "W.  "W".  Lowe 
commanding,  was  left  to  guard  the  line  of  the  Etowah — an  im- 


ETOWAH— ALLATOOXA — NEW    HOPE    CHURCH.         75 

portant  duty,  as  "Wheeler's  cavalry  had  been  sent  to  interrupt 
communications  north  of  that  river.  Garrard's  division  was 
covering  General  McPherson's  right  flank. 

At  daylight  on  the  24th,  by  direction  of  General  Thomas, 
General  Hooker  sent  Geary's  division  to  Euharley  creek,  to 
hold  the  Alabama  road  toward  Allatoona,  and  cover  the  left 
flank  of  the  corps,  until  relieved  by  General  Schofield.  The 
remainder  of  the  Twentieth  Corps  was  directed  to  advance  to 
Burnt  Hickory,  preceded  by  McCook's  cavalry.  The  cavalry 
commander,  upon  arrival,  was  instructed  to  picket  strongly 
the  roads  leading  toward  Alatoona,  and  cover  the  movements 
of  the  army.  McCook  reached  Burnt  Hickory  at  2  p.  M., 
having  skirmished  with  the  enemy  for  several  miles.  In  this 
skirmish  he  captured  a  rebel  courier,  bearing  dispatches  from 
General  Johnston  to  a  division  commander  of  cavalry,  re- 
quiring him  to  observe  the  movements  of  the  national  forces 
toward  Burnt  Hickory,  and  advising  him  that  his  army  was 
moving  toward  Dallas  and  Powder  Springs.  Later  in  the 
day,  General  Garrard  informed  General  Thomas  that  in 
moving  upon  Dallas,  he  had  been  attacked  by  Bate's  division, 
the  advance  of  Hardee's  corps.  Thus,  from  two  sources,  the 
fact  was  ascertained  that  General  Johnston  had  divined  Gen- 
eral Sherman's  purpose  in  time  to  throw  his  army  before  him 
near  Dallas.  .  At  night,  the  Fourth  and  Twentieth  Corps  en- 
camped at  Burnt  Hickory ;  the  Fourteenth,  impeded  by  trains, 
halted  some  distance  in  the  rear. 

The  next  morning,  the  march  was  resumed.  McCook's 
cavalry  moved  on  the  road  to  Golgotha,  followed  by  Butter- 
field's  division.  Hooker's  other  two  divisions,  and  Howard's 
corps,  advanced  on  roads  running  south  of  Butterfield's  line 
of  march.  General  Howard  sought  roads  to  the  right,  to 
avoid  the  main  roads,  upon  which  the  trains  of  Johnson's  di- 
vision and  the  Twentieth  Corps  were  advancing.  Baird's 
division  was  left  at  Burnt  Hickory,  to  protect  trains  and  tne 
rear  of  the  army.  The  divisions  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land, marching  upon  four  roads,  were  under  orders  to  con- 
verge upon  Dallas,  as  it  was  not  expected  that  Johnston's  army 
would  be  met  nearer  than  that  place.  But  at  11  A.  M.  Geary's 
division,  the  central  one  of  the  Twentieth  Corps,  came  upon 


76        ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW  HOPE   CHURCH. 

the  enemy  in  considerable  force.  A  cavalry  outpost  had  been 
previously  found  near  Owen's  Mill,  where  a  burning  bridge 
had  caused  some  delay.  After  crossing  this  bridge,  General 
Geary  had  deployed  the  Fifth  Ohio  as  skirmishers  in  ad- 
vance of  Candy's  brigade,  and  when  within  four  and  a  half 
miles  of  Dallas,  this  regiment  became  heavily  engaged,  and 
soon  after,  a  charge  was  made  by  the  enemy.  Candy's  brigade 
was  then  rapidly  deployed,  and  after  a  sharp  conflict  repulsed 
the  foe.  General  Geary  immediately  extended  his  skirmish 
line,  formed  Candy's  brigade  in  line  of  battle,  and  brought  up 
Ireland's  and  Buschbeck's  in  support.  Advancing  again,  the 
division  drove  the  enemy  a  half  mile.  From  prisoners,  it  was 
now  ascertained  that  Hood's  corps  was  in  front,  and  that 
Hardee's  was  not  far  distant,  in  the  direction  of  Dallas.  The 
situation  was  now  critical,  as  no  supporting  forces  were  near. 
General  Hooker,  who  was  with  his  central  division,  now  di- 
rected that  it  should  be  formed  upon  a  hill  affording  advan- 
tages for  defense,  that  the  skirmish  line  should  be  extended, 
and  make  a  show  of  strength  by  maintaining  an  aggressive 
fire,  and  that  barricades  should  be  constructed.  He  sent 
orders  immediately  to  "Williams  and  Butterfield  to  hasten  to 
Geary's  support,  and  informed  General  Thomas  of  the  posture 
of  affairs. 

As  "Williams  and  Butterfield  were  several  miles  distant,  they 
did  not  reach  Geary's  position  until  late  in  the  afternoon. 
Upon  arrival,  their  divisions  advanced  against  the  enemy  with 
Geary's  in  reserve,  under  instructions  from  General  Sherman 
to  drive  him  beyond  New  Hope  Church,  a  point  where  roads 
from  Marietta,  Dallas,  and  Ackworth  meet. 

Though  the  country  was  hilly  and  covered  with  trees  and 
undergrowth,  Williams'  and  Butterfield's  division,  dashed  at 
the  enemy  at  double-quick,  and  drove  him  back  a  mile  and  a 
half,  to  New  Hope  Church;  but  here  they  received  his  artillery 
fire  at  short  range,  and  were  arrested.  Geary  moved  to  the 
front  again,  and  though  the  attack  was  vigorously  made,  the 
enemy  was  not  dislodged.  General  Johnston  had  thrown  his 
army  directly  across  General  Sherman's  line  of  advance,  and 
was  ready  for  defensive  battle.  His  position  was  a  strong  one, 


ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW   HOPE   CHURCH.         77 

and  his  troops  were  under  cover.  The  engagement  which 
defined  his  position  resulted  in  heavy  losses  to  "both  armies. 

When  General  Sherman  first  learned  that  the  enemy  was 
"before  him  in  force,  he  divined  that  he  was  on  Johnston's  right 
flank,  and  proposed  to  turn  it.  With  this  ohject  in  view,  he 
directed  General  McPherson  to  move  to  the  left,  if  he  could 
not  dislodge  the  eneny  in  his  front.  But  General  McPherson 
did  not  move  to  the  left  as  projected,  and  the  opportunity  to 
pass  round  General  Johnston's  right  to  Ackworth  and  Mari- 
etta was  lost. 

General  Hooker  at  night  intrenched  a  line  in  close  prox- 
imity to  the  enemy.  The  Fourth  Corps,  ordered  hy  General 
Thomas  to  his  support  during  the  day,  came  up  hy  divisions 
in  the  evening  and  after  night,  and  formed  on  his  left.  Davis' 
division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  having  left  Eome  on  the 
24th,  was  now  in  supporting  distance ;  hut  Johnson's  and 
Baird's  divisions,  having  been  delayed  by  the  trains  on  the 
roads  in  advance  of  them,  were  still  in  the  rear. 

The  following  day  was  spent  in  the  concentration  of  the 
armies.  General  McPherson's  army  advanced  to  Dallas,  and 
General  Schofield's  was  directed  to  the  left  of  General 
Thomas,  to  turn  Johnston's  right  flank.  Garrard's  cavalry 
formed  the  extreme  right,  Stoneman's  the  left,  and  McCook's 
covered  the  rear. 

The  Twentieth  Corps  maintained  the  position  assumed  the 
previous  evening.  The  Fourth  was  slightly  changed  by  swing- 
ing round  to  occupy  a  line  of  hills,  trending  at  right  angles  to 
Hooker's  line.  This  change  of  front  threatened  the  enemy's 
right  flank  more  directly.  General  Schofield,  on  Howard's 
left,  covered  the  road  leading  from  Allatoona  to  Dallas,  by 
K"ew  Hope  Church.  Both  Howard  and  Schofield  skirmished 
into  position ;  and  so  close  were  they  to  the  enemy  that  not 
only  their  skirmishers,  but  their  main  lines  maintained  a  con- 
tinuous fire. 

In  the  forenoon,  General  Davis,  by  direction  of  General 
Thomas,  made  a  reconnoissance  to  Dallas,  to  determine  the 
position  of  Johnston's  left  flank  and  open  communications 
with  General  McPherson.  He  advanced  on  the  Burnt  Hickory 
road  with  Morgan's  brigade  in  front,  drove  the  enemy's  pick- 


78        ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW   HOPE   CHURCH. 

ets  through  the  town,  and  deployed  his  division  on  the  east  of 
the  Marietta  road.  Soon  after,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
came  abreast,  and  was  formed  in  lines  extending  across  the 
Villa  Rica  road. 

During  the  day,  McCook,  on  the  left,  struck  a  column  of 
cavalry  in  flank,  broke  it  in  two,  and  captured  fifty-two  pris- 
oners. From  his  prisoners  he  learned  that  Wheeler's  cavalry 
corps  was  on  Johnston's  right  flank.  In  the  afternoon,  John- 
son's division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  came  up  in  the  rear  of 
the  Fourth  Corps. 

The  opposing  armies  were  now  in  closest  proximity.  Har- 
dee's  corps  was  on  Johnston's  left,  Hood's  on  his  right,  and 
Folk's  in  the  center.  The  batteries  of  the  two  armies  were 
placed  on  the  commanding  positions  in  the  opposing  lines, 
and  nothing  was  needed  to  precipitate  the  work  of  death  but 
a  word  from  either  of  the  commanding  generals. 

As  General  Johnston  had  twice  withdrawn  his  army  under 
circumstances  not  radically  different,  General  Sherman  did 
not  feel  confident  that  he  would  maintain  his  position  even 
for  a  day,  and  gave  such  orders  as  would  compass  the  issues 
of  battle  or  the  retreat  of  the  enemy.  He  directed  General 
McPherson  to  connect  his  left  with  Hooker's  right,  so  that  he 
could  then  move  his  whole  line  by  the  left  flank  beyond  John- 
ston's right,  and  interpose  between  him  and  the  railroad.  In 
addition  to  McPherson's  movement,  a  strong  demonstration 
by  Hooker  and  Howard,  and  a  positive  attack  upon  Johnston's 
right  flank,  were  ordered. 

The  effort  to  turn  this  flank  commanded  the  personal  atten- 
tion of  Generals  Sherman  and  Thomas,  in  addition  to  General 
Howard,  who  was  ordered  to  furnish  the  assaulting  column. 
In  the  beginning,  General  Sherman  designated  the  point  in 
the  enemy's  line  upon  which  the  assault  should  be  made,  but 
Generals  Thomas  and  Howard,  upon  special  examination, 
perceived  that  there  the  enemy  could  bring  a  cross-fire  of  ar- 
tillery and  musketry  to  bear  upon  the  approaches,  and  General 
Howard  was  directed  to  move  his  column  to  the  left,  beyond 
all  the  troops  in  line,  and  endeavor  to  strike  the  enemy's 
flank. 

General  T.  J.  "Wood's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  was 


ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW    HOPE   CHURCH.         79 

selected  to  make  the  assault,  to  be  supported  on  the  left  by 
General  R.  "W.  Johnson's  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps, 
and  by  General  McLean's  brigade  of  General  Schofield's 
Twenty-third  Corps,  on  the  right.  The  column  was  formed 
in  the  rear  of  the  extreme  left  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps — 
Wood's  division  in  column  of  six  lines  deep,  Johnson's  on 
the  left,  with  a  brigade  front.  After  moving  a  mile  to  the 
east,  General  Howard  supposed  that  he  had  reached  the  ene- 
my's flank,  and  directed  General  Wood  to  wheel  his  command 
so  as  to  face  the  south,  and  advance.  The  enemy's  works  were 
soon  discovered,  and  upon  examination  of  their  strength,  the 
column  was  moved  another  mile  to  the  east.  Here,  Generals 
Howard  and  Wood  reconnoitered  the  ground,  and  ascertained 
that  the  line  of  works  did  not  cover  the  whole  division  front, 
and  preparation  was  made  for  attack.  Johnson's  division  was 
slightly  refused  on  Wood's  left,  with  Scribner's  brigade  in 
front,  and  McLean's  brigade  was  sent  to  a  point  in  full  view 
from  the  enemy's  works,  a  little  to  the  right  of  the  place  of 
attack,  to  attract  his  attention  and  draw  his  fire. 

At  5  P.  M.  the  entire  column  marched  briskly  forward,  Ha- 
zen's  brigade  of  Wood's  division  leading,  and  having  driven 
back  the  enemy's  skirmishers,  assaulted  his  main  line  with 
great  vigor.  Hazen  at  first  was  without  support  from  John- 
son's division  on  his  left,  and  was  so  heavily  engaged  that 
General  Wood  was  compelled  to  move  up  his  supporting  lines. 
Scribner's  brigade  was  also  hurried  forward  on  Hazen's  left, 
but,  before  getting  abreast  of  Hazen,  was  struck  in  flank  from 
the  opposite  side  of  a  creek  on  the  left.  Colonel  Scribner 
halted,  to  throw  out  troops  to  cover  his  flank,  at  the  crisis  of 
the  assault,  and  it  was  soon  evident  that  it  had  failed.  The 
Confederate  general,  Cleburne,  threw  his  reserves  and  an  en- 
filading fire  upon  Wood's  left  flank,  and  forced  it  back,  and 
his  right  at  the  same  time  was  subjected  to  a  cross-fire  of  ar- 
tillery and  musketry,  and  was  also  without  support,  as  McLean 
had  not  shown  himself  to  the  enemy  nor  opened  fire.  As 
both  of  Wood's  flanks  were  melting  away  under  a  most  de- 
structive fire,  General  Howard  ordered  the  withdrawal  of  the 
column.  The  retirement  was  made  with  such  deliberation  as 
permitted  the  removal  of  the  wounded.  General  Johnson 


80        ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW   HOPE   CHUKOT. 

withdrew  to  the  left  and  rear  of  the  main  line,  and  General 
"Wood  to  a  ridge  farther  to  the  front  and  right.  General 
McLean  withdrew  entirely,  and  left  the  two  divisions  in  com- 
plete isolation. 

General  Wood  lost  over  fourteen  hundred  men  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing.  General  Johnson's  loss  was  slight  in 
comparison,  hut  was  himself  severely  wounded.  The  reported 
loss  of  the  enemy  was  four  hundred  and  fifty. 

Two  advantages  resulted  from  this  unsuccessful  assault, 
though  dearly  purchased.  A  position  was  secured  far  on  the 
enemy's  right,  which  was  of  importance  to  subsequent  move- 
ments, and  it  was  clearly  developed  that  Johnston's  right 
would  he  found  in  strength  wherever  a  column  might  go  to 
turn  it.  At  night,  Wood  and  Johnson  intrenched  their  re- 
spective positions. 

During  the  day,  the  enemy  came  out  of  his  works  in  front 
of  Newton's  division,  but  was  handsomely  repulsed  by  Wag- 
ner's and  Kimball's  brigades.  Colonel  Daniel  McCook's  bri- 
gade of  General  Davis'  division  seized  a  mountain  pass  in 
the  rebel  center,  and  held  it  against  a  night  attack  by  troops 
from  Folk's  corps. 

General  McPherson  found  it  impracticable  to  move  to  the 
left,  in  compliance  with  General  Sherman's  orders.  General 
Johnston  was  meditating  offensive  action,  and  pressed  the  na- 
tional lines  throughout  their  length  in  search  for  an  opportu- 
nity to  strike  an  effective  blow.  Each  commander  was  watch- 
ing for  an  advantage,  and  yet  each  was  "  duly  cautious  in  the 
obscurity  of  the  ambushed  ground."  During  the  28th,  there 
was  brisk  skirmishing  from  flank  to  flank.  General  Sherman 
was  waiting  for  McPherson's  movement  to  the  left,  to  make 
effort  to  turn  General  Johnston's  position,  and  the  latter  was 
planning  a  battle  for  the  next  day.  At  night,  General  Hood 
was  instructed  to  attack  the  national  left  the  next  morning  at 
dawn,  and  the  remainder  of  the  army  was  ordered  to  join  in 
the  action,  successively  from  right  to  left. 

General  Hood  advanced,  but  finding  an  intrenched  flank, 
refrained  from  attack  and  asked  for  instructions.  As  this 
delay  defeated  the  surprise,  that  was  intended,  in  the  initia- 
tive, Hood  was  recalled.  But  in  the  evening  General  John- 


ETOWAH< — ALLATOONA — NEW   HOPE   CHUKCH.        81 

ston  attacked  McPherson,  as  he  was  in  effort  to  leave  position 
to  close  up  on  the  center  of  the  national  line.  Fortunately 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  had  not  moved  far  from  the  de- 
fenses, and  repulsed  Hardee's  corps  with  great  loss.  As  a 
feint,  to  cover  the  assault  upon  McPherson,  the  enemy  demon- 
strated in  front  of  Stanley  and  Newton,  and  at  intervals  during 
the  day  there  was  artillery  action  and  skirmishing  throughout 
the  battle  front. 

As  General  McPherson  did  not  change  position,  there  were 
only  slight  changes  at  other  points  in  the  line.  A  brigade  of 
Stanley's  division  was  thrown  between  Schofield  and  Wood, 
and  Colonel  J.  G.  Mitchell's  brigade  of  Davis'  division  was 
placed  in  position  about  half-way  toward  General  Hooker. 
The  chasm  here  was  three  miles  wide.  Colonel  Mitchell  in- 
trenched thoroughly,  and  cut  roads  to  his  rear  to  facilitate  the 
closing  up  of  the  right  wing  upon  the  center  at  New  Hope 
Church. 

The  purpose  to  move  the  whole  line  to  the  left  was  not 
abandoned  by  General  Sherman,  though  the  repeated  attempts 
of  General  McPherson  to  leave  position,  during  the  last  days 
of  the  month,  invited  the  enemy's  attacks. 

During  the  month  of  May,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
lost  about  nine  thousand  men.  Sixty-six  officers  and  ten  hun- 
dred and  ninety  enlisted  men  were  killed ;  three  hundred  and 
one  officers,  and  six  thousand  four  hundred  and  fifty-one  en- 
listed men  were  wounded,  and  eight  officers  and  eight  hundred 
and  fifty-eight  men  were  missing  from  the  three  corps  of  in- 
fantry. Colonels  A.  S.  McDougall,  One  Hundred  and  Twenty- 
third  New  York,  and  John  H.  Patrick,  Fifth  Ohio,  fell  at  New 
Hope  Church,  and  Colonel  Gilbert,  Nineteenth  Michigan,  was 
mortally  wounded ;  Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  F.  Lloyd,  One  Hun- 
dred and  Nineteenth  New  York,  was  killed  at  Resaca.  The 
army  captured  one  thousand  four  hundred  and  seventy-seven 
prisoners,  and  received  five  hundred  and  fifty  deserters. 

As  General  Sherman  had  held  his  armies  before  General 

Johnston,  near  Dallas,  he  had  not  made  effort  to  ascertain 

with  what  force  Allatoona  was  held,  to  turn  which  stronghold 

was  his  primary  object  in  moving  his  armies  to  the  right.    He 

\     VOL.  n — 6 


82        ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW   HOPE   CHURCH. 

had  ordered  General  Blair  to  move  to  that  point,  but  on  the 
first  of  June  he  was  still  far  in  the  rear.  But  as  at  this  time 
General  McPherson  effected  his  own  dislodgment  from  the 
position  that  had  heen  so  closely  watched  by  the  enemy,  and 
the  united  armies  could  move  by  the  left  flank,  General  Sher- 
man ordered  General  Garrard  to  move  to  the  east  end  of 
Allatoona  Pass,  and  General  Stoneman  to  the  west  with,  in- 
structions to  fight  cavalry  with  cavalry,  and  infantry  with 
dismounted  cavalry.  » 

As  General  McPherson's  army,  by  divisions,  approached 
New  Hope  Church,  the  divisions  of  the  Twentieth  Corps 
moved  to  the  left  of  Johnson's  division,  which  had  held  the 
extreme  left  since  the  27th  of  May.  Davis'  division  relieved 
Hovey's  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  and  Baird's  advanced 
from  Burnt  Hickory  to  Johnson's  rear.  Schofield's  troops, 
passed  to  Hooker's  left.  At  night,  Garrard  and  Stoneman 
were  at  Allatoona. 

On  the  2d,  Hooker  moved  to  the  left  of  Schofield,  and  Baird 
moved  to  Johnson's  left,  when  Hooker,  Schofield,  and  Baird 
moved  on  a  right  wheel,  drove  back  the  enemy's  skirmishers, 
and  threw  General  Johnston  farther  from  the  roads  leading  to 
Ackworth  and  Allatoona ;  and  yet,  in  front  of  the  new  posi- 
tions on  the  left,  finished  defenses  were  found.  The  move- 
ments of  the  day  were  embarrassed  by  a  rain-storm,  which 
flushed  the  creeks  and  softened  the  ground. 

During  the  4th  and  5th,  the  national  line  was  gradually  ex- 
tended to  the  left,  and  by  successive  steps  was  advanced  to 
Johnston's  immediate  front.  From  first  to  last,  each  army 
fortified  as  it  advanced,  and  the  field-works  from  Dallas  far 
toward  Ackworth  revealed  to  the  future  the  proximity  and 
nature  of  the  belligerence  of  the  two  armies.  "When  at  last 
General  Johnston  perceived  that  General  Sherman's  move- 
ment to  the  left  had  given  him  an  open  way  to  Ackworth,  he 
abandoned  the  position  and  threw  his  army  upon  the  moun- 
tains and  hills  north  and  west  of  Marietta. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  rested  on  the  5th,  and  on  the 
next  day  moved  leisurely  into  position  southwest  of  Ackworth : 
Hooker's  corps,  near  the  junction  of  the  Sandtown  road  with 
the  one  leading  from  Burnt  Hickory  to  Marietta ;  Palmer's  on 


ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW   HOPE   CHUECH.         83 

his  left,  and  Howard's  at  Durham's  house,  three  miles  from 
Ackworth.  McPherson  was  now  on  the  left  and  Schofield  on 
the  right.  As  all  the  troops  had  been  under  fire  for  several 
consecutive  days,  though  there  had  been  no  general  battle,  a 
rest  until  the  10th  was  declared.  During  this  period,  the  re- 
pair of  the  railroad  was  hastened,  and  Allatoona  was  fortified 
as  a  secondary  base  of  supplies. 

June  8th,  General  Blair  reached  Ackworth  with  nine  thou- 
sand men,  having  left  fifteen  hundred  as  a  garrison  at  Alla- 
toona. This  reinforcement  restored  the  grand  aggregate  of 
the  armies  again. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  KINGSTON,  GA.,  May  20,  1864. 
Major-General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

We  have  secured  two  good  bridges  and  an  excellent  ford  across  the 
Etowah.  Our  cars  are  now  arriving  with  stores.  I  give  two  days'  rest,  to 
replenish  and  fit  up.  On  the  23d,  I  will  cross  the  Etowah  and  move  on  Dal- 
las. This  will  turn  the  Allatoona  Pass.  If  Johnston  remain  at  Allatoona, 
I  shall  move  on  Marietta;  but  if  he  fall  behind  the  Chattahoochee,  I  will 
make  for  Sandtown  and  Campbellton,  but  feign  at  the  railroad  crossing. 
General  Davis'  division  occupies  Rome,  and  finds  a  good  deal  of  provis- 
ions and  plunder — fine  iron-works  and  machinery.  I  have  ordered  the 
Seventeenth  Corps,  General  Blair's,  to  march  from  Decatur  to  Kome.  My 
share  of  militia  should  be  sent  at  once,  to  cover  our  lines  of  communica- 
tion. Notify  General  Grant  that  I  will  hold  all  of  Johnston's  army  too 
busy  to  send  anything  against  him. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  10.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  KINGSTON,  GA.,  May  22,  1864. 

»""•».•'.:  *•'-•'"*.''••-*"•:''*;-.••*'*"* 

II.  The  several  armies  will  move  punctually  to-morrow  morning,  pro- 
Tided  as  heretofore  ordered,  by  separate  roads,  aiming  to  reach  the  posi- 
tions hereinafter  assigned  them  in  the  course  of  the  third  day,  and  in 
the  meantime  each  wing  communicating  freely  with  the  center  by  cross- 
roads. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  will  move  on  Dallas  by  Euharley  and 
Stilesboro ;  the  division  of  General  Jeff.  C.  Davis,  now  at  Rome,  marching 
direct  for  Dallas  by  Van  Wert.  The  Army  of  the  Ohio  will  move  for  posi- 
tion on  the  left,  via  Richland  creek  and  Burnt  Hickory  or  Huntsville. 


84        ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW  HOPE   CHURCH. 

The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  will  move,  via  Van  Wert,  to  a  position  on  the 
right,  at  or  near  the  head  of  Pumpkin  Vine  creek,  south  of  Dallas. 

III.  -Marietta  is  the  objective  point,  and  the  enemy  is  supposed  to  be 
in  force  at  Allatoona,  but  with  cavalry  all  along  the  line  of  the  Etowah. 
Henceforth  great  caution  must  be  exercised  to  cover  and  protect  trains. 

a*       -'*•»••."*.':.:»»»•        4  •'.* 
By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  KINGSTON,  G A.,  May  23,  1864. 
General  Blair,  Huntsville,  Ala.  : 

We  are  now  all  in  motion  for  the  Chattahoochee.  Colonel  Long  tele- 
graphs from  Pulaski,  and  should  overtake  you  at  Decatur,  or  soon  after 
leaving.  Although  you  must  move  on  Rome  and  Kingston  by  the  direct 
road,  still  you  can  make  believe  you  have  designs  on  Gadsden  and  Talla- 
dega.  Keep  silent,  and  the  enemy  will  exaggerate  your  strength  and 
purposes.  Johnston  has  called  to  him  all  the  infantry  of  the  Southwest, 
and  also  the  cavalry  of  Mississippi,  so  you  must  look  out  for  them.  If 
they  hang  around  you,  keep  Long  close  in,  and  watch  the  opportunity  for 
him  to  charge  with  sabers. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  DALLAS,  GA.,  May  27,  1864 — 11  A.  M. 
GENERAL  : — If  you  can 't  drive  the  enemy  from  his  position,  work  to  the 
left,  so  as  to  connect  with  Hooker. 

We  are  working  on  the  left  of  the  line  in  front  of  us,  and  as  soon  as  you 
are  in  connection  with  General  Hooker,  I  will  strengthen  the  left,  and 
work  round  in  that  direction,  so  we  may,  if  we  choose,  march  round  their 
extreme  right,  and  reach  Marietta  or  Ackworth. 

Yours,  etc., 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 
General  McPherson,  Dallas,  Ga. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

NEAR  DALLAS,  May  28,  1864. 
General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

The  enemy  discovered  my  move  to  turn  Allatoona,  and  moved  to  meet 
us  here.  Our  columns  met  about  one  mile  east  of  Pumpkin  Vine  creek, 
and  we  pushed  them  back  about  three  miles,  to  the  point  where  the  road 
forks  to  Allatoona  and  Marietta.  Here  Johnston  has  chosen  a  strong  line, 
and  made  hasty  but  strong  parapets  of  timber  and  earth,  and  has  thus 
far  stopped  us.  My  right  is  at  Dallas,  center  about  three  miles  north,  and 


ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW   HOPE   CHURCH.        85 

I  am  gradually  working  around  by  the  left,  to  approach  the  railroad 
anywhere  in  front  of  Ackworth. 

Country  very  densely  wooded  and  broken;  no  roads  of  any  conse- 
quence. We  have  had  many  sharp  encounters,  but  nothing  decisive. 
Both  sides  duly  cautious  in  the  obscurity  of  the  ambushed  ground. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  DALLAS,  May  30,  1864. 
General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

To  move  General  McPherson  up  to  the  center,  he  has  had  to  make  a 
retrogade  of  a  mile  or  so,  owing  to  difficult  ground.  Every  time  he  at- 
tempted to  withdraw  division  by  division,  the  enemy  attacked  his  whole 
line ;  it  may  be  on  the  theory  that  we  wanted  to  draw  off  altogether. 
These  assaults  were  made  in  the  night,  and  were  all  repulsed  with 
comparatively  small  loss  to  us,  but  seemingly  heavy  to  the  enemy.  If 
we  can  induce  the  enemy  to  attack  us,  it  is  to  our  advantage. 

Do  n't  expect  us  to  make  much  progress  toward  the  Chattahoochee  till 
Blair  comes  up,  and  moves  into  Allatoona  Pass. 

•*•*•***#*•** 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  ACKWORTH,  June  8,  1864. 
Major-General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

General  Blair  arrived  to-day,  with  two  divisions  of  the  Seventeenth 
Army  Corps,  about  nine  thousand  (9,000)  strong,  having  left  about  fifteen 
hundred  (1,500)  in  the  Allatoona  Pass,  to  fortify  and  hold  it.  Colonel 
Wright,  railroad  superintendent,  reports  he  will  have  the  Etowah  bridge 
done  by  the  12th  instant. 

To-morrow  I  will  feel  forward  with  cavalry,  and  follow  with  infantry 
the  moment  the  enemy  develops  his  designs. 

If  he  fights  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  I  will  turn  it;  but  if  he  selects  the 
line  of  the  Chattahoochee,  then  I  must  study  the  case  a  little  before  I 
commit  myself. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major- General  Commanding, 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

OPERATIONS  NEAE  KENESAW  MOUNTAIN,  INCLUDING  THE  BATTLE 
AT  KULP'S  HOUSE,  ASSAULT  OF  THE  MOUNTAIN,  AND  THE  FLANK 
MOVEMENT. 

JUNE  9th,  General  E.  M.  McCook,  commanding  the  First 
division  of  cavalry,  made  a  reconnoissance  in  front,  and  having 
driven  back  the  enemy's  pickets,  formed  a  heavy  line  three 
miles  in  front  of  General  Hooker,  and  observed  the  enemy  in 
force  on  Pine  Mountain.  General  Johnston's  army  now 
rested  with  its  left  on  Lost  Mountain,  its  center  at  Gilgath 
Church,  and  its  right  extended  across  the  railroad.  On  the 
10th,  Palmer's  corps  advanced  southeasterly  and  confronted 
Pine  Mountain,  and  skirmishing,  gained  an  eminence  within 
artillery  range.  Howard's  corps,  with  Hooker's  in  rear,  came 
abreast.  The  next  day,  Palmer  and  Howard  advanced  slightly, 
and  moved  by  the  left  flank  until  Palmer's  left  touched  Mc- 
Pherson's  right  at  the  railroad.  General  Johnston's  position 
was  now  fully  discovered.  His  lines  extended  over  a  series  of 
hills  from  Kenesaw  Mountain  to  Lost  Mountain,  with  Pine 
Mountain  fortified  in  front.  Before  him,  the  ground  was  so 
broken  by  ravines  and  so  densely  wooded  as  greatly  to  em- 
barrass the  advance  of  the  national  armies.* 

Two  days  of  constant  rain  prevented  all  motion;  but  on 
the  14th,  active  overations  were  resumed.  The  Fourteenth 
Corps,  carrying  with  it  the  left  of  the  Fourth,  advanced  a 
mile.  The  right  of  the  Fourth  still  rested  in  proximity  to 
Pine  Mountain,  with  the  Twentieth  Corps  closed  compactly 
upon  it.  During  the  day,  Lieutenant-General  Polk  was 
killed  upon  the  mountain  by  a  cannon  shot  from  one  of  the 
guns  of  Simonson's  Indiana  battery.  The  advanced  position 

(86) 


OPEKATIONS   NEAK   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN.  87 

being  now  well  turned  by  the  forward  movement  of  the  left 
of  the  national  line,  was  abandoned  the  following  night,  and 
the  troops  withdrawn  to  the  main  line  of  intrenchments  be- 
tween Kenesaw  and  Lost  Mountain. 

It  was  not  known  that  General  Johnston  had  a  second  in- 
trenched line,  and  that  he  might  not  have  time  to  construct 
one,  General  Sherman  ordered  an  advance  of  his  armies  the 
next  day.  General  Schofield  was  directed  to  threaten  Lost 
Mountain ;  General  McPherson  'to  turn  Kenesaw  Mountain  on 
the  left,  and  General  Thomas  to  press  the  center  with  a  view 
to  its  rupture.  General  Schofield  carried  a  line  of  works  in 
his  immediate  front,  which  had  been  left  exposed  by  the  aban- 
donment of  Pine  Mountain.  General  McPherson  gained  a 
hill  on  his  left  front,  and  General  Thomas  advanced  a  mile 
and  a  half  in  the  center ;  but  as  in  all  other  cases,  General 
Johnston  had  his  key-points  well  fortified  and  strongly  de- 
fended. Newton's  and  Geary's  divisions,  supported  by  the 
remaining  divisions  of  the  Fourth  and  Twentieth  Corps,  car- 
ried an  intrenched  skirmish  line  and  advanced  nearly  to  the 
main  line.  General  Howard,  deeming  it  unsafe  to  assault  with- 
out a  reconnoissance,  restrained  Newton ;  but  Geary  pene- 
trated the  abatis  and  maintained  a  conflict  under  the  enemy's 
guns  until  dark,  losing  five  hundred  and  thirty-four  men. 
During  the  night,  the  two  corps  intrenched  a  line  a  short  dis- 
tance from  the  enemy,  and  in  the  morning  cannon  responded 
to  cannon,  while  the  usual  skirmishing  prevailed  between  the 
armies.  It  being  now  evident  to  General  Johnston  that  an 
assault  could  be  made  with  fair  prospect  of  success,  he  aban- 
doned six  miles  of  good  field-works  and  fell  back  to  an  in- 
trenched line  on  the  Marietta  side  of  Mud  creek. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  General  Thomas  ordered 
an  advance  of  his  army.  The  Fourth  and  Twentieth  Corps 
and  the  right  of  the  Fourteenth  moved  over  the  abandoned 
fortifications  in  a  southeasterly  direction,  and  encountered  a 
skirmish  line  in  front  of  a  series  of  hills  extending  southwest 
from  Kenesaw  Mountain.  The  ground  was  so  favorable  to 
the  enemy  that  it  was  not  until  night  that  his  skirmishers 
were  driven  across  Mud  creek,  and  during  the  night  he  made 
two  attempts  to  dislodge  the  skirmishers  of  the  Fourth  Corps 


88  OPERATIONS   NEAR   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN. 

intrenched  on  the  west  side  of  the  stream.  The  next  morn- 
ing Generals  Wood  and-  Newton  threw  forward  a  strong 
line  of  skirmishers,  and  partially  surprising  the  enemy,  secured 
a  portion  of  his  main  line.  General  Harker,  of  Newton's 
division,  without  waiting  for  orders,  deployed  two  regiments 
to  hold  the  position.  Perceiving  the  advantage,  General  How- 
ard ordered  General  Newton  to  move  up  his  entire  division  in 
support.  General  Wood  gained  the  ridge  across  the  creek  on 
the  right  and  intrenched,  and  General  Baird  moved  his  division 
promptly  on  General  Newton's  left.  As  soon  as  it  was  dark, 
Newton's  division  intrenched  within  less  than  one  hundred 
yards  of  the  enemy's  works.  The  advantage  gained  was  de- 
cisive. General  Johnston's  ^iew  line  was  nearly  perpendicular 
in  direction  to  his  old  one,  and  that  portion  of  the  latter  which 
he  had  lost  was  so  related  to  the  former  that  a  successful  as- 
sault was  practicable.  This  General  Thomas  ordered  for  the 
next  day,  but  the  enemy  withdrew  before  morning. 

Early  the  following  morning,  General  Thomas  ordered  an 
advance  to  ascertain  how  far  General  Johnston  had  receded. 
The  Fourth  Corps,  Stanley's  division  leading,  moved  forward, 
and  driving  the  enemy  across  Nose's  creek,  halted  on  the  west 
bank ;  the  Twentieth  Corps  crossed  the  creek  late  in  the  day, 
and  formed  with  its  left  in  proximity  to  the  right  of  the 
Fourth;  and  the  Fourteenth  advanced  toward  Kenesaw 
Mountain  and  rested  in  line  in  proximity  to  its  base,  touching 
with  its  right  the  left  of  the  Fourth.  General  Johnston's  po- 
sition was  now  well  denned.  Hood's  corps,  was  covering 
Marietta  on  the  northeast;  Loring's  was  holding  Kenesaw 
Mountain,  and  Hardee's  extended  from  the  mountain  to  the 
road  from  Lost  Mountain  to  Marietta.  His  lines  were  in  view 
running  along  the  base  of  the  large  mountain  over  the  small 
one,  and  thence  on  the  hills  to  the  southwest.  The  large 
mountain  was  his  salient,  and  from  it  right  and  left  he  drew 
back  his  flanks  to  cover  Marietta  and  his  communications. 
The  position  was  one  of  great  strength,  thoroughly  intrenched, 
and  covered  against  approach  by  entanglements  of  every  type. 

Through  three  weeks  of  rain,  General  Sherman  had  been 
pressing  the  enemy  from  position  to  position,  but  it  was  now 
apparent  that  General  Johnston  must  maintain  his  ground  or 


OPERATIONS   NEAK   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN.  89 

defend  Atlanta  much  nearer  its  gates.  That  he  might  reach 
round  his  army  toward  his  communications,  General  Sherman 
determined  to  move  his  armies  hy  the  right  flank,  but  not  at 
first  to  uncover  his  depot  of  supplies  at  Big  Shanty,  and  while 
he  put  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  in  motion  to  the  right, 
he  held  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  east  of  the  railroad,  in 
readiness,  at  call,  or  when  the  noise  of  battle  should  reveal 
the  necessity  to  move  also  to  the  right. 

On  the  morning  of  the  20th,  General  "Wood's  division  and 
one  brigade  of  General  Stanley's  moved  to  the  right  to  relieve 
General  Williams'  division,  that  the  latter  might  co-operate 
with  General  Schofield  whose  advance  was  resisted  on  the  Sand- 
town  road.  During  the  forenoon^  General  Stanley,  with  Whit- 
taker's  and  Kirby's  brigades,  crossed  Nose's  creek  and  in- 
trenched a  line,  and  in  the  afternoon  Whittaker  carried  a 
wooded  hill  in  his  front  and  Kirby  a  bald  one  before  him. 
The  former  barricaded  at  once,  and  held  his  position  against 
repeated  and  furious  assaults  of  the  enemy,  but  the  latter  hav- 
ing been  less  prompt  in  constructing  defenses,  was  driven 
back.  At  dark,  the  extended  right  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps 
touched  the  left  of  the  Fourth,  and  Williams'  division  was  in 
connection  with  General  Schofield's  left. 

The  next  morning,  General  Newton's  division  was  relieved 
by  a  division  from  General  Palmer's  corps,  when  it  moved  to 
the  right  of  General  Wood.  This  accomplished,  General 
Howard  ordered  Kirby's  brigade  and  Nodine's,  the  left  bri- 
gade of  General  Wood's  division,  to  regain  the  hill  which 
Kirby  had  lost  the  evening  previous.  It  had  been  intrenched 
by  the  enemy  during  the  night,  and  his  artillery  bore  upon  it, 
but  these  brigades  carried  it  handsomely  and  intrenched  its 
crest,  under  the  fire  of  two  of  the  enemy's  batteries.  General 
Wood  then  pushed  two  regiments  to  the  front  and  right,  and 
gained  an  eminence  which  commanded  a  long  intrenched 
skirmish  line,  and  permitted  the  advance  of  the  right  of  the 
Fourth  Corps  a  distance  of  five  hundred  yards.  General 
Hooker  advanced  with  his  left  abreast  of  General  Howard's 
right,  against  all  the  resistance  the  enemy  could  offer.  This 
movement  was  so  threatening,  that  General  Johnston  trans- 
ferred Hood's  corps  from  his  right  to  his  left,  leaving  only 


90  OPERATIONS   NEAR   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN. 

Wheeler's  cavalry  in  front  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and 
made  three  unsuccessful  assaults  during  the  night  to  dislodge 
General  Wood. 

The  removal  of  this  corps  from  General  McPherson's  front 
was  so  thoroughly  covered  hy  the  activity  of  Wheeler's  troop- 
ers, that  he  was  led  to  believe  that  there  was  a  concentration 
rather  than  a  vacuum  behind  their  bold  front.  But  though 
General  Johnston  succeeded  in  hiding  the  uncovering  of  his 
right,  and  the  heavy  concentration  on  his  left,  his  subsequent 
aggression  resulted  in  signal  defeat.  He  gained,  however,  in 
defensive  strength  at  the  very  point  it  was  most  needed,  and 
defeated  the  combination  to  turn  his  left,  and  in  fact  defeated 
for  a  time  all  efforts  to  dislodge  him.  General  Sherman's  plan 
proposed  that  General  McPherson  should,  "  at  the  first  pos- 
sible chance,  push  forward  on  the  line  of  the  railroad  and 
main  Marietta  road,  break  through  the  enemy  and  pursue 
him,  or  secure  a  position  on  the  commanding  ridge  over  which 
these  roads  pass,"  while  the  movement  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  toward  General  Schofield,  who  was  searching  for 
the  enemy's  left  flank,  should  cause  him  to  lengthen  his  line 
"  beyond  his  ability  to  defend,"  and  give  an  opportunity  to 
break  it,  by  a  quick  and  energetic  blow.  This  maneuver  en- 
tirely failed  in  its  final  development  through  the  transfer  of 
Hood's  corps  from  the  right  to  the  left,  so  secretly  that  it  was 
in  battle  against  Hooker's  corps,  on  the  Powder  Spring  road, 
before  it  was  ascertained  that  it  was  not  still  before  McPher- 
son. 

The  movements  ordered  by  General  Sherman  for  the  22d, 
had  reference  to  preparation  for  attack  upon  Johnston's  left 
flank.  He  directed  General  Schofield  to  cross  Nose's  creek, 
and  turn  the  head  of  his  column  up  toward  Marietta  until  he 
reached  Hooker,  and  deploy  south  of  the  Marietta  and  Pow- 
der Spring  road ;  while  General  Hooker  was  ordered  to  get 
possession  of  the  ground,  if  practicable,  up  to  Mrs.  Kulp's, 
and  deploy  with  his  right  resting  on  the  Powder  Spring  road. 
This  accomplished,  the  remainder  of  General  Thomas'  line 
was  to  be  advanced  in  conformity.  General  McPherson  was 
instructed  to  press  the  enemy  in  his  front,  to  cover  Big 


OPERATIONS   NEAR   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN.  91 

Shanty,  and  hold  his  rear  massed  in  readiness  to  support 
General  Thomas,  should  he  become  heavily  engaged. 

At  3  A.  M.  on  the  22d,  Cobham's  detachment  of  Geary's  di- 
vision drove  the  enemy  from  the  hill  a  mile  in  front  of  the 
center  of  the  Twentieth  Corps.  The  whole  division  soon  fol- 
lowed, and  intrenched  a  commanding  ridge,  reversing  the 
works  of  the  enemy,  and  covering  artillery  as  well  as  infantry 
lilies.  Subsequently,  Williams'  division  advanced  to  Geary's 
right,  and  Butterfield's  to  his  left,  each  skirmishing  into  posi- 
tion. The  corps  did  not  form  a  continuous  line,  but  each 
division  occupied  a  hill  with  slopes  to  right  and  left,  and 
between  Williams'  left  and  Geary's  right  there  was  a  swampy 
ravine.  Williams'  right  rested  on  the  Powder  Spring  road, 
at  Kulp's  house,  and  his  division  was  formed  with  Ruger's 
brigade  on  the  right,  Knipe's  in  the  center,  and  Robinson's- 
on  the  left.  In  front  of  Robinson,  who  held  a  lateral  hill, 
slightly  refused,  there  was  an  open  space  extending  to  Geary's 
front.  The  ground  was  open  before  Knipe,  except  in  front 
of  his  left,  and  almost  entirely  wooded  in  Ruger's  front.  Gen- 
eral Williams'  placed  Winegar's  and  Woodbury's  batteries- 
before  his  center  and  left  so  as  to  command  all  the  open 
ground.  When  the  Twentieth  Corps  had  attained  this  ad- 
vanced position,  General  Howard  moved  his  line  forward  in 
correspondence. 

At  3  P.  M.,  General  Williams  was  informed  that  Hood's  corp& 
was  massed  before  him.  Reporting  the  fact  to  General  Hooker, 
he  was  directed  to  deploy  his  division  and  construct  breast- 
works without  delay.  He  had,  however,  no  time  to  construct 
defenses,  and  barely  enough  for  array,  before  the  enemy  was 
seen  to  emerge  from  the  woods  beyond  the  open  space  in  his- 
front  and  dash  toward  his  lines.  The  formation  in  triple  lines- 
and  the  peculiar  shout  of  the  troops  forming  them,  alike, pre- 
saged an  assault.  The  movement  was  begun  with  the  enemy's- 
usual  spirit,  but  Woodbury's  canister  swept  the  open  ground 
with  such  destructive  effect  that  the  enemy  was  soon  thrown 
into  confusion  and  retreat.  A  portion  of  the  column  was  driven 
directly  back,  and  the  remainder  was  forced  by  volleys  from 
Knipe's  line  and  Ruger's  left,  to  seek  cover  in  a  ravine  and 
dense  clump  of  trees  and  underbrush,  on  Knipe's  left  front. 


9  OPERATIONS   NEAR   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN. 

A  second  column  moved  directly  against  Robinson's  position, 
but  being  exposed  in  the  open  ground  to  a  direct  fire  from 
Winegar's  battery,  and  an  enfilading  one  from  Geary's  guns 
on  the  left,  was  also  thrown  into  confusion  and  rout.  As  a  final 
effort,  the  rebel  troops  who  had  taken  shelter  in  the  ravine  and 
woods,  having  been  reinforced  from  the  rear,  attempted  to  turn 
Knipe's  left  flank  by  a  stealthy  advance  under  cover ;  but  the 
movement  having  been  perceived,  Vinegar's  battery  and 
Geary's  artillery  again  opened.  The  Sixty-first  Ohio  of  Robin- 
son's brigade  advanced  to  support  the  endangered  flank,  and 
the  concentric  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry  soon  completed 
the  repulse  of  the  enemy.  While  Hood's  attack  was  in  pro- 
gress, heavy  cannonading  was  maintained  throughout  the  front 
of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

In  the  repulse  of  Hood's  attack,  General  Hooker's  artillery 
was  so  remarkably  effective,  that  General  Johnston  admitted 
in  his  official  report  that  his  troops,  Stevenson's  and  Hindman's 
divisions,  were  compelled  to  withdraw  by  the  fire  of  fortified 
artillery.  His  loss  was  exceedingly  heavy ;  General  Hooker's 
very  light.  General  "Williams,  who  alone  was  directly  assailed, 
lost  only  one  hundred  and  thirty  men,  including  nineteen  cap- 
tured on  the  picket  line  by  the  sudden  advance  of  the  enemy. 
Major  D.  C.  Becket,  of  the  Sixty-first  Ohio,  was  killed. 

As  soon  as  the  character  of  the  attack  upon  General  Hooker 
was  developed,  General  Thomas  made  provision  for  his  support. 
The  reserve  regiments  of  the  Fourth  Corps  were  immediately 
thrown  to  the  right,  and  as  soon  as  practicable,  Butterfield's 
division  was  relieved  by  Stanley's,  and  moved  to  the  rear  of 
Williams'  right.  These  dispositions  were  sufficient  for  defense, 
but  the  transfer  of  Hood's  corps  to  General  Johnston's  left 
flank,  necessitated  a  new  combination,  either  to  turn  his  posi- 
tion or  break  through  his  lines.  General  Thomas  suggested 
that  General  McPherson  should  attack  Marietta  from  the  east 
side  of  Kenesaw  Mountain ;  but  General  Sherman  decided  to 
attack  General  Johnston's  fortified  lines  near  his  center,  and 
on  the  24th,  directed  Generals  McPherson  and  Thomas  to  make 
preparations  to  assault  on  the  27th — the  former  near  Little 
Kenesaw,  and  the  latter  about  a  mile  to  the  south,  in  front  of 
the  Fourth  Corps. 


OPERATIONS   NEAR   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN.  93 

General  Thomas  designated  Davis'  and  Newton's  divisions 
to  form  the  assaulting  column,  and  during  the  night  of  the 
25th,  Davis'  and  Baird's  divisions  having  been  relieved  on  the 
left  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  by  General  McPherson's 
troops,  moved  to  the  rear  of  the  Fourth  Corps.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  27th,  Morgan's  brigade  of  Davis'  division  occupied 
the  intrenchments  thrown  up  by  "Whittaker's  brigade  of  Stan- 
ley's division.  Stanley  moved  to  the  left  to  support  Newton, 
and  Baird  held  his  division  in  direct  support  on  Davis'  right. 
Hooker's  whole  corps  was  held  in  readiness  to  support  Palmer's 
and  Howard's. 

At  8  A.  M.  the  preparations  were  complete.  The  brigades  of 
Colonels  Daniel  Me  Cook  and  J.  G.  Mitchell  were  massed  in 
rear  of  the  intrenchments  held  by  Morgan's  brigade,  as  there 
was  no  cover  for  formation  in  front.  Their  point  of  attack 
was  a  salient  in  the  enemy's  works,  conforming  to  a  projection 
in  the  ridge,  around  whose  summit  his  fortifications  were  built, 
and  was  selected  in  consequence  of  the  absence  of  obstructions 
in  front.  Newton's  division  was  formed  with  Harker's  and 
"Wagner's  brigades  in  line,  slightly  separated  for  better  cover, 
and  KimbalPs  in  echelon  with  "Wagner's.  For  fifteen  minutes 
all  the  artillery  available,  poured  a  concentrated  fire  upon  the 
points  of  attack,  and  then  the  columns  moved  forward.  From 
the  moment  that  McCook's  and  Mitchell's  brigades  bounded 
over  their  intrenchments,  they  were  subjected  to  a  galling  fire 
of  artillery  and  musketry.  The  distance  to  the  enemy's  works 
was  about  six  hundred  yards,  and  the  ground  was  rough  and 
partially  covered  with  trees  and  undergrowth  ;  but  disregard- 
ing the  fire  of  the  enemy  and  the  difficulties  of  the  way,  these 
brigades  advanced  rapidly  until  they  were  under  the  guns  of 
the  enemy.  They  reached  his  works,  but  such  was  their 
strength,  and  the  spirit  of  the  heavy  forces  behind  them,  and 
such  their  own  exhaustion,  that  they  were  compelled  to 
halt.  At  this  juncture,  their  situation  was  exceedingly 
critical.  To  carry  the  works  was  impracticable ;  to  retreat, 
threatened  almost  total  destruction,  and  the  maintenance  of 
position  likewise  involved  great  hazard  and  loss.  As,  how- 
ever, it  was  soon  ascertained  that  it  was  possible  to  so  far 
restrain  the  fire  of  the  enemy  by  a  vigorous  response  that 
defenses  could  be  constructed,  General  Thomas  directed 


94:  OPERATIONS   NEAR   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN. 

-General  Davis  to  hold  the  position  and  fortify  it.  Intrenching 
tools  were  at  once  sent  forward,  and  works  were  thrown  up 
within  a  few  yards  of  the  enemy.  The  loss  in  the  advance  and 
during  the  day  was  very  great.  Colonel  McCook  fell  early  mor- 
tally wounded ;  Colonel  Harmon,  the  next  in  rank,  was  soon 
after  killed,  when  the  command  fell  to  Colonel  Dilworth. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  James  Shane  and  Major  John  Yager  of 
Mitchell's  brigade  received  fatal  wounds,  and  from  both  bri- 
gades a  very  large  number  of  officers  and  men  were  killed  and 
wounded. 

The  conditions  of  Newton's  assault  were  somewhat  differ- 
ent, and  so  was  the  result.  His  troops  were  less  exposed  in 
the  advance,  but  the  formidable  obstructions  and  entangle- 
ments held  them  to  a  terrific  fire  under  circumstances  that  for- 
bade its  restraint.  As  a  consequence,  he  was  compelled  to 
withdraw  his  division  altogether  as  soon  as  it  was  evident 
that  the  assault  could  not  be  successful.  At  the  moment  of 
making  a  second  effort  to  advance,  General  Harker  was 
mortally  wounded,  and  in  his  brigade  and  in  Wagner's  the 
loss  was  very  great.  Some  were  killed  on  the  enemy's  para- 
pet. 

The  aggregate  loss  to  Davis  and  Newton,  in  nearly  equal 
division,  was  fifteen  hundred  and  eighty  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing.  The  compensation  was  the  lodgment  of  troops  in 
proximity  to  works  too  strong  to  be  assaulted,  and  the  in- 
fliction of  a  loss  to  the  enemy  of  two  hundred  and  thirty-six 
men,  including  one  hundred  captured.  The  officers  and  men 
engaged  in  this  assault  "  went  to  their  work  with  the  greatest 
•coolness  and  gallantry,"  as  General  Thomas  testified,  but  their 
valor  and  sacrifice  brought  no  adequate  reward. 

During  the  progress  of  the  action  in  the  center,  Generals 
McPherson  and  Schofield  demonstrated  strongly  on  the  ene- 
my's flanks.  The  former  threw  a  portion  of  his  army  against 
a  spur  of  Little  Kenesaw,  and  though  he  attained  position 
near  the  enemy,  did  not  disturb  his  line.  The  latter  gained 
some  advantage  at  Olley's  creek,  as  opening  the  way  for  an- 
other flank  movement  to  the  right. 

Thus  far  in  the  campaign,  Generals  Sherman  and  Johnston 
had  each  kept  up  the  most  persistent  belligerence  to  keep  the 


OPEKATIONS   NEAR   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN.  95 

other  from  detaching  troops  to  Virginia.  But  on  the  28th, 
General  Grant  authorized  General  Sherman  to  make  his  move- 
ments without  reference  to  the  retention  of  General  Johnston's 
forces  where  they  were.  This  independence  and  the  necessity 
of  active  offense  induced  immediate  preparation  for  an  effort 
to  reach  General  Johnston's  communications.  As  the  ac- 
complishment of  this  project  necessitated  the  temporary 
abandonment  of  the  railroad,  General  Sherman  proposed, 
should  the  development  of  his  movement  cause  General  John- 
ston to  abandon  Marietta,  to  swing  in  upon  the  road  in  his 
rear,  but  should  he  hold  that  position,  to  strike  it  between  him 
and  the  Chattahoochee  bridge. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  lost  during  the  month  five 
thousand  seven  hundred  and  forty-seven  men — sixty-seven  offi- 
cers killed,  two  hundred  and  fifty-nine  wounded,  and  eight 
missing,  and  eight  hundred  and  seventy-three  enlisted  men 
killed,  four  thousand  three  hundred  wounded,  and  forty  miss- 
ing. The  army  captured  seven  hundred  and  forty-two 
prisoners,  including  thirty-seven  officers,  and  received  five 
hundred  and  two  deserters  at  Nashville  and  Chattanooga. 

During  the  month,  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  small  parties, 
assisted  by  guerrillas  and  disloyal  citizens,  was  exceedingly 
active  along  the  railroad  south  of  Dalton,  but  wrought  no 
damage  beyond  slight  interruptions  and  the  destruction  of  a 
few  cars.  On  the  10th,  the  "District  of  the  Etowah"  was 
created,  with  General  Steedman  in  command,  who  was  charged 
with  the  protection  of  the  line  of  supply  south  from  Chatta- 
nooga. Soon  after,  the  district  commander  sent  Colonel  "Wat- 
kins'  brigade  of  cavalry  to  Lafayette,  and  a  few  days  later  it 
was  attacked  by  General  Pillow  with  about  two  thousand 
men.  Colonel  Watkins  refused  to  surrender,  and  with  four 
hundred  men  defended  the  town  until  reinforced  by  Colonel 
Croxton,  commanding  the  Fourth  Kentucky  Mounted  In- 
fantry, whose  vigorous  attack  routed  the  enemy.  Pillow's 
loss  was  about  three  hundred  men,  including  eighty  captured. 
"Watkins  and  Croxton  lost  sixty.  On  the  28th,  Brigadier- 
General  Smith's  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  arrived  at 
Chattanooga,  and  was  soon  after  disposed  to  protect  the  rail- 
road north  from  Allatoona. 


96  OPERATIONS   NEAR   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN. 

As  these  troops  gave  assurance  of  secure  communications, 
and  as  supplies  had  been  accumulated  in  such  quantity  as  to 
warrant  the  temporary  abandonment  of  the  railroad,  General 
Sherman  gave  orders,  July  1st,  for  the  movement  of  his  armies 
to  the  right,  to  turn  the  position  he  had  failed  to  carry  by 
assault.  His  orders  required  that  General  Thomas  should 
hold  his  intrenchments  and  observe  the  enemy  until  General 
McPherson  should  pass  to  the  right  in  menace  to  Johnston's 
rear.  General  McPherson  moved  his  army  on  the  2d,  and  the 
night  following  General  Johnston  withdrew  his  army,  and 
when  morning  dawned,  was  far  on  his  way  to  other  intrench- 
ments. In  the  pursuit,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  first 
converged  upon  Marietta,  and  then  moved  on  the  direct  roads 
to  Atlanta.  The  enemy's  rear-guard  was  overtaken  four 
miles  from  Marietta,  and  driven  forward  to  Ruff's  station, 
where  his  forces  were  found  in  strong  earthworks,  constructed 
long  before  in  provision  for  retreat.  The  lines  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  were  speedily  formed,  and  at  midnight 
were  again  in  closest  proximity  to  the  enemy.  General  Sher- 
man urged  his  army  commanders  to  extreme  activity  and  vigor 
to  press  the  enemy  in  confusion  upon  the  bridges  across  the 
Chattahoochee.  But  General  Johnston  was  secure  against  direct 
attack.  His  forecast  of  the  possibilities  of  the  unequal  war- 
fare had  been  so  exhaustive  that  his  steps  from  one  intrenched 
position  to  another  had  all  been  anticipated.  He  held  his 
works  at  Ruff's  station  and  on  his  left  flank  against  General 
McPherson,  until  Hood's  and  Loring's  corps  were  across  the 
Chattahoochee,  and  then  placed  Hardee's  corps  in  his  intrench- 
ments on  the  right  bank  of  the  river  to  cover  the  bridges. 

General  Sherman's  plans  were  soon  formed,  though  their 
execution  was  deferred  to  give  rest  to  his  armies,  perfect  his 
communications,  and  accumulate  supplies  in  proximate  depots, 
that  he  might  be  free  from  daily  dependence  upon  the  contin- 
uity of  his  communications  in  the  next  stage  of  his  cam- 
paign. He  proposed  to  make  the  next  advance  from  his  left, 
and  the  initial  dispositions  were  such  as  at  the  same  time  to 
protect  his  communications  against  an  anticipated  cavalry 
raid  north  of  Marietta.  While  holding  the  main  portion  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  firmly  against  Hardee's  corps  in  his 


OPERATIONS   NEAR   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN.  97 

defenses,  and  feigning  with  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  and 
Stoneman's  cavalry  far  down  to  the  right,  he  threw  Garrard's 
cavalry  to  Roswell,  and  disposed  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  and 
portions  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  to  secure  and  fortify  the  cross- 
ings from  Roswell  to  Paice's  ferry.  Between  the  6th  and  9th, 
two  heads  of  column  crossed  the  river,  one  at  Roswell  and 
the  other  at  Phillips'  ferry;  and  to  give  security  to  the  cross- 
ings, strong  defenses  were  thrown  up  on  the  enemy's  side  of 
the  river. 


[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  20.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  ACWORTH,  GA.,  June  9, 1864. 
The  armies  will  move  forward  to-morrow  morning. 

I.  Major-General  Thomas,  the  center,  on  the  Burnt  Hickory  and  the 
Marietta  road,  and  such  other  roads  as  he  may  choose  between  it  and  the 
Acworth  and  Marietta  road,  aiming  to  strike  the  northern  end  of  Kene- 
saw  Mountain. 

II.  Major-General  McPherson  will  move  by  the  Acworth  and  Marietta 
road,  with  a  column  following  the  railroad,  and  his  cavalry  well  to  the 
left  after  passing  Big  Shanty. 

III.  Major-General  Schofield  will  cover  his  wagons  well  about  Mount 
Olive  Church,  and  feel  well  with  cavalry  and  skirmishers  down  the  road 
past  Hardshell  Church,  to  ascertain  the  enemy's  strength  about  Lost 
Mountain  and  the  ridge  connecting  it  with  Kenesaw  Mountain.     He  will 
not  pass  position  about  Hardshell  Church  in  force  until  he  is  certain  Major- 
General  Thomas  has  reached  some  point  on  Kenesaw. 

IV.  The  object  will  be  to  develop  the  enemy's  position  and  strength, 
and  to  draw  artillery  fire  from  his  intrenched  works.     .     .     . 

V.  Major-General  Stoneman's  cavalry  will  cover  the  right,  and  Brigadier- 
General  Garrard's  the  left  flanks.     Brigadier-General  McCook's  cavalry 
should  be  kept  to  the  rear,  or  to  keep  up  communications. 

VI.  The  movement  will  begin  at  six  (6)  o'clock  A.  M.,  and  continue  until 
Borne  one  of  the  columns  reaches  Kenesaw  Mountain,  or  until  the  center 
is  checked. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

R.  M.  SAWYER 

Aid-de-Camp* 
VOL.  H— 7 


98  OPERATIONS  NEAR  KENESAW   MOUNTAIN. 

x 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  BIG  SHANTY,  June  11,  1864. 
General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Johnston  is  intrenched  on  the  hills  embracing  Lost  Mountain,  Pine 
Hill,  and  Kenesaw.  Our  Hnes  are  down  to  him,  but  it  has  rained  so  hard, 
and  the  ground  is  so  boggy,  that  we  have  not  developed  any  weak  point  or 
flank. 

I  will  proceed  with  due  caution,  and  try  and  make  no  mistake.  The 
Etowah  bridge  is  done,  and  the  construction  train  has  been  to  our  very 
camps.  Supplies  will  now  be  accumulated  at  Allatoona  Pass,  or  brought 
right  up  to  our  lines. 

One  of  my  chief  objects  being  to  give  full  employment  to  Joe  John- 
ston, it  makes  no  difference  where  he  is,  so  he  is  not  on  his  way  to  Vir- 
ginia. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  BIG  SHANTY,  June  13,  1864. 
Major-General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  G.  : 

We  have  had  hard  and  cold  rains  for  about  ten  days.  A  gleam  of  sun- 
shine this  evening  gives  hope  of  a  change.  The  roads  are  insufficient 
here,  and  the  fields  and  new  ground  are  simply  impassable  to  wheels.  As 
soon  as  possible  I  will  study  Johnston's  position  on  Kenesaw  and  Lost 
Mountain,  and  adopt  some  plan  to  dislodge  him  or  draw  him  out  of  his 
position.  We  can  not  risk  the  heavy  losses  of  an  assault  at  this  distance 
from  our  base.  Cars  now  run  to  our  very  front  camps.  All  well. 

There  are  troops  enough  in  Kentucky  to  manage  Morgan,  and  in  Ten- 
nessee to  watch  Forrest  should  he  make  his  appearance,  as  Johnston 

doubtless  calculates. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  BIG  SHANTY,  June  16,  1864. 
General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

General  Thomas  did  not  make  the  progress  last  night  I  expected.  He 
found  the  enemy  strongly  intrenched  on  a  line  slightly  advanced  from 
a  straight  line  connecting  Lost  and  Kenesaw  Mountain.  I  have  been 
along  it  to-day,  and  am  pressing  up  close.  Shall  study  it,  and  am 
now  inclined  to  feign  on  both  flanks,  and  assault  the  center.  It  may 
cost  us  dear,  but  in  result  would  surpass  an  attempt  to  pass  round.  The 
enemy  has  a  strong  position,  and  covers  his  road  well,  and  the  only 
weak  point  in  the  game  is  in  having  the  Chattahoochee  in  his  rear.  If, 
by  assaulting,  I  can  break  his  line,  I  see  no  reason  why  it  should  not  pro- 
duce a  decisive  effect.  I  know  he  shifts  his  troops  about  to  meet  our 


OPERATIONS   NEAR   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN.  99 

supposed  attacks,  and  thereby   fatigues   his   men,  and  the  woods  will 
•enable  me  to  mask  our  movements. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major- General  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  BIG  SHANTY,  June  21,  1864. 
Major-General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

This  is  the  nineteenth  day  of  rain,  and  the  prospect  of  clear  weather 
as  far  off  as  ever.  The  roads  are  impassable,  and  fields  and  woods  be- 
come quagmires  after  a  few  wagons  have  crossed,  yet  we  are  at  work  all 
the  time.  The  left  flank  is  across  Novaday,  and  the  right  across  Nose's 
creek.  The  enemy  holds  Kenesaw,  a  conical  mountain,  with  Marietta 
behind  it,  and  has  retired  his  flanks  to  cover  that  town  and  his  rail- 
road. I  am  all  ready  to  attack  the  moment  the  weather  and  roads  will 
permit  troops  and  artillery  to  move  with  anything  like  life. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

HEADQTARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  June  22,  1864. 

GENERAL  : — I  will  start  early  to  look  at  the  position  of  McPherson  as 
near  the  north  base  of  Kenesaw  as  I  can  safely  do,  and  then  come  to 
Wallace's,  or  the  house  in  front,  and  then  over  to  Hooker.  I  have  ordered' 
Schofield  to  cross  his  whole  command  over  Nose's  creek,  and  turn  the 
head  of  his  column  up  toward  Marietta,  until  he  reaches  Hooker,  to  sup- 
port and  co-operate  on  his  right,  but  to  keep  his  cavalry  and  a  part  of  his 
rear  infantry  on  the  Sandtown  road,  prepared  to  regain  it  in  case  the  enemy 
shows  signs  of  let  go.  I  fear  we  will  get  our  commands  too  close,  but  I 
suppose  Schofield  can  find  room  to  deploy  south  of  the  Powder  Springs 
and  Marietta  road.  You  may  order  Hooker  to  extend  to  that  road  and 
leave  Schofield  beyond.  If  he  can  get  possession  of  the  ground  up  to 
Mrs.  Kulp's  house,  I  wish  him  to  do  so,  and  the  balance  of  your  line  to 
-conform.  I  will  explain  McPherson's  orders  when  I  meet  you. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 
Major-General  Thomas,  Commanding  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  BIG  SHANTY,  June  22,  1864 — 9  P.  M. 

GENERAL  : — When  on  the  hill  in  front  of  your  center  to-day,  waiting  for 
you,  I  signaled  General  Hooker : 

"  How  are  you  getting  along  ?    Near  what  house  are  you  ? 

"  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

"Major-General" 


100          OPERATIONS   NEAR   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN. 

At  this  hour  (9 £)  I  have  received  this  answer : 

"  KULP  HOUSE — 5.30  p.  M. 

"  We  have  repulsed  two  heavy  attacks,  and  feel  confident,  our  only  ap- 
prehension being  from  our  extreme  right  flank.  Three  (3)  entire  corps 
are  in  front  of  us. 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  HOOKER." 

I  was  at  the  Wallace  house  at  5.30  p.  M.,  and  the  Kulp  house  was  within 
two  miles ;  and  though  I  heard  some  cannonading,  I  had  no  idea  of  his 
being  attacked,  and  General  Hooker  must  be  mistaken  about  three  (3) 
corps  being  in  his  front.  Johnston's  army  has  only  three  corps,  and  I 
know  there  was  a  respectable  force  along  McPherson's  front ;  so  much  so, 
that  this  general  thought  the  enemy  was  massing  against  him.  I  know  there 
was  some  force  in  front  of  Palmer  and  Howard,  for  I  was  there.  Still,  it  is 
very  natural  the  enemy  should  meet  Hooker  at  that  point  in  force,  and  I 
gave  Schofield  orders  this  morning  to  conduct  his  column  from  Nose's 
creek,  on  the  Powder  Spring  road,  toward  Marietta,  and  support  Hooker's 
right  flank,  sending  his  cavalry  down  the  Powder  Spring  road  toward  Sweet- 
water,  and  leaving  some  infantry  from  his  rear  to  guard  the  fords.  Cap- 
tain Dayton  says  that  General  Schofield  received  my  orders,  which  were 
in  writing.  If  later  information  shows  that  Schofield  is  not  up,  send  a 
staff  officer  and  notify  him  of  the  necessity,  and,  if  need  be,  call  off  all 
of  Palmer's,  and  notify  McPherson,  who  has  orders  for  this  very  contin- 
gency. To-morrow,  if  need  be,  we  must  bring  things  to  a  crisis. 
•  Cars  and  telegraph  now  all  right.  Some  of  John  E.  Smith's  men  are 
at  Chattanooga,  so  that  I  think  our  road  will  be  better  guarded.  The 
cavalry  of  Lowe  should  be  out  on  the  Tennessee  road,  patrolling  from 

Cartersville  to  Spring  Place. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 
Major-General  Thomas,  Commanding  Army  of  the  Cumberland 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  BIG  SHANTY,  June  22,  1864. 

GENERAL: — General  Hooker,  this  P.  M.,  advanced  to  the  Kulp  house, 
two  and  half  miles  southwest  of  Marietta,  and  reports  finding  three  (3) 
corps.  He  was  attacked  twice,  and  successfully  repulsed  the  enemy. 
General  Thomas  thinks  that  that  will  be  the  enemy's  tactics,  and  that  you 
ought  to  attack  Marietta  from  that  side  of  Kenesaw,  but  I  judge  the  safer 
and  better  plan  to  be  the  one  I  indicated,  viz.,  for  you  to  leave  a  light 
force  and  cover  that  flank,  and  throw  the  remainder  rapidly,  and  as  much 
out  of  view  as  possible,  to  our  right. 

You  may  make  the  necessary  orders,  and  be  prepared  for  rapid  action 
to-morrow.  So  dispose  matters  that  the  big  guns  of  Kenesaw  will  do  you 
as  little  mischief  as  possible.  Yours,  etc., 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 
Major-General  McPherson,  Commanding  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 


OPERATIONS   NEAR   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN.          101 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  28.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  KENESAW  MOUNTAIN,  June  24,  1864. 
The  army  commanders  will  ma'ke  full  reconnoissances  and  preparation 
to  attack  the  enemy  in  force  on  the  27th  instant,  at  eight  (8)  o'clock  A.  M. 
precisely.     The  commanding  general  will  be  on  "  Signal  Hill,"  and  will 
have  telegraphic  communication  with  all  the  army  commanders. 

I.  Major-General  Thomas  will  assault  the  enemy  at  any  point  near  his 
center,  to  be  selected  by  himself,  and  will  make  any  changes  in  his  troops 
necessary,  by  night,  so  as  not  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  enemy. 

II.  Major-General  McPherson  will  feign  by  a  movement  of  his  cavalry 
and  one  (1)  division  of  infantry  on  his  extreme  left,  approaching  Marietta 
from  the  north,  and  using  artillery  freely ;  but  will  make  his  real  attack 
at  a  point  south  and  west  of  Kenesaw. 

III.  Major-General  Schofield  will  feel  to  his  extreme  right,  and  threaten 
that  flank  of  the  enemy  with  artillery,  and  display,  but  attack  some  one 
point  of  the  enemy's  line  as  near  the  Marietta  and  Powder  Spring  road  as 
lie  can  with  prospect  of  success. 

IV.  All  commanders  will  maintain  reserve  and  secrecy,  even  from  their 
staff   officers,   but  make  all  proper  preparations  and  reconnoissances. 
When  troops  are  to  be  shifted  to  accomplish  this  attack,  the  movements 
will  be  made  at  night.    At  the  time  of  the  general  attack,  the  skirmishers 
jit  the  base  of  Kenesaw  will  take  advantage  of  it,  to  gain,  if  possible,  the 
Bummit,  and  hold  it. 

V.  Each  attacking  column  will  endeavor  to  break  a  single  point  of  the 
•enemy's  line,  and  make  a  secure  lodgment  beyond,  and  be  prepared  for 
following  it  up  toward  Marietta  and  the  railroad,  in  case  of  success. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

A  id-de-  Camp. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  KENESAW,  June  24,  1864. 

GENERAL: — I  am  directed  by  the  major-general  commanding  to  acknowl- 
edge the  receipt  through  you  of  Rousseau's  communication  in  copy,  the 
original  of  which  also  came  to  hand.  The  general  commanding  thinks 
quite  favorably  of  the  suggestion  therein,  and  desires  you  to  instruct  Gen- 
eral Rousseau  to  gradually  collect  his  available  force  of  cavalry  and  infantry 
at  Pulaski,  Athens,  and  Decatur,  upon  the  representation  of  protecting 
our  roads  against  Forrest,  but  really  to  strike  as  proposed ;  the  cavalry  to  be 
well  fed,  and  the  infantry  stripped  for.  light,  rapid  movements,  and  to  be 
ready  to  move  at  telegraphic  notice  from  us.  The  time  to  do  it  will  be 

when  we  have  forced  Johnston  across  the  Chattahoochee 

L.  M.  DAYTON," 

Aid-de-Camp. 
Major-General  G.  H.  Thomas,  Commanding,  etc. 


102          OPERATIONS   NEAR   KENESAW   FOUNTAIN. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  KENESAW  MOUNTAIN,  June  25, 1864. 
General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

I  have  nothing  new  to  report ;  constant  skirmishing  and  cannonading. 
I  am  making  some  changes  in  the  disposition  of  our  men,  with  a  view  to 
attack  the  enemy's  left  center.  I  shall  aim  to  make  him  stretch  his  line- 
until  he  weakens  it,  and  then  break  through. 

•*•*#•*#•*#•*•# 

W,  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding* 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI 

IN  THE  FIELD,  June  27,  1864 — 11.45  A.  M. 
General  Schqfield : 

Neither  McPherson  nor  Thomas  has  succeeded  in  breaking  through,  but 
each  has  made  substantial  progress,  at  some  cost.  Push  your  operations- 
on  the  flank,  and  keep  me  advised. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding* 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI 

IN  THE  FIELD,  June  27,  1864—11.45  A.  M. 
General  Thomas : 

McPherson's  column  marched  near  the  top  of  the  hill  through  very 
tangled  brush,  but  was  repulsed  ;  it  is  found  almost  impossible  to  deploy, 
but  they  still  hold  the  ground.  I  wish  you  to  study  well  the  positions, 
and,  if  it  be  possible,  break  through  the  line  to  do  it;  it  is  easier  now  than 
it  will  be  hereafter.  I  hear  Leggett's  guns  well  behind  the  mountain. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding , 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI. 

IN  THE  FIELD,  June  27,  1864—1.30  p.  M. 
General  Thomas  : 

McPherson  and  Schofield  are  at  a  dead  lock.  Do  you  think  you  can 
carry  any  part  of  the  enemy's  main  line  to-day  ?  McPherson's  men  are 
up  to  the  abatis,  and  can't  move  without  direct  assault.  I  will  order  an 
assault,  if  you  think  you  can  succeed  at  any  point.  Schofield  has  one 
division  close  up  on  the  Powder  Spring  road,  and  the  other  across  Olley's 
creek,  about  two  miles  to  his  right  and  rear. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  June  27 — 2.25  p.  M. 
General  Thomas : 
Secure  what  advantageous  ground  you  have  gained ;  but  is  there  any- 


OPERATIONS  NEAR  KENESAW   MOUNTAIN.          103 

thing  in  the  enemy's  present  position,  that,  if  we  should  approach  by  reg- 
ular saps,  he  could  not  make  a  dozen  new  parapets  before  our  saps  are 
completed  ?  Does  the  nature  of  the  ground  warrant  the  time  necessary 

for  regular  approaches  ? 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General  Commanding. 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

June  27 — 10.45  A.  M. 
Major-General  Sherman :  . 

Yours  received.  Harker's  brigade  advanced  to  within  twenty  paces 
of  the  enemy's  breastworks,  and  was  repulsed  with  canister  at  short 
range,  General  Harker  losing  an  arm.  General  Wagner's  brigade  of 
Newton's  division,  supporting  General  Harker,  was  so  severely  handled 
that  it  is  compelled  to  reorganize.  Colonel  Mitchell's  brigade  of  Davis* 
division  captured  one  line  of  rebel  breastworks,  which  they  still  hold. 
McCook's  brigade  was  also  severely  handled,  nearly  every  colonel  being 
killed  or  wounded.  It  is  compelled  to  fall  back  and  reorganize.  The 
troops  are  all  too  much  exhausted  to  advance,  but  we  hold  all  that  we 
have  gained. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  V. 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND,  June  27. 
General  Sherman  : 

Your  dispatch  of  2.25  received.  We  still  hold  all  the  ground  we  have 
gained,  and  the  division  commanders  report  their  ability  to  hold.  They 
also  report  the  enemy's  works  exceedingly  strong ;  in  fact,  so  strong  that 
they  can  not  be  carried  by  assault,  except  by  immense  sacrifice,  even  if 
they  can  be  carried  at  all.  I  think,  therefore,  the  best  chance  is  to  ap- 
proach them  by  regular  saps,  if  we  can  find  a  favorable  approach  to  bat- 
ter them  down.  We  have  already  lost  heavily  to-day,  without  gaining 
any  material  advantage.  One  or  two  more  such  assaults  would  use  up 
this  army. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  V. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  KENESAW,  June  27,  1864. 
General  Halleck : 

Pursuant  to  my  orders  on  the  24th,  a  diversion  was  made  on  each  flank 
of  the  enemy,  especially  on  the  Sandtown  road,  and  at  8  A.  M.  General 
McPherson,  at  the  southwest  end  of  the  Kenesaw,  and  General  Thomas 
at  a  point  about  a  mile  further  south ;  at  the  same  time,  skirmishers  and 
artillery  along  the  whole  line  kept  up  a  sharp  fire.  Neither  attack  sue- 


104          OPERATIONS   NEAR   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN. 

ceeded,  though  both  columns  reached  the  enemy's  works,  which  are  very- 
strong.  General  McPherson  reports  his  loss  about  five  hundred,  and 
General  Thomas  about  two  thousand ;  the  loss  particularly  heavy  in  gen- 
erals and  field  officers.  General  Harker  is  reported  mortally  wounded; 
also,  Colonel  Dan.  McCook,  commanding  brigade;  Colonel  Rice,  Fifty- 
seventh  Ohio,  very  seriously.  Colonels  Barnhill,  Fortieth  Illinois,  and 
Augustine,  Fifty-fifth  Illinois,  are  killed. 

The  facilities  with  which  defensive  works  of  timber  and  earth  are  con- 
structed, gives  the  party  on  the  defensive  great  advantage 

I  can  not  well  turn  the  position  of  the^enemy  without  abandoning  my 
railroad,  and  we  are  already  so  far  from  our  supplies  that  it  is  as  much  as 
the  road  can  do  to  feed  and  supply  the  army.  There  are  no  supplies  of 
any  kind  here.  I  can  press  Johnston,  and  keep  him  from  reinforcing 
Lee,  but  to  assault  him  in  position  will  cost  us  more  lives  than  we  can 
spare. 

McPherson  took,  to-day,  one  hundred  prisoners,  and  Thomas  about 
as  many,  but  I  do  not  suppose  that  we  have  inflicted  heavy  loss  on  the 
enemy,  as  he  kept  close  behind  his  parapets. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

June  27,  1864 — 9  p.  M. 
General  Thomas : 

Are  you  willing  to  risk  the  move  on  Fulton,  cutting  loose  from  our 
railroad?  It  would  bring  matters  to  a  crisis,  and  Schofield  has  secured 
the  way. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major- General  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND,  June  27. 
General  Sherman  : 

What  force  do  you  think  of  moving  with  ?  If  with  the  greater  part  of 
the  army,  I  think  it  decidedly  better  than  butting  against  breastworks 
twelve  feet  thick,  and  strongly  abatised. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major- General  U.  S.  V. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI^ 

NEAR  KENESAW  MOUNTAIN,  June,  27,  1864. 
General  Thomas : 

Let  your  troops  fortify  as  close  up  to  the  enemy  as  possible.  Get  good 
positions  for  artillery,  and  group  as  conveniently  as  you  can  by  corps  and 
divisions,  keeping  reserves.  Schofield  has  the  Sandtown  road  within 
eleven  miles  of  the  Chattahoochee,  and  he  could  move  by  that  flank. 
The  question  of  supplies  will  be  the  only  one.  I  regret  beyond  measure 
the  loss  of  two  such  young  and  dashing  officers  as  Harker  and  McCook. 


OPERATIONS   NEAR  KENESAW   MOUNTAIN.          105 

McPherson  lost  two  or  three  of  his  young  and  dashing  officers,  which  is 
apt  to  be  the  case  in  unsuccessful  assaults.  Had  we  broken  the  line  to- 
day, it  would  have  been  most  decisive;  but  as  it  is,  our  loss  is  small  com- 
pared with  some  of  those  east.  It  should  .not  in  the  least  discourage  us. 
At  times,  assaults  are  necessary  and  inevitable.  At  Arkansas  Post  we 
succeeded ;  at  Vicksburg  we  failed.  I  do  not  think  our  loss  to-day  greater 
than  Johnston's,  when  he  attacked  Hooker  and  Schofield  the  first  day 
we  occupied  our  present  ground. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General  Commanding. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  KENESAW,  June  27,  1864. 
General  McPherson : 

Is  General  Blair  back  ?  Report  to  me  fully  his  operations  for  to-day. 
Schofield' s  right  division  (Cox)  has  gained  a  good  position  on  the  other 
side  of  Olley's  creek  and  at  the  head  of  Nickajack.  If  we  had  our  sup- 
plies well  up,  I  would  move  by  the  right  flank;  but  suppose  we  must 
cover  our  railroad  for  a  few  days. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major- General  Commanding. 

WASHINGTON,  June  28,  1864 — 4  p.  M. 
Major- General  Sherman: 

General  Grant  directs  me  to  say  that  the  movements  of  your  army  may 
be  made  entirely  independent  of  any  desire  to  retain  Johnston's  forces 
where  they  are.  He  does  not  think  that  Lee  will  bring  any  more  addi- 
tional troops  to  Richmond,  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  feeding  them. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  KENESAW,  June  30,  1864. 
-General  Schofield: 

General  Thomas  is  here.  He  will  study  the  ground  well,  and  prepare 
to  relieve  Hascall's  division  to-night,  in  which  event  I  want  you  with  your 
whole  force  to  occupy  between  Olley's  creek  and  Nickajack,  to  drive  the 
enemy  from  the  forks  of  the  road,  and  picket  as  far  down  as  Nickajack 
creek,  and  as  far  down  on  the  Sandtown  road  as  possible.  At  the  same 
time,  General  Stoneman's  cavalry,  supported  by  McCook,  should  move 
across  Sweetwater  by  Powder  Springs,  and  down  the  west  side  of  Sweet- 
water  creek  to  Sweetwater  town,  which  crossing  once  secured,  Stoneman 
to  hold  it,  and  McCook  to  return  to  Lost  Mountain. 

General  McPherson's  command  to  remain  where  it  is  until  our  stores 
are  complete,  when  his  cavalry  will  guard  the  roads  from  Marietta  to- 
ward Allatoona,  while  McPherson  moves  with  his  whole  command  down 
the  Sandtown  road  to  the  Chattahoochee.  If  Johnston  holds  on  to 


106         OPERATIONS   NEAR   KENESAW   MOUNTAIN. 

Kenesaw,  then  we  must  strike  some  point  on  the  railroad,  between  Ma- 
rietta and  the  bridge ;  but  if  he  lets  go  of  Marietta,  then  we  will  swing 
across  the  railroad,  to  a  position  that  gives  us  again  the  use  of  the  rail- 
road. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General  Commanding. 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO  31.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  KENESAW  MOUNTAIN,  July  1,  1864. 
The  object  of  the  contemplated  movement  is  to  deprive  the  enemy  of 
the  great  advantage  he  has  in  Kenesaw,  as  a  watch-tower  from  which  to 
observe  our  every  movement,  to  force  him  to  come  out  of  his  intrench- 
ments,  or  move  further  south.     To  attain  this  end : 

I.  All  army  commanders  will  fill  up  their  wagons  at  Big  Shanty  depot, 
to  their  utmost,  with  provisions,  ammunition,  and  forage.     The  chief 
quartermaster  and  commissary  will  give  all  necessary  orders  to  clean  out 
the  depots  in  front  of  Allatoona,  and  so  instruct  that  the  locomotives  and 
cars  will  come  forward  of  Allatoona  with  great  caution,  and  only  when  or- 
dered by  chief  commmissary. 

II.  Major-General  Thomas  will  hold  the  ground  below  Kenesaw,  as  far 
as  Olley's  creek,  near  Mount  Zion;  Major-General  Schofield  that  from 
Olley's  creek  to  Nickajack,  and  General  McPherson  will  move  his  train 
and  troops  rapidly  in  a  single  march,  and  as  little  observed  from  Kenesaw 
as  possible,  to  the  Sandtown  road,  and  down  it  to  the  extreme  right,  with 
one  corps  near  the  Widow  Mitchell's,  another  near  Ruff's  mill  on  the 
Nickajack,  and  the  the  third  in  reserve,  near  the  forks  of  the  road. 

III.  General  Garrard's   cavalry  will  cover  the  roads  out  of  Marietta 
which  pass  north  of  Kenesaw,  and  General  Stoneman's  cavalry  will  oc- 
cupy Sweetwater  (old  town),  coincident  with  the  movement  of  McPherson. 
General  McCook  will  receive  orders  from  General  Thomas.     In  case  the 
enemy  presses  Garrard  back  by  superior  and  overwhelming  forces,  he 
will  send  one  of  his  brigades  to  the  flank  of  General  Thomas,  and  will, 
with  the  others,  fall  back  gradually  toward  Allatoona,  disputing  every 
foot  of  ground. 

IV.  Major-General  McPherson  will  threaten  the  Chattahoochee  river 
and  also  the  railroad,  and  General  Thomas  will  .press  the  enemy  close, 
and,  at  the  very  earliest  possible  moment,  break  his  lines,  and  reach  the 
railroad  below  Marietta.     All  movements  must  be  vigorous  and  rapid,  as 
the  time  allowed  is  limited  by  the  supplies  in  our  wagons. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-  Camp. 


OPERATIONS   NEAR  KENESAW   MOUNTAIN.          107 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

MARIETTA,  GAM  July  3,  1864—10  A.  M. 
General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.  ; 

The  movement  on  our  right  caused  the  enemy  to  evacuate.  We  occu- 
pied Kenesaw  at  daylight,  and  Marietta  at  8£  A.  M.  Thomas  is  moving 
down  the  main  road  toward  the  Chattahoochee ;  McPherson  toward  the 
mouth  of  Nickajack,  on  the  Sandtown  road.  Our  cavalry  is  on  the  ex- 
treme flank.  Whether  the  enemy  will  halt  this  side  of  the  Chattahoochee 
or  not  will  soon  be  known.  Marietta  is  almost  entirely  abandoned  by  its 
inhabitants,  and  more  than  a  mile  of  the  railroad  iron  is  removed  betwen 
the  town  and  the  foot  of  Kenesaw.  I  propose  to  press  the  enemy  close 
*ill  he  is  across  the  Chattahoochee  river,  when  I  must  accumulate  stores 
and  better  guard  my  rear. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major- General  Commanding, 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  CHATTAHOOCHEE,  July  9,  1864. 
General  HallecJc,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

I  telegraphed  to  you,  and  Mr.  Secretary  Stanton  answers.  Drop  me  a. 
word  now  and  then  of  advice  and  encouragement.  I  think  I  have  done 
well  to  maintain  such  an  army  in  this  country,  fighting  for  sixty  (60)  days, 
and  yet  my  losses  are  made  up  by  the  natural  increase.  The  assault  I 
made  was  no  mistake.  I  had  to  do  it.  The  enemy,  and  our  own  army 
and  officers,  had  settled  down  into  the  conviction  that  the  assault  of  lines 
formed  no  part  of  my  game,  and  the  moment  the  enemy  was  found  be- 
hind anything  like  a  parapet,  why  everybody  would  deploy,  throw  up 
counter-works,  and  take  it  easy,  leaving  it  to  to  the  "  Old  Man  "  to  turn 
the  position.  Had  the  assault  been  made  with  one-fourth  more  vigor 
(mathematically),  I  would  have  put  the  head  of  George  Thomas'  whole 
army  right  through  Johnston's  deployed  line  on  the  best  ground  for  "  go 
ahead,"  while  my  entire  forces  were  well  in  hand  on  roads  converging  to 
my  then  object,  Marietta.  Had  Harker  and  McCook  not  been  struck 
down  so  early,  the  assault  would  have  succeeded,  and  then  the  battle 
would  have  all  been  in  our  favor,  on  account  of  our  superiority  of  num- 
bers and  initiative.  Even  as  it  was,  Johnston  has  been  much  more  cau- 
tious since,  and  gave  ground  more  freely.  His  next  fighting  line  (Smyrna 
camp-ground)  he  only  held  one  day. 

********* 

Write  me  a  note  occasionally,  and  suggest  anything  that  may  occur  to 
you,  as  I  am  really  in  the  wilderness  down  here;  but  I  will  fight  any  and  all 
the  time  on  anything  like  fair  terms,  and  that  is  the  best  strategy,  but  it 
would  not  be  fair  to  run  up  against  such  parapets  as  I  find  here. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 


108         OPERATIONS  NEAR  KENESAW  MOUNTAIN. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  CHATTAHOOCHEE  RIVER,  July  13,  1864. 

DEAR  GENERAL  : — I  have  written  you  but  once  since  the  opening  of  the 
campaign,  but  I  report  by  telegraph  to  General  Halleck  daily,  and  he 
furnishes  you  copy.  My  progress  was  slower  than  I  calculated,  from 
two  chief  causes — an  uninterrupted  rain  from  June  2d  to  the  22d,  and 
the  peculiar  submountainous  nature  of  the  country  from  the  Etowah  to 
the  Chattahoochee.  But  we  have  overcome  all  opposition,  and  whipped 
Johnston  in  every  fight  when  we  were  on  anything  like  fair  terms,  and  I 
think  the  army  feels  that  way,  that  we  can  whip  the  enemy  in  anything 
like  a  fair  fight ;  but  he  has  uniformly  taken  shelter  behind  parallels  of 
strong  profile,  made  in  advance  for  him  by  negroes  and  militia.  I  regarded 
an  assault  on  the  27th  of  June  necessary  for  two  good  reasons :  1.  Because 
the  enemy,  as  well  as  my  own  army,  had  settled  down  into  the  belief  that 
"  flanking"  alone  was  my  game ;  and,  2.  That  on  that  day  and  ground,  had 
the  assault  succeeded,  I  could  have  broken  Johnston's  center,  and  pushed 
his  army  back  in  confusion,  and  with  great  loss,  to  his  bridges  over  the 
Chattahoochee.  We  lost  nothing  in  morale  in  the  assault,  for  I  followed 
it  up  on  the  extreme  right,  and  compelled  him  to  quit  the  very  strong  lines 
of  Kenesaw,  Smyrna  camp-ground,  and  the  Chattahoochee,  in  quick  suc- 
cession-. .  .  . 

I  have  now  fulfilled  the  first  part  of  the  "  grand  plan."  Our  lines  are 
up  to  the  Chattahoochee,  and  the  enemy  is  beyond. 

•*•*•******* 

I  feel  certain  we  have  killed  and  crippled  for  Joe  Johnston  as  many  as 
we  have  sent  of  our  men  to  the  rear ;  have  sent  back  about  six  or  seven 
thousand  prisoners ;  have  taken  eleven  (11)  guns  of  Johnston,  and  about 
ten  (10)  in  Rome;  have  destroyed  immense  iron,  cotton,  and  wool  mills; 
and  have  possession  of  all  the  entire  country.  My  operations  have  been 
rather  cautious  than  bold,  but,  on  the  whole,  I  trust  are  satisfactory  to 
you. 

**#**#*** 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 
Lieutenant-General  Grant  near  Petersburg,  Va. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

ADVANCE   UPON  ATLANTA,   AND   BATTLE   OF   PEACHTREE   CREEK. 

ACTING  upon  the  belief  that  two  corps  were  across  the  river, 
and  intrenched,  General  Johnston  withdrew  Hardee's  corps 
the  night  of  the  9th,  and  the  smoke  of  the  burning  bridges 
was  the  first  revelation  of  his  action.  He  selected  as  his  next 
line,  Peachtree  creek  and  the  Chattahoochee  below  its  mouth, 
and  placed  his  army  on  the  high  ground  south  of  the  creek  in 
waiting  to  attack  the  national  armies  whenever  they  should 
attempt  to  cross.  Should  he  be  unsuccessful  in  preventing 
their  passage,  he  proposed  to  delay  their  approach  to  Atlanta 
until  his  defenses  between  the  Marietta  and  Decatur  roads 
could  be  intrusted  to  the  state  troops,  and  then  sally,  oat  with 
his  whole  army,  and  strike  the  flank  most  exposed.  He  was 
under  the  impression  that  his  method  of  defense,  covering  con- 
tinually, not  only  his  main  line,  but  his  skirmishers,  with  in- 
trenchments,  had  enabled  him  to  inflict  losses  fivefold  greater 
than  his  own,  and  that  such  had  been  the  reduction  of  Gen- 
eral Sherman's  superiority  that  he  could  now  safely  deliver 
offensive  battle,  especially  as  he  had  the  fortifications  of  At- 
lanta for  refuge  in  the  event  of  defeat,  which,  in  his  esti- 
mation, were  "  too  strong  to  be  assaulted,  and  too  extensive  to 
be  invested."  But  as  his  estimation  of  the  reduction  of  Gen- 
eral Sherman's  strength  was  radically  erroneous,  there  was  no 
ground  for  his  faith  in  his  ability  to  meet  him  in  general 
battle.  He  confessed  a  loss  of  ten  thousand  killed  and 
wounded  of  infantry  and  artillery,  and  though  General  Sher- 
man's loss  in  the  same  arms  were  probably  one-half  more,  the 
relative  strength  of  the  armies  had  not  materially  changed 
since  the  battle  of  Resaca,  and  now,  as  then,  he  had  fifty 

(109) 


110         ADVANCE  UPON  ATLANTA,  ETC. 

thousand  against  a  hundred  thousand  men  for  an  open  battle. 
In  the  defense  of  fortifications,  he  was  relatively  stronger,  as 
he  had  gradually  received  accessions  of  militia,  to  be  used  only 
in  constructing  and  holding  intrenchments,  so  that  his  pur- 
pose to  act  offensively  before  Atlanta  was  formed  in  ignorance 
of  the  fact  that  General  Sherman  had  maintained  a  hundred 
thousand  men  on  his  offensive  front,  against  all  his  losses  and 
the  demands  of  an  ever-lengthening  line  of  supply. 

To  General  Sherman,  the  outlook  from  the  Chattahoochee 
was  promising  in  the  main,  but  there  were  contingencies  pro- 
ductive of  no  slight  anxiety.  He  had  been  able  thus  far  to 
maintain  his  communications  against  all  the  forces  that  Gen- 
eral Johnston  could  detach  against  them ;  but  Forrest,  the  bold 
raider,  had  given  remote  menace  from  East  Tennessee,  and 
the  possibility  of  a  dash  by  him  from  Mississippi  was  not  yet 
entirely  removed.  And  he  looked  anxiously,  though  hope- 
fully, to  Major-General  Canby,  commanding  the  newly  created 
military  division  of  West  Mississippi,  to  so  engage  the  enemy's 
forces  in  the  "West  and  Southwest  as  to  prevent  their  approach 
to  his  rear.  Before  him,  the  city  of  Atlanta,  his  next  objective, 
was  in  view.  Its  importance  as  a  railroad  and  manufacturing 
center,  and  the  moral  effect  of  its  successful  defense,  might 
justly  be  regarded  as  overmastering  incentives  to  the  enemy 
to  fortify,  and  to  fight  to  hold  it.  To  sever  its  railroad  con- 
nection with  the  states  west,  and  cut  off  supply  and  reinforce- 
ment from  that  quarter,  General  Rousseau,  with  a  mounted 
force,  was  in  motion  from  Decatur,  Alabama,  to  Opelika,  and 
Stoneman  had  been  sent  to  strike  the  same  road  nearer  At- 
lanta. But  another  general  advance  could  not  be  delayed  in 
waiting  for  the  issues  of  remote  operations,  and  with  the  com- 
pletion of  preparations  for  it,  there  came,  as  an  incentive  to 
prompt  motion,  the  announcement  from  General  Grant  that 
the  transfer  of  Confederate  troops  from  Virginia  to  Georgia 
was  not  improbable,  and  that  provision  for  such  a  contingency 
should  be  made. 

On  the  16th,  the  date  of  General  Grant's  dispatch,  General 
Sherman  gave  orders  for  the  advance  toward  Atlanta  on  the 
following  day.  McPherson's  army  had  been  previously  trans- 
ferred from  the  extreme  right  to  Eoswell ;  Schofield's  was  across 


ADVANCE   UPON   ATLANTA,  ETC.  Ill 

in  front  of  Phillip's  ferry,  and  Howard's  corps  on  the  south 
side,  before  Power's  ferry.  The  next  morning,  General 
McPherson  crossed  at  Roswell,  and  moved  toward  the  Augusta 
railroad,  east  of  Decatur;  General  Schofield  advanced  toward 
Cross  Keys,  and  Palmer's  and  Hooker's  corps  passed  the  river 
on  pontoon  bridges,  at  Paice's  ferry,  covered  by  Wood's  di- 
vision, which  marched  down  the  left  bank  of  the  river  from 
Power's  ferry,  and  subsequently  rejoined  the  Fourth  Corps, 
and  with  it  moved  toward  Buckhead.  Garrard's  cavalry  acted 
witli  General  McPherson,  and  Stoneman's  and  McCook's 
watched  the  river  and  roads  below  the  railroad. 

The  movement  was  a  right  wheel,  with  Palmer's  corps  of 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  as  a  pivot.  The  night  of  the 
17th,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  rested  on  Nancy's  creek, 
a  tributary  of  Peachtree  creek,  having  pressed  back  the 
enemy's  skirmishers  from  the  bank  of  the  Chattahoochee. 
The  next  day  it  advanced  until  Palmer's  right  rested  at  the 
junction  of  ISTancy's  and  Peachtree  creeks,  and  Howard's 
corps  at  Buckhead.  General  Schofield  approached  Decatur, 
and  General  MePherson  broke  up  a  section  of  the  Augusta 
railroad  a  few  miles  east  of  the  town.  The  line  was  now  a 
long  one,  but  the  movements  prescribed  for  the  19th  were  de- 
signed to  unite  the  armies  before  Atlanta,  or  in  that  city. 

Early  in  the  morning,  "Woods'  division  leading,  the  Fourth 
Corps  reached  Peachtree  creek  on  the  Buckhead  and  At- 
lanta road,  finding  the  bridge  burned  and  a  heavy  fortification 
on  the  high  ground  beyond,  manned  with  infantry  and  artil- 
lery. In  the  afternoon,  General  Wood  constructed  a  bridge 
and  forced  the  passage,  and  drove  the  enemy  from  his  defenses. 
General  Stanley  crossed  the  north  fork  of  the  creek  some  dis- 
tance to  the  left,  against  strong  opposition.  To  the  right, 
Davis'  and  Geary's  divisions  fought  their  way  over  the  stream. 
General  Geary  covered  the  construction  of  a  foot-bridge  with 
a  heavy  artillery  fire,  and  gained  a  strong  position  beyond. 
General  Davis  first  threw  over  Dilworth's  brigade,  which  soon 
became  warmly  engaged,  and  after  a  sharp  conflict  repulsed 
the  enemy.  Mitchell's  brigade  moved  promptly  in  support, 
and  participated  in  the  action  near  its  close.  All  the  troops 
on  the  south  side  intrenched  during  the  night. 


112  ADVANCE   UPON  ATLANTA,  ETC. 

Early  the  next  morning  the  remaining  divisions  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  passed  the  stream.  This  army  was  now 
compactly  formed,  and  was  under  orders  to  advance  to  de- 
velop the  enemy's  purpose  with  respect  to  Atlanta.  Between 
General  Thomas'  left  and  General  Schofield's  right  there  was, 
however,  a  wide  interval,  and  General  Sherman  ordered  two 
divisions  of  the  Fourth  Corps  to  move  to  the  left  to  connect 
with  General  Schofield.  Their  movement  to  the  left  did  not 
fill  the  interval  nor  greatly  diminish  its  length,  hut  changed 
its  location  in  the  general  battle  front,  and  gave  the  prepon- 
derance of  strength  to  the  left  wing.  When  Stanley  and 
"Wood  had  moved  to  the  left  and  faced  toward  Atlanta,  in 
harmony  with  General  Schofield's  column,  there  was  still  an 
interval  of  nearly  two  miles*  between  the  right  of  their  line 
and  General  Thomas'  left  on  the  Buckhead  road. 

When  General  Williams  crossed  the  creek,  he  advanced  be- 
yond General  Geary  to  an  eminence  abreast  of  one  Johnson 
had  taken  for  his  division  on  the  left  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps, 
and  separated  from  it  by  a  depression.  Here  he  halted,  by 
direction  of  General  Hooker,  as  he  was  near  an  extensive  in- 
trenched outpost  of  the  enemy,  and  his  front  was  covered  by 
dense  woods  and  thickets.  At  10  A.  M.  General  Geary  moved 
forward  to  the  hill  on  the  left  of  General  Williams,  and  formed 
his  division  several  hundred  yards  in  advance.  Later,  General 
Newton  advanced  and  attained  a  good  position  in  open  ground 
on  the  Buckhead  road,  a  division  interval  from  Geary's  left. 
General  Hooker  for  a  time  held  Ward's  division  opposite  this 
interval,  but  concealed  behind  a  hill.  The  resistance  offered 
to  the  skirmishers  that  covered  the  advance  of  these  divisions, 
and  other  circumstances,  indicated  the  presence  of  the  enemy 
in  strong  force,  and  both  Newton  and  Geary  made  dispositions 
for  defense.  The  former  placed  two  brigades  in  line — Wag- 
ner's, Colonel  Blake  commanding,  on  the  left  of  the  road,  and 
Kimball's  on  the  right — and  held  Bradley's  in  column  for  sup- 
port. Between  the  two  deployed  brigades,  he  placed  a  four- 
gun  battery,  and  constructed  slight  rail  barricades.  General 
Geary  formed  his  division  with  Candy's  brigade  on  the  left, 

*  Statement  in  General  Howard's  report. 


ADVANCE   UPON  ATLANTA,  ETC.  113 

Jones'  on  the  right,  and  Ireland's  massed  in  rear  of  Jones'. 
As  the  ground  in  front  of  Jones  was  wooded,  but  open  before 
Candy  and  on  his  left,  General  Geary  planted  his  guns  on 
Candy's  line.  Here  also  barricades  of  rails  were  constructed. 

A  new  army  commander  had  been  observing  the  movements 
of  the  national  forces  since  the  17th,  as  on  that  day  General 
Johnston,  by  order  of  the  Confederate  President,  had  given  his 
army  and  his  immediate  projects  to  General  Hood.  General 
Johnston  had  proposed  to  himself  attack  General  Sherman's 
armies  as  they  should  cross  Peachtree  creek,  in  hopes  of  press- 
ing them  in  confusion  upon  the  creek  and  the  river  beyond, 
but  he  had  not  anticipated  such  favorable  conditions  as  now 
existed.  He  had  determined  to  assume  the  offensive  against 
Sherman's  combined  armies,  and  to  make  flanks  to  turn,  by 
breaking  lines ;  but  his  successor  had  been  permitted  to  see  the 
wide  separation  of  the  two  smaller  armies  from  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  and  then  to  see  the  latter  cross  Peachtree 
creek  bereft  of  the  two  divisions  which  extended  its  flank  be- 
tween the  forks  of  the  stream,  and  then  advance  with  its  short- 
ened left  flank  thrown  forward  almost  to  the  hills  upon  which 
his  forces  were  massed  for  sudden  attack,  while  its  right  was 
wedged  in  between  his  works  and  the  creek.  And  now  to  add 
surprise  to  exposure,  that  his  success  might  be  assured,  he 
called  in  his  skirmishers  in  semblance  of  entire  withdrawal, 
and  sent  soldiers  into  the  national  lines,  under  the  pretense  of 
capture,  who  should  say  that  there  were  no  heavy  bodies  of 
their  troops  within  two  miles.  So  when,  after  formation,  the 
most  exposed  divisions  threw  forward  their  skirmishers  to  de- 
velop the  state  of  things  in  their  front,  there  was  no  resist- 
ance, and  no  enemy  in  view  until  the  moment  that  the  massed 
forces  were  ready  to  spring  from  concealment,  in  boldest  at- 
tack. The  blow  was  well  concealed,  and  it  was  well  delivered 
under  the  most  favorable  conditions.  It  was  nevertheless  as 
complete  a  failure  as  any  assault  of  the  war. 

At  3  P.  M.  the  enemy  in  masses  rushed  from  the  woods.     A 
division  attacked  Newton  in  front;  another  passed  his  left 
flank  altogether,  and  thrust  itself  between  Peavine  and  Peach- 
tree  creeks,  and  a  third  attacked  his  right  flank.     As  the 
VOL.  n — 8 


114  ADVANCE   UPON   ATLANTA,  ETC. 

menace  to  his  left  flank  involved  the  greatest  danger,  General 
Newton  first  repulsed  the  column  on  his  left,  and  drove  it  to 
the  woods,  with  Bradley's  hrigade  and  his  reserve  artillery. 
Wagner's  and  Blake's  brigades  next  repelled  the  front  attack, 
and  drove  back  the  enemy  with  heavy  loss.  The  latter 
changed  front  at  right  angles,  and  engaged  the  enemy's  third 
division.  "While  this  division  had  advanced  between  Newton 
and  Geary,  in  evident  belief  that  then  there  was  a  complete 
•opening  in  the  line,  and  had  faced  to  the  east  to  engage  New- 
ton, Ward's  division  advanced  from  cover,  and  the  heavy 
^skirmish  line,  far  in  advance,  composed  of  the  Twenty-second 
Wisconsin  and  One  Hundred  and  Thirty-sixth  New  York, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Bloodgood  commanding,  held  the  enemy 
in  check  until  the  whole  division  had  reached  a  hill  to  the 
right  and  rear  of  Newton.  The  unexpected  appearance  of 
this  division  and  its  destructive  fire  threw  the  enemy  into 
confusion,  and  he  fell  back  with  shattered  ranks.  General 
Ward  then  advanced  to  another  eminence  abreast  of  Newton 
and  Geary,  and  formed  his  division  so  as  to  connect  with  the 
right  of  the  one  and  the  left  of  the  other.  The  hill  he  occu- 
pied commanded  the  open  space  for  six  hundred  yards  in 
front,  and  the  enemy  for  a  time  refrained  from  attack.  During 
this  interval,  General  Ward  fortified  his  position.  The  enemy 
first  attacked  the  right  of  Geary's  line,  then  passed  round  to 
attack  him  in  flank  and  rear.  Williams'  division  not  being  fully 
abreast,  this  advantage  was  possible.  Geary  was  therefore 
compelled  to  change  front  to  the  right  with  almost  all  of  his  di- 
vision, and  extend  his  line  to  connect  with  Williams,  leaving 
only  five  regiments,  with  his  artillery,  on  his  first  line.  When 
the  noise  of  severe  battle  was  first  heard  by  General  Williams, 
he  was  in  the  act  of  moving  artillery  to  his  skirmish  line,  to 
dislodge  the  enemy  from  his  fortified  outpost ;  but  warned  by 
the  heavy  volleys  of  musketry  on  his  left,  he  deployed  his 
division  at  double-quick — Knipe's  brigade  on  the  right,  Robin- 
son's on  the  left,  and  Ruger's  in  reserve — to  await  the  devel- 
opment of  the  attack.  He  placed  his  batteries  by  sections,  to 
command  his  front  and  flanks,  and  held  three  sections  in  re- 
serve. Hardly  had  these  dispositions  been  made  before  the 
enemy  advanced  upon  Williams  in  great  force,  and  having 


ADVANCE   UPON   ATLANTA,  ETC.  115 

driven  in  his  skirmishers,  with  his  line  of  battle  under  cover 
of  the  thickets  and  undergrowth,  approached  very  near  with- 
out being  seen.  His  attack,  as  in  other  cases,  was  direct  in 
part,  but  heavy  masses  swept  down  the  ravines  to  right  and 
left.  Hearing  heavy  firing  on  his  right,  General  Williams  sent 
the  Twenty-seventh  Indiana  to  reinforce  Knipe's  right.  This 
regiment  and  the  Forty-sixth  Pennsylvania  speedily  checked 
-•and  drove  back  the  enemy,  and  held  the  ground  until  the 
close  of  the  action.  On  the  left,  the  attack  was  more  threat- 
ening, because  made  with  stronger  columns ;  but  Robinson's 
brigade,  the  artillery,  and  Geary's  line  upon  the  other  hill, 
poured  a  destructive  fire  upon  the  enemy,  and  here,  too,  he 
was  completely  repulsed.  This  first  attack  swept  from  New- 
ton's position  to  Colonel  Anson  McCook's  brigade  of  John- 
son's division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps ;  but  though  signally 
repulsed,  General  Hood  did  not  desist,  and  soon  again,  from 
Newton  to  Johnson,  the  battle  raged  furiously. 

The  second  general  action  was  commenced  upon  Newton's 
left  in  effort  to  double  up  the  line  by  taking  it  in  reverse  as 
well  as  in  flank.  This  time  General  Thomas  sent  the  artillery 
of  Ward's  division,  and  in  person  urged  the  artillery  horses 
to  the  greatest  possible  speed  to  meet  the  emergency,  and  then 
directed  their  action.  These  guns,  and  all  of  Newton's,  with 
.all  kinds  of  metal  most  destructive  at  short  range,  opened 
upon  the  heavy  assaulting  columns,  and  they  were  again 
repulsed.  Again  the  battle  raged  to  the  right;  but  as  the 
national  line  was  now  compact,  the  enemy  exhausted  himself 
in  direct  attacks.  His  infantry  assaults,  as  at  first,  extended 
from  Newton  to  Johnson,  and  further  to  the  right  his  forti- 
fied artillery  was  most  active,  but  charge  after  charge  from  left 
to  right  was  repulsed,  until  at  6  P.  M.,  when  he  abandoned  his 
effort  to  turn  or  break  the  line.  In  this  action,  artillery  was 
used  with  fearful  effect,  and  so  skillfully  was  it  posted,  and  so 
bravely  defended,  that  the  enemy  did  not  reach  a  single  gun. 

When  it  is  considered  that  four  divisions  and  one  brigade, 
in  open  field,  repulsed  an  attack  of  the  army  which  was  in- 
tended to  initiate  such  offense  as  should  destroy  Sherman's 
armies,  the  grandeur  of  this  victory  becomes  apparent.  Not 
General  Hood  alone,  but  General  Johnston  also,  was  defeated 


116  ADVANCE   UPON  ATLANTA,  ETC. 

in  the  "  Battle  of  Peachtree  Creek."  A  new  policy  demanded 
by  the  authorities  at  Richmond,  and  by  the  Southern  people, 
and  a  plan  of  battle  elaborated  by  an  able  general  and  put 
upon  trial  under  conditions  far  more  favorable  than  had  been 
anticipated,  was  defeated  by  less  than  half  of  the  infantry  and 
artillery  of  the  "  Army  of  the  Cumberland."  Four  divisions, 
and  a  third  of  another,  parried  a  blow  intended  to  initiate  the 
ruin  of  three  armies,  comprising  more  than  five  times  as 
many  men,  and  the  significance  of  the  miscarriage  should  have 
been  accepted  as  the  prophecy  of  the  doom  of  the  rebellion. 
The  national  troops  fought  great  odds,  introducing  aggression 
as  the  policy  of  a  new  commander,  to  stop  the  further  advance 
of  General  Sherman  and  save  Atlanta.  It  was  seemingly  a 
grand  opportunity,  but  the  issue  was  positive  defeat  and  im- 
mense loss.  An  opportunity  for  the  enemy,  it  was  an 
emergency  for  the  exposed  flank  and  the  fraction  of  the  na- 
tional army  subjected  to  attack.  But  there  were  those  in 
chief  and  subordinate  command,  who,  by  personal  direction  and 
vigor,  inspirited  the  troops  made  veteran  by  participation 
in  numerous  battles.  Generals  Thomas  and  Hooker  were 
with  their  troops  at  the  points  of  extreme  danger,  and  officers 
and  men  in  proportionate  service  contributed  to  the  emphatic 
repulse  of  the  enemy  in  a  combination  planned  for  grandest 
effect. 

General  Hood  lost  from  three  to  five  thousand  men.  He 
left  over  six  hundred  dead  on  the  field,  and  several  hundred  of 
his  men  were  captured.  "Ward's  division  captured  seven 
battle  flags  and  two  hundred  and  forty-six  prisoners. 

The  total  loss  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  sixteen 
hundred.  Colonel  Cobham,  One  Hundred  and  Eleventh 
Pennsylvania ;  Colonel  Logie,  One  Hundred  and  Forty-fourth 
Few  York ;  Lieutenant-Colonel  Eandall,  One  Hundred  and 
Forty-ninth  New  York,  and  many  other  officers  were  killed ; 
and  Lieutenant- Colonel  W.  H.  H.  Brown,  Sixty-first  Ohio, 
and  Major  Lathrop  Baldwin,  One  Hundred  and  Seventh  New 
York,  were  mortally  wounded.  A  number  of  field  and  line 
officers  were  severely  wounded.  General  Newton's  loss  was 
only  one  hundred,  though  his  division  was  on  the  flank  and 
in  extreme  exposure. 


ADVANCE  UPON  ATLANTA,  ETC.         117 

Generals  Stanley  and  Wood  were  somewhat  heavily  engaged 
during  the  afternoon  and  evening,  the  enemy  using  artillery 
freely.  They  drove  in  his  outposts,  and  came  up  in  sight  of 
intrenchments,  with  the  usual  skirmish  line  in  front.  Late  in 
the  evening,  General  Stanley  captured  a  portion  of  the  pickets, 
drove  in  the  remainder,  and  worked  up  close  to  the  enemy. 

The  night  following,  the  enemy  withdrew  from  General 
]N"ewton's  left.  The  next  morning,  General  Wood  advanced 
his  right  a  mile  and  a  half,  and  during  the  day,  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  from  left  to  right,  advanced  close  to  the 
enemy's  works.  Heavy  skirmishing  was  maintained ;  batteries 
were  put  in  position  and  kept  in  continuous  action  wherever 
there  was  probability  of  effect,  and  the  new  front  was  strongly 
intrenched. 

In  the  night,  the  enemy  retired  to  the  immediate  defenses 
of  the  city ;  comprising  a  strong  line  of  redoubts,  connected  by 
curtains,  covered  by  abatis  and  cheveau  de  frise.  The  next 
morning,  General  Thomas  advanced  his  line  and  intrenched 
as  close  as  practicable  to  the  enemy's  works.  The  Fourteenth 
Corps  fortified  a  line  west  of  the  railroad,  the  Twentieth  Corps 
from  the  railroad  to  the  Buckhead  road,  and  the  Fourth 
Corps  from  that  road  to  General  Schofield's  right — the  con- 
traction of  the  line  now  permitting  the  reunion  of  the  three 
divisions  in  continuous  front.  General  Thomas'  position  was 
strong,  affording  commanding  points  for  batteries  within  easy 
range  of  the  city,  and  bearing  directly  upon  the  fortifications 
of  the  enemy.  Constant  skirmishing  and  cannonading  were 
maintained.  General  McCook's  cavalry  was  thrown  on  Gen- 
eral Thomas'  right,  along  Proctor's  creek,  and  covering  the 
Macon  and  Turner's  Ferry  roads. 

On  the  22d,  while  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  changing 
position  to  close  in  upon  Atlanta,  General  Hood  put  upon 
trial  General  Johnston's  suggestion  to  sally  from  the  fortifi- 
cations and  strike  the  most  exposed  flank.  This  time  he 
gained  \  temporary  advantage,  but  in  the  final  issue  was 
defeated  with  heavy  loss. 

General  McPherson  was  killed  early  in  the  engagement, 
while  making  dispositions  to  save  his  left  flank. 

The  same  day,  General  Rousseau  arrived  at  Marietta,  having 


118  ADVANCE   UPON   ATLANTA,    ETC. 

accomplished  his  raid  through  Alabama  and  Georgia.  He- 
suggested  the  expedition,  and  had  organized  and  commanded 
it  by  permission  of  General  Sherman.  He  destroyed  over 
thirty  miles  of  railroad,  several  trestle-bridges,  many  station- 
buildings,  and  quantities  of  supplies  and  materials.  He  met 
and  defeated  General  Clanton  at  the  Coosa  river,  and  another 
force  at  Chehaw  station,  and  having  suffered  a  loss  of  about 
forty  men  from  a  command  of  twenty -five  hundred,  reached 
the  theater  of  war  at  a  time  when  cavalry  reinforcements  were 
much  needed. 


EXTRACTS  FROM  THE  OFFICIAL  REPORT  OF  GENERAL  JOS.  E, 

JOHNSTON. 

The  character  of  Peachtree  creek,  and  the  numerous  fords  in  the 
Chattahoochee  above  its  mouth,  prevented  my  attempting  to  defend  that 
part  of  the  river.  The  broad  and  muddy  channel  of  the  creek  would 
have  separated  the  two  parts  of  the  army.  It  and  the  river,  below  its 
mouth,  were  therefore  taken  as  our  line.  A  position  on  the  high  ground 
south  of  the  creek  was  selected  for  the  army,  from  which  to  attack  the 
enemy  while  crossing.  The  engineer  officers,  with  a  large  force  of  ne- 
groes, were  set  to  work  to  strengthen  the  fortifications  of  Atlanta,  and 
mount  on  them  seven  heavy  rifles,  borrowed  from  General  Maury.  The 
chief  engineer  was  instructed  to  devote  his  attention,  first,  to  the  works 
between  Marietta  and  Decatur  roads,  to  put  them  in  such  condition  that 
they  might  be  held  by  state  troops,  so  that  the  army  might  attack  the 
enemy  in  flank  when  he  approached  the  town.  This,  in  the  event  that 
we  should  be  unsuccessful  in  attacking  the  Federal  army  in  its  passage 
of  Peachtree  creek. 

•fc-*-*-*****-* 

In  transferring  the  command  to  General  Hood,  I  explained  my  plans 
to  him.  First,  to  attack  the  Federal  army  while  crossing  Peachtree 
creek.  If  we  were  successful,  great  results  might  be  hoped  for,  as  the 
enemy  would  have  both  it  and  the  river  to  intercept  his  retreat.  Second, 
if  unsuccessful,  to  keep  back  the  enemy  by  intrenching,  to  give  time  for 
the  assembling  of  the  state  troops  promised  by  Governor  Brown ;  to  garri- 
son Atlanta  with  those  troops,  and  when  the  Federal  army  approached 
the  town,  to  attack  it  on  its  most  exposed  flank  with  all  the  Confederate 
troops. 

These  troops,  who  had  been  for  seventy-four  days  in  the  immediate 
presence  of  the  enemy,  laboring  and  fighting  daily,  enduring  toil,  ex- 
posure, and  danger  with  equal  cheerfulness,  more  confident  and  high 
spirited  than  when  the  Federal  army  first  presented  itself  near  Dalton, 
were  then  inferior  to  none  who  ever  served  the  Confederacy. 


ADVANCE   UPON   ATLANTA,    ETC.  119 

I  commenced  the  campaign  with  General  Bragg' s  army  of  Missionary 
Ridge,  with  one  brigade  added  (Mercer's),  and  two  taken  away  (Baldwin's 
and  Quarles').  That  opposed  to  us  was  Grant's  army  of  Missionary  Ridge, 
then  estimated  at  eighty  thousand  by  our  principal  officers,  increased,  as 
I  have  stated,  by  two  corps,  a  division,  and  several  thousand  recruits — in 
all,  at  least  thirty  thousand  men.  The  cavalry  of  that  army  was  esti- 
mated by  Major-Gen eral  Wheeler  at  fifteen  thousand. 

The  reinforcements  which  joined  our  army  amounted  to  fifteen  thou- 
sand infantry  and  artillery,  and  four  thousand  cavalry.  Our  scouts 
reported  much  greater  numbers  joining  the  United  States  army — the 
garrisons  and  bridge-guards  from  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  relieved  by 
"one  hundred  days'  men,"  and  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  with  two  thousand 
cavalry. 

The  loss  of  our  infantry  and  artillery,  from  the  5th  of  May,  had  been 
about  ten  thousand  in  killed  and  wounded,  and  four  thousand  seven 
hundred  from  all  other  causes,  mainly  slight  sickness  produced  by  heavy 
cold  rains,  which  prevailed  in  the  latter  half  of  June.  These  and  the 
slightly  wounded  were  beginning  to  rejoin  their  regiments.  For  want  of 
reports,  I  am  unable  to  give  the  loss  or  the  services  of  the  cavalry,  which 
was  less  under  my  eye  than  the  rest  of  the  army.  Its  effective  strength 
was  increased  by  about  two  thousand  during  the  campaign. 

The  effective  force  transferred  to  General  Hood  was  about  forty-one 
thousand  infantry  and  artillery,  and  ten  thousand  cavalry. 

According  to  the  opinions  of  our  most  experienced  officers,  daily  re- 
ports of  prisoners,  and  statements  of  Northern  papers,  the  enemy's  loss 
in  action  could  not  have  been  less  than  five  times  as  great  as  ours.  In 
the  cases  in  which  we  had  the  means  of  estimating  it,  it  ranged  from 
seven  to  one  to  ninety  to  one,  compared  to  ours,  and  averaged  thirteen 
to  one.  The  Federal  prisoners  concurred  in  saying  that  their  heaviest 
loss  was  in  the  daily  attacks  made  in  line  of  battle,  upon  our  skirmishers 
in  their  rifle-pits.  Whether  they  succeeded  in  dislodging  our  skirmishers 
or  not,  their  loss  was  heavy  and  ours  almost  nothing. 

Between  Dalton  and  the  Chattahoochee,  we  could  have  given  battle 
only  by  attacking  the  enemy  intrenched,  or  so  near  intrenchments  that 
the  only  result  of  success  to  us  would  have  been  his  falling  back  into 
them,  while  defeat  would  have  been  our  ruin. 

In  the  course  pursued,  our  troops  always  fighting  under  cover,  had 
very  trifling  losses  compared  with  those  they  inflicted,  so  that  the  en- 
emy's numerical  superiority  was  reduced  daily  and  rapidly,  and  we  could 
reasonably  have  expected  to  cope  with  the  Federal  army  on  equal  ground 
by  the  time  the  Chattahoochee  was  passed.  Defeat  on  this  side  of  that 
river  would  have  been  its  destruction.  We,  if  beaten,  had  a  place  of 
refuge  in  Atlanta,  too  strong  to  be  assaulted,  and  too  extensive  to  be  in- 
vested. 


120         ADVANCE  UPON  ATLANTA,  ETC. 

EXTEACT  FROM  GENERAL  SHERMAN'S  COMMUNICATION  TO 
GENERAL  GRANT,  OF  JULY  12,  1864. 

As  soon  as  I  hear  from  General  Stoneman,  I  will  shift  all  of  General 
McPherson's  army  to  Roswell,  and  cross  General  Thomas  three  (3)  miles 
above  the  railroad  bridge,  and  move  against  Atlanta — my  left  well  to  the 
East,  to  get  possession  of  the  Augusta  road  about  Decatur  or  Stone  Moun- 
tain. I  think  all  will  be  ready  in  three  (3)  days.  I  will  have  nearly  one 
hundred  thousand  (100,000)  men. 

I  feel  certain  we  have  killed  and  crippled  for  Joe  Johnston  as  many 
as  we  have  sent  to  the  rear ;  have  sent  back  six  or  seven  thousand  pris- 
oners. 


CITY  POINT,  VA.,  July  16,  1864—10  A.  M. 
Major-General  Sherman : 

The  attempted  invasion  of  Maryland  having  failed  to  give  the  enemy 
a  firm  foothold  north,  they  are  now  returning  with  possibly  twenty-five 
thousand  (25,000)  troops.  All  the  men  they  have  here  beyond  a  suffi- 
ciency to  hold  their  string  of  fortifications,  will  be  an  element  of  weak- 
ness by  eating  up  their  supplies.  It  is  not  improbable,  therefore,  that 
you  will  find  in  the  next  fortnight,  reinforcements  on  your  front  to  the 
number  indicated  above.  I  advise,  therefore,  that  if  you  get  Atlanta, 
you  set  about  destroying  the  railroad  as  far  to  the  east  and  south  of  you 
as  possible.  Collect  all  stores  of  the  country  for  your  own  use,  and 
select  a  point  that  you  can  hold  until  help  can  be  had.  I  shall  make  a 
desperate  effort  to  get  a  position  here  which  will  hold  the  enemy  without 
the  necessity  of  so  many  men.  If  successful,  I  can  detach  from  here  for 
other  enterprises,  looking  much  to  your  assistance,  or  anything  else- 
where. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


WASHINGTON,  July  16,  1864—4.30  p.  M. 
Major-General  Sherman: 

Lieutenant-General  Grant  wishes  me  to  call  your  attention  to  the  pos- 
sibility of  Johnston's  being  reinforced  from  Richmond,  and  the  impor- 
tance of  your  having  prepared  a  good  line  of  defense  against  such  an 
increase  of  rebel  force.  Also,  the  importance  of  getting  as  large  an 
amount  of  supplies  collected  at  Chattanooga  as  possible. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 
Major-General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  ON  CHATTAHOOCHEE,  July  16,  1864. 
Generals  Thomas  and  McPherson : 

Dispatches  from  General  Grant  and  Halleck  to-day  speak  of  the  enemy 
having  failed  in  his  designs  in  Maryland,  and  cautioning  me  that  Lee 


ADVANCE    UPON   ATLANTA,  ETC.  121 

may,  in  the  next  fortnight,  reinforce  Johnston  by  twenty  thousand 
(20,000)  men.  It  behooves  us  therefore  to  hurry,  so  all  will  move  to- 
morrow as  far  as  Nancy's  creek. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General  Commanding. 


[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  36.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  CHATTAHOOCHEE,  July  17,  1864. 

The  operations  of  the  army  for  to-morrow,  the  18th  July,  will  be  as 
foil-  ws: 

I.  Major-General  Thomas  will  move  forward,  occupy  Buckhead,  and 
the  ridge  between  Nancy's   creek   and   Peachtree,   also  all  the  roads 
toward  Atlanta  as  far  as  Peachree  creek. 

II.  Major-General  Schofield  will  pass  through  Cross  Keys,  and  occupy 
the  Peachtree  road  where  intersected  by  the  road  from  Cross  Keys  to 
Decatur. 

III.  Major-General  McPherson  will  move  toward  Stone  Mountain,  to 
secure  strong  ground  within  four  (4)  miles  of  General  Schofield's  position, 
and  push  Brigadier-General  Garrard's  cavalry  to  the  railroad,  and  destroy 
some  section  of  the  road,  and  then  resume  position  to  the  front  and  left 
of  General  McPherson. 

IV.  All  armies  will  communicate  with  their  neighbors.     The  com- 
mand er-in-chief  will  be  near  General  Thomas'  left,  or  near  General  Scho- 
field. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  AT  SAN  HOUSE,  PEACHTREE  ROAD, 
FIVE  MILES  NORTHEAST  OF  BUCKHEAD,  GA.,  July  18,  1864. 
GENERAL  : — I  have  reports  from  General  McPherson  to  2  p.  M.  He  has 
reached  the  railroad  at  a  point  two  (2)  miles  from  Stone  Mountain  and 
seven  (7)  miles  from  Decatur;  had  broken  the  telegraphs  and  road,  and 
by  5  P.  M.  will  have  four  (4)  or  five  (5)  miles  broken.  To-morrow  I 
want  a  bold  push  for  Atlanta,  and  have  made  my  orders,  which  I  think 
will  put  us  in  Atlanta  or  very  close  to  it.  Hold  on  about  Howell's  mill 
and  the  main  road,  and  let  your  left  swing  across  Peachtree  creek,  about 
south  fork,  and  connect  with  General  Schofield,  who  will  approach 
Decatur  from  the  north,  whilst  General  McPherson  moves  down  from 
the  East.  It  is  hard  to  realize  that  Johnston  will  give  up  Atlanta  without 
&  fight,  but  it  may  be  so.  Let  us  develop  the  truth. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major- General  Commanding. 
Major-General  Thomas,  Buckhead. 


122  ADVANCE   UPON  ATLANTA,  ETC. 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  39.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  DECATUR,  July  19,  1864. 

The  whole  army  will  move  on  Atlanta  by  the  most  direct  roads  to- 
morrow, July  20th,  beginning  at  five  (5)  o'clock  A.  M.,  as  follows: 

I.  Major-General  Thomas  from  the  direction  of  Buckhead,  his  left  to 
connect  with  General  Schofield's  right,  about  two  (2)  miles  northeast  of 
Atlanta,  about  lot  15,  near  the  houses  marked  as  Howard  and  Colonel 
Hooker. 

II.  Major-General  Schofield,  by  the  road  leading  from  Dr.  Powell's  to 
Atlanta. 

III.  Major-General  McPherson  will  follow  one  or  more  roads  direct 
from  Decatur  to  Atlanta. 

Each  army  commander  will  accept  battle  on  anything  like  fair  terms, 
but  if  the  army  reach  within  cannon  range  of  the  city  without  receiving 
artillery  or  musketry  fire,  he  will  halt,  form  a  strong  line,  with  batteries 
in  position,  and  await  orders.  If  fired  on  from  the  forts  or  buildings  of 
Atlanta,  no  consideration  will  be  paid  to  the  fact  that  they  are  occupied 
by  families,  but  the  place  must  be  cannonaded  without  the  formality  of  a 
demand. 

The  general-in-chief  will  be  with  the  center  of  the  army,  viz.,  with 
or  near  General  Schofield. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

SIEGE   OF  ATLANTA. 

AFTER  the  22d,  the  situation  at  Atlanta  conformed  in  the 
main  to  the  type  of  the  campaign  developed  north  of  the  Oos- 
tanaula.  The  two  armies  presented  to  each  other  fortified 
fronts,  each  inviting  the  attack  of  the  other.  The  stronger  not 
being  able  to  secure  a  general  battle  on  fair  terms,  was  restricted 
again  to  a  choice  between  assault  and  flank  movement.  As 
the  issue  of  previous  assaults  did  not  warrant  the  attempt  to 
carry  the  defenses  of  Atlanta,  the  alternative  of  a  movement 
by  the  flank  was  inevitable.  The  railroad  on  the  east  having 
been  greatly  damaged  by  General  Garrard  to  Covington,  and 
nearer  Atlanta  by  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  there  remained 
but  one  railroad — that  from  Macon  to  Atlanta — which  had  not 
been  greatly  damaged.  If  this  road  were  held  by  the  national 
forces  or  damaged  beyond  use,  General  Hood  could  no  longer 
remain  in  the  city.  General  Sherman  resolved  to  change  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  from  the  left  to  the  right,  and  to  reach 
toward  the  Macon  road  from  his  right  flank,  and  at  the  same 
time  throw  his  cavalry  in  two  heavy  columns  upon  it — five 
thousand  under  General  Stoneman  to  pass  to  the  east  of  the 
city  to  McDonough,  and  four  thousand  under  General  McCook 
to  the  west  to  Fayetteville,  to  meet  at  Lovejoy's  Station  and 
there  destroy  the  road  effectually.  This  accomplished,  General 
Stoneman  had  permission  to  make  effort  with  his  own  division 
to  liberate  the  prisoners — two  thousand  at  Macon,  and  twenty 
thousand  at  Andersonville.  The  object  of  these  movements 
was  to  force  the  enemy  to  come  out  of  Atlanta  to  fight  or  be 
invested,  or  force  him  to  extend  his  lines  to  the  south,  and 

choose  between  Atlanta  and  East  Point. 

(123) 


124  SIEGE   OF   ATLANTA. 

The  cavalry  started  on  the  27th.  General  McCook  crossed 
the  Chattahoochee  at  Riverton,  and  moved  rapidly  on  Palmetto 
station,  on  the  West  Point  road.  Here  he  destroyed  a  section 
of  the  track  two  and  a  half  miles  long,  and  advanced  to  Fay- 
etteville.  There  he  burned  a  hundred  hales  of  cotton,  destroyed 
two  railroad  trains,  burned  a  train  of  four  hundred  wagons, 
killed  eight  hundred  mules,  saving  a  large  number,  and  cap- 
tured two  hundred  and  fifty  prisoners.  He  then  moved  to 
Lovejoy's  Station  to  meet  General  Stoneman.  He  there  burned 
the  depot  and  having  commenced  the  destruction  of  the  rail- 
road, only  desisted  when  there  was  such  an  accumulation  of 
the  enemy  that  he  was  forced  to  defend  himself.  Hearing  noth- 
ing of  General  Stoneman  and  being-  strongly  opposed  on  the 
east,  he  turned  south  and  west  to  Newnan,  on  the  West  Point 
road.  At  Newnan  he  encountered  an  infantry  force  that  had 
been  stopped  on  its  way  to  Atlanta  by  the  break  he  had  made 
in  the  road  at  Palmetto.  The  pursuing  cavalry  and  the  infantry 
now  hemmed  him  in  completely,  and  he  was  compelled  to  drop 
his  captives  and  fight.  He  cut  his  way  out  with  a  loss  of  five 
hundred,  and  reached  Marietta  in  safety  with  the  remainder  of 
his  command. 

General  Stoneman  went  farther  and  fared  worse.  He  sent 
Garrard's  cavalry  to  Flat  Rock,  and  moved  through  Covington, 
down  the  Ocmulgee,  to  East  Macon.  In  endeavoring  to  return, 
he  was  hemmed  in  and  captured  with  seven  hundred  of  his 
command,  the  remainder  escaping.  General  Garrard  engaged 
successfully  two  divisions  of  cavalry  at  Flat  Rock,  and  then  re- 
turned to  Atlanta.  These  cavalry  expeditions  in  the  main  were 
failures,  and  made  no  impression  upon  the  situation  at  Atlanta. 

On  the  27th,  General  Howard  was  assigned  to  the  command 
of  the. "  Army  of  the  Tennessee."  by  order  of  the  President, 
and  General  Stanley,  by  seniority  of  rank,  to  the  command  of 
the  Fourth  Corps.  At  this  time  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
was  in  motion  to  the  right,  and  the  next  morning  went  into 
position  on  the  right  of  General  Thomas,  with  its  line  trending 
to  the  south.  As  a  support  to  this  movement,  General  Davis' 
division  was  ordered  to  make  a  detour  to  Turner's  ferry  on  the 
Chattahoochee,  and  thence  to  Howard's  right,  to  take  the  en- 
emy in  flank  should  he  sally  forth  as  on  the  22d.  This  change 


SIEGE   OF  ATLANTA.  125 

of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  so  threatening  that  General 
Hood  threw  two  corps  upon  it — Hardee's  and  Lee's — with  great 
impetuosity.  Attacking  again  and  again,  they  were  repulsed 
with  immense  loss.  To  create  a  diversion  during  the  progress  of 
this  action,  there  was  heavy  skirmishing  on  the  whole  front  of 
the  "  Army  of  the  Cumberland ;"  but  Davis'  division,  General 
Morgan  commanding,  was  unable,  through  absence  of  a  direct 
road,  to  reach  the  enemy's  flank  in  time  to  participate  in  the 
action. 

General  Morgan  was  not  only  embarrassed  in  not  finding 
such  roads  as  had  been  anticipated,  but  he  was  left  in  igno- 
rance of  the  object  of  his  movement — his  orders,  which  were 
received  late  in  the  morning,  not  being  explicit  as  to  his  duty 
nor  definite  in  description  of  the  road  which  he  was  to  pur- 
sue, and  the  consequence  was,  that  the  movement  so  far  mis- 
carried that  he  did  not  reach  his  camp  until  very  late  at  night. 
The  next  day  he  was  joined  by  General  Ward's  division  of 
the  Twentieth  Corps,  when  the  two  divisions  advanced,  and 
driving  back  the  enemy,  ascertained  that  he  had  strong  in- 
trenched lines  in  their  front.  Strong  reconnoissances  from 
the  Fourteenth  and  Twentieth  Corps  developed  the  fact  that 
General  Hood's  lines  were  still  strong  on  his  right,  although 
he  had  greatly  extended  his  left. 

On  the  30th,  the  picket  line  of  the  Twentieth  Corps  was 
advanced  to  high  ground,  and  captured  one  hundred  and 
twenty  of  the  enemy,  including  eight  ofiicers.  The  dash  was 
a  bold  one,  but  the  ground  was  permanently  held.  The  next 
day  General  Davis  made  a  reconnoissance  toward  the  Macon 
railroad,  and  found  the  enemy  within  a  mile,  posted  in  earth- 
works, from  which  his  artillery  opened  with  canister.  It 
was  the  old  story  of  extension  and  counter-extension  of  lines 
and  intrenchments,  and  the  weaker  army  having  inner  lines 
could  keep  fully  abreast,  and  at  the  same  time  have  easy  con- 
centration for  sally  or  defense. 

During  the  month  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  lost  forty 
commissioned  ofiicers,  one  hundred  and  sixty  wounded,  and 
seventeen  missing ;  five  hundred  and  forty-seven  enlisted  men 
killed,  two  thousand  five  hundred  and  ninety-two  wounded, 
and  three  hundred  and  forty-four  missing— total,  three  thou- 


126  SIEGE   OF  ATLANTA. 

sand  seven  hundred  and  nine.  General  Hooker  was  relieved 
of  the  command  of  the  Twentieth  Corps,  at  his  own  request, 
and  General  "Williams  was  assigned  to  temporary  command. 
The  President  gave  General  Stanley  the  permanent  command 
of  the  Fourth  Corps. 

On  the  first  of  August,  General  Schofield  moved  from  the 
left  to  relieve  Davis  and  Ward,  and  the  "  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland" was  holding  the  left  of  the  investing  line.  The 
Fourth  Corps  refused  its  left  to  cover  the  Buckhead  road ;  two 
divisions  of  the  Twentieth  were  in  the  center  and  two  divis- 
ions of  the  Fourteenth  between  the  railroad  and  Turner's 
Ferry  road ;  Garrard's  division  was  on  the  left  of  the  Fourth 
Corps,  guarding  the  approaches  from  Decatur,  and  Roswell's 
and  Kilpatrick's  divisions,  having  been  relieved  on  the  line  of 
the  Etowah  by  McCook's,  was  on  the  railroad  from  Chatta- 
hoochee  bridge  to  Marietta.  When  Davis  and  Ward  gave 
room  for  Schofield  on  Howard's  right,  and  then  moved  to  the 
right  of  Schofield,  the  former  was  on  the  left  in  line,  and  the 
latter  refused,  to  form  a  strong  flank. 

After  the  failure  of  General  Hood's  third  effort  at  aggres- 
sion, he  relapsed  into  the  defensive,  and  General  Sherman  was 
again  forced  to  choose  between  assault  and  the  "  turning  move- 
ment." The  investing  line  had  been  moved  far  to  the  west 
and  south,  and  yet  Hood's  left  flank  had  not  been  found.  The 
supposition  was  that  the  main  portion  of  his  army  was  on  his 
left,  extending  his  intrenchments  as  far  or  farther  than  General 
Sherman's,  and  that  his  main  works  on  the  north  of  Atlanta 
were  held  by  state  troops  or  a  slender  line  of  regular  troops. 
General  Sherman's  armies  had  been  on  a  strain  for  three 
months,  in  frequent  battles,  and  perpetual  skirmishing  and 
watching.  But  though  the  enemy  had  been  roughly  handled 
during  July,  his  army  was  yet  as  much  out  of  reach  as  at  any 
period  of  the  campaign.  General  Sherman  decided  to  again 
extend  his  line  still  farther  to  the  right,  so  as  at  least  to  reach 
the  Macon  railroad  with  artillery  at  short  range,  and  force 
General  Hood  to  fight  or  abandon  the  city.  In  the  execution 
of  this  plan  it  was  necessary  that  his  right  flank  should  be  kept 
exceedingly  strong,  while  his  line  throughout  its  length  should 
have  such  firmness  as  would  insure  its  safety  and  at  the  same 


SIEGE   OF  ATLANTA.  127 

time  menace  Atlanta  from  the  north  so  strongly  as  to  prevent 
an  overwhelming  concentration  against  the  advancing  right 
flank. 

On  the  3d,  Johnson's  and  Baird's  divisions  of  Palmer's 
corps  were  moved  to  the  right  in  support  of  Schofield,  while 
Ward's  division  moved  to  the  right  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  and 
assisted  in  covering  the  space  previously  held  by  the  Four- 
teenth. The  Fourth  and  the  Twentieth  now  held  a  line  of 
intrenchments  five  miles  long.  During  the  day,  while  General 
Schofield  was  rushing  to  reach  the  railroad,  there  was  great 
activity  along  the  whole  line  from  General  Thomas'  left  to 
General  Howard's  right,  in  skirmishing  and  cannonading,  to 
relieve  the  pressure  upon  the  right  flank  in  its  aggression. 
General  Schofield  succeeded  in  getting  two  divisions,  one  of 
his  own,  and  General  Baird's,  across  the  head  of  Utoy  creek. 
General  Baird  formed  his  division  on  the  right  of  General 
Hascall's,  with  his  right  swung  back  toward  the  creek. 

The  next  morning,  General  Baird  readjusted  his  line  in 
expectation  of  supporting  the  divisions  of  General  Schofield  in 
an  assault.  But  no  movement  was  made  of  a  general  char- 
acter, and  late  in  ther  day  General  Palmer  directed  him  to  feel 
the  enemy's  works  in  his  front  with  a  brigade.  He  designated 
Colonel  Gleason's  brigade  for  this  service,  which  advanced  in 
double  lines  with  skirmishers  in  front.  Colonel  Gleason  car- 
ried the  first  and  second  line  of  rifle-pits,  and  approached  so 
near  the  enemy's  main  line,  as  to  develop  its  location  and 
character,  and  drew  from  it  an  artillery  and  musketry  fire. 
At  night  he  withdrew  his  brigade,  but  held  with  shirmishers 
the  outer  line  of  rifle-pits  which  he  had  carried. 

The  next  morning  at  8  A.  M.  General  Baird's  division  was 
in  line  ready  to  advance.  He  was  instructed  to  pay  no  atten- 
tion to  his  connections  on  his  left,  as  General  Cox's  division 
was  to  fill  the  space  between  him  and  General  Hascall,  and 
was  informed  that  the  latter  was  already  so  near  the  enemy 
that  he  would  not  advance  during  the  day.  He  was  promised 
support  on  his  right  by  the  other  two  divisions  of  his  own 
corps,  although  he  was  not  yet  in  communication  with  them. 
Regarding  his  orders  to  advance  as  imperative,  he  threw  for- 
ward skirmishers  in  double  the  usual  strength,  and  moved  for- 


128  SIEGE    OF   ATLANTA. 

ward  in  perilous  insulation.  As  he  advanced,  he  found  that 
the  enemy  had  reoccupied  the  inner  line  of  rifle-pits  which 
Colonel  Gleason  had  carried  the  evening  previous.  This  line 
he  again  carried  against  stubborn  resistance,  capturing  one 
hundred  and  forty  prisoners.  He  was  then  within  short 
musket  range  of  the  enemy's  main  works.  He  could  advance 
no  farther,  unless  he  assaulted  without  support,  but  held  the 
position,  refusing  two  regiments  on  his  right,  and  intrenched 
himself  as  rapidly  as  possible  under  the  fire  of  musketry  and 
artillery.  The  main  lines  were  now  four  hundred  yards  apart, 
while  only  thirty  yards  separated  the  skirmishers.  Baird  lost 
in  this  engagement,  five  officers,  and  seventy-eight  enlisted 
men  killed  and  wounded.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Myron  Baker, 
commanding  Mnety -fourth  Indiana,  was  killed. 

Soon  after  General  Baird  attained  position  near  the  enemy, 
General  Davis'  division,  General  Morgan  commanding,  formed 
on  his  right,  and  later,  General  Johnson's  division  took  po- 
sition in  the  rear  of  Morgan.  As  on  the  3d,  there  was  great 
activity  along  the  line  of  the  left  to  divert  attention  from  the 
advance  on  the  right. 

Thus  there  was  just  sufficient  extension  and  action  on  the 
right  to  advise  the  enemy  of  what  was  intended,  without  gain- 
ing any  advantage  that  promised  ultimate  success.  The  line 
had  only  been  extended  by  one  division.  General  Sherman's 
orders  required  that  the  attack  on  the  right  should  be  pressed, 
and  he  had  given  promise  that  if  it  was  too  hard  pressed, 
Generals  Thomas  and  Howard  should  attack  somewhere,  bufc 
the  indications  were  emphatic  that  General  Hood  was  rapidly 
extending  his  intrenchments  toward  East  Point,  and  yet  Gen- 
eral Sherman  was  so  shut  up  to  counter-movement,  that  he 
said  to  General  Thomas  in  the  evening,  "  We  will  try  again 
to-morrow,  and  proceed  to  the  end." 

Accordingly,  the  next  morning  a  new  effort  was  made  to 
reach  beyond  the  enemy's  left  flank.  The  Fourteenth  Corps, 
under  command  of  Brigadier- General  R.  "W.  Johnson,  by 
virtue  of  seniority,  General  Palmer  having  been  relieved  at 
his  own  request,  held  its  own  line  and  that  occupied  by  the 
Twenty -third  Corps,  and  the  latter  moved  to  the  right,  beyond 
what  appeared  the  day  before  to  be  the  left  flank  of  the  en- 


SIEGE   OF   ATLANTA.  129 

emy.  General  Schofield  then  threw  forward  Reilly's  brigade, 
but  it  was  found  impossible  to  penetrate  the  obstructions  be- 
fore the  enemy's  parapets.  General  Schofield  then  made  a 
still  larger  circuit  to  the  right,  for  the  purpose  of  "  breaching  " 
his  line  at  a  point  not  protected  by  abatis,  but  he  found  his 
lines  extended  beyond  the  main  Utoy  creek.  While  General 
Schofield  was  operating  against  General  Hood's  left,  the  latter 
evinced  great  activity  on  his  right.  He  felt  General  Thomas' 
line  from  right  to  left,  and  was  so  demonstrative  against  Gen-, 
eral  Stanley,  as  to  make  it  evident  that  he  was  either  looking 
for  a  weak  point  to  assault,  or  was  endeavoring  to  ascertain 
the  strength  of  his  line,  as  throwing  light  upon  General  Scho- 
field's  movements.  General  Hood  was  now  holding  his  works 
north  of  the  city  by  state  troops,  supported  by  movable  divis- 
ions of  regular  troops.  The  main  portion  of  the  army  was 
on  his  left,  extending  his  defenses  to  hold  the  Macon  railroad. 
General  Sherman's  line  was  also  greatly  attenuated,  and  as  a 
compensation  for  it,  the  defenses  on  the  north  were  made  ex- 
ceedingly strong,  and  from  them  shells  were  constantly  thrown 
to  the  city. 

In  the  evening  or  the  6th,  General  Sherman  said  to 
General  Schofield :  "  There  is  no  alternative  but  for  you  to 
continue  to  work  on  that  flank  with  as  much  caution  as 
possible,  and  it  is  possible  the  enemy  may  attack  us,  or  draw 
out."  To  General  Thomas,  he  said :  "  Instead  of  going  round 
East  Point,  I  would  prefer  the  enemy  to  weaken,  so  wo 
may  break  through  at  some  point,  and  wish  you  to  continue 
to  make  such  effort.  I  will  instruct  General  Howard  to  do 
the  same  at  the  head  of  Utoy  creek,  his  right."  But  Gen- 
eral Thomas  did  not  deem  it  prudent  to  assault  such  works, 
as  there  was  a  certainty  of  great  loss,  and  with  such  a  column, 
as  he  could  form  from  his  attenuated  line,  there  was  little 
probability  of  success.  His  response  was :  "  I  will  keep  the 
attention  of  the  enemy  fully  occupied  by  threatening  all  along 
my  front ;  but  I  have  no  hopes  of  breaking  through  his  lines 
anywhere  in  my  front,  as  long  as  he  has  a  respectable  force  to 
defend  them.  My  troops  are  so  thinned  out  that  it  will  be 
impossible  to  form  an  assaulting  column  sufficiently  strong  to 

VOL.  II — 9 


130  SIEGE   OF  ATLANTA. 

make  an  attack  sure."  In  the  emergency,  General  Sherman 
ordered  heavy  rifled  guns  from  Chattanooga  to  "  batter  the 
town." 

On  the  7th,  General  Hood  withdrew  his  troops  from  the 
intrenchments  assaulted  by  General  Schofield,  which,  though 
strong  and  well  protected  by  entanglements,  formed  no  part 
of  his  main  line,  and  their  abandonment  did  not  greatly  en- 
danger his  possession  of  the  Macon  railroad.  During  the  day 
the  Fourteenth  Corps  advanced,  carried  a  line  of  rifle-pits  in 
front  of  the  position  previously  occupied  by  the  Twenty-third 
Corps,  and  established  a  line  close  to  the  enemy's  works.  The 
loss  of  the  corps  was  seventy  men  killed,  and  four  hundred 
and  thirteen  wounded.  One  hundred  and  seventy-two  prison- 
ers were  taken. 

From  the  8th  to  the  10th,  General  Sherman  continued  his 
effort  to  reach  the  Macon  road,  by  the  extension  of  his  line  to 
the  right.  He  thought  it  impossible  that  the  enemy  could 
reach  much  farther  in  that  direction,  but  it  was  finally  ascer- 
tained that  his  well-fortified  line  extended  from  the  Decatur 
road,  on  the  east  of  Atlanta,  to  East  Point,  a  distance  of  fif- 
teen miles.  And  as  the  farther  attenuation  of  the  investing 
line  was  not  considered  safe,  and  as  the  enemy's  works  were 
too  strong  to  be  assaulted,  General  Sherman  began  to  cast 
about  for  a  new  plan.  In  the  meantime,  the  heavy  guns  were 
at  work  throwing  solid  shell  into  the  city  with  great  fre- 
quency, night  and  day,  in  expectation  that  their  agency  would 
reduce  the  value  of  Atlanta  as  a  "  large  machine-shop  and 
depot  of  supplies." 

On  the  llth,  General  Sherman  received  intelligence  through 
General  Garrard,  that  General  Hood  was  collecting  an  im- 
mense force  of  cavalry  to  operate  upon  his  communications. 
It  was  important  to  General  Hood  to  cut  short  General  Sher- 
man's supplies,  but  in  the  effort  to  do  it,  by  breaking  his  rail- 
road far  to  the  north,  he  was  depriving  his  own  communica- 
tions of  protection.  As  soon  as  General  Sherman  learned 
that  "Wheeler,  with  eight  or  ten  thousand  troopers,  was  mov- 
ing to  the  north,  he  determined  to  throw  his  cavalry  upon  the 
railroad  south  of  Atlanta. 

The  news  from  the  north  on  the  14th  gave  confirmation  to 


SIEGE   OF   ATLANTA.  131 

previous  reports  of  Wheeler's  intended  raid.  Early  in  the 
morning  of  that  day  he  attacked  a  party  guarding  a  large 
lierd  of  cattle  near  Calhoun,  dispersed  a  portion  of  the  guard 
.and  captured  a  large  number  of  the  cattle,  some  portions  of 
which  were  recaptured  by  Colonel  Faulkner,  who  pursued 
upon  receipt  of  the  news.  At  3  P.  M.  General  Steedman,  at 
Chattanooga,  was  informed  that  "Wheeler  was  going  toward 
Dalton.  He  at  once  relieved  all  the  troops  that  could  be 
spared  from  the  garrison  to  prepare  to  move  to  Dalton.  Be^ 
ing  delayed  by  trains  running  on  unusual  time,  General  Steed- 
man did  not  reach  the  vicinity  of  Dalton  until  midnight ;  and 
having  been  informed  that  the  garrison  had  surrendered,  he 
awaited  daylight,  and  then  moved  forward  and  engaged  the 
enemy's  skirmishers.  Hearing  firing  in  Dalton,  and  learning 
that  the  garrison  was  still  holding  out,  he  dashed  into  the  town 
and  cleared  it  of  the  enemy.  He  remained  for  a  day, -and 
learning  that  the  enemy  had  moved  oft',  through  fear  for  the 
bridges  over  the  Chickamauga,  he  hastened  back  to  Chatta- 
nooga. Colonel  Laiboldt  had  held  his  position  against  a  supe- 
rior force,  and  General  Steedman's  quick  relief  gave  him  final 
safety.  The  troops  under  General  Steedman  were  the  Second 
Missouri,  Twenty-ninth,  Fifty-first,  and  Sixty-eighth  Indiana, 
Seventy-eighth  Pennsylvania,  One  Hundred  and  Eighth  Ohio, 
and  the  Fourteenth  United  States  Colored  troops,  in  all  about 
eighteen  hundred  effective  men.  Wheeler's  loss  was  about 
two  hundred.  He  left  thirty-three  dead  and  fifty-seven  badly 
wounded  on  the  field.  Steedman's,  was  one  officer  and  eight 
men  killed,  one  officer  and  twenty-nine  men  wounded,  and 
twenty-three  men  missing. 

From  Dalton,  General  Wheeler  moved  north,  injured  the 
railroad  slightly  at  Graysville,  threatened  Cleveland  with  a 
detachment,  and  then  turned  to  the  northeast.  Soon  after, 
however,  he  changed  his  course  to  meet  in  Middle  Tennessee 
another  cavalry  force  under  General  Roddy.  The  latter,  had 
crossed  the  Tennessee  river,  near  Decatur,  to  strike  the  Nash- 
ville and  Decatur  railroad.  General  Wheeler's  primary  object 
was  to  damage  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  railroad. 
About  the  same  time,  the  enemy  was  active  near  Fort  Donel- 
son,  thus  giving  a  third  intimation  of  purpose  to  disturb  the 


132  SIEGE   OF  ATLANTA. 

communications  of  the  national  armies  before  Atlanta.  There 
was,  however,  less  force  in  the  raiding  columns  or  more  in  the 
troops  defending  the  railroads  than  had  been  anticipated,  as 
little  injury  was  effected.  The  failure  resulted  from  the  com- 
bined opposition  of  General  Rousseau,  commanding  at  Nash- 
ville, General  Steedman  at  Chattanooga,  and  General  R.  S. 
Granger  at  Decatur. 

General  Granger  sallied  forth  from  Decatur  and  encountered 
Roddy  near  Athens,  Alabama,  which  place  he  was  besieging. 
The  garrison  had  been  upon  the  defensive  previously,  but 
upon  his  arrival  the  barricades  were  removed,  and  the  enemy 
was  attacked  and  routed.  General  Granger  then  marched  up 
the  Nashville  and  Decatur  railroad  to  Pulaski,  to  intercept 
Wheeler,  who  was  moving  to  the  west,  followed  by  General 
Rousseau.  From  Pulaski  he  moved  upon  Linnville  with 
three  regiments  of  infantry,  expecting  General  Starkweather 
to  join  him  with  a  brigade  of  cavalry  in  time  to  give  battle. 
He  met  his  advance  and  drove  it  back,  but  his  cavalry  did  not 
arrive  in  time  to  •  engage  the  enemy.  During  the  night, 
"Wheeler  abandoned  the  line  of  the  railroad  and  moved  in  the 
direction  of  Lawrenceburg.  Granger  then  left  his  infantry  to 
guard  the  railroad,  and  assuming  personal  command  of  his 
cavalry  went  in  pursuit ;  and  overtaking  the  enemy  as  he  was 
leaving  Lawrenceburg,  he  fell  upon  Wheeler's  rear-guard  and 
harassed  him  as  he  retreated.  At  this  juncture,  General 
Rousseau  ordered  General  Granger  to  halt  and  form  a  junc- 
tion with  his  own  force.  For  a  time  the  order  was  not  obeyed, 
upon  the  supposition  that  General  Rousseau  was  ignorant  of 
the  fact  that  he  was  up  with  the  enemy  and  was  retarding  his 
retreat.  A  second  order  was  received,  requiring  him  to  discon- 
tinue the  pursuit  and  move  upon  Athens  to  intercept  Roddy. 
The  result  was  that  both  Wheeler  and  Roddy  succeeded  in 
crossing  the  Tennessee  river  without  loss  or  embarrassment. 
The  enemy  thus  escaped  serious  punishment,  but  utterly 
failed  to  interrupt  General  Sherman's  communications. 

Having  despaired  of  flanking  Hood  out  of  Atlanta,  on  the 
16th  General  Sherman  announced  his  new  plan  of  operations, 
but  suspended  them  first  to  learn  the  results  of  a  raid  by  Kil- 
patrick  to  Fairburn,  and  subsequently  until  his  cavalry  could 


SIEGE   OF  ATLANTA.  133 

make  one  more  effort  to  break  up  General  Hood's  communi- 
cations and  compel  him  to  fight  or  abandon  the  city.  General 
Kilpatrick  drove  back  Jackson's  division  of  cavalry  from 
Fairburn  on  the  15th,  destroyed  the  station  and  public  build- 
ings, and  the  telegraph  and  railroad  for  about  three  miles.  On 
the  18th,  he,  with  his  own  division  and  two  brigades  from  Gen- 
eral Garrard's,  in  all  about  five  thousand  cavalry,  dashed  out 
from  his  camp  at  Sandtown  to  the  "West  Point  road,  and  broke 
it  near  Fairburn,  and  thence  moved  to  Jonesborough,  defeated- 
Koss'  cavalry,  and  commenced  the  destruction  of  the  road; 
but  while  thus  engaged  he  was  attacked  by  Jackson's  cavalry 
and  a  brigade  of  infantry,  which  had  hurried  up  from  the  south, 
and  he  was  compelled  to  draw  off  toward  McDonough.  He 
then  made  a  circuit  to  Lovejoy's  Station,  where  again,  while 
breaking  the  road,  he  was  attacked  by  the  same  force.  Per- 
ceiving that  he  was  almost  surrounded,  he  charged  the  cav- 
alry and  cut  his  way  through,  capturing  four  guns  and  many 
prisoners  ;  but  being  hard  pressed  could  not  incumber  himself 
with  all  of  his  captives,  and  brought  in  but  seventy  men, 
three  flags,  and  one  gun.  He  then  returned  by  McDonough 
and  Decatur. 


EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  MORGAN'S  REPORT  OF  HIS  ACTION 
ON  THE  28TH  OF  JULY. 

July  28th,  received  orders  to  be  ready  with  my  brigade  at  8  A.  M.  ;  re- 
ported to  General  Davis  for  orders ;  was  informed  by  him  that  he  was  too 
unwell  to  take  command  of  the  division  in  the  field.  At  9  A.  M.  took 
command  of  the  division  on  the  Turner  Ferry  road,  to  move  under  the 
following  order: 

\>"  "  July  28,  1864. 

Major-General  G.  H.  Thomas: 

"  Order  General  Davis  to  leave  camp  and  move  to  Turner's  ferry,  and 
then  by  a  road  leading  toward  East  Point,  to  feel  forward  for  Howard 
right  back  with  some  known  point  at  Turner's  ferry.  I  will  be  over  on 
that  flank  all  day,  and  await  to  reach  out  as  far  as  possible. 

(Signed,)  "  W.  T.  SHERMAN." 

In  compliance  with  above  order,  I  did  move  to  Turner's  ferry,  halted 
nn  hour  for  rest  and  dinner.  Having  no  guide,  no  correct  map  of  the 
country,  I  had  to  rely  upon  such  information  as  I  could  obtain  from  resi- 
dents. Returning  from  the  ferry,  turned  to  the  right  at  the  church,  one 
mile  from  the  river,  and  took  the  road  leading  toward  East  Point.  The 
•enemy's  pickets  were  soon  met  upon  the  road ;  they  were  well  posted  and 


134  SIEGE   OF   ATLANTA. 

in  good  numbers,  requiring  the  deployment  of  a  whole  regiment  to  clear 
the  front.  After  moving  upon  this  road  about  one  and  a  half  miles,  a  staff 
officer  of  the  general  commanding  division  overtook  the  command,  and  I  re- 
ceived verbal  orders  to  return  as  soon  as  possible  to  the  Turner's  Ferry  road, 
the  enemy  having  attacked  General  Howard's  right.  Heavy  skirmishing 
continuing  in  front,  I  determined  to  advance  and  take  the  first  road  to  the 
left.  This  was  done,  and  the  division  was  moved  with  all  possible  dispatch 
to  Turner's  Ferry  road,  arriving  late  in  evening,  and  owing  to  a  bad  swamp 
and  a  very  dark  night,  was  nearly  all  night  in  getting  into  camp. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  July  30,  1864. 
Generals  Thomas  and  Howard : 

I  am  just  back  from  an  interview  with  General  Schofield.  r;  .  .. 
I  think  General  Stoneman  has  gone  to  Macon,  east  of  Yellow  river,  and 
that  is  well.  I  have  ordered  General  Garrard  in  on  our  left,  and  to-mor- 
row night  will  let  him  fill  with  a  skirmish  line  General  Schofield's  position, 
and  move  all  of  Schofield's  to  the  right  of  General  Howard,' and  with  the 
divisions  of  General  Davis  and  Ward  kept  in  reserve  on  the  right,  to  strike 
a  blow  beyond  our  new  right  flank  when  intrenched.  Our  right  flank 
must  be  advanced  in  close  and  absolute  contact  with  the  enemy;  and  with 
General  Schofield  on  that  flank,  I  think  we  can  make  him  quit  Atlanta, 
or  so  weaken  his  line  that  we  can  break  through  somewhere,  the  same  a* 
our  Kenesaw  move.  .  .  . 

(Signed,)  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General  Commanding* 


[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  48.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  1,  1864. 

I.  During  the  next  series  of  operations,  General  Thomas  will  be  the 
left,  General  Howard  the  center,  and  General  Schofield  the  right  army. 
The  two  divisions  of  Generals  Davis  and  Ward  will  continue  to  be  held 
in  reserve  toward  the  right,  and  in  case  the  enemy  attack  that  flank, 
these  divisions  will  report  to,   and  during  the  action,    obey   General 
Schofield's  orders.     When  not  engaged,  General  Thomas  will  post  them 
so  as  to  cover  his  communications  from  danger  coming  from  the  South- 
east. 

II.  Brigadier-General  Garrard's  cavalry  will  relieve  General  Schofield 
on  the  left,  and  occupy  in  part  his  trenches,  patrol  the  road  about  Decatur, 
and  picket  toward  Roswell.     He  will  report  to  General  Thomas,  and  be 
prepared  to  sally  out  as  cavalry  from  his  trenches  in  case  of  necessity. 

III.  All  trains  of  wagons  going  to  and  from  the  depots  of  Vining's  and 
Marietta  will  follow  roads  converging  at  the  railroad  bridge,  and  never 
go  north  of  Buckhead  or  south  of  Turner's. 


SIEGE   OF   ATLANTA.  135 

IV.  General  Thomas  will  cause  a  new  infantry  flank  to  be  prepared  on 
the  left,  north  of  the  Buckhead  road,  connecting  General  Stanley's  lines 
with  the  old  rebel  parapet  near  Peachtree  creek. 
By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDEES,  NO.  51.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  4,  1864. 
The  order  of  movement  of  the  army  to-day  will  be  as  follows : 

I.  Major-General    Schofield,   with    his    own    command    and    General 
Palmer's  corps,  will  move  directly  on  the  railroad  which  leads  south  out 
of  Atlanta,  at  any  point  between  Whitehall  and  East  Point,  and  will  not 
stop  until  he  has  absolute  control  of  the  railroad,  but  must  not  extend 
more  to  the  right  than  is  absolutely  necessary  to  that  end. 

II.  Major-Generals  Thomas  and  Howard  will  press  close  on  the  enemy 
at  all  points,  and  reinforce  well  the  points  of  the  line  where  the  enemy  is 
most  likely  to  sally — viz.,  on  the  Decatur,  Buckhead,  and  Turner's  Ferry 
roads;    but  more  especially  watch  the  outlet  along  the  railroad — viz., 
General  "Williams'  front. 

III.  On  the  right  we  mufet  assume  the  offensive,  and  every  man  be  pre- 
pared to  fight,  leaving  knapsacks,  etc.,  in  present  trenches.     Wagon's  will 
not  be  taken  east  of  Utoy  creek,  until  General  Schofield  has  secured 
position  on  the  railroad,  or  so  near  it  that  it  can  be  reached  by  musket- 
balls  and  canister.     If  necessary  to  secure  this  end,  ordinary  parapets 
must  be  charged  and  carried,  and  every  hour's  delay  enables  the  enemy 
to  strengthen  ;  therefore,  let  it  be  done  to-day. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  4,  1864. 
General  Palmer : 

You  will,  during  the  movement  against  the  railroad,  report  to  and  re- 
ceive orders  from  General  Schofield.  General  Thomas  will  personally 
look  to  the  front  of  Atlanta.  General  Howard  will  co-operate  with  Gen- 
eral Schofield,  and  General  Schofield,  reinforced  by  your  corps,  is  charged 
to  reach  the  railroad.  Obey  his  orders  and  instructions.  Acknowledge 
receipt. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 


136  SIEGE   OF  ATLANTA. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  5,  1864. 
General  Schofield : 

Dispatch  received.  All  right.  Press  the  attack  on  the  right.  I  will 
judge  by  the  sound ;  and  if  I  judge  you  are  too  hard  pressed,  will  order 
Generals  Thomas  and  Howard  to  assault  somewhere.  Get  some  part  of 
your  command  where  you  can  easily  reach  the  railroad  with  short-range 
guns,  and  then  intrench  a  strong  flank.  It  is  worth  a  battle,  and  the 
closer  the  first  advantages  are  followed  up,  the  better.  The  weakest  point 
of  the  enemy  must  be  mathematically  at  some  point  between  Atlanta 
and  East  Point.  Keep  me  often  advised  of  your  progress,  and  I  will 
come  over  any  minute  you  say,  but  can  better  handle  the  whole  army 
from  here  by  telegraph. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  6,  1864. 
General  Thomas  : 

General  Schofield  has  been  at  work  to-day  with  his  two  divisions,  and 
holds  Johnson's  in  support.  .  .  . 

He  tried  to  break  through  the  enemy's  lines  by  a  brigade  to-day,  but 
failed,  losing  five  hundred  (500)  men.  Instead  of  going  round  East 
Point,  I  would  prefer  the  enemy  to  weaken,  so  we  may  break  through  at 
some  point,  and  wish  you  to  continue  to  make  such  an  effort.  I  will  in- 
struct General  Howard  to  do  the  same  about  the  head  of  Utoy  creek — 

his  right. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  6,  1864. 
General  Schofield : 

I  have  your  dispatch.  There  is  no  alternative  but  for  you  to  continue 
to  work  on  that  flank  with  as  much  caution  as  possible,  and  it  is  possible 
the  enemy  may  attack  us  or  draw  out.  He  must  defend  that  road. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND,  August  7,  1864. 
Major-General  Sherman  : 

I  will  keep  the  attention  of  the  enemy  fully  occupied  by  threatening 
all  along  my  front  as  long  as  he  has  a  respectable  force  to  defend  them. 
My  troops  are  so  thinned  out  that  it  will  be  impossible  to  form  an  assault- 
ing column  sufficiently  strong  to  make  an  attack  sure. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General. 


SIEGE   OF  ATLANTA.  137 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  7,  1864. 

General  Halleck,  Washington : 

*#•**•*•*•**•* 

I  do  not  deem  it  prudent  to  extend  more  to  the  right,  but  will  push 
forward  daily  by  parallels,  and  make  the  inside  of  Atlanta  too  hot  to  be 
endured. 

I  have  sent  to  Chattanooga  for  two  (2)  30-pounder  Parrotts,  with  which 
I  can  pick  out  almost  any  house  in  the  town.  I  am  too  impatient  for  a 
siege,  but  I  do  n't  know  but  here  is  as  good  a  place  to  fight  it  out  as' 
further  inland.  One  thing  is  certain — whether  we  get  inside  of  Atlanta 
or  not,  it  will  be  a  used-up  community  by  the  time  we  are  done  with  it. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  10,  1864. 
•General  Howard : 

I  thank  you  for  the  suggestion.  I  am  studying  all  the  combinations 
possible,  and  beg  you  to  think  also,  and  communicate  to  me ;  but  be  care- 
ful to  keep  your  own  confidence.  I  spoke  of  the  same  thing  to-day  to 
General  Thomas,  and  he  goes  to  look  at  the  railroad  bridge,  to  see  to  a 
proper  cover  there  for  the  wagons  and  a  corps.  I  want  to  expend  four 
thousand  (4,000)  heavy  rifle  shots  on  the  town  before  doing  anything  new, 
«,nd  then  will  be  prepared  to  act  quick.  General  Schofield  has  been  re- 
connoitering  the  right  all  day,  and  after  he  has  answered  a  few  more  of 
my  questions,  I  will  give  you  the  substance  of  his  report. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  10,  1864. 
'General  Thomas : 

I  have  your  last  dispatch.  I  hear  the  guns.  I  hear  the  guns  and  shells 
also.  The  enemy's  battery  of  32-pounders,  rifled,  are  firing  on  us  here 
from  the  Whitehall  fort,  to  draw  off  or  divert  our  fire.  Keep  up  a  steady, 
persistent  fire  on  Atlanta  with  the  4£-mch  guns  and  20-pounder  Parrotts, 
and  order  them  to  pay  no  attention  to  the  side  firing,  by  which  the  en- 
•emy  may  attempt  to  divert  their  attention.  I  think  those  guns  will 
make  Atlanta  of  less  value  to  them  as  a  large  machine-shop  and  depot 
•of  supplies.  The  inhabitants  have,  of  course,  got  out. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 


138  SIEGE   OF   ATLANTA. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  16,  1864. 
General  Thomas : 

•**#***•*** 

I  do  think  our  cavalry  should  now  break  the  Macon  road  good.  If  we 
can  save  our  rations  at  Marietta  and  Allatoona,  and  break  the  Macon  road 

for  many  miles,  we  can  wait  as  long  as  Hood. 

•fc*-*-****** 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  16,  1864. 
Generals  Thomas,  Howard,  and  Schqfield : 

We  will  commence  the  movement  against  the  railroad  about  Jonesboro, 
Thursday  night,  unless  something  occurs  in  the  meantime  to  mar  the 
plan.  I  will  make  my  orders,  and  the  preliminary  preparations  may  be 
begun. 

If  Wheeler  interrupts  our  supplies,  we  can  surely  cut  off  those  of  Hoodr 
and  see  who  can  stand  it  best. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
„  Major-General 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  57.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  16,  1864. 

The  movement  of  the  army  against  the  Macon  railroad  will  begin 
Thursday  night,  August  18th,  and  will  be  continued  on  the  following  gen- 
eral plan : 

I.  All  army  commanders  will  send  across  the  Chattahoochee  river,  and 
within  the  old  rebel  works  at  the  bridge,  and  down  as  far  as  Turner's  ferry, 
all  surplus  wagons,  horses,  men,  and  materials  not  absolutely  necessary  to- 
the  success  of  the  expedition,  and  will  collect  in  their  wagons,  with  best 
teams,  bread,  meat,  sugar,  coffee,  etc.,  for  fifteen  (15)  days,  after  the  nine- 
teenth (19th)  instant,  and  ammunition,  and  park  them  near  Utoy  creek. 

First  move. — General  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  will  move  to  Camp  creek;  Gen- 
eral Schofield  will  cover  the  Campbelton  road,  and  General  Thomas  will 
move  one  corps  (General  Williams')  to  the  Chattahoochee  bridge,  with 
orders  to  hold  it;  Paice's  ferry  bridge,  and  pontoon  bridge  (Captain 
Kossack's)  at  Turner's  ferry,  ready  to  be  laid  down  if  necessary.  Th& 
other  corps  (General  Stanley's)  will  move  south  of  Proctor's  creek,  to  near 
Utoy,  beliind  the  right  center  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  prepared  to 
cover  the  Bell's  Ferry  road.  General  Garrard's  cavalry  will  fall  behind 
Peachtree  creek,  and  act  against  the  enemy  should  he  sally  against  Gen- 
eral Williams  or  General  Stanley's  corps  during  the  movement. 

Second  move. — The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  will  withdraw  cross  Utoy 
creek,  and  move  by  most  direct  road  toward  Fairburn,  going  as  far  as  Camp 


SIEGE   OF   ATLANTA.  139 

creek.  General  Thomas  will  mass  his  two  corps  (General  Stanley's  and 
Johnson's)  below  Utoy  creek,  and  General  Garrard's  cavalry  will  join  Gen- 
eral Thomas  by  most  direct  road,  or  by  way  of  Sandtown  bridge,  and  act 
with  him  during  the  rest  of  the  move. 

General  Schofield  will  advance  abreast  of  and  in  communication  with 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  as  far  as  Camp  creek. 

Third  move. — The  Armies  of  the  Ohio  and  Tennessee  will  move  direct 
for  the  West  Point  road,  aiming  to  strike  it  between  Red  Oak  and  Fair- 
burn.  General  Thomas  will  follow,  well  closed  up  into  two  columns,  the 
trains  between.  General  Kilpatrick  will  act  as  advance,  and  General 
Garrard  will  cover  the  rear,  under  direction  of  General  Thomas. 

The  bridges  at  Sandtown  will  be  kept  and  protected  by  a  detachment 
of  cavalry,  detailed  by  General  Elliott,  with  a  section  of  guns  or  four  (4) 
gun  battery. 

II.  During  the  movement,  and  until  the  army  returns  to  the  river,  the 
utmost  care  will  be  taken  to  expose  as  little  as  possible  the  trains  of  cars 
and  wagons.  The  depots  at  the  bridge,  at  Allatoona  and  Marietta,  will 
be  held  against  any  attack,  and  communication  kept  up  with  the  army 
as  far  as  possible  by  way  of  Sandtown.  On  reaching  any  railroad,  the 
troops  will  at  once  be  disposed  for  defense,  and  at  least  one-third  put  to 
work  to  tear  up  track  and  aestroy  iron,  ties,  and  all  railroad  material. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND,  August  17,  1864. 
Major-General  Sherman  : 

Information  from  all  sources  seems  to  confirm  the  report  that  Wheeler 
has  taken  off  the  greater  part  of  his  cavalry.  I  therefore  think  this  will 
be  as  good  a  time  as  could  be  taken  to  make  another  raid  on  the  Macon 
railroad ;  but  if  you  send  Kilpatrick,  I  would  insist  on  his  taking  the  most 
practicable  route,  and  avoid  the  enemy's  infantry  as  much  as  possible. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  19,   1864 — 10.45  A.  M. 
General  Grant,  City  Point : 

I  have  your  dispatches  of  14th  and  16th,  and  also  that  of  18th.  I  will 
never  take  a  step  backward,  and  have  no  fears  of  Hood.  I  can  whip  him 
outside  of  his  trenches,  and,  I  think,  in  time  can  compel  him  to  come  out. 
I  think  at  this  time  I  have  a  fine  cavalry  force  on  the  only  road  which  can 
feed  him,  and,  if  necessary,  will  swing  my  whole  army  across  it  also. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

THE  FLANK  MOVEMENT     CULMINATING  IN  THE  BATTLE  OF  JONESBORO 
AND   THE   FALL   OF   ATLANTA. 

PENDING  General  Kilpatrick's  movements  the  shelling  of 
Atlanta  was  actively  maintained,  and  feints  of  various  kinds 
were  employed  by  General  Stanley  on  the  left  to  confuse  the 
enemy  and  lead  to  the  belief  that  a  movement  was  intended 
in  that  direction ;  but  when,  after  General  Kilpatrick's  return, 
it  was  ascertained  that  the  damage  to  the  railroads  was  not 
such  as  to  greatly  embarrass  the  enemy,  General  Sherman  re- 
peated his  order  for  the  grand  movement  by  the  right  flank, 
which  involved  the  necessity  of  raising  the  siege  of  Atlanta, 
and  using  his  armies  against  the  communications  of  the  enemy 
rather  than  against  his  intrenchments  around  the  city.  To 
take  the  place  by  siege  would  require  too  much  time,  and  to 
take  it  by  assault  would  cost  too  many  lives.  His  sick,  and 
all  surplus  supplies,  wagons,  and  incumbrances,  having  been 
sent  to  the  intrenchments  beyond  the  Chattahoochee,  the 
Fourth  Corps  was,  on  the  25th,  withdrawn  to  the  high  ground, 
in  the  rear  of  the  Twentieth  Corps,  to  cover  the  retirement  of 
the  latter  to  the  farther  side  of  the  Chattahoochee,  to  hold  the 
railroad  bridge  and  the  bridges  at  Paice's  and  Turner's  ferries, 
and  guard  the  material  there  accumulated.  Garrard's  cavalry 
covered  the  movement  of  the  Twentieth  Corps  to  the  rear, 
and  that  of  the  Fourth  Corps  to  the  right,  to  take  position  on 
the  high  ground  along  Utoy  creek.  This  change  was  effected 
on  the  26th  with  but  slight  molestation,  and  the  night  following, 
the  Fourteenth  Corps,  now  in  permanent  command  of  Brevet 
Major-General  J.  C.  Davis,  was  withdrawn  from  position  and 
formed  on  the  right  of  General  Stanley,  on  Utoy  creek.  The 

(140) 


FALL   OF  ATLANTA,    ETC.  141 

same  night  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  moved  rapidly  by  a 
circuit  toward  Sandtown.  General  Schofield  alone  remained 
in  position. 

The  next  day  the  Fourth  Corps  advanced  to  Mount  Gilead 
Church,  and,  forming  line  of  battle  on  the  road  to  Fairburn, 
skirmished  with  the  enemy's  cavalry.  The  Fourteenth  Corps 
remained  in  position,  as  it  was  necessary  that  one  corps  should 
cover  another  until  out  of  reach  of  the  enemy.  General 
Garrard's  cavalry  operated  upon  the  rear  and  left  of  the  armies 
during  these  movements,  and  Kilpatrick's  having  crossed  the 
Chattahoochee,  at  Paice's  ferry,  and  recrossed  at  Sandtown, 
was  charged  with  similar  service  on  the  right.  The  Twentieth 
Corps,  at  the  Chattahoochee,  passed  to  the  command  of  Major- 
General  H.  W.  NSlocum. 

On  the  28th,  the  Fourteenth  Corps  passed  the  Fourth  at 
Mount  Gilead,  and  reached  its  designated  camp,  near  Eed  Oak, 
late  in  the  afternoon,  p-eneral  Morgan's  division,  in  the  ad- 
vance, skirmished  with  the  enemy's  cavalry  during  the  day. 
The  Fourth  Corps  followed,  and  the  two  corps  encamped  in 
line  across  the  "West  Point  railroad,  facing  east.  The  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  was  on  the  same  road  above  Fairburn,  and 
General  Schofield  was  on  this  road  below  East  Point.  Shortly 
after  dark,  orders  were  received  to  destroy  the  railroad,  by 
heating  and  twisting  the  rails  and  burning  the  ties.  The  work 
of  destruction  was  continued  through  the  night  and  a  portion 
of  the  following  day,  by  each  army,  and  twelve  and  a  half 
miles  of  the  road  were  thoroughly  dismantled.  But  this  was 
not  the  road  of  most  importance  to  the  enemy.  The  Macon 
road  passes  to  Jonesboro,  from  Atlanta,  on  the  ridge  dividing 
the  waters  of  the  Flint  and  Ocmulgee  rivers,  and  offered  a 
good  position  as  a  strategic  base  for  ulterior  movements,  and 
on  the  30th  the  armies  advanced  eastward  to  reach  it,  more 
directly  in  rear  of  Atlanta. 

The  Fourth  and  Fourteenth  Corps  moved  to  Couch's  house, 
formed  a  line  trending  to  the  northwest,  and  went  into  camp. 
The  leading  divisions  of  each  corps  skirmished  with  infantry 
and  cavalry,  and  at  night  it  was  ascertained  that  there  was  a 
force  of  the  enemy  at  Morrow's  mill,  on  Crooked  creek, 
three-fourths  of  a  mile  from  General  Stanley's  left.  General 


142  FALL   OF   ATLANTA,    ETC. 

Thomas  was  in  communication  with  General  Howard  beyond 
Renfrew's,  but  not  with  General  Schofield  on  the  left.  General 
Garrard  was  guarding  the  left  and  rear,  at  Red  Oak,  and  Gen- 
eral Kilpatrick  was  on  General  Howard's  right. 

General  Sherman  having  ascertained  that  General  Howard 
was  near  Jonesboro,  directed  General  Thomas  to  send  Stan- 
ley's corps  toward  Rough  and  Ready,  in  connection  with 
Schofield,  and  to  send  forward  a  strong  detachment  from  the 
Fourteenth  Corps  to  "  feel  for  the  railroad."  In  compliance, 
General  Baird,  with  his  own  division,  and  Mitchell's  brigade 
of  Morgan's  division,  was  sent  forward  from  the  center,  and 
an  early  advance  discovered  that  the  enemy's  trains  were  in 
motion  on  a  road  to  the  east  toward  Jonesboro,  and  later  in 
the  day  it  was  ascertained  from  captured  stragglers  that  Har- 
dee's  and  Lee's  corps  had  passed. 

In  the  afternoon  General  Baird's  leading  detachment  reached 
the  railroad  about  four  miles  from  Jonesboro.  Although, 
greatly  in  advance  of  other  columns,  General  Baird  determined 
to  hold  the  railroad  by  strengthening  Colonel  Carleton's  party 
in  the  advance,  and  sending  Colonel  Gleason's  brigade  for- 
ward in  support.  The  Fourth  Corps  formed  a  junction  with 
the  Twenty -third,  at  the  railroad,  and  rested  on  the  road  south- 
east of  Rough  and  Ready,  in  a  barricaded  line  facing  Jones- 
boro. Carlin's  division,  formerly  Johnson's,  moved  to  Ren- 
frew's to  cover  the  trains,  and  late  in  the  afternoon  was 
ordered  to  support  General  Howard,  who  had  been  attacked 
by  Hardee's  and  Lee's  corps.  Carlin  moved  as  ordered,  but  did 
not  reach  the  field  until  after  General  Howard  had  completely 
repulsed  the  enemy. 

The  situation  was  now  partially  developed.  Two  corps  of 
Hood's  army  were  at  Jonesboro.  It  was  not  known  that  Stew- 
art's corps  had  left  Atlanta,  but  as  the  army  was  in  force  at 
Jonesboro,  General  Sherman  determined  to  move  against  that 
place,  and  if  Stewart  was  not  there  to  thrust  his  forces  between 
the  two  portions  of  Hood's  army.  Deeming  it  probable  that 
the  third  corps  would  abandon  Atlanta,  he  directed  General 
Thomas  to  order  General  Slocum  to  make  a  reconnoissance 
toward  Atlanta  to  determine  the  state  of  affairs,  and  also  to 
send  a  cavalry  force  toward  Decatur  to  observe  the  enemy  in 


FALL   OF  ATLANTA,   ETC.  143 

that  direction.  Circumstances  now  indicated  a  speedy  solution 
of  all  problems  having  connection  with  Atlanta. 

General  Sherman's  orders  for  September  1st  required  all  the 
forces  to  turn  upon  Jonesboro.  General  Howard  was  already 
before  it,  and  General  Davis,  with  Morgan's  and  Carlin's  divis- 
ions, joined  Baird's  on  the  railroad,  and  the  whole  corps  was 
soon  on  Howard's  left.  Generals  Schofield  and  Stanley,  having 
a  longer  march,  and  owing  to  railroad  destruction  and  other 
causes,  were  greatly  delayed.  General  Garrard  was  still  in  the 
rear,  and  General  Kilpatrick  was  sent  down  the  west  bank  of 
Flint  river  to  threaten  the  railroad  below  J6nesboro,  and  Gen- 
eral Blair's  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  sent  in  the 
same  direction.  This  immense  combination  had  been  directed 
against  Hardee's  corps  alone,  which  had  been  left  behind  to 
cover  the  retreat  to  a  point  where  the  dissevered  army  could 
be  reunited. 

After  occupying  the  'position  vacated  by  General  Blair's 
corps,  General  Davis  directed  General  Carlin  to  send  a  brigade 
to  explore  the  ground  toward  the  railroad  upon  which  General 
Stanley  was  advancing.  The  reconnoissance  was  made  by  Edie's 
brigade  of  regulars,  and  was  strongly  resisted  by  the  enemy. 
It  was,  however,  pressed  until  a  commanding  hill  beyond  Mo- 
ker's  creek  was  carried,  from  the  front  of  which  the  enemy's 
works  could  be  attacked  with  advantage. 

At  this  juncture  General  Thomas  reached  the  head  of  column, 
to  whom  General  Davis  reported  the  condition  of  affairs,  and 
suggested  a  plan  of  operations.  Having  received  permission 
to  make  the  attack  directly  before  the  hill  which  Edie  had 
gained,  General  Davis  pushed  his  troops  in  column  to  that  point, 
and  deployed  for  action.  Carlin's  second  brigade  was  formed 
on  the  right  of  Edie's.  General  Morgan  crossed  the  creek  and 
connected  the  left  of  his  division  with  Carlin's  right.  General 
Baird  formed  his  division  in  rear  of  Carlin's  left,  which  rested 
on  the  railroad.  General  Morgan's  movement  was  executed 
over  rough  ground,  and  in  exposure  to  the  enemy's  artillery. 
About  the  time  that  the  formation  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps 
was  completed,  General  Stanley's  head  of  column  appeared  on 
Carlin's  left,  and  Grose's  and  Kirby's  brigades  of  KimbalPs 


144  FALL   OF  ATLANTA,  'ETC. 

division  were  deployed,  under  instructions  to  push  the  enemy 
vigorously  on  the  left  of  the  railroad. 

The  troops  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  designated  for  the  at- 
tack, were  General  Carlin's  two  brigades  and  General  Morgan's 
entire  division,  and  were  formed  in  double  lines,  and  as  nearly 
contiguous  as  the  ground  would  permit.  The  distance  to  the 
enemy  from  Morgan's  division,  when  deployed,  was  about  one 
thousand  yards ;  the  intervening  space  was  open,  but  swampy, 
and  cut  with  ditches.  The  distance  to  the  enemy's  works  in 
General  Carlin's  front  could  not  be  determined,  as  a  dense 
thicket  interposed.  The  defenses  of  the  enemy  were  in  the 
woods  on  a  ridge,  at  various  distances  from  the  edge  of  the 
wooded  ground,  but  in  no  case  exceeding  one  hundred  yards. 
Morgan's  division  was  formed  by  brigades  in  column  of  regi- 
ments in  echelon,  from  left  to  right — Lum's,  Mitchell's,  and 
Dil  worth's — and  were  ordered  to  assault  with  the  bayonet 
alone. 

At  4  P.  M.,  after  a  heavy  cannonade  from  Prescott's  and 
Gardner's  batteries  on  Carlin's  ridge,  the  troops  moved  for- 
ward, but  owing  to  the  thickets  in  Carlin's  front,  and  the 
swampy  ground  and  ditches  before  Morgan,  their  progress 
was  slow,  and  there  was  difficulty  in  maintaining  alignments 
and  direction.  When  the  whole  line  had  advanced  to  the 
slope  of  a  hill',  and  an  open  field  within  three  or  four  hundred 
yards  of  the  enemy's  position,  it  was  halted  for  readjustment, 
the  ground  offering  some  protection.  Thus  far  the  enemy's 
fire  had  been  only  slightly  felt,  except  by  Edie's  brigade,  which 
was  some  distance  in  advance  of  the  troops  on  the  right,  and 
had  already  carried  a  projection  of  the  enemy's  works,  and 
was  exposed  to  a  most  galling  fire.  To  give  Edie  support,  or 
rather  to  relieve  him  from  position  in  the  line,  Este's  brigade 
of  Baird's  division  was  thrown  forward,  and  took  part  in  the 
general  attack  which  followed.  The  other  two  brigades  of 
Baird's  division  were  retained  on  the  left,  to  push  the  advan- 
tage on  that  flank,  should  a  general  assault  prove  successful. 

At  5  P.  M.,  the  rectified  lines  again  moved  forward,  and  the 
attack  was  quickly  and  vigorously  made  along  the  whole  bat- 
tle front.  There  had  been  so  many  unsuccessful  assaults  made 
by  both  armies  during  the  campaign,  that  the  enemy  regarded 


FALL   OF   ATLANTA,  ETC.  145 

this  attempt  to  carry  his  intrenchments,  so  strongly  defended, 
as  an  exhibition  of  folly  and  harmless  audacity.  But  it  was 
soon  revealed  that  the  most  determined  resistance  could  not 
arrest  or  defeat  the  bold  assault. 

Morgan's  division  carried  its  entire  front,  and  gloriously  re- 
versed the  issue  of  its  assault  near  Kenesaw  Mountain  on  the 
27th  of  June.  The  brigades  of  Mitchell  and  Dilworth  there 
clung  to  the  hillside  under  the  enemy's  guns,  having  failed 
in  assault ;  here  they  leaped  the  fortifications,  and  under 
sword  and  bayonet  held  captive  the  troops  set  for  their  de- 
fense. 

Este's  brigade  was  successful  at  once  on  its  right,  the  Tenth 
Kentucky  and  Seventy-fourth  Indiana  gaining  the  intrench- 
ments in  their  front ;  but  the  Fourteenth  and  Thirty-eighth 
Ohio,  on  the  left,  met  such  obstructions,  as  compelled  them  to 
halt.  They,  however,  held  their  ground  under  a  fire  of  fearful 
effect.  Colonel  Este,  who  had  been  in  the  charge  on  his  right, 
now  turned  his  attention  to  his  left,  and  meeting  with  Colonel 
"W.T.  C.  Grower,  Seventeenth  New  York,  of  General  Morgan's 
left  brigade,  requested  him  to  put  in  his  regiment,  which  he 
did  with  great  gallantry  and  success,  though  he  was  himself 
one  of  the  first  to  fall.  Joined  by  this  regiment,  Este's  left 
carried  the  works  in  front,  and  captured  a  large  number  of 
prisoners.  Moore's  brigade,  Carlin's  left,  encountered  such 
obstructions  as  held  it  in  check  for  a  time,  but  finally  joined 
the  remainder  of  the  assaulting  troops  in  the  enemy's  works. 

Equal  success  on  the  part  of  the  Fourth  Corps  might  have 
resulted  in  the  capture  of  Hardee's  command ;  but  Kimball's 
and  Newton's  divisions  were  so  delayed  by  the  thick  under- 
growth, and  the  enemy's  skirmishers,  that  they  did  not  get 
before  his  main  lines  until  5  p.  M.,  and  then  Grose  and  Kirby 
only  succeeded  in  breaking  through  the  entanglements  in 
front  of  his  barricade,  while  Newton,  who  was  compelled  to 
make  a  larger  circuit,  passed  beyond  the  right  flank  of  the 
enemy,  when  it  was  too  dark  to  take  advantage  of  his  position. 

Although  Hardee's  corps  was  neither  captured  nor  annihi- 
lated— a  conjectured  result,  had  the  troops  on  the  left  reached 
the  field  earlier — the  action  was  the  most  brilliant  and  success- 

VOL.  II — 10 


146  FALL   OF   ATLANTA,  ETC. 

fill  of  its  type  during  the  campaign.  All  other  assaults  of 
main  lines  by  either  army  had  resulted  in  failure,  and,  as  a 
general  rule,  the  defensive  in  positive  battle  had  been  success- 
ful ;  but  here  a  strongly  intrenched  line  was  carried,  with  the 
capture  of  nearly  a  thousand  men,  including  one  general  offi- 
cer, and  many  of  inferior  grades,  also  eight  guns,  and  seven 
battle  flags.  During  the  night,  about  one  thousand  men  in 
addition  either  surrendered  or  were  captured. 

The  contest  closed  so  late  in  the  evening  that  pursuit  was 
impossible,  and  the  troops  bivouacked  in  the  enemy's  works 
connecting  with  the  Fourth  Corps  at  the  railroad.  During* 
the  night,  Hardee  fell  back  to  Lovejoy's  Station.  The  nexl, 
morning  the  national  forces  followed,  except  the  Fourteenth 
Corps,  left  behind  to  bury  the  dead  and  collect  the  material 
-abandoned  by  the  enemy.  The  troops  in  pursuit  reached  the 
vicinity  of  the  station  at  noon.  The  Fourth  Corps  formed 
line  of  battle,  and  made  preparations  to  attack  the  enemy  who 
was  busy  fortifying  a  line  across  the  railroad,  a  mile  north. 
The  necessity  of  resistance  at  this  point  had  not  been  antici- 
pated, and  the  enemy  was  extemporizing  defenses.  General 
Stanley's  line  was  formed  with  Wood's  division  in  the  center, 
and  Newton's  and  Kimball's  on  the  right  and  left.  As  his 
attack  was  to  be  co-operative  with  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
he  waited  for  General  Howard  to  fix  the  time,  and  a|  3J  P.  M. 
as  directed,  advanced  his  line.  Upon  reaching  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  enemy,  he  did  not  deem  it  advisable  to  attack 
at  the  railroad,  as  Hood's  artillery  swept  this  point  completely. 
Supposing  that  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  would  so  hold  the 
enemy  by  attack,  that  he  could  reach  his  right  flank,  General 
Stanley  advanced  his  center  and  left.  The  ground,  however, 
was  so  unfavorable,  on  account  of  roughness,  streams,  and 
marshes,  that  Wood's  and  KimbalPs  divisions  did  not  get  near 
the  position  until  nearly  6  p.  M.  While  General  Wood  was 
selecting  a  point  for  attack,  he  received  a  wound  which  obliged 
him  to  relinquish  his  command.  However,  his  left  brigade, 
Knefler's,  charged  and  carried  the  enemy's  works,  but  could 
not  maintain  its  hold,  as  it  was  subjected  to  an  enfilading  fire 
on  both  flanks.  KimbaH's  column  was  exposed  to  a  sweeping 
artillery  fire,  and  the  ground  before  them  being  open,  the 


FALL   OF   ATLANTA,  ETC.  147 

order  to  charge  was  countermanded.  Both  divisions  in- 
trenched. General  Sherman  did  not  deem  it  advisable  subse- 
quently to  press  the  attack,  as  he  was  led  to  believe  that 
Hood  had  halted  merely  to  cover  the  roads  to  McDonough 
and  Fayetteville,  and  that  it  was  then  too  late  to  intercept 
•Stewart's  corps,  reported  to  be  in  retreat  from  Atlanta  upon 
McDonough. 

Pending  the  movement  south  of  Atlanta,  General  Slocum 
strengthened  the  position  at  the  Chattahoochee,  and  watched 
the  enemy  closely  toward  Atlanta.  The  explosions  during 
the  night  of  the  1st  called  forth  a  special  reconnoissance.  As 
Colonel  Coburn,  commanding  the  advance,  approached  the 
>city  on  the  2d,  he  was  met  by  the  mayor,  who  made  to  him  a 
formal  surrender  of  the  place.  After  entering  Atlanta,  Colonel 
Coburn  exchanged  a  few  shots  with  Ferguson's  cavalry,  act- 
ing as  a  rear-guard  of  the  retreating  army,  and  captured  one 
hundred  men.  Generalv  Slocum  soon  after  occupied  the  city 
with  seven  brigades,  and  found  twenty  pieces  of  artillery  and 
several  hundred  small  arms ;  but  General  Hood  had  destroyed 
almost  all  valuable  material  which  he  could  not  remove,  in- 
cluding eight  locomotives  and  eighty-one  cars  loaded  with 
ammunition  and  supplies.  The  explosion  of  the  ammunition 
had  been  heard  at  Jonesboro,  and  was  the  first  indication  of 
the  total  abandonment  of  the  place.  As  General  Sherman  had 
interposed  between  Stewart's  corps  at  Atlanta,  and  Hardee's 
and  Lee's  on  the  Macon  road,  the  retreat  of  the  former  was 
the  only  condition  of  safety. 

The  losses  in  the  engagements  south  of  Atlanta  amounted 
in  the  aggregate  to  twelve  hundred  men.  Fifteen  hundred 
of  the  enemy  were  captured,  and  he  left  three  hundred  dead 
on  the  field  of  battle. 

September  3d,  General  Sherman  announced  the  conclusion 
of  the  campaign,  and  gave  orders  for  the  return  of  his  armies 
to  Atlanta,  to  rest  and  recuperate  until  the  enemy's  move- 
ments or  some  new  plan  of  his  own  should  call  them  again  to 
action.  As  the  enemy  remained  in  his  intrenchments  at  Love- 
joy's  Station,  General  Sherman  did  not  withdraw  his  army  at 
once.  Both  commanding  generals  sent  their  trains  to  the 


148  FALL   OF   ATLANTA,  ETC. 

rear;  and  thus  indicated  a  mutual  disposition  to  widen  the 
breach  between  them  for  a  time  at  least. 

On  the  5th,  the  Fourth  Corps  quietly  withdrew  from  posi- 
tion and  joined  the  Fourteenth  at  Jonesboro,  at  daylight  on 
the  6th.  Though  the  general  withdrawal  was  impeded  by  a 
rain-storm  and  consequent  bad  roads,  it  was  successfully  con- 
ducted. The  enemy  manifested  a  disposition  to  annoy  the 
two  corps  at  Jonesboro,  but  there  was  no  action  beyond  the 
exchange  of  a  few  shots.  The  next  day,  the  army  moved 
to  Rough  and  Ready,  the  enemy  refraining  from  pursuit,  and 
went  into  camp  on  the  8th,  on  the  outskirts  of  Atlanta — the 
Fourteenth  Corps  on  the  right  of  the  Campbellton  road,  and 
the  Twentieth  and  Fourth  Corps  to  the  east  in  reserve.  Pick- 
ets were  thrown  out  well  to  the  front  upon  commanding  posi- 
tions. Thus,  Atlanta  was  gained  after  a  campaign  of  four 
months,  involving  strategical  and  tactical  combinations  on  a 
grand  scale,  but  without  a  general  decisive  battle.  General 
Sherman  did  not  risk  a  general  assault,  and  the  Confederate 
generals  did  not  offer  battle  with  a  broad  front,  except  with 
intrenched  lines ;  but  there  were  many  engagements  of  great 
severity,  and  constant  skirmishing  on  a  scale  that  produced 
great  waste  of  life. 

The  fall  of  Atlanta  was  hailed  by  the  Northern  people  as  a 
result  of  great  moment.  The  noise  of  cannon-  all  over  the 
land,  orders  of  congratulation  from  Washington  and  army 
commanders  gave  expression  to  the  general  appreciation  of 
the  campaign  and  its  issue.  The  moral  effect  of  the  consum- 
mation was  indeed  great  North  and  South,  and  yet,  as  no  army 
had  been  destroyed  or  signally  defeated,  the  possession  of 
Atlanta  was  only  a  partial  solution  to  the  war  problem  in  the 
West.  The  march  southward  of  Sherman's  armies,  despite 
the  heaviest  concentration  that  could  be  made  in  resistance, 
the  destruction  of  extensive  manufactories  of  materials  of 
war,  and  the  palpable  diminution  of  the  central  insurgent 
forces,  were  grand  results  indeed ;  but  the  Confederate  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  was  not  annihilated,  and  until  it  and  the 
one  in  Virginia  should  be,  the  end  of  the  war  could  not  come. 
The  end  was  indeed  foreshadowed  by  the  fact  that  the  national 
armies  could  force  their  way  into  the  South  anywhere,  sub- 


FALL   OF   ATLANTA,  ETC.  149 

ject  to  the  one  condition  of  supplies.  But  this  war,  beyond 
most  wars,  was  a  conflict  of  ideas,  and  the  persistence  of  the 
parties  to  it  revealed  the  overmastering  force  of  the  antago- 
nistic opinions.  The  protraction  of  the  war  had  intensified 
the  original  antagonisms,  and  had,  besides,  involved  the  two 
sections  in  debt  to  such  an  enormous  extent  that  financial  ruin 
was  inevitable  in  the  defeat  of  either.  The  success  of  the 
North  would  restore  the  Union  and  place  its  debt  upon  the 
whole  country.  The  success  of  the  South  would  be  a  division 
of  the  country,  with  a  burden  of  debt  to  each  portion  of  crush- 
ing weight.  So  that  now,  not  only  the  primal  causes  of  the 
war  and  the  extreme  reluctance  of  a  proud  people  to  yield  to 
an  enemy,  but  financial  considerations,  precluded  peace  so  long 
as  the  South  could  maintain  armies.  The  campaigns  of  the 
Bummer  had  made  a  heavy  draft  upon  the  strength  of  the  Con- 
federate armies ;  but  the  two  which  unfurled  their  banners 
before  Grant  and  Sherman  in  May  were  intact,  though  one 
had  been  shut  up  in  Richmond  and  the  other  had  been  bat- 
tled and  flanked  out  of  Atlanta.  General  Canby  and  Admiral 
Farragut  had  neutralized  Mobile,  though  the  former  had  been 
bereft  of  the  corps  intended  for  its  complete  reduction  to  rein- 
force the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  There  were  troops  yet  in  the 
Gulf  States,  east  of  the  Mississippi,  to  raise  Hood's  army  to  its 
maximum  strength,  though  their  accretion  would  reveal  the 
desperate  straits  of  the  insurgents.  There  were  forces  beyond 
the  Mississippi,  whose  isolation  hitherto,  through  the  viligance 
of  General  Canby,  had  prevented  a  more  potential  combination 
against  General  Sherman  in  Georgia.  These  troops  were  raid- 
ing in  Missouri,  and  by  predatory  warfare  were  doing  local 
mischief  without  affecting  the  general  issue.  The  rebellion, 
then,  was  palpably  resting  upon  the  armies  of  Lee  and  Hood. 
The  former,  by  political  considerations,  if  not  by  purely  mili- 
tary ones,  was  restricted  to  the  defense  of  the  Confederate  cap- 
ital. Hood's  army  alone  had  freedom  of  motion,  and  to  de- 
termine how  best  to  use  that  freedom  was  to  the  insurgent 
leaders  the  great  problem  of  the  hour. 

The  aggregate  casualties  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
during  the  campaign,  from  the  1st  of  May  to  the  6th  of  Sep- 
tember, were  as  follows  :  One  hundred  and  ninety-six  officers 


150  FALL   OF   ATLANTA,  ETC. 

and  two  thousand  eight  hundred  and  forty -five  rhen  enlisted 
were  killed;  eight  hundred  and  ten  officers  and  fourteen 
thousand  nine  hundred  and  seventy-three  enlisted  men  were 
wounded ;  one  hundred  and  four  officers  and  two  thousand 
six  hundred  and  three  enlisted  men  were  captured — in  all, 
twenty-one  thousand  five  hundred  and  thirty -four  men.  Dur- 
ing the  campaign  forty-three  thousand  one  hundred  and  fifty- 
three  were  reported  sick  to  Major  George  E.  Cooper,  surgeon 
United  States  army,  medical  director  of  the  department.  Of 
these,  twenty-six  thousand  one  hundred  and  eighty-four  were 
sent  to  the  rear ;  two  hundred  and  seven  died  from  disease, 
and  one  thousand  and  sixty-seven  died  from  wounds.  Almost 
all  others,  sick  or  wounded,  were  returned  to  duty. 

General  J.  M.  Brannan,  chief  of  artillery,  reported  the  cap- 
ture of  four  guns  by  the  Twentieth  Corps,  at  Resaca,  in  battle, 
and  four  left  by  the  enemy  in  his  fortifications;  ten  guns 
captured  by  General  J.  C.  Davis,  at  Rome  ;  twenty  left  by  the 
enemy  in  Atlanta,  and  eight  captured  by  the  Fourteenth 
Corps,  at  Jonesboro.  He  also  reported  the  expenditure  of 
86,611  rounds  of  artillery  ammunition,  11,815,299  rounds  of 
infantry  ammunition,  and  the  loss  of  1,439  artillery  horses. 

During  the  period  the  army  captured  8,067  men  from  the 
enemy  and  received  2,162  deserters,  as  reported  by  Colonel 
Parkhurst,  provost  marshal  general  of  the  department.  These 
statistics  reveal  the  cost  of  war. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI,. 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  13,  1864 — 8  P.  M. 
General  Halleck,  Washington,  I).  C.  : 

We  have  now  pressed  the  enemy's  lines  from  the  east  around  to  East- 
Point  on  the  south.  The  nature  of  the  ground,  with  its  artificial  defenses, 
makes  it  too  difficult  to  assault,  and  to  reach  the  road  by  a  further  exten- 
sion will  be  extra  hazardous.  I  have  ordered  army  commanders  to  pre- 
pare for  the  following  plan :  Leave  one  corps  strongly  intrenched  at  the* 
Chattahoochee  bridge  in  charge  of  our  suplus  wagons  and  artillery  ;  with 
sixty  thousand  (60,000)  men  reduced  to  fighting  trim,  to  make  circuit  of 
devastation  around  the  town,  with  a  radius  of  fifteen  or  twenty  miles. 

To  do  this,  I  go  on  faith  that  the  militia  in  Atlanta  are  only  good  for 
the  defense 'of  its  parapets,  and  will  not  come  out. 

I  would  like  the  utmost  activity  to  be  kept  up  in  Mobile  Bay,  and  if 


FALL   OF   ATLANTA,    ETC.  151 

possible,  about  the  mouth  of  Apalachicola ;  also,  to  be  assured  that  no 
material  reinforcements  have  come  here  from  Virginia. 

If  ever  I  should  be  cut  off  from  my  base,  look  out  for  me  about  St. 
Marks,  Florida,  or  Savannah,  Georgia. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  13,  1864. 
General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

In  making  the  circuit  of  Atlanta,  as  proposed  in  my  dispatch  of  to-day, 
I  necessarily  run  some  risk.  If  there  be  any  possibility  of  Admiral  Far- 
ragut  and  the  land  forces  of  Gordon  Granger  taking  Mobile  (which  rebel 
prisoners  now  report,  but  the  report  is  not  confirmed  by  Macon  papers  of 
the  llth,  which  I  have  seen),  and  further,  of  pushing  up  to  Montgomery, 
my  best  plan  would  be  to  wait  awhile  as  now,  and,  at  proper  time,  to  move 
down  to  West  Point,  and  operate  into  the  heart  of  Georgia  from  there. 

Before  cutting  loose,  as  proposed,  I  would  like  to  know  the  chances  of 
our  getting  the  use  of  the  Alabama  river  this  campaign.  I  could  easily 
break  up  the  railroads  back  to  Chattanooga,  and  shift  my  whole  army 
down  to  West  Point  and  Columbus,  a  country  rich  in  corn,  and  make  my 
fall  campaign  from  there. 

I  know  Fort  Morgan  must  succumb  in  time. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  17,  1864. 
Generals  Thomas,  Schojield,  and  Howard : 

I  now  have  positive  and  official  information  that  General  Wheeler  has 
gone  up  into  East  Tennessee,  beyond  Spring  Place.  We.  will  repair  all 
damages  to  railroad  and  telegraph  to-night.  I  will  not  move  our  infantry 
now,  but  break  the  Macon  road  all  to  pieces  with  our  cavalry  to-morrow 
night.  Therefore,  be  active,  and  demonstrate  against  Atlanta,  to  occupy 
the  entire  front,  and  make  them  believe  we  will  attack  them  in  their 
trenches  during  to-morrow  and  next  day. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  24,  1864 — 8  A.  M. 
Generals  Thomas,  Schafield,  and  Howard : 

I  will  ride  down  to  the  bridge  to-day,  to  see  the  lay  of  the  ground  and 
the  character  of  the  redoubts  there.  Go  on  and  make  all  preparations 
possible,  so  that  our  movement,  when  begun,  may  proceed  rapidly  and 
safely.  Our  maps  should  be  compiled,  and  as  many  roads  laid  down  be- 
tween Red  Oak  and  Jonesboro  as  we  can  be  sure  of  existence. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 


152  FALL   OF   ATLANTA,    ETC. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

August  24,  1864. 
Major-General  Sherman : 

A  fire  seems  to  be  raging  in  Atlanta,  direction  ten  (10)  degrees  south 
of  east  from  my  tree.  Can  see  heated  air  rising  in  dense  columns;  seems 
to  be  spreading.  Town  is  filled  with  smoke. 

I  have  directed  my  heavy  guns  to  fire  on  the  town. 

0.  0.  HOWARD, 

Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  LOVEJOY'S  STATION,  GA.,  September  2,  1864 — 8  P.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas : 

Until  we  hear  from  Atlanta  the  exact  truth,  I  do  not  care  about  your 
pushing  your  men  against  breastworks.  Destroy  the  railroad  well  up  to 
your  lines.  Keep  skirmishers  well  up,  and  hold  your  troops  in  hand  for 
anything  that  may  turn  up.  As  soon  as  I  know  positively  that  our  troops 
are  in  Atlanta,  I  will  determine  what  to  do. 

I  have  ordered  General  Schofield  to  feel  for  the  McDonough  road,  to 
prevent  reinforcements  coming  to  the  enemy  from  that  direction. 

Yours,  etc.,  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General  Commanding. 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  63.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  LOVEJOY'S,  September  3,  1864. 

I.  Army  commanders  will,  during  to-day,  send  to  Jonesboro  all  sick 
and  wounded  men,  all  empty  wagons  and  prisoners  of  war,  also  all  surplus 
wheels  not  needed  for  a  five  days'  stay  in  front,  ready  to  start  to-morrow 
morning,  at  6^0' clock,  from  Jonesboro  to  Atlanta.     Each  army  will  send 
a  regiment  to  escort  these  wagons,  and  General  Thomas  will  send  an  ex- 
perienced colonel  to  conduct  the  train  into  Atlanta,  there  to  wait  further 
orders. 

II.  The  army  will  be  prepared  to  move  back  to-morrow  or  next  day — 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  Atlanta  and  Chattahoochee  bridge,  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  to  East  Point,  and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  to  De- 
catur.     Major-General  Thomas  will  have  General  Garrard's  cavalry  ready 
to  act  as  rear  guard. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aidrde-Camp. 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  66.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  JOXESBORO,  GA.,  September  6,  1864. 
I.  The  General-in-Chief  communicates,  with  a  feeling  of  just  pride  and 
satisfaction,  the  following  orders  of  the  President  of  the  United  States. 


FALL   OF  ATLANTA,    ETC.  153 

and  telegram  of  Lieutenant-General  U.  S.  Grant,  on  hearing  of  the  cap- 
ture of  Atlanta : 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION, 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C..  September  3,  1864. 

The  national  thanks  are  rendered  by  the  President  to  Major-General 
W.  T.  Sherman,  and  the  gallant  officers  and  soldiers  of  his  command 
before  Atlanta,  for  the  distinguished  ability,  courage,  and  perseverance 
displayed  in  the  campaign  in  Georgia,  which,  under  Divine  favor,  has  re- 
sulted in  the  capture  of  the  city  of  Atlanta.  The  marches,  battles,  sieges, 
and  other  military  operations  that  have  signalized  the  campaign,  must 
render  it  famous  in  the  annals  of  war,  and  have  entitled  those  who  have 
participated  therein  to  the  applause  and  thanks  of  the  nation. 

(Signed,)  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN, 

President  of  the  United  States. 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION, 
WASHINGTON  CITY,  Septmber  3,  ]  864. 
Ordered: 

1st 

2d.  That,  on  Wednesday,  the  9th  day  of  September,  commencing  at 
the  hour  of  12  M.,  there  shall  be  fired  a  salute  of  one  hundred  (100)  guns, 
at  the  arsenal  at  Washington,  and  at  New  York,  Boston,  Philadelphia, 
Baltimore,  Pittsburg,  Newport,  Kentucky,  St.  Louis,  New  Orleans,  Mobile, 
Pensacola,  Hilton  Head,  anc^Newbern,  or  the  day  after  the  receipt  of  this 
order,  for  the  brilliant  achievements  of  the  army  under  command  of 
Major-General  Sherman,  in  the  State  of  Georgia,  and  the  capture  of  At- 
lanta. The  Secretary  of  War  will  issue  directions  for  the  execution  of 
this  order. 

(Signed,)  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN, 

President  of  the  United  States. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  September  4,  1864 — 9  p.  M. 
Major-General  Sherman : 

I  have  just  received  your  dispatch,  announcing  the  capture  of  Atlanta. 
In  honor  of  your  great  victory,  I  have  ordered  a  salute  to  be  fired  with 
shotted  guns  from  every  battery  bearing  upon  the  enemy.  The  salute 
will  be  fired  within  an  hour,  amidst  great  rejoicing. 

(Signed,)  U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 

II All  the  corps,  regiments,  and  batteries  composing  this 

army,  may,  without  further  orders,  inscribe  "Atlanta"  on  their  colors. 
By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 


[GENERAL  ORDERS,  NO.  134.] 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

ATLANTA,  GA.,  September  9,  1864. 
•Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland: 

The  major-general  commanding,  with  pride  and  pleasure,  congratu- 
lates you  upon  the  fact  that  your  achievements  during  the  campaign 


154  FALL   OF   ATLANTA,  ETC. 

which  has  just  closed,  in  connection  with  those  of  the  Armies  of  the 
Tennessee  and  Ohio,  have  received  such  distinguished  marks  of  appre- 
ciation as  the  thanks  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the 
major-general  commanding  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi. 

Your  commander  now  desires  to  add  his  to  those  you  have  already  re- 
ceived, for  the  tenacity  of  purpose,  unmurmuring  endurance,  cheerful 
obedience,  brilliant  heroism,  and  all  those  high  qualities  which  you  have 
displayed  to  an  eminent  degree,  in  attacking  and  defeating  the  cohorts 
of  treason,  driving  them  from  position  after  position,  each  of  their  own 
choosing,  cutting  their  communications,  and  in  harassing  their  flanks  and 
rear,  during  the  many  marches,  battles,  and  sieges  of  this  long  and  event- 
ful campaign. 

It  is  impossible,  within  the  limits  of  an  order  like  this,  to  enumerate 
the  many  instances  in  which  your  gallantry  has  been  conspicuous,  but 
among  them  may  be  mentioned  the  actions  of  Rocky  Face  Mountain 
and  before  Dalton,  fought  between  the  8th  and  13th  of  May;  of  Resaca, 
on  the  14th  and  15th;  of  Adairsville,  on  the  17th,  and  of  New  Hope 
Church,  on  the  25th  of  the  same  month ;  of  Gulp's  Farm,  June  22d-;  Peach- 
tree  creek,  July  20th,  and  the  crowning  one  of  Jonesboro,  fought  Sep- 
tember 1st,  which  secured  the  capture  of  the  city  of  Atlanta,  the  goal 
for  which  we  set  out  more  than  four  months  ago,  and  furnished  a  brilliant 
termination  to  your  struggles  for  that  long  period. 

Let  these  successes  encourage  you  to  the  continued  exercise  of  those 
same  high  qualities,  and  to  renewed  exertions  in  the  cause  of  our  country 
and  humanity  when  you  shall  again  be  called  upon  to  meet  the  foe;  and 
be  assured,  the  time  is  not  far  distant  when  your  prowess  will  conquer 
what  territory  now  remains  within  the  circumscribed  limits  of  the  re- 
bellion. A  few  more  fields  like  those  whose  names  now  crowd  your 
standards,  and  we  can  dictate  the  terms  of  a  peace  alike  honorable  to 
yourselves  and  our  country.  You  can  then  retire  to  your  homes  amid 
the  plaudits  of  your  friends,  and  with  the  proud  consciousness  that  you. 
have  deserved  well  of  the  country. 

Our  rejoicings  are  not  unmixed  with  a  proud  regret  for  our  brave  com- 
rades who  have  fallen.  Their  graves  mark  the  spots  where  they  went 
down  amid  the  din  and  roar  of  battle,  dotting  every  field  and  hillside, 
or  lying  beneath  the  spreading  boughs  of  the  forest  along  our  route;  they 
will,  in  future  days,  serve  like  finger-boards,  to  point  out  to  the  traveler 
the  march  of  your  victorious  columns.  Those  silent  mounds  appeal  to  us 
to  remain  true  to  ourselves  and  the  country,  and  to  so  discharge  the 
high  duty  devolving  upon  us  that  their  lives,  which  they  so  freely  offered 
up,  may  not  prove  a  useless  sacrifice. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Thomas. 

WM.  D.  WHIPPLE, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

THE    MARCH    OF   THE    OPPOSING  ARMIES    TO   THE    NORTH   AND    THE 
EVOLUTION   OF  NEW   CAMPAIGNS. 

WHEN  General  Sherman,  August  13th,  informed  General 
Halleck  that  he  would  make  the  circuit  of  Atlanta  with  his 
armies,  he  suggested  that  it  might  be. prudent  to  break  up  the 
railroad  to  Chattanooga,  and  shift  his  armies  to  West  Point 
and  Columbus,  and  there  make  his  base  for  the  fall  campaign. 
To  this  General  Grant  replied,  advising  that  there  should  be 
no  backward  movement,  even  if  his  roads  should  be  so  cut  as 
to  preclude  the  possibility  of  supplies  from  the  North,  and 
said  :  "  If  it  comes  to  the  worst,  move  South  as  you  suggest.'* 
After  General  Sherman  had  taken  the  city,  without  overthrow- 
ing the  army  which  had  so  long  defended  it,  he  was  occupied 
with  the  question  of  its  use  in  future  operations.  That  he 
might  hold  it  for  purely  military  purposes,  he  banished  the 
citizens,  giving  them  choice  to  go  North  or  South ;  and  as  the 
defenses  constructed  by  the  enemy  were  so  extensive  that  only 
an  army  could  utilize  them,  he  established  an  inner  line  of 
works,  which,  held  by  an  ordinary  garrison,  would  protect  his 
depots.  That  he  might  accumulate  supplies  for  future  enter- 
prise, he  restricted  the  railroads  to  persons  connected  with  the 
army,  and  the  transportation  of  military  stores.  But  under- 
lying these  essential  preparations,  even  to  hold  Atlanta  defen- 
sively, there  was  the  grand  problem  of  farther  aggression.  To 
hold  Atlanta  and  the  long  railroad  to  his  primary  base,  and 
have  forces  to  advance,  in  the  manner  of  his  previous  move- 
ment, required  an  impracticable  augmentation.  As  the  enemy 
was  now  free  to  detach  heavily,  to  break  his  communications, 
tie  was  compelled  to  send  troops  to  the  rear,  and,  besides  this 

(155) 


156  MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC. 

draft,  lie  was  constantly  losing  regiments  by  expiration  of 
term  of  service.  Despairing  of  being  able  to  cling  to  the  rail- 
roads in  advancing  from  Atlanta,  he,  in  common  with  General 
Grant,  was  looking  for  a  southern  base  to  which  he  might 
leap,  without  intervening  communications.  General  Grant 
suggested  that  General  Canby  should  act  upon  Savannah,  and 
General  Sherman  upon  Augusta.  General  Sherman  in  reply 
expressed  his  willingness  "  to  move  upon  Milledgeville,  and 
compel  Hood  to  give  up  Macon  and  Augusta,  and  then  turn 
upon  the  other,"  if  he  could  be  assured  of  finding  provisions 
at  Augusta  or  Columbus ;  but  without  such  assurance  he 
would  risk  his  army  by  going  far  from  Atlanta.  The  country, 
in  any  direction  southward,  would  supply  an  army  that  could 
maintain  motion  and  freedom  to  forage,  but  the  contingency 
of  slow  maneuvers  or  stopping  to  dislodge  an  intrenched 
enemy,  coupled  with  constraint  in  foraging,  was  the  barrier  to 
a  campaign  having  a  remote  objective.  The  questions  of  the 
direction  and  object  of  an  advance,  though  discussed  at  length 
by  Generals  Grant  and  Sherman,  remained  unsettled  until 
General  Hood's  movements  gave  a  turn  to  affairs  which  had 
not  been  anticipated  by  either. 

Soon  after  the  fall  of  Atlanta,  the  Southern  President  left 
Richmond  to  confer  with  his  western  generals  with  regard  to 
the  next  campaign,  and  to  use  his  eloquence  to  rouse  the 
people  from  despondency.  His  removal  of  General  Johnston 
from  command  had  not  averted  disaster.  He  had  watched  the 
closing  in  of  the  national  lines  around  his  capital,  but  the  con- 
ditions of  warfare  were  there  inveterately  denned,  and  he  sped 
to  the  West  to  give  shape  to  some  new  enterprise  in  solution 
of  the  problems  imposed  by  the  issue  of  the  preceding  dis- 
astrous campaign. 

It  would  have  been  well  had  he  called  General  Johnston  to 
Palmetto,  and  this  he  doubtless  would  have  done,  had  his  sole 
object  been  to  give  a  successful  issue  to  a  new  campaign;  but 
even  in  this  supreme  moment,  personal  considerations  were 
dominant,  and  the  justification  of  his  removal  of  his  ablest 
western  general  from  command,  took  rank  with  the  projects 
which  involved  the  fate  of  the  Confederacy.  He  now  needed 
judicious  counsel,  for  another  campaign  of  dire  issue  would  be 


MAECH   TO   THE   NOKTH,  ETC.  157 

fatal.  Nearly  one  hundred  thousand  national  troops  were 
holding  Atlanta,  and  preparing  to  utilize  all  the  advantages 
gained  in  the  previous  campaign.  It  was  not  possible  to  in- 
crease Hood's  army  promptly  to  such  an  extent  as  to  justify 
direct  offense  in  open  field,  much  less  against  Atlanta.  The 
Confederate  leaders  were  then  restricted  to  the  continuance 
of  the  defensive,  wherever  General  Sherman  should  invite  de- 
fense, or  to  some  diversion  that  would  retard  or  avert  the 
blow  which  he  was  meditating.  It  was  decided  that  Hood's 
army  should  be  thrown  upon  General  Sherman's  communica- 
tion, and  the  forces  under  Smith  and  Magruder  called  over 
the  Mississippi  river  for  conjunction  in  Northern  Alabama ; 
that  the  united  armies,  gathering  recruits  as  they  advanced, 
should  sweep  through  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  and  stand  a 
hundred  thousand  strong  upon  the  banks  of  the  Ohio.  Critics 
have  been  swift  to  condemn  Hood's  advance  to  the  North, 
and  considered  as  an  independent  movement,  it  is  seemingly, 
at  least,  open  to  criticism ;  but  regarded  as  a  part  of  a  compre- 
hensive plan,  it  is  not  apparent  that  his  army  could  have  been 
used  to  better  advantage.  That  the  expectation  of  gathering 
a  vast  army  on  the  Tennessee  river  was  the  inspiration  of 
Hood's  movement,  which  in  itself  promised  no  mean  results, 
is  plainly  true ;  for  before  he  had  crossed  the  Chattahoochee, 
the  Confederate  President  sent  an  order  (which  General 
Canby  intercepted)  to  Smith  and  Magruder  to  cross  the 
Mississippi  river  with  their  forces.  The  assumption  of  the 
practicability  of  their  conjunction  with  Hood,  is  the  explana- 
tion of  Mr.  Davis'  prophetic  declarations  in  speeches  through- 
out the  South,  that  should  the  absent  soldiers  return  to  their 
colors,  General  Sherman  should  be  forced  into  a  retreat  as  dis- 
astrous as  that  of  Napoleon  from  Moscow,  and  the  Confeder- 
ate army  would  advance  in  triumph  to  the  Ohio  river.  The 
precedents  of  the  war  were  against  the  plan  itself,  as  even  in 
the  first  flush  of  the  rebellion  all  aggression  with  remote  ob- 
jectives had  resulted  in  failure ;  while  in  no  case  during  the 
conflict,  had  a  Confederate  army  been  thrown  with  ultimate 
advantage  upon  the  communications  of  a  national  army  whose 
aggressive  pressure .  could  not  be  resisted.  Latterly,  all  de- 
fense in  the  West  had  been  unsuccessful,  and  the  disparity  of 


It58  MARCH    TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC. 

aggregate  forces  forbade  all  sober-minded  Southerners  the 
hope  that  any  plan  could  be  devised  whose  execution  would 
arrest,  much  less  avert  the  downfall  of  the  rebellion. 

General  Hood  remained  at  Lovejoy's  Station,  quietly  recu- 
perating and  reinforcing  his  army,  until  the  20th  of  September? 
when  those  on  the  outlook  informed  General  Sherman  that  he 
was  in  motion.  General  Sherman's  first  thought  was  that  he 
was  drawing  back  to  Macon,  and  would  send  reinforcements 
to  Richmond.  The  next  day,  however,  it  was  apparent  that 
General  Hood  had  only  shifted  his  army  to  Palmetto  Station, 
and  was  there  intrenching.  This  movement,  and  the  appear- 
ance of  Forrest  with  a  force  of  six  or  eight  thousand  men  in 
Tennessee,  were  the  first  steps  in  the  execution  of  the  new  plan 
of  operations.  General  Sherman  now  surmised  that  General 
Hood  had  resolved  to  throw  his  army  on  his  flanks,  to  prevent 
the  accumulation  of  supplies,  and  made  dispositions  to  thwart 
him.  He  sent  General  Newton's  division  to  Chattanooga,  and 
ordered  General  Corse  to  unite  his  division  at  Rome,  to  act 
against  any  force  that  might  threaten  Bridgeport  from  the  di- 
rection of  Gadsden.  Having  provided  for  the  defense  of  these 
important  points,  he  left  the  disposition  of  Forrest  to  the  dis- 
trict commanders — Generals  Steedman,  Granger,  and  Rousseau. 

A  raid  from  Forrest  into  Middle  Tennessee  had  been  ex- 
pected by  those  in  the  rear,  though  not  by  those  in  the  front. 
About  the  12th  of  the  month,  General  Granger  received  through 
his  scouts  information,  which  he  deemed  reliable,  that  such  was 
his  purpose,  if  the  corps  of  General  A.  J.  Smith  had  been  re- 
moved from  West  Tennessee.  He  therefore  expressed  his  con- 
victions to  General  Sherman,  and  asked  if  Smith's  corps  had 
left  Tennessee.  General  Sherman  directed  General  Thomas  to 
inform  him  that  he  need  feel  no  uneasiness  about  Forrest,  as  he 
had  gone  to  Mobile.  Notwithstanding  this  positive  assurance 
that  there  was  no  danger,  General  Granger  sent  a  force  to  re- 
•connoiter  in  the  direction  of  Forrest's  anticipated  approach. 
In  obedience  to  his  order,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Elliott,  command- 
ing the  Sixth  Tennessee  Cavalry,  advanced  toward  Florence, 
and  having  returned  to  the  main  road,  after  a  short  detour, 
found  himself  in  the  rear  of  a  cavalry  force  of  eight  or  ten 
thousand  men.  And  thus  was  positively  revealed  the  first  of 


MARCH   TO   THE   NORTPI,  ETC.  159 

a  series  of  aggressive  movements  on  the  part  of  the  enemy, 
which  gave  a  new  complexion  and  unexpected  issues  to  mili- 
tary operations  in  Tennessee  and  Georgia. 

September  25th,  it  was  supposed  that  General  Hood  was 
moving  toward  the  Alabama  line,  and  this  opening  of  the  way 
for  a  march  to  the  sea,  turned  General  Sherman  to  the  consid- 
eration of  a  movement  thither  without  an  intermediate  base 
of  supplies.  General  Grant,  however,  suggested  that  his  at- 
tention should  first  be  given  to  affairs  in  his  rear,  and  appre- 
ciating the  situation  in  Tennessee,  and  knowing  that  desperate 
efforts  would  be  made  to  force  Sherman  to  relax  his  grasp 
upon  Georgia,  ordered  all  the  spare  troops  in  the  West  to 
Nashville,  that  no  further  redaction  of  forces  at  Atlanta  might 
be  necessary.  On  the  28th,  General  Sherman  said  to  General 
Grant :  "  I  want  Apalachicola  arsenal  taken,  also  Savannah, 
and  if  the  enemy  does  succeed  in  breaking  my  road,  I  can 
fight  my  way  to  one  ortthe  other  place,  but  I  think  it  better 
to  hold  on  to  Atlanta  and  strengthen  to  my  rear,  and  there- 
fore I  am  glad  that  you  have  ordered  troops  to  Nashville." 
And  to  President  Lincoln,  he  said :  "  It  would  have  a  bad 
effect,  if  I  am  forced  to  send  back  any  material  part  of  my 
army  to  guard  roads,  so  as  to  weaken  me  to  an  extent  that  I 
could  not  act  offensively,  if  the  occasion  calls  for  it."  Cling- 
ing thus  to  Atlanta,  he  was  nevertheless  so  apprehensive  with 
regard  to  his  communications,  that  he  sent  General  Thomas 
to  the  north  to  provide  for  their  security,  having  previously 
ordered  General  Morgan's  division  to  Chattanooga,  and  a  bri- 
gade of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  the  cavalry  from 
Memphis,  to  Eastport,  to  operate  against  the  flank  of  any  force 
going  into  Tennessee  by  any  of  the  fords  near  Florence. 
General  Thomas  started  on  the  29th,  and  the  same  day  there 
came  to  General  Sherman  the  first  intimation  that  Hood  was 
crossing  the  Chattahoochee.  The  day  following  it  was  known 
that  a  portion  of  his  army  was  across,  and  by  the  first  of  Oc- 
tober the  movement  was  well  developed,  except  in  respect  to 
its  ultimate  object.  The  direction  of  the  march  did  not  indi- 
cate an  advance  to  Blue  Mountain,  but  toward  General  Sher- 
man's communications,  and  citizens  reported  that  Rome  was 
General  Hood's  destination.  In  doubt  of  his  purpose  and 


160  MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC. 

destination,  General  Sherman  made  provision  for  two  contin- 
gencies— the  enemy  swinging  across  to  the  Alabama  line  and 
thence  into  Tennessee,  or  striking  the  railroad  south  of  King- 
ston. In  the  one  case,  he  proposed  to  send  back  to  Chatta- 
nooga all  the  troops  from  Kingston  north,  and  with  all  south 
of  Kingston  to  move  to  the  sea-board,  and  in  the  other,  he 
would  turn  upon  Hood  and  attack  him. 

To  ascertain  the  direction  of  the  enemy's  march  before  put- 
ting his  own  armies  in  motion,  General  Sherman  sent  General 
Garrard  to  Powder  Springs,  General  Kilpatrick  to  Sweet- 
water,  General  Howard  to  reconnoiter  to  Fairburn,  and  Gen- 
eral Cox,  commanding  the  Twenty-third  Corps  in  absence  of 
General  Schofield,  to  send  a  division  to  Flat  Rock.  His  ob- 
ject, in  addition,  was  to  get  the  bridges  over  the  Chattahoo- 
chee,  and  then  place  his  armies  between  them  and  General 
Hood.  But  the  latter  was  indifferent  to  all  such  designs,  as 
he  had  cut  loose  from  all  connections  in  his  rear.  General 
Sherman  regarded  his  movement  as  ostentatious,  but  it  was 
one  of  desperation  rather,  and  right  boldly  did  he  and  his 
army  dash  on  to  the  issues  involved.  He  was  vigorously  ex- 
ecuting his  part  of  the  grand  combination  which  had  been 
projected,  to  change,  if  possible,  the  theater  and  the  issue  of 
the  war  in  the  West.  Having  crossed  the  Chattahoochee,  he 
threw  Stewart's  corps  upon  the  railroad  north  of  Marietta, 
and  with  the  remainder  of  his  infantry  forces,  moved  toward 
Dallas,  his  cavalry,  under  "Wheeler,  being  already  in  Northern 
Georgia.  Stewart  reached  the  railroad,  and  commenced  its 
destruction,  October  2d,  and  citizens  reported  that  it  was  Gen- 
eral Hood's  purpose  to  attack  Acworth  and  Allatoona,  after- 
ward Rome,  and  in  the  event  of  repulse,  to  retreat  to  Blue 
Mountain,  Jacksonville,  and  Selma.  General  Sherman  now 
ordered  General  Stanley  to  move  with  ten  days'  rations  to 
Ruff's  Station,  and  open  communications  with  General  El- 
liott, who,  with  his  cavalry  divisions,  was  over  toward  Sweet- 
water  and  Nose's  creek.  The  next  day,  he  ordered  all  his 
remaining  forces,  except  the  Twentieth  Corps,  which  was  left 
to  hold  Atlanta  and  the  railroad  bridge  over  the  Chatta- 
hoochee, to -follow  Stanley.  In  the  evening  of  the  4th,  the 
advance  of  the  latter  encamped  near  Little  Kenesaw  Moun- 


MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC.  161 

tain.  General  Hood's  infantry  was  then  advancing  upon  Al- 
latoona, having  captured  the  garrisons  at  Big  Shanty  and 
Acworth,  and  destroyed  the  track  of  the  road  for  several 
miles.  The  same  day,  General  Elliott  found  the  enemy  be- 
tween Dallas  and  Big  Shanty,  occupying  the  old  works  of  the 
national  army,  in  more  force  than  could  be  dislodged  by  dis- 
mounted cavalry. 

General  Sherman  had  been  convinced  of  General  Hood's 
audacity  too  late  to  protect  his  communications,  and  was  now 
anxious  with  regard  to  his  depot  of  supplies  at  Allatoona. 
He  had  previously  ordered  General  Corse  to  reinforce  the  gar- 
rison from  Rome,  should  the  enemy  approach  from  the  south  ; 
and  this  provision  saved  the  place.  General  Corse  reached 
Allatoona  with  a  few  regiments,  on  the  4th,  and  the  next 
morning  he  was  attacked  by  French's  division  of  Stewart's 
corps.  General  Sherman,  while  signaling  his  presence  at 
Kenesaw  Mountain,  and'his  purpose  to  give  the  earliest  pos- 
sible support,  witnessed  the  repeated  repulse  of  the  enemy. 
The  gallant  resistance  of  the  garrison,  and  the  movement  of 
General  Cox  to  his  left,  induced  General  French  to  withdraw 
entirely  during  the  afternoon,  having  lost  at  least  a  thousand 
men.  This  was  not  a  promising  initiative  for  General  Hood, 
and  its  probable  bearing  upon  his  plans  was  added  to  other 
circumstances  of  positive  character  to  conceal  again,  for  a  few 
days,  his  ultimate  purpose.  French's  division  remained  in  the 
rear  of  the  army,  and  offered  such  resistance  to  General  El- 
liott, that  it  was  impossible  to  ascertain  in  what  direction  the 
enemy's  standards  were  pointing.  From  the  5th  to  the  10th, 
it  was  not  known  whether  they  were  pointing  northward  or 
westward. 

During  this  period,  General  Sherman  again  proposed  to 
General  Grant  to  break  up  the  railroad  to  Chattanooga,  and 
move  with  wagons  to  Savannah,  entertaining  the  opinion  that 
Hood  would  move  to  the  West.  But  on  the  10th,  learning 
that  he  was  marching  toward  Rome,  he  ordered  his  generals 
to  move  upon  Kingston  with  a  view  to  support  General  Corse 
at  Rome,  should  the  enemy  approach  in  force.  General  Hood 
crossed  the  Coosa  river  twelve  miles  below,  in  feint  upon 

VOL.  II — 11 


162  MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC. 

Home,  to  cover  another  dash  upon  the  railroad  and  his  march 
northward.  General  Sherman's  forces  were  concentrated  in 
the  vicinity  of  Kingston  on  the  llth,  hut  again  General  Hood's 
movements  were  in  doubt,  as  he  disappeared  from  the  vicinity 
of  Home  without  indicating  where  he  was  going.  General 
Sherman,  on  the  12th,  made  effort  to  develop  his  movements, 
by  sending  Garrard's  division*  and  the  Twenty-third  Corps 
across  the  Oostanaula,  while  a  brigade  from  Hazen's  division 
moved  down  the  Coosa  from  Home.  In  the  meantime,  Hood 
moved  rapidly  toward  Resaca  with  his  whole  army.  Here, 
again,  provision  had  been  made  to  reinforce  the  garrison,  as, 
in  compliance  with  General  Sherman's  contingent  orders,  the 
troops  at  Cassville,  Colonel  "Watkins'  brigade  of  cavalry,  and 
General  Baurn,  with  three  hundred  and  fifty  infantry,  moved 
forward  before  the  place  was  invested.  Colonel  Watkins  left 
his  horses  on  the  left  bank,  and  placed  his  men  in  the  intrench- 
ments  on  the  other  side.  General  Hood  demanded  the  sur- 
render of  the  place  on  the  llth,  under  the  threat  that  no  pris- 
oners would  be  taken  if  he  should  be  compelled  to  carry  the 
works  by  assault.  But  though  General  Baum  refused  to 
capitulate,  and  General  Hood  had  a  heavy  force,  probably  two 
corps  present,  and  threw  a  line  around  the  town  from  the  river 
above  to  the  river  below,  he  may  have  been  deterred  from 
attack  by  the  uncertainty  of  the  issue,  or  may  have  considered 
the  temporary  possession  no  compensation  for  the  cost  of  tak- 
ing it. 

While  halting  before  Resaca,  General  Hood  sent  detach- 
ments to  destroy  the  railroad  toward  Dalton,  and  having  him- 
self withdrawn  on  the  12th,  he  demanded  the  surrender  of 
the  latter  place  the  next  day.  Colonel  Johnson,  commanding 
the  Forty-fourth  Colored  regiment,  was  convinced  that  resist- 
ance was  useless,  and  accepted  terms.  The  garrison  at  Tilton 
was  also  captured.  Early  in  the  day,  General  Schofield  had 
reached  Dalton  on  his  way  to  join  General  Sherman,  but  not 
being  able  to  go  farther,  and  learning  that  the  enemy  was  ad- 
vancing, he  returned  to  Cleveland  with  his  train  and  what 

*  General  Garrard  drove  a  brigade  of  the  enemy  through  the  entrance 
to  Chattooga  valley,  and  captured  two  guns. 


MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC.  163 

public  property  it  was  practicable  to  save.  From  Dalton, 
General  Hood,  with  Lee's  and  Cheatham's  corps,  passed  into 
Snake  Creek  Gap.  Stewart's  corps  destroyed  the  railroad  to 
Tunnel  Hill.  General  Sherman  reached  Resaca  on  the  14th, 
and  disposed  his  forces  to  strike  the  enemy  in  flank,  or  force 
him  to  fight  by  shutting  him  up  in  Snake  Creek  Gap.  He 
sent  General  Howard  to  the  southern  entrance,  and  General 
Stanley,  with  his  own  and  Davis'  corps,  by  Tilton,  to  the 
northern  entrance.  But  though  General  Howard  skirmished 
to  hold  General  Hood  in  the  pass  until  General  Stanley  should 
reach  his  rear,  his  effort  was  ineffectual,  as  he  retreated  to  the 
north  before  Stanley  could  intercept  him  by  closing  the  Gap. 
Having  emerged  from  the  pass,  General  Hood  had  freedom  of 
motion  north  and  west.  On  the  16th,  General  Sherman  threw 
Iris  columns  to  Lafayette  to  cut  off  his  retreat,  but  he  was  able 
to  unite  his  forces  in  time  to  attain  a  safe  position  between 
the  Coosa  and  Lookout- Mountain. 

Reference  should  here  be  made  to  operations  by  which  For- 
rest was  expelled  from  Tennessee.  This  bold  trooper  crossed 
the  Tennessee  river  at  Waterloo,  September  20th,  and  two  days 
.afterward  appeared  before  Athens,  Alabama.  Colonel  Camp- 
bell, commanding  the  post,  after  skirmishing  with  the  enemy 
for  a  short  time,  withdrew  from  the  town  to  the  fortifications. 
This  step  exposed  the  public  buildings  and  stores,  and  Forrest 
immediately  applied  the  torch.  The  next  day  he  invested  the 
fort,  which  had  been  constructed  for  defense  by  a  small  force, 
^nd  opened  with  his  artillery.  Colonel  Campbell  responded  with 
spirit,  and  refused  two  calls  to  surrender,  but  finally,  through 
a  personal  interview  with  Forrest,  was  induced  to  conclude  that 
resistance  was  useless.  Forrest  adopted  the  policy,  which  in 
many  instances  was  successful,  to  make  a  show  of  force  to  in- 
duce surrender,  when  there  was  no  intention  to  attack,  or  at 
least  a  great  reluctance  to  do  so,  in  view  of  inevitable  loss  or 
uncertain  issue.  The  garrison  surrendered  consisted  of  four 
hundred  and  fifty  men  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Sixth,  One 
Hundred  and  Tenth,  and  One  Hundred  and  Eleventh  Colored 
regiments,  and  one  hundred  and  thirty  men  of  the  Third  Ten- 
nessee Cavalry.  A  half  hour  later,  the  Eighteenth  Michigan 
.and  One  Hundred  and  Third  Ohio  arrived,  and  were  surren- 


164  MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC. 

dered  after  an  engagement.  This  was  an  auspicious  beginning 
for  Forrest,  but  fortunately  proved  to  be  his  only  important 
success. 

From  Athens  he  advanced  toward  Pulaski,  and  destroyed 
the  Nashville  and  Decatur  railroad  for  several  miles.  At  Pu- 
laski, General  Rousseau  was  awaiting  his  coming  with  such 
force  that  Forrest  withdrew  after  a  skirmish.  The  same  day, 
the  29th,  one  of  his  detachments  appeared  on  the  Nashville  and 
Chattanooga  road,  north  and  south  of  Tullahoma,  cut  the  tele- 
graph wires,  and  injured  the  track.  The  road  was  soon  repaired, 
but  the  party  having  touched  it,  was  the  advance  of  Forrest's 
main  force,  which  passed  Fayetteville  the  night  following, 
moving  toward  Decherd.  Having  learned,  however,  that 
heavier  forces  were  before  him  than  he  wished  to  meet,  he 
changed  direction  and  divided  his  forces.  General  Rousseau 
had  moved  by  rail,  the  day  previous,  to  Tullahoma,  and  Gen- 
eral Steedman  had  crossed  the  Tennessee  river,  and  was  ad- 
vancing north  upon  the  road  with  five  thousand  men,  and  in 
the  face  of  the  two  columns,  Forrest  turned  back,  sending  Bu- 
ford  with  four  thousand  men  to  Huntsville,  and  moving  him- 
self with  three  thousand  toward  Columbia.  Buford  reached 
Huntsville  the  night  of  the  30th,  and  made  an  ineffectual  de- 
mand for  the  surrender  of  the  place.  Remaining  during  the 
night,  he  repeated  his  demand  with  similar  issue  the  next  morn- 
ing, and  then  moved  off  toward  Athens.  Here  he  made  an 
attack  at  3  p.  M.,  and  was  repulsed  by  the  Seventy-third  Indiana, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Slade  commanding,  which  had  been  sent 
thither  by  General  Granger  to  regarrison  the  post,  immediately 
after  Colonel  Campbell's  surrender.  Buford  anticipated  an  easy 
victory,  but  was  twice  repulsed,  and  was  pursued  after  with- 
drawal, by  a  small  party  of  General  Granger's  cavalry.  He 
crossed  the  Tennessee,  at  Brown's  ferry,  on  the  3d  of  October. 

General  Forrest  succeeded  no  better.  He  reached  Columbia 
on  the  1st,  but  refrained  from  attack.  He  remained  in  the  vi- 
cinity until  the  3d,  and  then  moved  in  the  direction  of  Mount 
Pleasant,  destroying  five  miles  of  railroad  between  Cartersville 
and  Spring  Hill.  By  this  time,  four  columns  were  converging 
upon  him,  under  the  direction  of  General  Thomas.  General 
Morgan's  division  having  arrived  at  Huntsville  the  night  of 


MARCH    TO    THE   NORTH,  ETC.  165 

the  1st,  moved  through.  Athens  to  secure  the  crossing  at  Bain- 
bridge  ;  General  Rousseau  was  on  his  way  from  Nashville  with 
four  thousand  men,  who  had  "been  hastily  mounted ;  Croxton 
was  advancing  throughLawrenceburg,  and  General  Washburne, 
with  three  thousand  infantry  and  fifteen  hundred  cavalry,  was 
passing  up  the  Tennessee  river,  under  instructions  to  leave  his 
infantry  at  Johnsonville  and  join  General  Rousseau  at  Pulaski, 
with  his  cavalry.  In  addition  to  these  dispositions,  Lieutenant- 
Commander  Forrest,  commanding  the  naval  force  on  the  Up- 
per Tennessee,  was  requested  to  send  gunboats  to  Florence,  if 
the  stage  of  water  would  permit.  This  combination  might 
have  resulted  in  Forrest's  capture,  had  not  the  high  water  in 
Elk  river  detained  Morgan,  who  did  not  reach  Rogersville  until 
the  night  of  the  4th,  while  Forrest  passed  through  Laurence- 
burg  the  same  night,  and  crossed  at  Bainbridge  on  the  6th,  his 
rear  forces  having  been  reached  by  "Washburne's  advance.  But 
if  Forrest  was  neither  captured  nor  defeated,  the  main  line  of 
railroad  was  saved  from  serious  damage,  and  to  break  it  was 
•doubtless  the  chief  object  of  his  raid. 

As  soon  as  General  Thomas  was  advised  of  Hood's  north- 
ward march,  he  made  dispositions  to  offer  resistance  on  the 
line  of  the  Tennessee  river,  and  especially  to  defend  Chatta- 
nooga and  Bridgeport — the  most  important  points  on  the 
direct  line  of  supply.  He  first  directed  General  Rousseau  to 
destroy  all  ferry-boats  and  other  means  of  crossing  the  river 
below  Decatur,  and  then  take  post  at  Florence,  Alabama, 
and  ordered  General  Morgan  to  return  to  Athens.  "When  the 
direction  of  General  Hood's  march  was  clearly  indicated,  he 
directed  General  Croxton,  with  his  brigade  of  cavalry,  to  cover 
the  crossings  of  the  river  from  Decatur  to  Eastport,  and  hur- 
ried Morgan's  division  from  Athens  to  Chattanooga,  Steed- 
man's  from  Decatur  to  Bridgeport,  and  Rousseau's  from  Flor- 
ence to  Athens.  The  garrisons  at  Decatur,  Huntsville,  and 
Stevenson  were  not  reinforced,  that  there  might  be  the  heavi- 
est concentration  possible,  should  the  enemy  advance  toward 
Chattanooga  or  Bridgeport. 

The  northward  march  of  Hood's  army,  on  General  Sher- 
man's communications,  created  an  intense  alarm  all  over  the 
North,  from  which  the  highest  military  circles  were  not  free. 


166  MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC. 

As  a  consequence,  all  available  troops  in  the  Department  of 
the  Ohio,  and  all,  in  fact,  far  and  near,  were  directed  to  Gen- 
eral Thomas ;  and  so  threatening  was  the  emergency  in  the 
estimation  of  the  lieutenant-general,  that  he  advised  the  with- 
drawal of  all  the  forces  on  the  railroad  "  from  Columbia  to 
Decatur,  and  thence  to  Stevenson."  General  Thomas,  how- 
ever, did  not  adopt  the  suggestion,  and  subsequent  events  jus- 
tified his  action. 

"When,  on  the  13th,  General  Thomas  ascertained  that  Hood's 
advance  was  at  Lafayette,  Georgia,  he  directed  General  Wag- 
ner, in  command  at  Chattanooga,  to  call  in  all  the  detachments 
from  Tunnel  Hill,  north,  and  make  preparations  to  hold  his 
important  post.  Accordingly,  a  very  large  number  of  guns 
were  mounted  in  the  fortifications,  which  had  been  made 
exceedingly  strong  by  Colonel  Merrill,  with  his  engineer  regi- 
ment and  the  forces  left  as  a  garrison,  while  all  the  outlying 
troops  were  concentrated  for  the  defense  of  the  town  and  sup- 
plies. 

Upon  General  Schofield's  return  from  Dalton  to  Cleveland, 
General  Thomas  directed  him  to  assume  command  at  Chat- 
tanooga, and  add  to  the  garrison  all  the  troops  within  reach. 

But  though  General  Hood  was  so  near,  he  had  no  thought 
of  putting  his  army  between  the  mountains,  south  of  Chatta- 
nooga, at  least  while  General  Sherman  was  in  his  immediate 
rear,  and  soon  moved  westward  to  avoid  battle  and  pursue  the 
accomplishment  of  the  ultimate  object  of  his  march  to  the 
north.  As  soon  as  he  turned  westward,  General  Thomas  sent 
General  Schofield,  with  Morgan's  and  "Wagner's  divisions,  up 
"Will's  valley  to  watch  against  the  approach  of  the  enemy 
toward  Bridgeport,  but  soon  recalled  him,  having  gained 
knowledge  of  General  Hood's  movement  upon  Gadsden. 

When  General  Sherman  learned  that  Hood  had  turned  west- 
ward, he  proposed  to  follow  him  wherever  he  might  go,  but 
did  not  believe  that  he  meditated  the  invasion  of  Tennessee,, 
though  the  declarations  of  the  Confederate  President  and  Gen- 
eral Hood  gave  assurance  of  this  design.  The  pursuit  of  Hood 
was  maintained  by  various  routes  to  Gaylesville,  and  there 
General  Sherman  halted  his  armies  to  await  the  repair  of  the 
railroad  and  the  developments  of  the  enemy.  He  stationed 


MARCH   TO   THE   NOKTH,  ETC.  167 

the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  near  Little  river,  to  support  the 
cavalry  and  observe  the  enemy  toward  "Will's  valley;  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio  at  Cedar  Bluffs,  to  feel  forward  to  Center 
and  in  the  direction  of  Blue  Mountain ;  and  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  at  Gaylesville.  "While  in  this  region  the  armies 
drew  their  supplies  from  the  country. 

Although  General  Hood  had  not  achieved  the  grand  results 
which  the  sanguine  President  had  predicted,  he  had  neverthe- 
less been  so  far  successful  as  to  perplex  the  national  com- 
manders and  give  hope  to  the  insurgents.  He  had  not  forced 
General  Sherman  into  a  disastrous  retreat,  but  he  had  drawn 
him  to  the  north,  not  in  abandonment  of  Atlanta  and  his  forti- 
fied positions,  but  with  nearly  all  his  forces.  He  had  twice 
thrown  his  armies  between  General  Sherman  and  his  base ; 
had  maneuvered  with  skill;  had  captured  the  garrisons  at 
Big  Shanty,  Acworth,  Tilton,  and  Dalton ;  had  destroyed 
nearly  thirty  miles  of  railroad,  and,  except  in  his  attack  upon 
Allatoona,  had  received  no  harm.  He  had  moved  in  boldest 
disregard  of  railroads  and  communications,  contrary  to  the 
precedents  of  the  previous  campaign,  and,  in  fine,  his  north- 
ward march  had  been  brilliantly  executed.  The  resulting 
problems  were  freighted  with  the  gravest  issues.  The  insur- 
gents were  now  too  far  exhausted  to  bear  the  overthrow  of 
his  army  in  its  perilous  adventure  to  the  north,  and  yet  Hood 
held  boldly  to  his  plan,  as  though  assured  of  success.  A  new 
base,  with  railroad  communications,  was  in  preparation  for 
him  in  Northern  Mississippi,  under  the  direction  of  General 
Beauregard,  now  in  supreme  command  in  the  "West,  not  for 
defense,  but  for  aggression  of  the  boldest  type,  whose  expla- 
nation is  found  in  the  expectation  that  the  trans-Mississippi 
forces  would  swell  Hood's  army  for  its  resistless  sweep  through 
Tennessee  and  Kentucky.  General  Canby's  dispatch  to  Gen- 
eral Sherman,  dated  October  18th,  gives  evidence  of  the 
effort  to  reinforce  Hood's  army  from  the  West;  as,  without 
heavy  reinforcements,  aggression,  in  the  face  of  General 
Sherman's  armies,  was  palpably  impossible.  No  doubt  the 
minor  object  was  to  decoy  General  Sherman  from  the  Chatta- 
nooga and  Atlanta  railroad,  and  the  undoing  of  the  campaign 
on  that  line ;  but  the  main  one  was  the  invasion  of  Tennessee 


168  MARCH    TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC. 

and  Kentucky.  Subsequently,  General  Sherman's  movement 
to  the  south  so  changed  the  situation  that  this  invasion  was 
attempted  without  the  trans-Mississippi  forces. 

"While  the  rebel  generals  were  preparing  to  invade  Ten- 
nessee and  Kentucky,  General  Sherman  was  engrossed  with 
the  project  which  he  first  suggested  as  a  contingency  when 
about  to  make  the  circuit  of  Atlanta,  in  August,  and  which 
he  had  since  repeatedly  brought  to  the  attention  of  General 
Grant.  At  Atlanta,  Allatoona,  Kingston,  and  now,  while 
awaiting,  at  Gaylesville,  the  repair  of  the  railroad,  he  made 
suggestions  to  General  Grant,  from  day  to  day,  concerning 
the  "  march  to  the  sea."  He  was  unwilling  to  follow  Hood 
farther  west,  as  in  this  way,  it  had  been  planned  that  he  should 
be  decoyed  from  Georgia.  By  the  20th  of  October  his  plans 
for  a  counter-movement  were  well  matured,  and  his  utterances 
and  orders  foreshadowed  their  early  execution.  He  proposed 
to  leave  General  Thomas  in  command  of  the  military  division  in 
his  absence — which  at  first  he  thought  would  be  ninety  days,  as 
in  that  time  he  could  go  to  the  sea  and  return — giving  him  as 
an  army  for  defense  the  Fourth  Corps,  the  garrisons  in  Ten- 
nessee and  Alabama,  and  the  new  troops  that  had  been  ordered 
to  Nashville.  For  himself  he  would  retain  the  Fourteenth, 
Fifteenth,  Seventeenth,  Twentieth,  and  Twenty-third  Corps, 
and  a  cavalry  corps  of  three  divisions,  comprising  twenty-five 
hundred  men  each,  under  the  command  of  Brevet  Major-Gen- 
eral J.  H.  "Wilson,  recently  sent  by  General  Grant  to  be  chief 
of  the  cavalry  of  the  military  division.  These  troops  were  to 
be  trimmed  to  perfect  efficiency.  The  railroad  was  to  be  re- 
paired to  Atlanta,  for  use  in  preparation  for  the  march  beyond, 
and  then  to  be  destroyed. 

Telegraphic  communication  between  Chattanooga  and  At- 
lanta was  established  October  20th,  and  on  the  28th  the  rail- 
road was  in  running  order.  In  the  meantime  General  Hood 
assumed  the  offensive.  Advancing  from  G  adsden,  he  appeared 
before  Decatur  on  the  26th  and  made  an  attack,  but  not  with 
such  force  as  indicated  a  purpose  to  storm  the  place — his 
three  corps  of  infantry  being  near,  and  his  cavalry  being  dis- 
posed on  the  south  bank  of  the  river,  from  Guntersville  to 
Eastport.  General  Thomas  sent  two  regiments  to  General 


MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC.  169 

Granger,  from  Chattanooga,  and  instructed  him  to  hold  his 
post  at  all  hazards.  This  was  a  feeble  reinforcement,  but  he 
had  no  other  spare  troops  to  throw  before  the  enemy.  The 
divisions  of  Morgan  and  Wagner  had  been  recalled  from  Ten- 
nessee by  General  Sherman,  and  for  the  defense  of  the  line  of 
the  Tennessee  river  there  were  the  usual  garrisons,  and  Gen- 
eral Croxton's  brigade  of  cavalry  spread  out  on  the  north  bank. 
In  the  emergency  General  Sherman  ordered  General  Stanley 
to  report  with  his  corps  to  General  Thomas,  and,  by  order, 
placed  the  latter  in  command  of  all  troops  and  garrisons  in  his 
military  division,  not  in  his  own  presence,  contingent  upon 
his  separation  from  his  division  "  by  military  movements  or 
the  accidents  of  war." 

On  the  27th,  General  Hood  intrenched  his  position  before 
Decatur,  skirmished  during  the  day,  but  used  no  artillery, 
though  he  put  guns  in  position.  Under  the  cover  of  darkness, 
he  drove  in  General  Granger's  pickets  with  a  strong  force,  and 
established  a  new  line  within  five  hundred  yards  of  the  town. 
The  next  day.  General  Granger  made  a  successful  sortie.  .  His 
troops  advanced,  under  cover  of  the  guns  of  the  fort,  down 
the  river  bank  and  round  to  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  rifle-pits, 
and  by  a  bold  charge  cleared  them,  killing  a  large  number  of 
men  and  capturing  one  hundred  and  twenty.  A  battery  above 
the  town  was  also  captured  by  the  Fourteenth  United  States 
Colored  troops,  Colonel  T.  J.  Morgan  commanding,  but  the 
position  being  too  much  exposed  to  be  held,  the  guns  were 
spiked  and  the  regiment  under  orders  retired  to  the  fort.  In 
the  charge,  Colonel  Morgan  lost  forty  men  killed  and  wounded, 
including  three  officers  killed.  This  resistance  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  his  investing  lines,  and  his  lack  of  provisions,  in- 
duced General  Hood  to  withdraw  his  forces  altogether  at  4 
A.  M.  on  the  29th.  He  could  neutralize  the  place  by  passing  to 
the  west  and  meet  his  supplies,  while  he  could  secure  crossings 
at  less  cost  down  the  river ;  and  these  considerations  doubtless 
induced  his  withdrawal.  He  lost  several  hundred,  perhaps 
more  than  a  thousand  men,  while  inflicting  a  loss  of  eighty, 
and  kept  his  troops  in  action  in  almost  utter  destitution  of 
provisions. 

General  Hood  has  not  reported  his  objects  in  the  various 


170  MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC. 

movements  of  his  campaign,  and  hence  his  purpose  in  oper- 
ating against  Decatur  has  not  heen  authentically  revealed. 
All  circumstances,  except  his  own  statement  of  his  plan,  lead 
to  the  belief  that  he  expected  to  cross  the  Tennessee  river  at 
Decatur  and  move  rapidly  upon  General  Sherman's  communi- 
cations in  Middle  Tennessee,  and  cut  off'  his  supplies  entirely. 
The  press  in  the  South,  and  his  own  officers,  entertained  and 
expressed  the  opinion  that  this  extreme  aggression  was  medi- 
tated. The  opposition  of  General  Granger's  small  force  at 
Decatur  was  so  positive,  even  showing  the  purpose  of  offense,, 
that  he  was  deterred  from  the  effort  to  carry  the  position  by 
assault.  There  was  a  diversity  of  opinion  among  his  gen- 
oral  officers  as  to  the  wisdom  of  his  withdrawal  from  Decatur,. 
MS  it  involved  the  abandonment,  for  a  time,  of  his  advance  to 
Nashville. 

During  the  29th,  General  Croxton  discovered  that  the  enemy 
svas  crossing  the  Tennessee  river  at  the  mouth  of  Cypress 
creek,  two  miles  below  Florence.  He  concentrated  his  forces 
as  far  as  practicable,  but  was  unable  to  regain  the  north  bank. 
Having  been  informed  of  this  turn  of  affairs,  General  Thomas 
directed  General  Hatch,  at  Clifton,  commanding  a  cavalry 
division  of  General  Howard's  army,  and  under  orders  to  j^oin 
General  Sherman  in  Georgia,  when  ready  for  the  field,  to  move 
to  General  Croxton's  support,  and  urged  both  commanders  to 
keep  the  enemy  from  crossing  other  forces,  if  possible,  until 
the  Fourth  Corps  could  arrive  from  Georgia  and  get  into  posi- 
tion to  meet  him.  It  was,  however,  too  late  to  defend  the  line 
of  the  Tennessee  river,  as  Hood  was  master  of  too  many 
crossings ;  and  when  General  Wood's  division,  the  advance  of 
the  corps,  arrived  at  Athens,  on  the  31st,  General  Thomas 
ordered  General  Stanley  to  unite  his  command  at  Pulaski  and 
await  further  instructions.  The  same  clay,  General  Schofield 
was  ordered  to  move  from  Resaca,  Georgia,  to  Columbia,  Ten- 
nessee, to  combine  with  General  Stanley  and  the  cavalry  to 
resist  the  advance  of  the  enemy  into  Middle  Tennessee.  That 
an  invasion  was  meditated  had  become  evident  from  Southern 
newspapers,  and  prisoners  and  deserters  from  Hood's  army 
bore  testimony  to  this  purpose.  The  conjecture  that  he  could 
not  supply  his  army  on  the  Tennessee  or  north  of  it  was  now 


MAECH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC.  171 

plainly  groundless,  as  he  had  established  communications  by 
the  repair  of  the  Ohio  and  Mobile  railroad,  and  supplies  were 
coming  to  him  from  Selma  and  Montgomery,  through  Corinth,. 
and  thence  eastward  to  Cherokee  Station,  on  the  Memphis 
and  Charleston  railroad.  And  while  he  had  thrust  the  heads 
of  infantry  columns  over  the  river  at  Florence  and  at  points 
above  and  below,  he  had  sent  Forrest  with  his  bold  troopers 
up  the  Tennessee  river  to  break  up  General  Thomas'  line  of 
supply  by  the  river  and  the  Northwestern  railroad. 

Forrest  appeared  at  Fort  Heiman,  an  earthwork  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  Tennessee,  about  seventy -five  miles  from  Padu- 
cah,  where,  three  days  later,  he  captured  gunboat  No.  55,  and 
two  transports,  having  previously  burned  the  steamer  Em- 
press. On  the  2d  of  November,  he  planted  his  batteries  above 
and  below  Johnsonville,  the  western  terminus  of  the  North- 
western railroad,  and  an  important  depot  of  supplies.  His 
guns  blockaded  the  river,  and  shut  in  before  the  town  three 
gunboats,  eight  transports,  and  about  a  dozen  barges.  The 
garrison  comprised  a  thousand  men  from  the  Forty-third 
Wisconsin  and  the  Twelfth  United  States  Colored  regiment, 
and  a  detachment  of  the  Eleventh  Tennessee  cavalry,  under 
the  command  of  Colonel  C.  R.  Thompson,  of  the  Twelfth  Col- 
ored regiment.  The  naval  forces,  under  Lieutenant  E.  M. 
King,  attacked  the  enemy's  guns  below  the  town,  but  though 
repulsed  after  a  severe  conflict,  they  recaptured  a  transport 
having  on  board  two  20-pounder  Parrott  guns  and  quarter- 
master's stores,  and  forced  Forrest  to  burn  the  gunboat  cap- 
tured on  the  31st  of  October.  On  the  4th,  the  enemy  opened 
fire  upon  the  gunboats  from  the  opposite  bank.  The  guns  on 
boats  and  land  responded  briskly,  but  were  soon  disabled, 'and 
for  fear  that  they  would  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  both 
gunboats  and  transports  were  fired.  The  flames  reached  the 
stores  on  the  levee,  and  property  worth  a  million  of  dollars 
was  consumed.  It  was  fear  rather  than  necessity  that  caused 
this  waste,  as  Forrest  withdrew  soon  after  altogether,  having 
delivered  a  furious  cannonade.  He  crossed  the  river  above 
the  town,  by  means  of  extemporized  flat-boats,  and  moved  to- 
ward Clifton,  with  evident  design  of  co-operating  with  the 
main  army. 


172  MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC. 

On  the  evening  of  the  5th,  General  Schofield  reached  John- 
sonville  with  a  portion  of  his  command,  having  moved  rapidly 
by  rail,  in  compliance  with  instructions  from  General  Thomas 
to  save  the  gunboats  and  supplies.  Having  left  a  sufficient 
force  to  defend  the  place,  he  then  proceeded  to  join  General 
Stanley  at  Pulaski,  to  assume  command  of  the  forces  before 
the  enemy.  He  was  assigned  to  this  position,  by  reason  of  his 
rank  as  a  department  commander,  though  General  Stanley 
was  his  senior  as  a  major-general. 

General  Hood  was  now  free  to  invade  Tennessee,  as  the  low 
stage  of  water  in  the  river  prevented  the  effective  use  of  the 
gunboats  against  his  pontoon  bridges,  and  General  Thomas 
could  not  offer  a  strong  army  on  the  north  bank.  He  was 
also  free  to  move  to  the  southwest  should  General  Sherman 
concentrate  his  armies  against  him;  but  General  Sherman 
was  unwilling  to  do  this.  His  preparations  for  his  march 
through  Georgia  were  nearly  completed,  and  he  was  unwilling 
to  take  a  step  backward,  to  pursue  Hood.  He  made  provis- 
ion, however,  for  reinforcing  General  Thomas,  by  calling  two 
divisions,  under  General  A.  J.  Smith,  from  Missouri,  and  by 
sending  back  General  Wilson,  and  the  cavalry  of  McCook's 
and  Garrard's  divisions  to  give  a  good  remount  to  Kilpatrick's 
division,  retained  by  himself. 

General  Hood's  threatening  attitude  called  forth  a  fresh 
discussion  of  General  Sherman's  projected  march  between  him 
and  General  Grant,  but  induced  no  change  of  plan.  The 
conclusions  reached  were  these,  that  turning  back  would  undo 
the  work  of  the  preceding  campaign,  give  up  the  territory 
which  had  been  gained,  and  fulfill  the  predictions  of  Mr.  Davis 
witli  regard  to  the  effect  of  Hood's  advance  to  the  North,  and 
that  he  could  not  be  overtaken  if  followed;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  going  forward  would  destroy  the  railroads  of  Georgia, 
inflict  immense  damage,  and  produce  a  most  potent  moral 
effect,  in  illustrating  the  vulnerability  of  the  South.  In  his 
last  communication  to  General  Grant,  General  Sherman  said  : 
"  If  we  can  march  a  well-appointed  army  right  through  this 
territory,  it  is  a  demonstration  to  the  world — foreign  and  do- 
mestic— that  we  have  a  power  which  Davis  can  not  resist. 
This  may  not  be  war,  but  rather  statesmanship.  Nevertheless 


MAKCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC.  173 

it  is  overwhelming  to  my  mind,  that  there  are  thousands  of 
people  ahroad  and  in  the  South  who  will  reason  thus :  If  the 
North  can  march  an  army  right  through  the  South,  it  is  proof 
positive  that  the  North  can  prevail  in  this  contest,  leaving 
only  its  willingness  to  use  that  power."  This  moral  effect  was, 
indeed,  the  justification  of  the  movement,  as  General  Sherman 
proposed  to  use  the  territory  which  he  had  gained  in  Georgia 
as  a  track  simply  for  his  march,  and  not  hold  any  part  of 
Georgia  except  his  objective  on  the  Atlantic  shore,  while  he 
left  behind  him  one  of  the  two  great  armies  upon  which  the 
existence  of  the  rebellion  depended.  It  is  true,  however,  that 
even  in  his  last  dispatches  before  starting,  he  expressed  the 
conviction  that  Beauregard  and  Hood  would  be  forced  by 
public  clamor  to  follow  him.  He  retained  for  himself  from 
his  three  armies  the  Fourteenth,  Fifteenth,  Seventeenth,  and 
Twentieth  Corps,  and  one  large  division  of  cavalry,  in  all 
sixty  thousand  infantry,  and  five  thousand  five  hundred  cav- 
alry, and  one  pieee  of  artillery  to  every  thousand  men. 


CITY  POINT,  VA.,  September  10, 1864. 
Major-General  /Sherman : 

As  soon  as  your  men  are  properly  rested  and  preparations  can  be  made, 
it  is  desirable  that  another  campaign  should  be  commenced. 

We  want  to  keep  the  enemy  continually  pressed  to  the  end  of  the  war. 
If  we  give  him  no  peace  while  the  war  lasts,  the  end  can  not  be  far  dis- 
tant. Now  that  we  have  all  of  Mobile  Bay  that  is  valuable,  I  do  not  know 
but  it  will  be  the  best  move  for  Major-General  Canby's  troops  to  act 
upon  Savannah,  while  you  move  on  Augusta.  I  should  like  to  hear  from 

you  on  this  matter. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 

0 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

ATLANTA,  GA.,  September  14,  1864. 
Brigadier-General  R.  S.  Granger,  Decatur  : 

General  Sherman  informs  me  that  General  Smith  has  been  directed  to 
Missouri  by  orders  from  Major-General  Halleck;  also,  that  he  has  official 
information  that  Forrest  and  his  command  reached  Mobile  on  the  8th 
instant.  You  must  therefore  apprehend  no  trouble  from  any  but  Roddy, 
Wheeler,  and  the  parties  which  have  already  been  in  Tennessee. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
*         Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


174  MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  ATLANTA,  GA.,  October  1,  1864. 
Lieutenant- General  U.  S.  Grant,  City  Point  : 

Hood  is  evidently  on  the  west  side  of  Chattahoochee,  below  Sweet- 
water.  If  he  tries  to  get  on  my  road  this  side  of  the  Etowah,  I  shall  at- 
tack him;  but  if  he  goes  on  to  the  Selma  and  Talladega  road,  why  would 
it  not  do  for  me  to  leave  Tennessee  to  the  forces  which  Thomas  has  and 
the  reserves  soon  to  come  to  Nashville,  and  for  me  to  destroy  Atlanta,  and 
then  march  across  Georgia  to  Savannah  or  Charleston,  breaking  roads  and 
•doing  irreparable  damage  ?  We  can  not  remain  on  the  defensive. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  ATLANTA,  GA.,   October  1,  1864 — 2  p.  M. 
•General  G.  H.  Thomas,  Chattanooga  : 

I  have  your  dispatch  of  noon.  Use  your  own  discretion  as  to  matters 
north  of  the  Tennessee  river.  If  I  can  induce  Hood  to  swing  across  to 
Blue  Mountain,  I  shall  feel  tempted  to  start  for  Milledgeville,  Millen,  and 
Savannah  or  Charleston,  absolutely  destroying  all  Georgia,  and  taking 
either  Savannah  or  Charleston.  In  that  event,  I  would  order  back  to 
Chattanooga  everything  the  other  side  of  Kingston,  and  bring  forward  all 
else ;  destroy  Atlanta  and  the  bridge,  and  absolutely  scour  the  Southern 
Confederacy.  In  that  event,  Hood  would  be  puzzled  and  would  follow 
me ;  or  if  he  entered  Tennessee  he  could  make  no  permanent  stay.  But 
if  he  attempts  the  road  this  side  of  Kingston  or  Rome,  I  will  turn  against 
him.  Forrest  will  not  attack  our  forts — that  is  manifest ;  but  will  try  and 
get  possession  of  Decatur.  All  the  infantry  and  cavalry  not  in  forts  or 
blockhouses  should  be  directed  against  him  by  roads — say  the  Shelby  ville 

pike  and  Fayetteville. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  68.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  ATLANTA,  GA.,  October  3,  18£4. 
The  following  movements  are  ordered : 

I.  Major-General  Slocum,  with  Twentieth  Corps,  will  hold  Atlanta  and 
the  Chattahoochee  bridge,  and  all  detachments  of  other  troops  or  corps 
ivill  report  to  him  and  be  assigned  by  him  to  posts  looking  to  the  secu- 
rity of  the  depot. 

II.  All  the  rest  of  the  army,  provided  with  ten  (10)  days'  rations,  will 
move  by  the  Chattahoochee  bridge  to  Smyrna  Camp-ground — the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  Major-General  Stanley  on  the  center,  looking  west;  the 


MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC.    4  175 

Army  of  the  Ohio,  Brigadier-General  Cox,  on  the  right,  and  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  Major-General  Howard,  on  the  left. 
III.  The  commanding  general  will  be  near  the  center. 
By  order  of  General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

(Signed,)  L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  85.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  KENESAW  MOUNTAIN,  October  6,  1864. 

I.  Major-General  Stanley,  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  will  occupy  a  strong 
defensive  position  across  the  Marietta  and  Burnt  Hickory,  and  Marietta 
and  Dallas  roads,  his  right  near  Pine  Hill  and  left  behind  Nose's  creek. 

II.  Major-General  Howard,  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  will  join  on  to  the 
left  of  Stanley,  and  make  a  line  covering  the  Powder  Spring  road,  and 
the  cavalry  on  the  flank ;  General  Kilpatrick  will  prevent  the  enemy  from 
reaching  the  railroad  below  Marietta. 

III.  Brigadier-General  Cox,  Army  of  the  Ohio,  will  move  on  the  Burnt 
Hickory  road,  via  Pine  Hill  and  Mount  Olivet  Church,  west,  until  he 
strikes  the  road  by  which  the  enemy  have  moved  on  Allatoona.     He  will 
have  his  columns  ready  for  a  fight,  but  not  deployed.     He  will  park  his 
wagons  near  Kenesaw.    '    . 

IV.  General  Elliott  will  send  cavalry  to-day  to  Big  Shanty,  Acworth, 
and  Allatoona,  and  bring  official  reports. 

V.  ... 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  87.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  KENESAW,  October  8,  1864. 

I.  The  armies  will  march  at  once  toward  Allatoona — that  of  the  Ohio  by 
the  roads  southwest  of  Acworth ;  that  of  the  Cumberland  by  roads  south 
and  west  of  Kenesaw  Mountain,  leading  through  Acworth,  and  that  of 
the  Tennessee  by  roads  north  and  east  of  Kenesaw,  via  Big  Shanty  and 
Acworth. 

II.  The  Army  of  the  Ohio  will  halt  for  orders  near  good  grass  and 
water,  two  or  three  miles  this  side  of  Allatoona ;  that  of  the  Cumberland, 
this  side  Acworth,  and  that  of  the  Tennessee  this  side  of  Big  Shanty, 
all  giving  attention  to  the  grazing  of  their  animals  when  not  on  the 
march. 

IV.  Until  further  orders,  General  Elliott  will  keep  his  cavalry  force 
watching  the  enemy,  but  ready  to  march  rapidly  to  Stilesboro  and  the 
Etovvah  bridge,  if  the  enemy  turns  north  toward  Rome  or  Kingston; 
otherwise  the  cavalry  will  remain  at  the  front  or  left  flank  of  the  army. 


176  .     MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC. 

V.  Should  the  enemy  attempt  our  road  about  Kingston  or  to  invest 
Rome,  the  army  must  be  prepared  to  leave  at  Allatoona  the  principal 
wagon  trains,  and  to  march  rapidly  to  the  points  threatened ;  but  if  the 
enemy  simply  moves  off  toward  Jacksonville  or  Blue  Mountain,  the  army 
will  remain,  its  right  at  Alatoona  and  left  at  Kenesaw,  until  our  roads  are 
repaired. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-  Camp. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  ALLATOONA,  GA.,  October  9,  1864. 
Lieutenant- General  Grant,  City  Point,  Va.  : 

It  will  be  a  physical  impossibility  to  protect  the  roads,  now  that  Hood, 
Forrest,  Wheeler,  and  the  whole  batch  of  devils  are  turned  loose  without 
home  or  habitation  I  think  Hood's  movements  indicate  a  diversion  to 
the  end  of  the  Selma  and  Talladega  railroad  at  Blue  Mountain,  about 
sixty  '(60)  miles  southwest  of  Rome,  from  which  he  will  threaten  King- 
ston, Bridgeport,  and  Decatur,  Alabama. 

I  propose  that  we  break  up  the  railroad  from  Chattanooga,  and  strike 
out  with  wagons  for  Milledgeville  and  Savannah.  Until  we  can  repopu- 
late  Georgia,  it  is  useless  to  occupy  it;  but  the  utter  destruction  of  its 
roads,  houses,  and  people  will  cripple  their  military  resources.  By  at- 
tempting to  hold  the  roads,  we  will  lose  a  thousand  men  monthly,  and 
will  gain  no  result.  I  can  make  the  march  and  make  Georgia  howl.  We 
have  over  eight  thousand  (8,000)  cattle  and  three  million  rations  of  bread, 
but  no  corn ;  but  we  can  forage  in  the  interior  of  the  state. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  CARTERVILLE,  October 10,  1864. 
General  Grant,  City  Point : 

Dispatch  about  Wilson  received.  Hood  is  now  crossing  Coosa,  twelve 
(12)  miles  below  Rome,  bound  west.  If  he  passes  over  to  the  Mobile  and 
Ohio  road,  had  I  not  better  execute  the  plan  of  my  letter  sent  by  Colonel 
Porter,  and  leave  General  Thomas  with  the  troops  now  in  Tennessee,  to  • 
defend  the  state  ?  He  will  have  an  ample  force  when  the  reinforcements 
ordered  reach  Nashville. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General  Commanding. 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  89.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  KINGSTON,  GA.,  October  11,  1864. 
The  army  will  move  to-morrow  morning  early  on  Rome— the  Armies  of 


MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC.  177 

the  Ohio  and  Tennessee  by  the  river  roads,  and  the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land by  a  detour  via  Woodland ;  all  to  reach  Rome  to-morrow  night. 
Trains  will  be  taken  to  Rome. 
By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-d&-Camp. 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  90.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  ROME,  GA.,  October  12,  1864. 
Orders  for  to-morrow,  October  13th,  will  be  as  follows  : 

I.  General  Corse  will  dispatch  his  division  and  the  brigade  of  the  Fif- 
teenth Corps  attached  to  his  garrison,  and  the  First  Alabama  Cavalry, 
down  the  Coosa  river,  on  its  east  bank,  toward  Coosaville,  to  develop  the 
force  guarding  the  bridge  by  which  the  enemy  crossed.     He  will  send 
one  (1)  battery  with  the  expedition,  and  equip  the  whole  party  light. 

II.  General  Elliott  will,  at  the  same  time,  dispatch  down  the  west  bank 
of  the  Coosa  a  division  of  cavalry  for  the  same  purpose — viz.,  to  develop 
the  force  guarding  the  bridge  by  which  the  enemy  crossed. 

III.  All  the  armies  will  be  held  ready  to  move  at  a  moment's  warn- 
ing. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-  Camp. 

BY    TELEGRAPH    FROM    "  WASHINGTON,    12    M.,    NASHVILLE, 

OCTOBER  13,  1864." 
Major-General  Geo.  H.  TJiomas,  Nashville: 

Two  old  regiments  from  General  Pope  and  several  new  ones  from  Ohio 
and  Indiana  are  on  their  way  to  Nashville.  Schofield  and  Burbridge  are 
ordered  to  send  to  you  everything  that  can  be  spared  from  Kentucky. 
Put  yourself  in  communication  with  them.  General  Grant  directs  that 
you  collect  your  forces,  and  be  prepared  to  meet  Hood  wherever  he  may 
present  himself  on  the  Tennessee,  and  that  you  take  the  supplies  of  the 
country  without  compunction.  By  thus  supplying  your  own  army,  you 

will  leave  none  for  him. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Major-  General. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  October  13,  1864. 
Major-General  Hatteclc : 

For  Major-General  Thomas'  information: 

I  think  it  will  be  advisable  for  Major-General  Thomas  now  to  abandon 
all  the  railroad  from  Columbia  to  Decatur,  thence  to  Stevenson.  This 
will  give  him  much  additional  force. 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  GRANT. 
VOL.  n — 12 


178  MAECH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC. 

WASHINGTON,  October  14,  1864. 
Major-General  Thomas  : 

Lieutenant-General  Grant  suggests  the  abandonment  of  the  railroad 
from  Columbia  to  Decatur,  and  thence  to  Stevenson,  in  order  to  give  you 

more  force  against  Hood. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  HALLECK. 


[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  91.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  RESACA,  GA.,  October  14,  1864. 
The  first  movement  will  be  to  free  the  Snake  Creek  Gap. 

I.  General  Howard  will  bring  up  all  the  men  of  his  command  he  can 
get  at  7  A.  M.  to-morrow,  and  move  direct  on  Snake  Creek  Gap,  approach- 
ing carefully,  and  holding  his  column  ready  to  pass  through  when  relieved 
by  General  Stanley's  movement. 

II.  General  Stanley  will  cross  over  to  the  hills  about  two  (2)  miles 
north  of  the  gap,  somewhere  south  of  Tilton,  and  with  infantry,  reach 
the  summit,  and,  if  possible,  find  a  way  across  into  the  valley  toward 
Villanow. 

III.  General  Cox  will  come  up  and  follow  General  Howard. 
*#****•*** 

V.  General  McCook  will  send  all  the  cavalry  he  can  raise  boldly  to  Buz- 
zard Roost  Pass,  to  threaten  the  enemy  in  that  quarter,  and  to  give  Gen- 
eral Stanley  notice  of  any  force  in  that  vicinity.  As  soon  as  General 
Garrard  comes  up,  he  will  be  dispatched  in  the  same  direction. 

»'         **  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 

By  order  of  Major-General  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 


[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  92.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  Mississippi, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  October  15,  1864. 

The  movement  to-morrow  will  be  on  Lafayette,  the  primary  object 
being  to  secure  possession  of  Ship's  Gap. 

I.  General  Howard  will  move  rapidly  on  Villanow  and  Ship's  Gap,  to 
secure  the  summit,  and  mass  to  the  right. 

II.  General  Stanley  will  follow  and  mass  to  the  left  of  the  gap. 

III.  General  Cox  will  halt  for  orders  at  Villanow,  guarding  roads  north 
and  south. 

IV.  General  Garrard's  cavalry  will  come  through  Snake  Creek  Gap  and 
guard  the  trains.     General  Elliott  will  dispatch  Colonel  Watkins'  cavalry 
and  scouts  to  open  communication  with  Chattanoogo,  to  let  them  know 


MAKCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC.  179 

that  this  army  is  in  pursuit  of  Hood,  and  to  inform  me  of  the  state  of 

facts  along  the  road  and  at  Chattanooga. 

********* 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  SHIP'S  GAP,  GA.,  October  16,  1864. 
General  Thomas,  Nashville : 

Send  me  Davis'  and  Newton's  old  divisions.  Ee-establish  the  road,  and 
I  will  follow  Hood  wherever  he  .may  go.  I  think  he  will  move  to  Blue 
Mountain.  We  can  maintain  our  men  and  animals  on  the  country. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 

ATLANTA,  October  17,  1864. 
Major-General  Sherman : 

I  have  a  Montgomery  jJaper  of  the  12th.  The  dispatches  from  Hood, 
.as  well  as  the  editorials,  state  that  Beauregard  is  with  Hood,  and  that  the 

army  is  going  to  cross  the  Tennessee  river. 

H.  W.  SLOCUM, 

Major-  General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  SHIP'S  GAP,  GA.,  October  17,  1864. 
General  Thomas,  Nashville: 

Hood  won't  dare  go  into  Tennessee.  I  hope  he  will.  We  now  occupy 
Ship's  Gap  and  Lafayette,  and  Hood  is  retreating  toward  Alpine  and 
Gadsden.  I  am  moving  General  Garrard  to-day  to  Dirttown,  and  will 
move  General  Corse  out  to  Coosaville,  and  with  the  main  army  move  on 
Summerville. 

If  Hood  wants  to  go  into  Tennessee,  west  of  Huntsville,  let  him  go, 
and  then  we  can  all  turn  on  him  and  he  can  not  escape.  The  gunboats 
can  break  any  bridge  he  may  attempt  above  Decatur.  If  he  attempts  to 
cross,  let  him  do  so  in  part,  and  then  let  a  gunboat  break  through  his 
bridge.  I  will  follow  him  to  Gadsden,  and  then  want  my  whole  army 
united  for  the  grand  move  into  Georgia. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,     ' 
Major-  General. 

NEW  ORLEANS,  October  18,  1864. 
Major-General  Sherman : 

I  learn  by  an  intercepted  dispatch  from  Jeff.  Davis  to  Kirby  Smith, 
dated  at  Montgomery  on  the  30th,  that  the  orders  to  cross  the  Mississippi 
had  been  received.  I  presume  that  duplicate  of  this  dispatch  has  reached 
Kirby  Smith,  as  Magruder's  force,  about  eighteen  or  twenty  thousand 
(18,000  or  20,000)  men,  suddenly  left  General  Steele's  front  and  moved 
in  the  direction  of  the  Washita  river.  I  have  sent  a  fast  boat  to  commu- 


180  MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC. 

nicate  this  intelligence  to  the  troops  and  gunboats  on  the  river,  and  as- 
I  have  now  about  eight  thousand  (8,000)  troops  afloat,  and  will  at  once 
increase  the  number,  I  think  the  crossing  can  be  prevented.  The  cross- 
ing will  probably  be  attempted  in  the  neighborhood  of  Games'  Landing. 

ED.  R.  S.  CANBY, 

Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  SUMMERVILLE,  GA.,  October  19,  1864 — 12  M. 
Major-General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Hood  has  retreated  rapidly  by  all  the  roads  leading  south.  Our  ad- 
vance columns  are  now  at  Alpine  and  Melville  Post-office.  I  shall  pursue 
him  as  far  as  Gaylesville.  The  enemy  will  not  venture  toward  Tennessee, 
except  around  by  Decatur.  I  propose  to  send  the  Fourth  Corps  back  to 
General  Thomas,  and  leave  him  that  corps,  the  garrisons  and  new  troops, 
to  defend  the  line  of  the  Tennessee,  and  with  the  rest  to  push  into  the 
heart  of  Georgia,  and  come  out  at  Savannah,  destroying  all  the  railroads 
of  the  state. 

The  break  at  Big  Shanty  is  repaired,  and  that  about  Dalton  should  be 
in  ten  (10)  days.  We  find  abundance  of  forage  in  the  country. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  SUMMERVILLE,  GA.,  October  19,  1864. 
General  G.  H.  Thomas,  Nashville,  Tenn. : 

Make  a  report  to  me  as  soon  as  possible  of  what  troops  you  now  have  in 
Tennessee,  what  are  expected,  and  how  disposed.  I  propose,  with  the 
Armies  of  the  Tennessee,  the  Ohio,  and  two  corps  of  yours,  to  sally  forth 
and  make  a  hole  in  Georgia  and  Alabama  that  will  be  hard  to  mend. 
Hood  has  little  or  no  baggage,  and  will  escape  me.  He  can  not  invade 
Tennessee,  except  to  the  west  of  Huntsville.  I  want  the  gunboats  and 
what  troops  are  on  the  Tennessee  to  be  most  active  up  at  the  head  of 
navigation.  I  want  General  Wilson  and  General  Mower  with  me,  and 
would  like  General  McCook's  division  made  up  to  twenty-five  hundred 
(2,500)  men  mounted.  I  will  send  back  into  Tennessee  the  Fourth 
Corps,  all  dismounted  cavalry,  all  sick  and  wounded,  and  all  incum- 
brances  whatever,  except  what  I  can  haul  in  our  wagons,  and  will  prob- 
ably, about  November  1st,  break  up  the  railroad  and  bridges,  destroy  At- 
lanta, and  make  a  break  for  Mobile,  Savannah,  or  Charleston.  I  want  you 
to  remain  in  Tennessee,  and  take  command  of  all  my  division  not  actually 
present  with  me.  Hood's  army  may  be  set  down  at  forty  thousand 
(40,000)  of  all  arms  fit  for  duty ;  he  may  follow  me  or  turn  against  you. 
If  you  can  defend  the  line  of  the  Tennessee  in  my  absence  of  three  (3) 

months,  is  all  I  ask. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Maj  or-  General. 


MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC.  181 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.,  October  26,  1864. 
Major-General  Thomas,  Nashville,  Tenn. : 

A  reconnoissance  pushed  down  to  Gadsden  to-day  reveals  the  fact  that 
the  rebel  army  is  not  there,  and  the  chances  are  it  has  moved  west.  If  it 
turns  up  at  Guntersville,  I  will  be  after  it ;  but  if  it  goes,  as  I  believe,  to 
Decatur  and  beyond,  I  must  leave  it  to  you  at  present,  and  push  for  the 
heart  of  Georgia.  All  I  want  is  to  get  my  sick  and  wounded  back  to  a 
safe  place.  I  start  the  Fourth  Corps  back  to-morrow,  via  Muston's  and 
Valley  Head,  ordering  it  to  Bridgeport  or  Chattanooga,  according  to  what 
-orders  Stanley  may  have  from  you.  Stanley  will  have  about  fifteen 
thousand  (15,000)  men.  Beaureguard  may  attempt  Tennesse  from  the  di- 
rection of  Muscle  Shoals,  but  when  he  finds  me  pushing  for  Macon,  Mil- 
ledgeville,  etc.,  he  will  turn  back.  I  send  you  a  copy  of  my  order  giving 
you  supreme  command  in  my  absence. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major- General  Commanding. 

NASHVILLE,  October  26,  1864 — 2  p.  M. 
Major-General  Sherman : 

General  Granger  telegraphs  me  again,  to-day,  that  Hood's  army  is  threat- 
ening to  cross  the  Tennessee  river  at  various  places  between  Guntersville 
and  Decatur.  I  have  sent  down  to  him  all  the  reinforcements  I  have  to 
rspare  at  this  time.  Have  you  any  information  that  Hood  has  moved  with 
his  army  in  the  direction  indicated  in  these  reports  ? 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-  General. 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  105.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.,  October  26,  1864. 

In  the  event  of  military  movements  or  the  accidents  of  war  separating 
the  general  in  command  from  his  military  division,  Major-General  Geo. 
H.  Thomas,  commanding  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland,  will  exer- 
cise command  over  all  troops  and  garrisons  not  absolutely  in  the  presence 
of  the  general-in-chief.  The  commanding  generals  of  the  departments, 
Armies  of  the  Ohio  and  Tennessee,  will  forthwith  send  abstracts  of  their 
returns  to  General  Thomas,  at  Nashville,  in  order  that  he  may  understand 
the  position  and  distribution  of  troops ;  and  General  Thomas  may  call 
for  such  further  reports  as  he  may  require,  disturbing  the  actual  condition 
of  affairs  and  mixing  up  the  troops  of  separate  departments  as  little  as 
possible  consistent  with  the  interests  of  the  service. 
By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 


182  MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND,. 

NASHVILLE,  November  1,  1864 — 9.30  A.  M. 
Brigadier-General  Jno.  F.  Croxton,  Shoal  Creek,  via  Pulaski : 

Your  dispatch  of  yesterday,  reporting  your  position  on  Shoal  creek,  re- 
ceived. Hold  that  position  as  long  as  possible,  so  as  to  enable  General 
Stanley  to  get  into  position  at  Pulaski.  Should  you  be  compelled  to  fall 
back,  do  so  with  the  view  of  covering  Stanley's  march  from  Athens.  I 
have  ordered  General  Hatch  to  co-operate  with  you.  Acknowledge  receipt 
and  report  state  of  affairs. 

.  GKEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


NASHVILLE,  November  1,  1864 — 7  p.  M. 
Major-General  HallecTc,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Your  dispatch  of  11.30  A.  M.  this  date,  received.  General  Croxton  re- 
ports that  last  night  he  held  the  fords  of  Shoal  creek,  eight  miles  east 
and  nine  miles  north  of  Florence,  and  that  he  will  retard  the  enemy  as- 
long  as  possible.  Stanley's  troops  are  now  arriving  at  Pulaski.  I  hope 
they  will  all  be  there  at  12  M.  to-morrow. 

I  have  halted  General  Hatch  at  Pulaski,  and  he  is  co-operating  with 
General  Croxton  against  the  enemy.  If  I  had  General  Schofield,  should 
feel  perfectly  easy.  I  have  given  such  instructions  as  ought  to  expedite 
his  arrival.  It  will  be  necessary  to  hold  the  usual  guards  on  the  railroad 
until  the  troops  can  pass  over.  I  will  give  instructions  to  have  them  con- 
centrated as  soon  as  the  troops  have  passed.  I  despair  of  getting  any 
troops  from  Missouri  in  time  to  be  of  any  service.  None  of  my  tele- 
grams have  been  answered  by  General  Eosecrans.  Be  assured  I  will  do- 
the  best  I  can. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.   V.  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  ROME,  GA.,  November  1,  1864. 
Lieutenant-General  U.  S.  Grant,  City  Point,  Va.  : 

As  you  foresaw,  and  as  Jeff.  Davis  threatened,  the  enemy  is  now  in  the 
full  tide  of  execution  of  his  grand  plan  to  destroy  my  communications 
and  defeat  this  army.  His  infantry,  about  thirty  thousand  (30,000),  with 
Wheeler's  and  Roddy's  cavalry,  from  seven  to  ten  thousand  (7,000  to 
10,000),  are  now  in  the  neighborhood  of  Tuscumbia  and  Florence,  and 
the  water  being  low,  are  able  to  cross  at  will.  Forrest  seems  to  be  scat- 
tered from  Eastport  to  Jackson,  Paris,  and  the  lower  Tennessee,  and  Gen- 
eral Thomas  reports  the  capture  by  him  of  a  gunboat  and  five  trans- 
ports. General  Thomas  has  near  Athens  and  Pulaski,  Stanley's  corps, 
about  fifteen  thousand  (15,000)  strong,  and  Schofield's  corps,  ten  thousand 
(10,000),  en  route  by  rail,  and  has  at  least  twenty  to  twenty-five  thousand 
(20,000  to  25,000)  men,  with  new  regiments  and  conscripts  arriving  all 


MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,  ETC.  183 

the  time ;  also,  General  Rosecrans  promises  the  two  divisions  of  Smith 
and  Mower,  belonging  to  me,  but  I  doubt  if  they  can  reach  Tennessee  in 
less  than  ten  (10)  days.  If  I  were  to  let  go  Atlanta  and  North  Georgia, 
and  make  for  Hood,  he  would,  as  he  did  here,  retreat  to  the  southwest, 
leaving  his  militia,  now  assembling  at  Macon  and  Griffin,  to  occupy  our 
conquests,  and  the  work  of  last  summer  would  be  lost.  I  have  retained 
about  fifty  thousand  (50,000)  good  troops,  and  have  sent  back  full  twenty- 
five  thousand  (25,000),  and  have  instructed  General  Thomas  to  hold  de- 
fensively Nashville,  Chattanooga,  and  Decatur,  all'  fortified  and  provis- 
ioned for  a  long  siege.  I  will  destroy  all  the  railroads  of  Georgia,  and  do 
as  much  substantial  damage  as  is  possible,  reaching  the  seacoast  near  one 
of  the  points  hitherto  indicated,  trusting  that  Thomas,  with  his  present 
troops,  and  the  influx  of  new  regiments  promised,  will  be  able  in  a  few 
days  to  assume  the  offensive. 

Hood's  cavalry  may  do  a  good  deal  of  damage,  and  I  have  sent  Wilson 
back  with  all  dismounted  cavalry,  retaining  only  about  four  thousand 
five  hundred  (4,500).  This  is  the  best  I  can  do,  and  shall,  therefore, 
when  I  get  to  Atlanta  the  necessary  stores,  move  south  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 


CITY  POINT,  November  1,  1864 — 6  P.  M. 
Major- General  Sherman : 

Do  you  not  think  it  advisable,  now  that  Hood  has  gone  so  far  north,  to 
entirely  ruin  him  before  starting  on  your  proposed  campaign  ?  With 
Hood's  army  destroyed,  you  can  go  where  you  please  with  impunity.  I 
believed,  and  still  believe,  if  you  had  started  south  while  Hood  was  in  the 
neighborhood  of  you,  he  would  have  been  forced  to  go  after  you.  Now 
that  he  is  so  far  away,  he  might  look  upon  the  chase  as  useless,  and  he 
will  go  in  one  direction  while  you  are  pushing  the  other.  If  you  can  see 
the  chance  for  destroying  Hood's  army,  attend  to  that  first,  and  make 
your  other  move  secondary. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  KINGSTON,  GA.,  November  2,  1864. 
Lieutenant-General  U.  S.  Grant,  City  Point,  Va.  : 

If  I  turn  back,  the  whole  effect  of  my  campaign  will  be  lost.  By  my 
movements,  I  have  thrown  Beauregard  well  to  the  west,  and  Thomas  will 
have  ample  time  and  sufficient  troops  to  hold  him  until  reinforcements 
meet  him  from  Missouri  and  recruits.  We  have  now  ample  supplies  at 
Chattanooga  and  Atlanta  to  stand  a  month's  interruption  to  our  com- 
munications, and  I  do  n't  belive  the  Confederate  army  can  reach  our  lines, 
save  by  cavalry  raids,  and  Wilson  will  have  cavalry  enough  to  checkmate 


184  MARCH   TO   THE    NORTH,  ETC. 

that.     I  am  clearly  of  opinion  that  the  best  results  will  follow  me  in  my 
contemplated  movement  through  Georgia. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 


CITY  POINT,  VA.,  November  2,  1864—11.30  A.  M. 

Major-General  Sherman : 

Your  dispatch  of  9  A.  M.  yesterday  is  just  received.  I  dispatched  you 
the  same  date  advising  that  Hood's  army,  now  that  it  had  worked  so  far 
north,  ought  to  he-looked  upon  more  as  the  object.  With  the  force,  how- 
ever, you  have  left  with  General  Thomas,  he  must  be  able  to  take  care  of 
Hood,  and  destroy  him.  I  really  do  not  see  that  you  can  withdraw  from 
where  you  are,  to  follow  Hood,  without  giving  up  all  we  have  gained  m 
territory.  I  say,  then,  go  on  as  you  propose. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  KINGSTON,  GA.,  November  10,  1864. 
General  Thomas,  Nashville : 

Your  dispatch  of  5  p.  M.  is  received.  All  will  be  ready  to  start  from 
here  the  day  after  to-morrow.  Keep  me  well  advised.  I  think  you  will 
find  Hood  marching  off,  and  you  should  be  ready  to  follow  him.  Decatur, 
Tuscaloosa,  Columbus,  and  Selma  are  all  good  points  to  forage  and  feed 
an  army. 

Let  me  keep  Beauregard  busy,  and  the  people  of  the  South  will  realize 
his  inability  to  protect  them. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  KINGSTON,  GA.,  November  11,  1864. 
Major-General  Thomas,  Nashville,  Tenn.  : 

Dispatch  of  to-night  received.  All  right.  I  can  hardly  believe  Beau- 
regard  would  attempt  to  work  against  Nashville,  from  Corinth  as  a  base, 
at  this  stage  of  the  war,  but  all  information  seems  to  point  that  way.  If 
he  does,  you  will  whip  him  out  of  his  boots ;  but  I  rather  think  you  will 
find  commotion  in  his  camp  in  a  day  or  two.  Last  night  we  burned 
Rome,  and  in  two  more  will  burn  Atlanta,  and  he  must  discover  that  I 
am  not  retreating,  but,  on  the  contrary,  fighting  for  the  very  heart  of 
Georgia.  About  a  division  of  rebel  cavalry  made  its  appearance  this 
morning  south  of  the  Coosa  river,  opposite  Rome,  and  fired  on  the  rear- 
guard, as  it  withdrew.  Also,  two  days  ago,  some  of  Iverson's  cavalry — 
about  eight  hundred  (800) — approached  Atlanta  from  the  direction  of  De- 
catur, with  a  section  of  guns,  and  swept  round  toward  Whitehall,  and 
disappeared  in  the  direction  of  Rough  and  Ready.  These  also  seem  to 


MARCH   TO   THE   NORTH,    ETC.  185 

indicate  that  Beauregard  expected  us  to  retreat.  I  hear  of  about  fifteen 
hundred  (1,500)  infantry  down  at  Carroll  ton,  and  also  some  infantry  at 
Jonesboro,  but  what  numbers  I  can  not  estimate.  These  are  all  the  en- 
emy I  know  to  be  in  this  neighborhood,  though  a  rumor  is  that  Breckin- 
ridge  has  arrived  with  some  from  West  Virginia.  To-morrow  I  begin  the 
movement  laid  down  in  my  Special  Field  Order  No.  1 15,  and  shall  keep 
things  moving  thereafter.  By  to-morrow  morning  all  trains  will  be  at  or 
north  of  Kingston,  and  you  can  have  the  exclusive  use  of  all  the  rolling 
stock.  By  using  detachments  of  recruits  and  dismounted  cavalry  in  your 
fortifications,  you  will  have  Schofield  and  Stanley  and  A.  J.  Smith, 
strengthened  by  eight  or  ten  new  regiments  and  all  of  Wilson's  cavalry. 
You  can  safely  invite  Beauregard  across  the  Tennessee,  and  prevent  his 
«ver  returning.  I  still  believe,  however,  that  the  public  clamor  will  force 
him  to  turn,  and  follow  me ;  in  which  event,  you  should  cross  at  Decatur, 
and  move  directly  toward  Selma,  as  far  as  you  can  transport  supplies. 
The  probabilities  are  the  wires  will  be  broken  to-morrow,  and  that  all 
communication  will  cease  between  us ;  but  I  have  directed  the  main  wire 
to  be  left,  and  will  use  it  if  possible,  and  wish  you  to  do  the  same.  You 
may  act,  however,  on  the  certainty  that  I  sally  from  Atlanta  on  the  16th, 
with  about  sixty  thousand  (60,000)  men,  well  provisioned,  but  expecting  to 
live  liberally  on  the  country. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

THE    RESISTANCE    TO   GENERAL    HOOD'S   ADVANCE    FROM    THE    TEN- 
NESSEE  RIVER,   CULMINATING  IN   THE   BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN. 

THE  responsibility  of  repelling  General  Hood  was  now 
thrown  upon  General  Thomas,  and  the  most  stupendous  in- 
terests turned  upon  his  success.  Not  in  figure,  hut  in  fact,  the 
territory  gained  by  all  the  battles  in  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  and 
Georgia  was  in  jeopardy.  The  peril  was  not  such  as  is  in- 
evitable when  two  equal  armies  meet  in  battle,  but  such  as  is 
intertwined  with  the  contingencies  of  improvising  an  army 
against  a  bold  invasion.  It  is  true  that  General  Thomas  ex- 
pressed himself  hopefully  in  his  last  dispatch  to  General  Sher- 
man, but  his  assurance  was  based  upon  the  fact  that  General 
Smith's  forces  were  then  due  at  Nashville,  and  the  expectation 
that  his  cavalry  would  be  speedily  remounted,  and  that  the 
coming  of  the  promised  reinforcements  from  the  North  would 
not  be  delayed.  In  these  expectations  he  was  disappointed,, 
and  the  situation  in  Tennessee  was  most  unpromising  during 
the  month  of  November.  General  Hood's  army  was  stronger 
than  when,  under  General  Johnston,  in  May,  it  boldly  con- 
fronted a  hundred  thousand  men.  His  three  corps  of  infantry r 
under  Generals  Lee,  Cheatham,  and  Stewart,  comprised  from 
forty  to  forty-five  thousand  men,  and  his  cavalry  corps  from 
ten  to  fifteen  thousand,  under  Forrest,  one  of  the  boldest  gen- 
erals in  the  South.  Against  this  compact  army,  at  least  fifty 
thousand  strong,  General  Thomas  had  a  movable  army  of 
twenty-two  thousand  infantry  and  four  thousand  three  hun- 
dred cavalry.  He  had,  in  addition,  the  garrisons  at  Chatta- 
nooga, Bridgeport,  Stevenson,  Huntsville,  Decatur,  Murfrees- 
boro,  and  Nashville,  and  the  detachments  in  block-houses 
(186) 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,   ETC.  187 

on  the  railroads ;  but  it  was  not  considered  safe  to  withdraw 
the  troops  from  either  of  the  two  railroads  leading  from  Nash- 
ville to  the  Tennessee  river,  until  General  Hood  should  indi- 
cate his  line  of  advance.  General  Hood,  with  the  exception 
of  Forrest's  raid  in  "West  Tennessee,  confined  himself  to  oper- 
ations near  Florence,  during  the  first  half  of  the  month.  His 
main  reason  for  clinging  to  the  Tennessee  river  was  doubtless 
the  uncertain  attitude  of  General  Sherman  in  Georgia.  ,  He 
may  have  still  hoped  that  reinforcements  from  the  other  side 
of  the  Mississippi  might  join  him  as  previously  anticipated. 
But  though  refraining  from  positive  offense,  he  was  preparing 
for  it.  His  forces  which  crossed  the  Tennessee  river  on  the 
29th  of  October,  drove  back  General  Croxton  and  covered  the 
laying  of  a  pontoon  bridge.  Lee's  corps  soon  after  crossed  and 
intrenched,  having  cavalry  in  front.  November  4th,  General 
Croxton  was  driven  across  Shoal  creek,  but  the  enemy  ad- 
vanced no  farther.  General  Hatch,  with  his  division  of  cav- 
alry, joined  General  Croxton  on  the  line  of  Shoal  creek  on 
the  7th,  and  these  officers  then  watched  closely  and  reported 
the  movements  of  the  enemy.  "Wishing  to  ascertain  the  ene- 
my's strength  in  his  front,  General  Hatch  crossed  the  creek  on 
the  llth,  and  drove  back  the  enemy's  cavalry  upon  the  in- 
fantry, and  ascertained  that  there  was  a  large  force  on  the 
"Waynesboro  road.  The  next  day  telegraphic  communication 
between  General  Sherman  and  General  Thomas  was  severed ; 
and  as  soon  as  it  was  thus  known  that  General  Sherman  had 
started  on  his  great  expedition,  there  was  the  most  anxious 
watching  in  Hood's  front,  in  the  endeavor  to  ascertain  how 
the  "  march  to  the  sea  "  would  affect  the  situation  in  Tennes- 
see. The  alternative  to  General  Thomas  and  his  little  army 
was  the  defensive  in  Tennessee,  or  the  offensive  in  Alabama, 
accordingly  as  Hood  should  advance  or  retreat,  and  all  were 
eager  for  the  development  of  his  intentions.  Generals  Hatch 
and  Croxton  watched  closely  for  decisive  indications,  and 
although  the  high  stage  of  water  in  the  Tennessee  delayed  a 
general  advance,  it  was  soon  evident  that  such  a  movement 
was  meditated.  To  delay  Hood's  advance  as  much  as  pos- 
sible, General  Hatch  obstructed  the  roads  crossing  Shoal 
creek,  and  sent  rafts  down  the  swollen  river  to  break  his 


188  BATTLE    OF   FRANKLIN,   ETC. 

bridges.  Reports  were  current,  subsequently,  that  his  bridges 
did  part,  and  from  this  or  other  causes,  he  did  not  complete 
the  transfer  of  his  army  to  the  north  bank  until  the  19th, 
when  his  movement  was  completely  developed.  Colonel 
Coon,  commanding  General  Hatch's  right  brigade,  crossed 
Shoal  creek,  which  still  separated  the  opposing  cavalry,  had 
a  severe  conflict,  and  did  not  return  until  he  had  discovered 
the  advancing  infantry.  The  possibility  of  General  Hood  fol- 
lowing General  Sherman  was  now  at  an  end. 

Up  to  this  time  General  Thomas  had  hoped  that  the  enemy 
would  be  so  delayed,  that  he  could  concentrate  his  forces  to 
give  battle  south  of  Duck  river,  but  this  was  now  plainly  im- 
possible. General  Smith  had  not  arrived,  new  regiments  had 
not  come  as  fast  as  old  ones  had  been  discharged  upon  expira- 
tion of  terms  of  service,  and  the  dismounted  cavalry  had  made 
but  little  headway  in  securing  horses,  arms,  and  accouterments. 
His  only  resource  then  was  to  retire  slowly,  and  delay  the 
enemy's  advance,  to  gain  time  for  reinforcements  to  arrive 
and  concentrate.  It  was  hoped  that  the  state  of  the  roads 
would  prevent  the  advance  of  infantry,  but  Hood  appreciated 
the  effect  of  delay,  and  pressed  forward.  He  advanced  on  the 
19th,  on  the  "Waynesboro  and  Butter  Creek  roads,  with  his 
cavalry  mainly  on  his  left.  The  direction  of  his  advance  indi- 
cated that  he  would  strike  Columbia,  rather  than  Pulaski,  and 
General  Thomas  authorized  General  Schofield  to  move  to  the 
former  place,  if  Hood's  approach  to  that  point  should  be 
developed.  General  Hatch  concentrated  his  division  at  Lex- 
ington, and  on  the  21st,  withdrew  to  Lawrenceburg,  where  he 
was  attacked  the  following  morning. 

A  severe  fight  continued  through  the  day,  but  General  Hatch 
held  the  position  against  a  heavy  force  of  cavalry,  with  nine 
pieces  of  artillery  in  action.  The  same  day,  General  Schofield 
commenced  the  removal  of  the  public  property  from  Pulaski, 
preparatory  to  falling  back  to  Columbia,  and  moved  with  the 
divisions  of  Generals  Cox  and  Wagner  to  Lynnville,  the  latter 
covering  the  passage  of  the  trains.  The  next  day  General  Cox 
advanced  ten  miles  toward  Columbia,  and  General  Stanley,  with 
the  divisions  of  Generals  Wood  and  Kimball,  reached  Lynnville. 
Colonel  Capron  was  before  the  enemy  on  the  Mount  Pleasant 


BATTLE   OF   FKANKLIN,    ETC.  189 

road,  and  Generals  Hatch  and  Croxton  covered  the  movement 
from  Pulaski,  the  latter  having  a  severe  fight  at  the  junction 
of  the  roads  to  Pulaski  and  Campbellsville,  maintaining  his  po- 
sition and  retiring  at  leisure  by  night  to  Campbellsville. 

In  the  meantime,  General  Thomas  made  dispositions  looking 
to  the  defense  of  the  line  of  Duck  river,  and  the  Nashville  and 
Chattanooga  railroad.  He  ordered  the  two  brigades  of  Gen- 
eral Huger's  division  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  to  move  from 
Johnson ville — one  by  rail  through  Nashville  to  Columbia,  and 
the  other  by  road  through  "Waverly — to  occupy  the  crossings 
of  Duck  river  at  Williamsport,  Gordon's  ferry,  and  Centerville. 
General  Granger  was  instructed  to  withdraw  his  command  from 
Decatur,  Athens,  and  Huntsville,  and  reinforce  the  garrisons 
of  Stevenson  and  Murfreesboro,  to  protect  the  Nashville  and 
Chattanooga  railroad.  He  sent  Colonel  Yon  Schrader,  his 
inspector-general,  to  Chattanooga  to  assist  in  the  organization 
of  the  detached  troops  belonging  to  General  Sherman's  army, 
and  another  officer — Lieutenant  M.  J.  Kelley — to  Paducah,  to 
hasten  the  coming  of  General  Smith.  His  engineers  were  busy 
with  the  construction  of  fortifications  at  various  points,  espe- 
cially at  Nashville,  while  effort  was  made  to  provide  pontoon 
trains  in  room  of  those  which  had  gone  to  Savannah. 

General  Hood's  rapid  advance  from  Florence  had  been  made 
with  the  hope  of  cutting  off  General  Schofield  from  Columbia, 
and  barely  failed  in  this  object,  as  the  national  troops  gained 
the  place  by  a  night  march.  General  Stanley,  having  been  in  - 
formed  after  midnight  that  Colonel  Capron  had  been  drivea 
from  Mount  Pleasant  by  an  infantry  force,  roused  his  corps 
and  hastened  toward  Columbia,  twenty-one  miles  distant.  Gen- 
eral Cox  started  at  the  same  hour,  and  reached  Columbia  in 
time  to  save  Capron  from  defeat  and  the  town  from  capture. 
"When  within  three  miles  of  Columbia,  General  Cox  crossed 
to  the  Mount  Pleasant  road  and  intercepted  the  enemy's  forces, 
which  were  pressing  Capron  back  upon  the  town.  As  the  di- 
visions of  the  Fourth  Corps  arrived,  they  formed  in  line  of  bat- 
tle south  of  Duck  river  and  intrenched.  General  Hatch  was 
attacked  at  Campbellsville  by  cavalry  supported  by  infantry. 
Colonel  "Wells,  commanding  first  brigade,  at  first  repulsed  the 
enemy,  but  subsequently  the  whole  command  was  compelled 


190  BATTLE    OF   FKANKLIN,   ETC. 

to  retire  to  Lynnville ;  there  the  fighting  was  continued  until 
.after  dark,  when  General  Hatch  withdrew  to  Columbia. 

With  a  view  to  check  the  enemy  and  hold  the  place,  heavy 
works  were  thrown  up  hefore  Columbia,  and  the  cavalry,  Gen- 
eral Wilson  commanding  in  person,  was  disposed  to  watch 
against  turning  movements  up  and  down  the  river.  Hatch's 
division  and  Croxton's  brigade  were  stationed  on  the  Shelby  - 
ville  road,  six  miles  east  of  Columbia,  and  Capron's  brigade  at 
Rally  Hill,  on  the  Lewisburg  turnpike.  Colonel  Stewart,  with 
three  regiments  from  Hatch's  division,  was  sent  to  the  right  to 
the  fords  between  Columbia  and  Williamsport ;  Capron's  bri- 
gade, and  the  Eighth  Iowa  and  Seventh  Ohio  Ce  valry  regiments 
were  here  formed  into  a  provisional  division  under  command 
of  General  R.  W.  Johnson.  » 

During  the  24th  and  25th,  the  enemy  skirmished  before  Co- 
lumbia, but  showed  nothing  but  dismounted  cavalry,  until  the 
26th,  when  his  infantry  appeared,  and  during  that  day  and  the 
next  he  pressed  the  lines,  but  made  no  assault.  General  Scho- 
field constructed  an  interior  line  of  works,  but  these  were  soon 
regarded  as  untenable,  as  the  enemy  manifested  an  intention 
to  pass  round  the  position.  An  effort  was  made  to  cross  to  the 
north  bank  the  night  of  the  26th,  but  failed  on  account  of  a 
severe  storm  and  entire  darkness.  The  night  following,  the 
movement  was  accomplished,  and  General  Schofield  left  Gen- 
eral Ruger  to  hold  the  crossing  at  the  -railroad  bridge ;  placed 
General  Cox's  division  before  the  town,  and  directed  General 
Stanley  to  station  his  corps  on  the  Franklin  turnpike,  in  read- 
iness to  meet  the  enemy  should  he  attempt  to  cross  near  Co- 
lumbia. These  dispositions  were  made  by  General  Schofield 
in  hope  that  he  could  hold  the  line  of  Duck  river,  until 
reinforcements  should  arrive ;  but  the  promised  reinforce- 
ments had  not  reached  Nashville.  General  Thomas  had  re- 
ceived twelve  thousand  raw  troops,  and  had  sent  North, 
either  on  final  discharge  or  to  vote,  fifteen  thousand  veterans. 
General  Smith  had  not  come,  and  only  one  thousand  cavalry 
had  found  horses  and  the  front.  General  Thomas  had  ob- 
tained permission  to  call  upon  the  governors  of  the  Western 
States  for  troops,  but  was  cautioned  to  use  such  troops  spar- 
ingly. 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC.  191 

The  28th  was  passed  in  quietness,  at  Columbia,  though 
there  were  palpable  indications  that  quietness  there  meant  ac- 
tivity in  another  quarter.  At  noon  the  enemy's  cavalry  ap- 
peared at  various  fords,  between  Columbia  and  the  Lewisburg 
turnpike,  in  such  force  as  to  indicate  plainly  the  purpose  to 
cross.  General  Hood's  cavalry  'was  especially  massed  at 
Huey's  Mills,  eight  miles  above  Columbia,  and  having  there 
driven  in  General  Wilson's  pickets,  began  to  pass  over  the 
river.  At  2.10  P.  M.  General  Wilson  notified  General  Scho- 
field of  the  enemy's  movements,  and  informed  him  that  he 
would  concentrate  his  cavalry  at  Hunt's  creek,  on  the  Lewis- 
burg  turnpike,  expressing  the  belief  that  the  enemy  would 
swing  in  between  them  and  strike  the  road  to  Franklin,  at 
Spring  Hill. 

General  Wilson's  cavalry  detachments,  at  the  various  fords, 
held  their  respective  positions  as  long  as  possible,  but  all  were 
finally  driven  back,  and  it  was  then  evident  that  three  divisions 
of  cavalry — Chalmers',  Buford's,  and  Jackson's — had  crossed 
Duck  river.  By  7  P.  M.  General  Wilson  had  concentrated  his 
command,  as  far  as  practicable,  at  Hart's  Cross-roads.  Major 
Young,  of  the  Fifth  Iowa  Cavalry,  commanding  detachments, 
was  intercepted,  but  cut  his  way  through  the  enemy's  lines 
with  trifling  loss.  During  the  night  General  Wilson  ascer- 
tained that  General  Forrest  was  moving  toward  Franklin, 
and  also  that  General  Hood's  infantry  forces  were  expected  to 
cross  before  morning.  In  view  of  the  palpable  peril,  he  ad- 
vised General  Schofield  to  withdraw  to  Franklin,  and  sug- 
gested that  his  command  should  be  at  Spring  Hill  by  10  A.  M. 
the  next  day.  When  General  Thomas  was  informed  of  the 
probable  state  of  things  at  Columbia,  he  directed  General 
Schofield  to  withdraw  to  Franklin,  as  soon  as  he  should  gain 
certain  knowledge  of  the  reported  movements  of  the  enemy. 
And  very  soon  afterward,  at  3.30  A.  M.  on  the  29th,  he  directed 
him  to  withdraw  from  Columbia,  as  by  this  time  he  was  con- 
vinced that  General  Hood  had  turned  General  Schofield's 
position. 

The  situation  at  Columbia  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  and 
during  that  day,  was  exceedingly  critical.  General  Hood's 
infantry  forces  were  crossing  the  river  during  all  the  early 


192  BATTLE   OF   FKANKLIN,  ETC. 

hours,  at  Huey's  Mills,  on  a  road  leading  directly  to  Spring 
Hill ;  his  cavalry  forces  had  very  early  cut  off  all  communica- 
tion between  Generals  Schofield  and  Wilson,  and  were  press- 
ing the  latter  back  upon  Franklin,  on  the  Levvisburg  turn- 
pike, General  Wilson  having  chosen  this  line  of  retreat  as 
the  one  upon  which  he  could  best  resist  General  Forrest,  and 
cover  the  retirement  of  the  infantry  on  the  direct  road  from 
Columbia  to  Franklin. 

To  develop  the  facts  fully,  before  withdrawing  altogether 
from  Columbia,  General  Schofield  directed  General  Wood  to 
send  a  brigade  up  the  river  to  watch  the  enemy ;  ordered  Gen- 
eral Stanley  to  move  with  two  of  his  divisions  to  Spring  Hill, 
to  hold  that  point  and  cover  the  trains  and  spare  artillery ;  left 
General  Cox  to  guard  the  crossing  at  Columbia,  and  ordered 
Ruger's  division  to  take  position  on  the  turnpike,  in  rear  of 
Rutherford's  creek,  leaving  one  regiment  to  hold  the  ford  at 
Columbia,  near  the  railroad  bridge — this  bridge  having  been 
partially  destroyed  and  all  the  others  entirely. 

General  Wood  sent  Post's  brigade  early,  to  reconnoiter  up 
the  river;  and  at  8  A.  M.  General  Stanley  moved  toward 
Spring  Hill  with  Wagner's  and  Kimball's  divisions.  Before 
reaching  Rutherford's  creek,  four  miles  distant,  he  learned 
that  the  enemy  was  crossing  infantry  and  trains  above  Colum- 
bia, and  was  moving  to  the  north  on  a  converging  road  which 
touched  General  Schofield's  line  of  retreat  at  Spring  Hill. 
Apprehending  that  the  forces  that  Colonel  Post  reported  to  be 
crossing  the  river  might  make  a  flank  attack  upon  the  troops 
between  Duck  river  and  Rutherford's  creek,  he  halted  Kim- 
ball's  division  and  formed  it  facing  east,  and  then  proceeded 
to  Spring  Hill  with  Wagner's  division.  When  within  two 
miles  of  the  place,  at  11.30  A.  M.,  he  was  informed  that  the 
enemy's  cavalry  was  approaching  from  the  direction  of  Rally 
Hill.  The  noise  of  firing  east  of  the  village  immediately 
called  the  division  to  rapid  motion,  and  the  town  was  gained 
in  time  to  meet  the  enemy,  who  was  driving  back  a  small  force 
of  national  toops,  composed  of  infantry  and  cavalry.  Colonel 
Opdycke  immediately  deployed  his  brigade  and  drove  back 
the  enemy's  cavalry,  when  General  Stanley  threw  forward  the 
division  to  hold  the  town  and  protect  the  trains.  Opdycke's 


BATTLE   OF   FKANKLLN",   ETC.  193 

and  Lane's  brigades  were  deployed  to  cover  such,  space  as 
served  to  park  the  wagons,  and  Bradley 's  was  advanced  to 
hold  a  wooded  knoll  nearly  a  mile  to  the  east,  which  com- 
manded the  approaches  from  that  direction. 

At  the  time  these  dispositions  were  made,  it  was  not  known 
that  heavy  forces  of  infantry  were  near ;  but  this  fact  was  soon 
after  developed  by  a  fierce  assault  upon  General  Bradley.  The 
nature  of  the  attack,  confirming  the  first  reports  of  the  ad- 
vance of  the  Confederate  army  to  the  east  of  Columbia,  gave 
demonstration  of  the  greatest  peril,  not  only  to  General  Stan- 
ley, but  to  the  four  divisions  behind  him.  General  Hood's 
columns  had  now  passed  General  Schofield's  left  flank,  and 
were  enveloping  a  single  division,  twelve  miles  in  his  rear,  or 
twelve  miles  in  advanc'e,  when  he  should  face  to  the  north  to 
retreat. 

When  the  enemy's  infantry  attacked  General  Bradley  from 
the  east,  his  cavalry  on  the  west  of  the  town  threatened  the 
railroad  station,  and  then  fell  upon  a  small  train,  composed  of 
some  baggage-wagons,  at  Thompson's  Station,  three  miles  north. 
About  the  same  time,  General  Stanley  received  a  dispatch 
from  General  Schofield,  confirming  the  reports  that  had  first 
indicated  the  strategy  of  General  Hood,  and  led  him  to  fear 
that  a  heavy  force  was  enveloping  his  position.  He  could  not 
therefore  reinforce  General  Bradley,  lest  he  should  thereby 
expose  his  trains  to  capture  or  destruction. 

General  Bradley  repulsed  two  fierce  attacks,  but  in  the  third 
his  right  flank  was  overlapped  by  the  enemy's  line,  and  he  was 
compelled  to  fall  back  to  the  town,  where  his  shattered  bri- 
gade was  rallied  and  reformed.  The  enemy  followed,  but  fell 
under  the  fire  of  eight  pieces  of  artillery,  at  good  range  for 
spherical  case  shot,  and  was  also  taken  in  flank  by  a  section 
on  the  turnpike,  south  of  the  town.  A  portion  of  the  attack- 
ing troops  then  fled  to  the  rear,  and  other  portions  sought 
cover  in  a  ravine  between  the  opposing  lines.  General  Stan- 
ley reported  Bradley's  loss  at  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  killed 
and  wounded,  and  the  enemy's  at  five  hundred.  General 
Bradley  received  a  severe  wound  while  encouraging  his  men 

VOL.  II — 13 


194  BATTLE   OP   FRANKLIN,  ETC. 

to  resist  the  last  attack,  and  the  command  of  the  brigade 
passed  to  Colonel  Conrad. 

As  darkness  fell,  the  enemy's  lines  were  extended  until  a 
corps  of  infantry  was  in  order  of  battle  facing  the  Franklin  road. 
Two  other  corps  were  near  a  little  later,  one  deployed  also,  and 
Forrest's  troopers  were  on  the  main  road,  both  north  and 
south  of  Spring  Hill.  It  seemed  hardly  possible  in  this  post- 
ure of  affairs  that  General  Schofield's  forces  and  trains  could 
elude  this  involution  by  General  Hood's  army,  and  yet  this 
result  was  achieved  without  a  serious  contest. 

During  the  day,  the  enemy  covered  his  movement  past 
General  Schofield's  left  to  his  rear  by  earnest  efforts,  as  Gen- 
eral Schofield  believed,  to  force  a  crossing  and  lay  a  pontoon 
bridge  at  Columbia,  that  he  might  thus  secure  a  passage  for 
his  artillery,  which  was  impracticable  at  Huey's  Mills.  His 
repeated  attacks  were  all  repulsed  by  General  Cox,  and  at  3 
p.  M.  General  Schofield  became  satisfied  that  the  enemy  would 
not  attack  on  Duck  river,  but  was  moving  two  corps  directly 
to  Spring  Hill.  He  then  gave  orders  for  the  withdrawal  of  all 
the  troops  when  darkness  would  cover  the  movement,  and 
with  General  Ruger's  division  hastened  forward  to  open  com- 
munications with  General  Stanley.  At  dark,  he  brushed  away 
the  enemy's  cavalry  from  the  road,  three  miles  south  of  Stan- 
ley, and  joined  him  at  7  P.  M.  Whittaker's  brigade  of  Kim- 
ball's  division  followed  Ruger's  closely  from  Rutherford's 
creek,  and  upon  arrival  was  posted  parallel  to  the  turnpike, 
where  the  enemy's  left  rested  within  eight  hundred  yards  of 
the  road,  to  cover  the  passage  of  the  troops  still  in  the  rear. 
General  Schofield,  leaving  the  management  of  the  march  and 
the  safety  of  the  trains  to  General  Stanley,  then  moved  again 
with  Ruger's  division  to  clear  the  road  to  Franklin.  As  he 
approached  Thompson's  Station,  the  enemy's  cavalry  disap- 
peared, and  then  the  road  was  open  from  Columbia  to  Frank- 
lin, though  an  army  of  at  least  fifty  thousand  men  was  in 
closest  proximity  to  it,  and  along  its  front  four  divisions  and 
an  immense  train  were  at  rest  or  in  motion,  and  yet  there  was 
only  slight  skirmishing  here  and  there,  and  occasional  picket- 
firing.  There  was  momentary  expectation  that  this  great 
army  would  take  a  step  forward,  and  press  troops,  artillery,  and 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC.  195 

trains  from  the  road  in  confusion  and  rout ;  but  still  the  move- 
ment went  on  without  interruption  by  the  enemy. 

Having  cleared  the  road  at  Thompson's  Station,  General 
Schofield  returned  to  Spring  Hill  to  make  arrangements  and 
dispositions  to  avert  his  extreme  peril.  He  did  not  anticipate 
the  possibility  of  his  getting  his  army  out  of  the  reach  of  the 
enemy  that  night,  and  feared  that  he  would  be  forced  to  fight 
a  general  battle  the  next  clay,  or  lose  his  wagon  train.  In  the 
emergency  he  had  dispatched  a  staff  officer  to  Franklin  to 
bring  forward  the  command  of  General  A.  J.  Smith,  which  he 
supposed  had  reached  Franklin. 

At  11  p.  M.  General  Thomas,  believing  that  General  Scho- 
field had,  in  obedience  to  his  order  of  3.30  A.  M.,  withdrawn 
from  Columbia  earlier  in  the  day,  telegraphed  to  him  at  Frank- 
lin to  withdraw  from  that  place  also,  should  the  enemy  attempt 
to  get  on  his  flank  with  infantry.  As  General  Smith's  troops 
had  not  yet  arrived  at  Nashville,  he  considered  it  necessary, 
should  the  enemy  advance  quickly  upon  General  Schofield,  to 
concentrate  his  forces  at  Nashville. 

General  Cox  left  Columbia  at  7  P.  M.,  followed  by  General 
Wood,  and  the  latter  by  General  Kimball.  There  was  some 
delay  at  Rutherford's  creek,  as  the  bridge  was  inadequate  for 
the 'emergency,  but  nevertheless  the  divisions,  one  after  an- 
other, arrived  at  Spring  Hill — the  foremost  of  the  three  at  11 
p.  M.  The  enemy's  pickets  fired  into  the  column  frequently, 
but  when  they  did  not  come  upon  the  road,  the  national  troops 
gave  no  response.  The  enemy  was  so  close  to  the  road,  that 
when  a  column  was  not  moving  upon  it,  it  was  difficult  for  a 
single  horseman  to  pass. 

The  danger  did  not  end  with  the  arrival  of  the  last  division 
at  Spring  Hill.  It  was  1  A.  M.  before  a  train  of  eight  hundred 
wagons,  including  artillery  and  ambulances,  could  move  to- 
ward Franklin,  in  rear  of  Cox's  division,  as  at  starting  the 
wagons  had  to  pass  singly  over  a  bridge.  This  caused  delay, 
and  consequently  peril,  as  an  attack  was  inevitable,  unless  the 
train  and  troops  could  be  put  on  the  road  and  in  motion  be- 
fore daylight.  General  Stanley  was  advised  to  burn  at  least  a 
portion  of  the  wagons,  to  avoid  an  attack,  but  he  determined 
to  save  all,  if  practicable.  At  3  A.  M.  an  attack  upon  the  head 


196  BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC. 

of  the  train,  north  of  Thompson's,  was  reported,  and  all 
wagons  on  the  road  were  stopped  until  General  Kimball  could 
rush  forward  to  clear  the  road,  and  General  Wood  deploy  his 
division  on  the  east  of  the  road.  The  attack  was  repulsed  by 
Major  Steele,  with  stragglers  that  he  had  gathered  together, 
and  then  the  train,  bereft  of  ten  wagons  burned  by  the  enemy, 
moved  on,  with  Wood's  division  on  the  right  and  Wagner's 
in  the  rear.  At  5  A.  M.  the  last  wagon  crossed  the  bridge,  and 
then  all  was  in  motion.  The  enemy's  cavalry  was  on  the  hills 
to  the  right  for  awhile,  and  made  one  or  two  dashes,  but  these 
were  easily  repulsed  by  Wood's  skirmishers,  with  the  help,  at 
one  time,  of  a  section  of  Canby's  battery.  Colonel  Opdycke's 
brigade  formed  the  rear-guard,  and  though  skirmishing 
with  the  pursuing  forces  of  the  enemy,  kept  them  so  well  in 
check  as  to  save  the  weary  and  lame  from  capture.  Earely 
has  an  army  escaped  so  easily  from  a  peril  so  threatening.  It 
has  been  accepted  as  true  that  General  Hood  ordered  one  corps 
general  and  then  another  to  attack  the  national  troops  when 
passing  so  near  the  front  of  his  army,  at  Spring  Hill;  but 
these  generals  disobeyed  the  orders,  so  plainly  imperative  from 
the  situation  itself,  as  well  as  from  the  voice  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief.  From  whatever  cause  the  failure  resulted, 
the  opportunity  of  the  campaign  was  lost  to  the  Confederate 
army. 

General  Schofield,  with  the  head  of  his  column,  reached 
Franklin  before  daylight,  and  he  immediately  made  prepara- 
tion to  pass  the  Harpeth  river,  as  he  had  been  ordered  by 
General  Thomas  to  fall  behind  this  stream.  The  railroad 
bridge  was  fitted  as  rapidly  as  possible  for  the  passage  of 
wagons,  and  a  foot-bridge  was  constructed,  which  also  proved 
adequate  for  them.  General  Schofield's  aim  was  to  get  his 
train  and  artillery  over  the  river  before  the  enemy  could  at- 
tack him,  but  he  nevertheless  instructed  General  Cox  to  put 
the  troops  in  line  around  the  town,  as  the  several  divisions 
should  arrive.  The  Twenty -third  Corps  formed  the  left  and 
center — Cox's  division  on  the  left  with  its  left  flank  on  the 
river,  Euger's  on  its  right,  and  Kimball's  completing  the  cir- 
cuit to  the  river  on  the  right.  Wood's  division  crossed  to  the 
north  bank  to  be  directed  to  the  support  of  either  flank  in  the 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,    ETC.  197 

event  of  a  turning  movement,  and  "Wagner's  was  left  in  front 
to  check  the  enemy,  should  he  form  his  army  to  attack.  Colonel 
Opdycke  reached  the  heights  two  miles  south  of  the  town  at 
noon,  and  was  ordered  to  halt  to  ohserve  the  enemy.  Crox- 
ton's  brigade  of  cavalry  was  pushed  hack  by  infantry  on  the 
Lewisburg  turnpike,  and  at  1  p.  M.  Colonel  Opdycke  re- 
ported heavy  columns  of  infantry  advancing  on  the  Columbia 
and  Lewisburg  roads,  when  the  division  was  withdrawn  to 
the  more  immediate  front  of  the  army  on  the  Columbia  road. 
Colonel  Opdycke,  at  his  own  notion,  came  inside  the  main  line, 
and  halted  his  brigade  on  the  Columbia  road  in  rear  of  the 
junction  of  the  right  a*id  left  flanks  of  Cox's  and  Ruger's  di- 
visions of  the  Twenty-third  Corps. 

The  line  as  formed,  was  about  one  mile  and  a  half  long, 
inclosing  the  town,  except  on  the  north  where  the  Harpeth 
river  was  the  boundary,  with  its  flanks  touching  the  river. 
The  line  rested  on  a  slight  elevation,  or  series  of  low  hills, 
which  encompassed  the  town.  The  troops  threw  up  breast- 
works, and  a  slight  abatis  was  also  constructed  in  places. 
The  artillery  of  the  Twenty -third  Corps  was  on  the  north  side 
of  the  river,  and  a  portion  of  it  placed  in  Fort  Granger — a 
fortification  previously  constructed  so  as  to  command  the  rail- 
road, which  leaves  the  town  near  the  river,  and  runs  in  paral- 
lelism with  it  for  some  distance.  The  batteries  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  were  held  on  the  south  side,  some  of  them  having  been 
placed  on  the  line  and  others  in  reserve.  The  Sixth  Ohio  Light 
Artillery  and  the  First  Kentucky  battery  were  in  position 
on  the  right  and  left  of  the  Columbia  road,  before  the  bat- 
tle opened.  Battery  "  M,"  Fourth  United  States  Artillery, 
and  battery  "  G,"  First  Ohio  Light  Artillery,  were  placed 
with  the  left  brigade  of  the  Twenty -third  Corps,  and  Bridge's 
battery,  Illinois  Light  Artillery,  was  posted  in  the  center  of 
Strickland's  brigade  of  Ruger's  division.  The  position  was  a 
good  one  for  defense,  and  the  undulations  of  the  ground  in 
front  exposed  the  enemy  in  approaching.  The  key-point  was 
Carter's  Hill  on  the  Columbia  road,  and  was  opposite  the  cen- 
ter of  General  Hood's  army,  which  was  advancing  on  the 
Lewisburg,  Columbia,  and  Carter's  Creek  turnpikes. 

General  Croxton  resisted  the  enemy's  infantry  on  the  Lewis- 


198  BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,   ETC. 

burg  road  until  2  p.  M.,  when,  having  learned  that  Forrest  was 
moving  to  his  left,  as  if  to  cross  at  Hughes'  ferry,  he  crossed 
at  McGarock's  ford.  He  had  hardly  gained  the  north  bank 
before  it  was  reported  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  were  endeavor- 
ing to  cross  at  several  points  above  Franklin.  General  Wil- 
son now  threw  his  whole  force  before  General  Forrest,  and 
held  him  in  check  during  the  day  and  following  night,  in 
some  cases  driving  back  detachments  after  they  had  succeeded 
in  crossing  the  river.  Had  General  Forrest  succeeded  in 
crossing  with  his  whole  force,  he  could  have  caused  a  heavy 
detachment  offerees  from  the  little  army  to  protect  the  trains 
already  in  motion  toward  Nashville,  in  anticipation  of  the 
withdrawal  of  the  army  from  Franklin  at  6  P.  M.,  should  Gen- 
eral Hood  make  no  attack. 

At  the  time  that  General  Croxton  was  forced  to  cross  the 
river,  General  Hood's  infantry  began  to  appear  in  great  force 
in  front  of  Wagner's  two  brigades,  but  it  was  not  believed  by 
the  ranking  generals  of  the  national  army,  until  4  P.  M.,  that  he 
would  attempt  to  carry  the  position  by  assault.  But  at  this 
hour  his  army  emerged  from  the  woods,  in  splendid  array, 
heavily  massed  on  the  Columbia  road,  two  corps  in  front  and 
one  in  reserve,  and  soon  brushed  away  the  two  brigades  of 
Wagner's  division,  posted  in  extreme  exposure  on  the  plain, 
opposite  the  massive  center  of  the  Confederate  army.  Gen- 
eral Wagner  had  been  instructed  to  check  the  enemy  with 
these  brigades,  without  involving  them  in  an  engagement  with 
superior  forces,  but  had,  notwithstanding,  directed  their  com- 
manders, Colonels  Conrad  and  Lane,  to  hold  their  position  as 
long  as  possible.  Conscious  of  their  extreme  peril  they  threw 
up  barricades,  and  when  General  Hood  finally  advanced 
against  them  with  his  main  lines,  uncovered  by  skirmishers, 
their  effort  to  check  him  precipitated  a  conflict  so  unequal  as 
to  have  been  hopeless  from  the  first.  When  broken  by  the 
attack  of  an  army,  they  fell  back  in  great  haste  and  disorder, 
arid  formed  a  shield-  for  the  enemy  following  upon  their  steps. 
The  veteran  troops  mainly  succeeded  in  reaching  the  main 
line  of  the  national  army,  but  a  large  portion  of  the  raw 
troops  were  captured.  The  pursued  and  the  pursuers  broke 
through  the  intrenched  line  in  company,  carrying  away  por- 


BATTLE   OF   FKANKLIN,  ETC.  199 

tions  of  Reilley's  brigade,  on  the  right  of  General  Cox's  divis- 
ion, and  Strickland's,  on  the  left  of  General  Ruger's.  And 
thus,  without  conflict  on  the  immediate  front  of  the  national 
army  or  on  the  parapet,  General  Hood  gained  a  lodgment  at 
the  key-point  of  the  position,  and  commanded  the  direct  ap- 
proach to  the  bridges.  He  had  gained  this  advantage,  almost 
without  firing  a  shot,  after  the  rout  of  Conrad  and  Lane,  and 
without  receiving  one,  except  that  a  portion  of  the  troops  of  the 
brigade  of  the  latter,  having  loaded  guns,  wheeled  and  fired 
as  they  crossed  the  intrenchments.  Such  an  advantage,  to  an 
army  of  more  than  double  the  strength  of  the  divisions 
holding  the  position,  according  to  the  precedents  of  war,  was 
decisive  of  complete  victory.  But  in  this  case  it  was  not, 
though  at  first  it  seemed  to  be  entirely  so.  The  enemy's  cen- 
ter, made  strong  to  thrust  itself  through  the  national  line, 
had  gained  its  immediate  objective,  and  commenced  at  once 
to  use  two  captured  batteries  in  enfilading  the  national  line, 
right  and  left,  to  double  each  fraction  upon  the  flanks,  and 
grasp  the  bridges  between  them.  Two  of  the  three  brigades  of 
Wagner's  division,  the  only  troops  south  of  the  river  not  in 
the  main  line,  were  so  shattered  that  they  could  not  be  rallied 
for  the  emergency,  and  every  moment  of  delay  in  attacking 
the  enemy's  forces  that  had  gained  the  center,  permitted  their 
reinforcement  from  his  rear  lines.  The  teams  from  the  cap- 
tured batteries  galloped  to  the  rear,  and  intensified  the  im- 
pression that  the  disaster  was  fatal.  Conrad's  brigade  had 
entered  the  intrenchments  near  the  Columbia  road,  and  on  the 
right  of  this  road  the  enemy  gained  at  the  first  dash  three  or 
four  hundred  yards  of  the  line.  Lane's  brigade  had  crossed 
the  parapet  several  hundred  yards  to  the  right,  without  dis- 
turbing the  troops  at  that  point,  and  its  volley  had  a  marked 
effect  upon  the  enemy.  Toward  the  breach,  the  enemy's 
heavy  central  lines  began  at  once  to  press,  and  to  it  his  lateral 
lines  were  turned,  in  seemingly  overwhelming  convergence. 
To  General  Hood,  the  advantage  so  easily  gained,  promised 
the  capture  or  destruction  of  the  national  army,  and  he  and 
his  army  were  inspired  to  quickest  action  to  maintain  and 
utilize  it  for  this  grand  achievement.  And  he  certainly  could 
have  maintained  his  hold  of  the  national  line,  and  used  it  for 


200  BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,   ETC. 

extreme  success,  had  time  been  given  him  to  thrust  into  the 
breach  his  rapidly-advancing  and  massive  rear  lines ;  and  as 
it  was,  he  began  to  gain  ground  right  and  left  from  the  Co- 
lumbia road. 

When  General  Stanley  first  heard  the  noise  of  battle,  he 
was  with  General  Schofield,  at  his  headquarters  on  the  north 
bank  of  the  river,  a  fifteen  minutes'  ride  from  Carter's  Hill, 
and  was  entertaining  the  conviction,  from  the  strength  of  the 
position  and  the  former  course  of  the  enemy,  that  an  assault 
was  entirely  improbable.  But  as  soon  as  an  attack  was  indi- 
cated to  him  and  others,  in  their  distant  view,  he  rode  rapidly 
to  his  troops,  and  reached  the  left  of  Opdycke's  brigade  to  find 
that  a  disaster,  seemingly  prophetic  of  the  overthrow  of  the 
army,  had  came  with  the  first  onset  of  the  enemy.  In  quick 
provision  for  the  emergency,  he  approached  this  one  reserve 
brigade,  to  order  it  to  charge  the  enemy  in  the  breach ;  but 
seeing  its  gallant  commander  in  front  of  its  center  leading  it 
forward,  he  gave  no  orders,  for  none  were  needed,  and  taking 
position  on  the  left  of  the  line,  the  corps  and  brigade  com- 
manders, with  common  purpose  to  hurl  back  the  enemy  and 
restore  the  continuity  of  the  line,  cheered  as  they  led  this 
heroic  brigade.  When  Colonel  Opdycke  had  first  seen  the 
enemy  within  the  intrenchments,  he  turned  to  his  men  from 
the  front  of  the  center  of  his  brigade,  to  find  they  had  already 
fixed  bayonets  for  the  encounter,  which  they  plainly  foresaw 
would  be  desperate  and  decisive ;  for  they  were  veterans  who 
had  charged  the  enemy  on  other  fields,  and  yet  they  had  never 
been  called  by  orders,  soldierly  instincts,  or  patriotism  to  such 
a  conflict  as  was  now  plainly  before  them.  Their  commander 
saw,  in  this  unbidden  act  of  preparation,  and  in  their  eyes  and 
attitude,  the  response  to  his  own  purpose,  and  his  ringing 
order,  "  First  brigade  forward  to  the  lines,"  was  in  harmony 
with  the  stern  will  of  every  officer  and  man  of  that  brigade. 
And  when  he  dashed  on  the  breach,  he  gave  expression  to  the 
courage  and  purpose  of  every  man  in  that  self-appointed  for- 
lorn hope,  while  those  near  General  Stanley  shouted :  "  We 
can  go  where  the  general  can."  Opdycke  rode  forward  until 
he  reached  the  enemy,  followed  closely  by  his  brigade.  He 
first  emptied  his  revolver,  then  clubbed  it  in  the  hand-to-hand 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,   ETC.  201 

conflict,  and  as  the  deadly  struggle  raged  more  fiercely,  he 
dismounted  and  cluhbed  a  musket.  His  men  fought  as  did 
their  leader,  and  with  bayonets  baptized  in  blood,  they  hurled 
the  enemy  from  the  intrenchments  and  saved  the  army.  This 
was  one  of  the  supreme  moments  of  battle  which  heroes  rec- 
ognize, and  by  which  only  the  bravest  of  the  brave  are  in- 
spired to  deeds  of  daring,  transcendent  from  motive  and  mo- 
mentous results.  Four  regimental  commanders  fell  in  the 
charge,  but  other  officers  of  similar  temper  maintained  the 
gallant  leadership.  Colonel  Oydycke,  foremost  in  the  charge 
and  throughout  the  ensuirfg  conflict  in  the  intrenchments,  es- 
caped injury.  General  Stanley  also  escaped  for  a  time,  but  in 
leaving  this  brigade  to  look  after  other  dispositions,  was  pierced 
in  the  neck  by  a  bullet,  and  was  compelled  to  leave  the  field. 

Colonel  Opdycke's  brigade  recaptured  eight  pieces  of  artil- 
lery, and  with  them  four  hundred  prisoners ;  wrenched  ten 
battle-flags  from  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  left  the  ground 
behind  them  strewn  with  a  greater  number,  which  dropped 
under  their  blows.  The  number  of  prisoners  and  battle-flags, 
shows  most  plainly  that  General  Hood  was  holding  the  po- 
sition with  an  exceedingly  strong  force. 

The  recaptured  guns  again  changed  the  direction  of  their 
missiles  of  death,  while  the  sheet  of  flame  from  Opdycke's  bri- 
gade and  others  in  reach  revealed  to  the  enemy  the  necessity 
of  other  charges  upon  new  and  less  promising  conditions,  or 
the  abandonment  of  the  conflict.  Opdycke's  charge  regained 
nearly  all  the  line  that  had  been  lost,  but  the  enemy  still  held 
a  small  salient  to  the  right  of  the  Columbia  road,  and  to  main- 
tain this  point  and  widen  the  breach,  General  Hood  and  his 
subordinate  commanders  exerted  themselves  to  the  utmost. 
In  counter  effort,  small  portions  of  Conrad's  and  Lane's  bri- 
gades were  directed  to  Opdycke's  support.  The  enemy's  first 
heavy  line  in  his  front  was  not  more  than  fifty  yards  distant, 
and  in  addition  to  a  direct  fire  from  this  line,  he  was  subjected 
to  an  enfilading  one  from  the  troops  still  in  the  intrenchments 
on  his  right.  It  was  next  to  impossible  for  his  brigade  to 
maintain  position  under  this  deadly  cross-fire,  but  yet,  in 
twenty  minutes,  through  the  vigorous  support  of  troops  on 
right  and  left,  the  enemy  was  entirely  expelled,  and  the  con- 


202  BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC. 

tinuity  of  the  line  re-established.  Then,  in  seeming  retribution 
for  General  Schofield's  escape  at  Spring  Hill,  and  his  own  dis- 
lodgment  from  his  hope-giving  grasp  of  the  key-point  of  the 
national  line,  General  Hood  repeated  his  assaults  with  the 
expression  of  frenzied  vengeance  and  valor.  His  subordinates, 
with  a  recklessness  of  life  in  keeping  with  the  charge  of 
Opdycke  and  his  heroic  brigade,  led  their  columns  to  the  mus- 
kets of  the  national  troops,  charging  repeatedly,  mainly  at 
Carter's  Hill,  and  only  desisted  with  the  fall  of  night.  In 
leading  a  charge,  General  Cleburne,  the  most  dashing  division 
commander  in  the  Confederate  army,  fell  upon  the  parapet  in 
front  of  Opdycke's  brigade,  and  in  the  whole  contest,  five 
other  generals  were  killed,  six  wounded,  and  one  captured — 
a  fact  which  reveals  how  the  columns  of  the  enemy  were  led ; 
while  the  loss  of  thirty-three  battle-flags  manifests  the 
strength  of  the  columns  which  gained  the  national  lines. 

The  defensive  fire  was  so  rapid  from  4  p.  M.  to  nightfall  that 
it  was  difficult  to  supply  the  troops  with  ammunition.  One 
hundred  wagon-loads  of  artillery  and  infantry  ammunition 
were  used  from  the  Fourth  Corps  train  alone,  and  this  ex- 
penditure wrought  fearful  havoc  in  the  ranks  of  the  enemy, 
whose  boldness  placed  them  much  of  the  time  at  short  range. 

Firing,  of  more  or  less  severity,  was  maintained  until  nearly 
midnight,  the  enemy  continuing  his  activity  to  determine  the 
time  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  national  army,  and  to  embarras 
such  a  movement. 

General  Hood  buried  seventeen  hundred  and  fifty  men  on 
the  field.  He  had  three  thousand  eight  hundred  so  disabled 
as  to  be  placed  in  hospitals,  and  lost  seven  hundred  and  two 
captured — an  aggregate  of  six  thousand  two  hundred  and  fifty- 
two,  exclusive  of  those  slightly  wounded. 

General  Schofield  lost  one  hundred  and  eighty-nine  killed, 
one  thousand  and  thirty-three  wounded,  and  one  thousand  one 
hundred  and  four  missing — an  aggregate  of  two  thousand  three 
hundred  and  twenty-six.  More  than  half  of  this  loss  was  from 
Wagner's  division,  from  the  exposure  of  Conrad's  and  Lane's 
brigades,  and  from  the  charge  and  subsequent  fighting  of  Op- 
dycke's brigade. 

The  battle  of  Franklin,  for  its  proportions,  was  one  of  the 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC.  203 

grandest  of  the  war.  The  salient  features  of  this  battle  were 
the  position  and  action  of  the  two  brigades  posted  in  front  of 
the  main  line,  and  the  gallantry  of  the  third,  after  the  enemy 
had  carried  the  intrenchments  on  Carter's  Hill. 

The  reports  of  Generals  Schofield,  Stanley,  and  Cox  declare 
that  it  was  not  the  expectation  that  the  brigades  in  front  should 
resist  until  they  should  be  compromised  in  an  engagement  with 
superior  forces,  and  that  General  Wagner  was  so  instructed. 
Nevertheless,  the  two  brigade  commanders  were  instructed  by 
General  Wagner  to  hold  their  position  as  long  as  possible,  and 
having  been  thus  impressed^  with  the  necessity  of  extreme  re- 
sistance, they  did  not  abandon  their  position  until  forced  to  do 
so  by  the  bayonets  of  the  enemy,  and  then  their  hurried  retreat 
brought  disaster  to  their  own  army.  Their  resistance,  if  not 
prudent,  was  exceedingly  gallant,  and  veterans  and  new  troops 
alike  displayed  the  highest  qualities  of  soldiers  in  confronting 
in  actual  conflict  an  army  of  three  corps,  and  deserve  mention 
in  history  as  brave  and  heroic,  under  circumstances  of  extreme 
trial  and  peril. 

With  regard  to  the  second  prominent  feature  of  this  battle, 
it  may  be  said  that  seldom  in  the  history  of  war  has  a  single 
brigade*  made  itself  so  conspicuous  in  saving  an  army,  and  its 
transcendent  action  must  be  accepted  as  proof  that  its  previous 
training  and  experience,  and  the  manhood  of  its  members  had 
given  the  morale — the  elan  requisite  for  such  an  emergency. 
It  was  no  new  experience  for  Colonel  Opdycke  to  ride  in  a 
charge  in  advance  of  his  men,  for  this  he  did  in  developing  the 
enemy  in  front  of  General  Thomas'  right,  after  the  great  dis- 
aster at  the  battle  of  Chickamauga.  He  charged,  too,  with  a 
demi-brigade  on  Missionary  Ridge,  and  with  his  regiment,  the 
One  Hundred  and  Twenty-fifth  Ohio,  on  Rocky  Face  Ridge, 
and  the  officers  and  men  of  his  brigade  were  meet  for  such  a 
leader.  And  General  Stanley,  sick  as  he  was,  manifested  his 
appreciation  of  the  emergency  as  well  as  his  personal  gallantry, 
in  descending  from  the  command  of  a  corps  to  take  the  left 

*This  brigade  comprised  the  One  Hundred  and  Twenty-fifth  Ohio;  the 
Twenty-fourth  Wisconsin ;  the  Thirty-sixth,  Fourty-fourth,  Seventy-third, 
Seventy-fourth,  and  Eighty-eighth  Illinois  regiments. 


204  BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC. 

of  a  brigade,  in  an  action  plainly  decisive  of  the  battle.  For 
beyond  all  power  of  generalship  to  mold  the  battle  or  control 
its  issue,  the  simple  charge  of  Opdycke's  brigade  stands  in  bold- 
est relief. 

The  enemy  having  been  repulsed  and  the  trains  transferred 
to  the  north  bank  of  the  Harpeth  river,  the  problem  to  solve 
was  the  safe  withdrawal  of  the  army  to  Nashville.  It  was 
still  in  General  Hood's  power,  having  great  superiority  in  both 
infantry  and  cavalry,  to  cross  the  river  above  General  Scho- 
field's  position,  and  unless  prevented  by  battle  or  withdrawal, 
to  throw  his  army  between  Franklin  and  Nashville.  As  to 
the  propriety  of  withdrawal,  there  was  no  question,  either 
with  the  general  officers  at  Franklin,  including  General  Scho- 
field,  or  with  General  Thomas.  So  that  the  movement  to  the 
rear,  meditated  before  the  battle,  was  commenced  as  soon  as 
the  quietness  of  the  enemy  permitted.  During  the  early  part 
of  the  night  the  artillery  was  transferred  to  the  north  bank, 
and  at  midnight  the  army  crossed  the  river  without  loss  or 
special  hinderance.  General  Wood  retained  his  position  until 
3  A.  M.,  and  then  moved  northward  as  the  rear-guard  of  the 
army.  General  Hood  perceived  the  retirement  early,  and 
though  following  closely,  wrought  no  damage.  General  Wood 
had  destroyed  the  bridges  before  leaving  position,  and  his  divis- 
ion in  rear  of  the  army,  with  Wilson's  cavalry  on  its  flanks, 
was  able  to  beat  back  General  Hood's  head  of  column,  which 
he  could  not  under  the  circumstances  make  strong  in  time, 
even  to  greatly  harass  so  strong  a  force.  With  the  exception 
of  a  brush  between  Hammond's  brigade  of  cavalry  and  some 
portion  of  Forrest's  command  at  Brentwood,  the  enemy  pro- 
voked no  engagement,  and  the  army  marched  quietly  to  Nash- 
ville. The  rear  column  reached  that  city  at  1  p.  M.,  and  the 
different  corps  were  assigned  to  positions  on  the  defensive  line 
which  General  Thomas  had  selected.  The  Twenty -third  Corps, 
under  General  Schofield,  was  assigned  to  'the  left,  extending 
to  the  Nolensville  turnpike ;  the  Fourth  Corps,  General  Wood 
commanding,  in  room  of  General  Stanley,  disabled  by  his 
wound,  took  position  in  the  center ;  and  the  corps  from  the 
"  Army  of  the  Tennessee,"  General  A.  J.  Smith  commanding, 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIX,   ETC.  205 

having  arrived  the  day  before,  held  the  right,  with  its  flank 
touching  the  river  below  the  city. 

In  view  of  General  Hood's  superiority  of  force,  his  opera- 
tions thus  far  had  fallen  behind  just  expectations.  He  had 
allowed  General  Schofield  to  pass  safely  before  his  army,  after 
he  had  touched  his  communications,  while  he  was  yet  at  Co- 
lumbia, and  he  had  met  most  disastrous  defeat  at  Franklin,  in 
assaults  that  could  not  be  repeated  with  greater  vigor.  The 
consequent  depression  in  his  army  was  doubtless  excessive. 
Thus  far,  none  of  the  grand  results  of  his  northward  march, 
as  announced  with  prophetic  emphasis  by  Mr.  Davis,  had  been 
achieved,  although  General  Sherman  had  swept  southward 
from  Northern  Georgia  and  on  toward  Savannah,  with  sixty- 
five  thousand  men ;  and  the  Confederate  army,  of  which  so 
much  had  been  expected,  was  now  far  from  its  base,  thus  far 
defeated  in  the  accomplishment  of  its  great  aims,  with  the 
consciousness  that  the  conditions  of  ultimate  success  were 
passing  day  by  day  beyond  the  range  of  possibilities.  To  go 
back  would  express  total  defeat;  and  before  General  Hood 
was  a  fast-increasing  army,  posted  on  a  strong  defensive  line, 
with  a  deep  river  behind,  and  its  key-points  fortified  early  in 
the  war ;  and  as  he  could  not  at  once  go  round  Nashville,  he 
sat  before  the  city  and  extended  his  lines  in  semblance  of  a 
siege,  which  should  last  until  General  Thomas  should  be  fully 
ready  to  throw  him  upon  the  defensive. 

General  Thomas  had  hoped  to  deliver  battle  at  some  point 
farther  to  the  south ;  but  his  reinforcements  had  come  too 
slowly,  and  his  cavalry  horses  had  come  as  tardily  as  his  acces- 
sions of  troops.  His  forces  were  not  fully  in  hand,  and  those 
that  had  fought  their  way  from  Columbia  were  physically  ex- 
hausted beyond  the  ordinary  experience  of  veterans  on  long 
marches  and  months  under  fire.  During  the  seven  days  of 
Hood's  advance  from  the  Tennessee,  he  had  hurried  his  prep- 
arations for  the  battle  now  palpably  imminent.  On  the  29th 
of  November,  he  had  ordered  General  Milroy  to  abandon 
Tullahoma  and  retire  to  Murfreesboro,  leaving  a  garrison  in 
the  block-house  at  Elk  River  bridge.  The  same  day,  he  had 
ordered  General  Steedman,  with  a  provisional  division  of  five 
thousand  men,  composed  of  detachments  from  the  corps  with 


206  BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC. 

General  Sherman  and  a  brigade  of  colored  troops,  to  move  to 
Nashville.  Nashville  had  been  placed  in  a  state  of  defense; 
additional  fortifications  had  been  constructed  under  the  direc- 
sion  of  Brigadier-General  Tower,  and  the  whole  had  been 
manned  by  the  regular  garrison,  reinforced  by  a  provisional 
force,  under  Brevet  Brigadier- General  Donaldson,  chief  quar- 
termaster, composed  of  the  employes  of  the  quartermaster 
and  commissary  departments.  No  other  forces  were  now  ex- 
pected, except  the  brigade  of  General  Cooper,  of  Ruger's 
division,  which  having  watched  the  fords  of  Duck  river,  below 
Columbia,  was  now  marching  to  Nashville  by  a  detour  to 
evade  the  enemy.  With  the  cavalry  remounted,  and  this  hete- 
rogeneous force  organized,  General  Thomas  proposed  to 
assume  the  offensive  and  dispute  with  General  Hood  the  pos- 
session of  Tennessee. 


NASHVILLE,  November  12,  1864—8.30  A.  M. 
Major-General  Sherman : 

Your  dispatch  of  12  o'clock  last  night  received.  I  have  no  fears  that 
Beauregard  can  do  us  any  harm  now,  and  if  he  attempts  to  follow  you  I 
will  follow  him  as  far  as  possible.  If  he  does  not  follow  you,  I  will  then 
thoroughly  organize,  and,  I  believe,  shall  have  men  enough  to  ruin  him, 
unless  he  gets  out  of  the  way  very  rapidly.  The  country  of  Middle  Ala- 
bama, I  learn,  is  teeming  with  supplies  this  year,  which  will  be  greatly  to 
our  advantage.  I  have  no  additional  news  to  report  from  the  direction 
of  Florence.  I  am  now  convinced  that  the  greater  part  6f  Beauregard' s 
army  is  near  Florence  and  Tuscumbia,  and  that  you  will  at  least  have  a 
clear  road  before  you  for  several  days,  and  that  your  success  will  fully 
equal  your  expectations. 

GEORGE  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General. 

VICKSBURG,  November  8, 1864,  VIA  CAIRO,  November  14,  1864. 
Major-General  Sherman  : 

Major-General  Thomas: 

Your  dispatch  of  October  30th  was  received  yesterday.  Hatch's  divis- 
ion of  cavalry  was  at  the  Tennessee  river  at  last  account.  Two  infantry 
divisions  under  General  A.  J.  Smith,  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  are  in  Mis- 
souri in  pursuit  of  Price.  They  have  been  ordered  to  Memphis  by  nearest 
route,  but  this  is  contingent  on  where  the  orders  may  reach  them,  and  the 
time  uncertain.  The  effective  field  force  left  on  the  river  is  very  light,  and 
the  posts  from  Cairo  to  Natchez  are  held  by  small  garrisons,  but  I  will,  to 
the  extent  of  my  force,  carry  out  your  instructions.  A  demonstration  of 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC.  .207 

three  thousand  cavalry  from  Baton  Rouge  promised  into  Lower  Missis- 
sippi. Magruder  is  moving  in  force  on  Major-General  Steele,  at  Little 
Rock.  The  enemy  is  threatening  to  (move  on)  cross  to  the  east  side  of 
the  Mississippi,  at  Games'  Landing,  where  Major-General  Reynolds  is 
ready  for  them. 

N.  J.  P.  DANA, 

Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  November  10,  1864 — 9  A.  M. 
Adjutant-General  U.  S.  A.,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Please  direct  the  return  to  this  department  immediately  of  all  conva- 
lescents belonging  to  the  Fourteenth,  Fifteenth,  Seventeenth,  and  Twen- 
tieth Army  Corps,  to  report  at  Chattanooga,  and  those  of  the  Fourth  and 
Twenty-third  Army  Corps  to  report  at  Decatur,  Alabama.  These  men 
were  furloughed  by  direction  of  the  War  Department  to  permit  them  to 
vote  in  their  several  States. 

GEORGE  II.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  JS.  V.  Commanding. 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  November  11,  1864 — 11  A.  M. 
Major-General  Stanley,  Pulaski : 

Have  Capron  make  a  scout  out  in  the  direction  of  Clifton,  and  ascertain 
the  truth  of  rumors  which  are  constantly  coming  to  these  headquarters, 
that  a  large  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  is  on  the  Lawrenceburg  road, 
between  Lawrenceburg  and  Columbia. 

GEORGE  II.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  iS.  V.  Commanding. 


NASHVILLE,  November  14,  1864. 
Brigadier-General  Hatch,  Tyler  Springs  via  Pulaski : 

Your  telegram  of  2  A.  M.  to-day  is  received.  Keep  a  good  lookout. 
Report  all  you  observe,  to  General  Schofield,  at  Pulaski,  as  well  as  myself. 

GEORGE  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 

NASHVILLE,  November  14,  1864. 
Major-General  W.  S.  Rosecrans,  St.  Louis : 

Your  dispatch  received.  Please  send  a  courier  to  overtake  Colonel 
Winslow  and  direct  him  to  this  place,  via  Louisville,  as  rapidly  as 
he  can. 

GEORGE  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General. 


208  BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC. 

CITY  POINT,  November  15,  1864 — 11  A.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas,  Nashville: 

If  Hood  commences  falling  back,  it  will  not  do  to  wait  for  the  full 
equipment  of  your  cavalry  to  follow.  He  should,  in  that  event,  be  pressed 
with  such  forces  as  you  can  bring  to  bear  upon  him. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  November  15,  1864 — 4  v.  M. 
Lieutenant-General  Grant,  City  Point,  Va. : 

Your  telegram  of  this  morning  just  received.  1  am  watching  Hood 
closely,  and,  should  he  move  after  General  Sherman,  will  follow  him  with 
what  force  I  can  raise  at  hand.  The  reports  this  morning  are  that  he  is 
moving  in  the  direction  of  Waynesboro.  A  cavalry  force  has  been  sent 
to  ascertain  the  true  state  of  facts. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  November  16,  1864 — 10  A.  M. 
Major-General  Schofield,  Pulaski : 

Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  just  received.  Send  me  the  first  reliable 
news  you  have  from  Hatch.  Smith  telegraphed  me  two  days  ago,  that 
his  troops  had  been  delayed  by  bad  roads  and  impassable  streams,  but 
that  he  would  make  all  possible  speed.  I  can  not  say  when  he  will  be 

here. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  WEST, 

TUSCUMBIA,  November  17,  1864. 
General  J.  B.  Hood,  Commanding,  etc.,  General : 

General  Beauregard  directs  me  to  say  that  he  desires  you  will  take  the 
offensive  at  the  earliest  practicable  moment,  and  deal  the  enemy  rapid 
and  vigorous  blows,  striking  him  whilst  thus  dispersed,  and  by  this 
means  distract  Sherman's  advance  into  Georgia.  .  .  . 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GEORGE  W.  BRENT, 
Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

CHEROKEE,  ALA.,  November  17,  1864—3.30  P.  M. 
Major-General  Howell  Cobb,  Macon  or  Griffin,  Ga. : 

Have  ordered  General  Taylor  to  send  at  once  all  troops  he  can  possibly 
spare,  and  General  Hood  to  send  immediately  one  brigade  of  Jackson's 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN-,  ETC.  209 

cavalry  division,  or  the  whole  division,  if  it  can  possibly  be  spared  at  this 
juncture.     A  victory  in  Tennessee  will  relieve  Georgia. 

#•*•*•*#•*•*•*#• 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD, 

General. 


PULASKI,  November  18,  1864. 
Major-General  Thomas . 

I  have  received  no  report  from  General  Hatch  this  evening.  His  re- 
port yesterday  indicated  that  Hood  was  about  to  move,  but  I  think  there 
is  no  probability  of  his  moving  this  way  while  this  weather  continues. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  November  19,  1864. 
Major- General  A.  J.  Smith,  or  commanding  officer  of  troops  en  route  for  Nashville, 

Paducah,  Ky. : 

Start  for  Nashville,  via  Cumberland  river,  as  soon  as  possible  after  re- 
ceiving this,  with  what  troops  you  have,  and  leave  orders  for  the  balance 
to  follow  the  same  route. 
Acknowledge  receipt, 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  November  19,  1864—2.30  p.  M. 
Major-General  Schofield,  PulasJci : 

If  the  enemy  advance  in  force,  as  General  Hatch  believes,  have  every- 
thing in  readiness  to  fight  him  at  Pulaski,  if  he  advances  on  that  place, 
or  cover  the  railroad  and  concentrate  at  Columbia.  Should  he  attempt 
to  turn  your  right  flank,  in  the  latter  case — that  is,  the  attempt  to  turn 
your  right  flank — General  Hatch  should  cover  the  fords  and  ferries  across 
Duck  river,  and  hold  them  when  you  concentrate  at  Columbia.  Report 
to  me  at  once,  should  you  be  compelled  to  leave  Pulaski,  that  I  may  give 
the  necessary  orders  for  the  concentration  of  the  troops  on  the  Nashville 
and  Chattanooga  railroad.  I  can  hardly  think,  however,  that  the  enemy 
will  attempt  to  advance  in  such  weather  as  we  now  have.  I  shall  send 
an  officer  to-morrow  morning  to  hurry  General  Smith's  troops  along  as 
fast  as  possible  to  this  place.  Give  the  necessary  orders  to  Hatch  and 
Croxton,  in  case  of  a  decided  advance  of  the  enemy. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 
VOL.  H — 14 


210  BATTLE   OF   FKANKLIN,  ETC. 

PULASKI,  November  19,  1864. 
Major-General  Thomas  : 

Your  dispatch  of  2.30  p.  M.  is  received.  I  have  already  given  the  neces- 
sary preliminary  instructions  to  Hatch,  and  will  have  everything  ready 
to  carry  out  your  orders  in  the  event  of  Hood's  'advance.  I  do  not  be- 
lieve he  will  attempt  to  move  his  infantry  in  this  state  of  roads,  but 

Forrest  may  make  a  raid  on  our  railroads. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  November  20,  1864—2.30  P.  M. 
Major-General  Schojield,  Pulaski : 

If  Forrest  makes  a  decided  advance,  I  think  it  would  be  best  for  you  to 
go  to  Lynnville  with  two  divisions,  leaving  Stanley  two  at  Pulaski.  In 
order  to  have  everything  out  of  your  way,  the  construction  party  which 
went  to  Pulaski  a  few  days  since  had  better  come  back  to  Columbia,  and 
all  surplus  stores  should  be  prepared  to  be  sent  back  in  case  Hood's  army 
advances.  Give  Hatch  instructions  according  to  your  movements,  and 
urge  iipon  him  the  necessity  of  getting  the  most  reliable  information  he 
can.  I  will  order  Kuger  with  one  brigade  to  Columbia. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


NASHVILLE,  November  20,  1864—5.30  P.  M. 
Major-General  A.  J.  Smith,  St.  Louis,  Mo. : 

Your  dispatch  of  this  date  just  received.  I  wish  you  to  make  every 
exertion  to  reach  this  place  with  all  possible  dispatch.  Bring  with  you 
all  the  troops  ordered  to  report  to  you  at  Paducah,  as  well  as  all  others 
belonging  to  your  command.  You  will  come  to  Nashville,  via  the  Cum- 
berland river.  I  have  sent  an  officer  with  orders  to  bring  Winslow's  cav- 
alry to  this  place  without  delay. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  November  21,  1864. 
Major-General  Schofield,  Pulaski : 

Have  you  seen  General  Hatch's  dispatch  from  Lexington  at  8  A.  M.  to- 
day? It  is  very  detailed,  and  he  thinks  it  reliable.  I  have  just  received 
your  two  telegrams  of  11  A.  M.  and  12  M.,  and  approve  the  move.  I  have 
sent  General  Wilson  out  to  take  general  charge  of  the  cavalry,  and  di- 
rected him  to  report  to  you.  He  will  reach  Lynnville  to-morrow  morning. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC.  211 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  November  23,  1864 — 10  p.  M. 
Major-General  H.  W.  HallecTc,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

It  has  occurred  to  me  since  my  last  dispatch  was  sent  to  you  that  it 
might  be  advisable  to  call  on  the  governor  of  Indiana  for  some  of  the 
militia  of  that  state,  and  I  would  like  to  know  whether  I  am  authorized 
to  make  the  application.  There  are  no  available  troops  in  Kentucky. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  V.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  November  23,  1864 — 1  p.  M. 
Major-General  W.  S.  Rosecrans,  St.  Louis,  Mo. : 

Has  General  Smith  and  command  embarked  for  this  place  yet?  If  so, 
when  ?  They  should  hurry  forward  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Please  answer 
on  receipt  of  this. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


NASHVILLE,  November  23,  1864. 
Colonel  Wm.  E.  Merrill,  Chattanooga : 

The  major-general  commanding  directs  that  you  organize  a  pontoonier 
battalion  out  of  your  regiment.  Yours  about  the  canvas  received ;  will 
be  attended  to. 

WM.  D.  WHIPPLE, . 

Brigadier-  General. 

COLUMBIA,  November  24,  1864. 
Major-General  Thomas : 

I  now  have  your  dispatch  of  9  A.  M.  I  do  not  believe  Forrest  has  had 
time  to  get  across  Duck  river  yet,  and  hope  the  troops  you  have  sent  will 
be  in  time  to  prevent  him.  Capron  was  driven  in  very  rapidly,  and  by  a 
pretty  large  force.  Cox  arrived  just  in  time  to  beat  it  back,  and  punished 
it  very  severely.  Hood  had  ten  miles  the  start  of  Stanley  at  noon  yester- 
day, but  Stanley  outmarched  him,  and  reached  here  at  10  o'clock  to-day. 
His  troops  are  all  here  and  in  position.  Colonel  Moore  got  here  last 
night.  My  orders  to  Hatch  are  as  you  suggested.  I  have  not  heard  from 
him  to-day. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 


COLUMBIA,  November  24,  1864—1.30  P.  M. 
Major-General  G.  H.  Thomas : 

Do  you  think  it  important  to  hold  Columbia?  My  force  is  not  large 
enough  to  cover  the  town  and  the  railroad  bridge.  I  can  hold  a  shorter 
line  covering  the  railroad  bridge,  leaving  the  town  and  the  railroad  depot 
outside;  but  in  any  case  the  enemy  can  turn  the  position  by  crosssing  above 


212  BATTLE   OF   FKANKLIN,  ETC. 

or  below,  and  rendering  withdrawal  to  the  north  bank  very  difficult. 
Please  give  me  your  views  soon. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  November  24,  1864 — 3  p.  M. 
Major-General  Schofield,  Columbia : 

If  you  can  not  hold  Columbia,  you  had  better  withdraw  to  the  north 
bank  of  the  river.  From  the  description  given,  I  supposed  the  line  was 
sufficiently  short  to  enable  you  and  Stanley  to  hold  it  securely  and  have 
a  reserve.  But  it  is  better,  of  course,  to  substantially  check  the  enemy 
than  to  run  the  risk  of  defeat  by  resisting  too  much.  Where  is  Stanley? 
Is  he  with  you  ? 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


WASHINGTON,  November  25,  1864 — 12  M. 
Major- General  Thomas : 

Secretary  war  authorizes  you,  if  you  deem  it  necessary,  to  call  upon  the 
governor  of  Indiana  and  of  any  other  Western  states  for  troops.  As  this 
force  is  very  expensive,  if  compared  with  its  value  against  an  enemy,  it 
should  be  used  as  sparingly  as  circumstances  will  admit.  Dispatches  just 
received  from  Hilton  Head  indicate  that  General  Sherman  has  captured 
Milledgeville  and  Macon,  and  that  Beauregard  has  been  recalled  from 
Tennessee  to  fall  on  General  Sherman's  rear.  This  is  also  indicated 
through  Beauregard's  proclamation  to  the  people  of  Mississippi,  sent 
from  Corinth  through  Selma. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 
Major-General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 


CITY  POINT,  VA.,  November  24,  1864—4  p.  M. 
Major-General  Geo.  H.  T/iomas,  Nashville : 

Following  proclamation  just  taken  from  papers  of  21st.     Do  not  let 
Forrest  get  off  without  punishment. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  November  25,  1864. 
Lieutenant-General  Grant,  City  Point,  Va.  : 

Your  dispatch  of  4  P.  M.  yesterday  just  received.  Hood's  entire  army 
is  in  front  of  Columbia,  and  so  greatly  outnumbering  mine  at  this  time, 
that  I  am  compelled  to  act  on  the  defensive.  None  of  General  Smith's 
troops  have  arrived  yet,  although  they  embarked  at  St.  Louis  on  Tuesday 
last.  The  transportation  of  General  Hatch's  and  Grierson's  cavalry  was 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC.  213 

ordered  by  General  Washburne,  I  am  told,  to  be  turned  in  at  Memphis, 
which  has  crippled  the  only  cavalry  I  have  at  this  time.  All  of  my  cavalry 
tvas  dismounted  to  furnish  horses  to  Kilpatrick's  division,  which  went 
with  General  Sherman.  My  dismounted  cavalry  is  now  detained  at 
Louisville,  awaiting  arms  and  horses.  Horses  are  arriving  slowly,  and 
arms  have  been  detained  somewhere  en  route  for  more  than  a  month. 
General  Grierson  has  been  delayed  by  conflicting  orders  in  Kansas  and 
from  Memphis,  and  it  is  impossible  to  say  when  he  will  reach  here.  Since 
being  in  charge  of  affairs  in  Tennessee,  I  have  lost  nearly  fifteen  thou 
sand  men,  discharged  by  expiration  of  service,  and  permitted  to  go  home 
to  vote.  My  gain  is  probably  twelve  thousand  of  perfectly  raw  troops ; 
therefore,  as  the  enemy  so  greatly  outnumbers  me,  both  in  infantry  and 
cavalry,  I  am  compelled  for  the  present  to  act  on  the  defensive.  The 
moment  I  can  get  my  cavalry,  I  will  march  against  Hood,  and  if  Forrest 
can  be  reached,  he  will  be  punished. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major- General  U.  iS.  V.  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  November  25,  1864 — 11.20  A.  M. 
Major-General  Schqfield,  Columbia: 

In  case  you  have  to  move  to  the  north  bank  of  Duck  river,  I  wish  you 
to  keep  some  cavalry  on  the  south  side  of  it,  to  observe  and  delay  Hood's 
advance  on  Chattanooga  railroad  as  much  as  possible.  I  hope  to  have 
five  (5)  regiments  of  Granger's  troops  in  Murfreesboro  to-day.  Have 
made  arrangements  for  Milroy  to  fall  back  to  Murfreesboro  on  this  side 
of  Duck  river ;  also,  if  the  enemy  advances,  the  cavalry  on  the  south  side 
of  Duck  river  should  cover  the  approaches  to  Shelby ville,  and  cross  at 
that  place,  and  hold  the  bridge  in  case  of  an  advance  in  force.  I  have 
asked  Steedman  how  large  a  force  he  can  raise  to  threaten  the  enemy's 
rear,  should  he  get  on  the  Chattanooga  road,  and  expect  an  answer  soon. 
About  one  thousand  of  Hatch's  cavalry  have  arrived  here  from  Mem- 
phis dismounted,  and  they  will  be  mounted  here  as  soon  as  possible,  and 
sent  to  the  front.  Three  regiments  should  start  to-day,  making  about 
one  thousand  men.  Have  not  heard  of  any  of  Smith's  troops  yet.  Some 
of  them  will  surely  be  here  to-day.  If  Hood  moves  on  the  Chattanooga 
road,  I  will  send  Smith  to  Murfreesboro,  as  we  shall  be  enabled  thereby 
to  concentrate  more  rapidly.  If  you  can  hold  Hood  on  the  south  side  of 
Duck  river,  I  think  we  shall  be  able  to  drive  him  back  easily  after  con- 
centrating. Answer,  giving  your  views. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major- General  U.  8.  V.  Commanding. 


214  BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBEBLAND- 

NASHVILLE,  November  26,  1864. 
Rear-Admiral  Lee,  Mound  City  :  . 

If  you  have  any  iron-clads  which  can  resist  heavy  shot,  I  will  be  obliged 
if  you  will  order  them  up  the  Tennessee  river  as  far  as  they  can  go,  on  a 
reconnoissance.  Hood  is  threatening  Columbia,  and  I  am  anxious  to  know 
positively  whether  he  has  all  his  force  with  him  or  not. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


WASHINGTON,  November  26,  1864 — 12  M. 
Major-General  Thomas: 

All  troops  ordered  from  Missouri  are  under  your  orders,  and  will 
be  subject  to  your  disposal.  Any  others,  embracing  all  officers  and 
troops  belonging  to  Sherman's  force  in  the  field,  left  behind  by  their  com- 
mands, will  be  under  your  orders  till  they  can  again  join  their  proper 
corps.  If  you  call  for  any  militia,  notify  adjutant-general's  office. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Chief  of  Staff. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  November  27,  1864. 
Major-General  Schqfield,  Columbia,  via  Franklin  : 

Your  dispatch  of  10  A.  M.  yesterday  received.  I  will  send  you  all  the 
available  infantry  I  can  raise.  I  expect  some  of  Smith's  command  here 
to-day,  and  will  send  it  forward  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Sent  you  two- 
regiments  of  cavalry  day  before  yesterday,  two  yesterday,  and  will  send 
another  to-day.  If  you  can  hold  Hood  in  check  until  I  can  get  Smith 

up,  we  can  whip  him. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 

PADUCAH,  November  27,  1864. 
Major-General  Thomas : 

I  have  just  arrived  at  this  point.  The  brigade,  Seventeenth  Army 
Corps,  and  First  division,  Sixteenth  Army  Corps,  will  proceed  immediately 
to  destination,  in  obedience  to  your  telegram  of  the  19th  inst.  The  Third 
division  will  be  up  early  in  the  morning.  Telegraph  me  at  Smithland. 

A.  J.  SMITH, 

Major- General. 

DTICKTOWN,  November  27,  1864—12.30  P.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas : 

The  enemy  has  made  no  real  attack,  and  I  am  satisfied  he  does  not 
mean  to  attack.  My  information,  though  not  very  satisfactory,  leads  me 
to  believe  that  Hood  intends  to  cross  Duck  river  above  Columbia,  and  aa 
near  it  as  he  can.  I  shall  withdraw  to  the  north  bank  to-night,  and  en- 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC.  215 

deavor  to  prevent  him  from  crossing.  Wilson  is  operating  mainly  on  my 
left,  with  a  portion  of  his  command  south  of  the  river.  I  have  no  late  in- 
formation from  him.  I  have  succeeded  in  getting  your  cipher  of  the 
25th  translated.  I  believe  your  dispositions  are  wise. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 

NEAR  COLUMBIA,  November  28,  1864 — 3.30  p.  M. 
Major- General  Thomas : 

The  enemy  has  crossed  in  force  a  short  distance  this  side  of  the  Lewis- 
burg  pike,  at  noon-  to-day,  and  has  driven  our, cavalry  back  across  the 
river  on  that  pike  at  the  same  time.  The  force  is  reported  to  be  infantry, 
but  I  do  not  regard  it  as  being  probable.  Wilson  has  gone  with  his  main 
force  to  learn  the  facts,  and  drive  the  enemy  back,  if  possible. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD 

Major-  General. 


NASHVILLE,  November  28,  1864. 
Major-General  Schqfield,  near  Columbia : 

Your  dispatch  of  3.30  is  just  received.  If  General  Wilson  can  not  suc- 
ceed in  driving  back  the  enemy,  should  it  prove  true  that  he  has  crossed 
the  river,  you  will  necessarily  have  to  make  preparations  to  take  up  a  new 
position  at  Franklin,  behind  Harpeth,  immediately,  if  it  becomes  neces- 
sary to  fall  back. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


NASHVILLE,  November  28,  1864. 
Major-General  Schojield: 

You  can  have  some  of  the  pontoons  you  used  at  Columbia  sent  to 
Franklin,  to  lay  a  bridge  there.  I  will  answer  your  other  telegram  in  a 
few  moments. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


NEAR  COLUMBIA,  November  28,  1864—11  A.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas: 

I  am  in  doubt  whether  it  is  advisable,  with  reference  to  future  opera- 
tions, to  hold  this  position  or  retire  to  some  point  from  which  we  can 
move  offensively.  Of  course,  we  can  not  recross  the  river  here.  I  could 
have  easily  held  the  bridge-head  at  the  railroad,  but  it  would  have  been 
useless,  as  we  could  not  possibly  advance  from  that  point.  Please  give  me 
your  views  and  wishes. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 


216  BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,    ETC. 

NEAR  COLUMBIA,  November  28,  1864 — 6  p.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas : 

The  enemy's  cavalry  in  force  has  crossed  the  river  on  the  Lewisburg 
pike,  and  is  now  in  possession  of  Rally  Hill.  Wilson  is  trying  to  go  on 
the  Franklin  road  ahead  of  them.  He  thinks  the  enemy  may  swing  in 
between  him  and  me  and  strike  Spring  Hill,  and  wants  Hammond's  bri- 
gade halted  there.  Please  give  orders,  if  you  know  where  it  is. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 


NEAR  COLUMBIA,  November  28,  1864 — 9  p.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas : 

If  Hood  advances  on  the  Lewisburg  and  Franklin  pike,  where  do  you 
propose  to  fight  him  ?  I  have  all  tire  force  that  is  necessary,  and  Smith's 
troops  should  be  placed  with  reference  to  the  proposed  point  of  concen- 
tration. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 


NASHVILLE,  November  29,  1864—3.30  A.  M. 
Major-General  Schofield,  near  Columbia  : 

Your  dispatches  of  6  p.  M.  and  9  p.  M.  yesterday  are  received.  I  have 
directed  General  Hammond  to  halt  his  command  at  Spring  Hill,  and  re- 
port to  you  for  orders,  if  he  can  not  communicate  with  General  Wilson, 
and  also  instructing  him  to  keep  you  well  advised  of  the  enemy's  move- 
ments. I  desire  you  to  fall  back  from  Columbia,  and  take  up  your  posi- 
tion at  Franklin,  leaving  a  sufficient  force  at  Spring  Hill  to  contest  the 
enemy's  progress  until  you  are  securely  posted  at  Franklin.  The  troops 
at  the  fords  below  Williamsport,  etc.,  will  be  withdrawn,  and  take  up  a 
position  behind  Franklin.  General  A.  J.  Smith's  command  has  not  yet 
reached  Nashville.  As  soon  as  he  arrives,  I  will  make  immediate  disposi- 
tion of  his  troops,  and  notify  you  of  the  same.  Please  send  me  a  report 
as  to  how  matters  stand,  upon  your  receipt  of  this. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  iS.  V,  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS,  HART'S  CROSS-ROADS,  ON  FRANKLIN  AND  LEWISBURG  PIKE, 

November  29,  1864 — 3  A.  M.  ;  VIA  FRANKLIN,  9.30  A.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas  : 

Forrest's  cavalry,  Buford's,  Chalmers',  and  Jackson's  brigades,  a  part  of 
Hanley's  and  Biffle's  regiments,  crossed  Duck  river  on  this  road,  and  at 
several  fords  between  it  and  Huey's  Mills,  seven  miles  above  Columbia, 
yesterday.  A  pontoon  train,  sufficient  for  three  bridges,  had  arrived  at 
Huey's  just  before  dark.  The  bridges  were  expected  to  be  ready  by  11 
o'clock  last  night,  and  their  infantry 'across  by  daylight  this  morning. 
The  cavalry  began  crossing  about  noon,  at  Davis'  fords,  near  Huey's,  but 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC.  217 

could  not  get  across  at  Hardison's,  on  the  pike.  Capron's  and  Garrard's 
brigades  were  struck  in  flank  and  rear  by  rebels,  at  Rally  Hill.  I  have 
kept  Major-General  Schofield  fully  informed,  and,  at  1  A.  M.,  sent  him 
the  information  above,  advising  him  to  get  back  to  Franklin  at  once.  I 
have  all  of  my  command,  except  Hammond's  and  Hatch's  first  brigade, 
here.  I  do  n't  know  where  the  former  is.  The  latter  has  been  watching 
the  river  at  Knobgrass  creek,  and  was  ordered,  at  sunset  last  night,  to 
join  him  at  Spring  Hill.  I  shall  delay  the  enemy  all  in  my  power,  if  he 
presses  me,  and  follow  him  wherever  he  goes.  I  have  information  from 
Franklin's  Hill  to-day.  The  Sixth  Illinois  is  now  probably  near  that 
place  to-night,  having  gone  to  Shelbyville  on  a  scout.  I  am  sure,  from 
what  prisoners  tell  me,  that  the'/enemy  is  aiming  for  Nashville,  via  Frank- 
lin; his  present  direction,  location  of  his  bridge,  and  other  circumstances 
point  clearly  to  that  conclusion.  This  being  so,  I  shall  probably  cross  the 
Harpeth  midway  between  Triune  and  Franklin,  and  aim  for  Nolensville. 
Everything  should  be  got  off  the  railroad  to-day.  Hurry  forward  all  cav- 
.alry,  via  Nolensville.  I  think  everything  should  be  concentrated  at 
Nashville. 

J.  H.  WILSON, 

Major- General. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO,  November  29 — 8.30  A.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas: 

The  enemy's  cavalry  has  crossed  in  force,  on  the  Lewisburg  pike,  and 
General  Wilson  reports  the  infantry  crossing  above  Huey's  Mills,  about 
five  miles  from  this  place.  I  have  sent  an  infantry  reconnoissance  to 
learn  the  facts.  If  it  prove  true,  I  will  act  according  to  your  instructions 
received  this  morning.  Please  send  orders  to  General  Cooper,*  via 
Johnsonville ;  it  may  be  doubtful  whether  my  messenger  from  here  will 
reach  him. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 


HEADQUARTERS,  4£  MILES  SOUTHEAST  OF  FRANKLIN, 

November  29,  1864 — 2  p.  M.,  VIA  FRANKLIN. 
Major-General  Thomas : 

The  enemy  pressed  the  rear  of  my  column  closely  as  far  as  the  Ridge 
Meeting-house,  and  by  marching  around  my  left  prevented  me  from 
getting  upon  the  Fayetteville  road.  My  impression  is  that  Forrest  is 
aiming  for  Nashville,  via  Triune  and  Nolensville.  A  part  of  his  force 
may  have  cut  into  Spring  Hill.  Heavy  artillery  firing  heard  in  that 
direction  since  1 1  A.  M.  I  can  not  hear  from  Schofield,  but  fear  he  may 
not  have  reached  Franklin.  I  shall  hold  Hatch's  second  brigade  and 

*  Commanding  a  brigade  of  General  lluger's  division. 


218  BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,   ETC. 

Hammond's  here  till  I  know  all  is  clear.  In  the  meantime,  Johnson  and 
Croxton  are  crossing  the  Harpeth  at  Henderson's  ford,  with  orders  to 
push  strong  parties  to  Triune  Zend  Grove,  and  thereby  to  push  on 
to  Nolensville  to-night,  if  they  find  the  enemy  moving  in  that  direction. 
I  shall  go  in  the  same  direction  as  soon  as  I  can  .leave  here  with  safety. 
You  had  better  look  out  for  Forrest  at  Nashville  to-morrow  noon.  I  '11 
be  there  before,  or  very  soon  after  he  makes  his  appearance. 

J.  H.  WILSON, 

Brevet  Major-General. 

NASHVILLE,  November  29,  1864—11  p.  M. 
Major-General  Schofield,  Franklin  : 

General  Wilson  has  telegraphed  me  very  fully  the  movements  of  the 
enemy  yesterday  and  this  morning.  He  believes  Forrest  is  aiming  to 
strike  this  place,  while  the  infantry  will  move  against  you,  and  attempt 
to  get  on  your  flank.  If  you  discover  such  to  be  his  movement,  you  had 
better  cross  Harpeth  at  Franklin,  and  then  retire  along  the  Franklin 
pike  to  this  place,  covering  your  wagon  train  and  the  railroad.  I  directed 
General  Cooper,  in  accordance  with  your  wishes  yesterday,  to  withdraw 
from  Centreville,  by  the  Nashville  road,  crossing  Harpeth  at  widow  Dean's, 
and  to  report  to  you  from  that  place  for  further  orders.  You  had  better 
Bend  orders  to  meet  him. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major- General  U.  iS.  V.  Commanding. 


FRANKLIN,  November  29,  1864 — 10  p.  M. 

Major-General  Thomas : 

Major-General  Schofield  directs  me  to  inform  you  that  the  enemy's 
cavalry  crossed  Duck  river  in  force  at  daylight  this  morning,  at  Huey's 
Mills,  six  miles  from  Columbia,  and  pushed  at  once  for  Spring  Hill.  Their 
cavalry  reached  that  point  at  4  P.  M.,  and  their  infantry  came  in  before 
dark,  and  attacked  General  Stanley,  who  held  the  place  with  one  division 
very  heavily  (engaged?).  General  Schofield's  troops  are  pushing  foi 
Franklin  as  rapidly  as  possible.  The  general  says  he  will  not  be  able  to  gei 
farther  than  Thompson's  Station  to-night,  and  possibly  not  farther  than 
Spring  Hill.  He  regards  his  situation  as  extremely  perilous,  and  fears  ha 
may  be  forced  into  a  general  battle  to-morrow,  or  lose  his  wagon  train. 
General  Wilson's  cavalry  have  been  pushed  off  toward  the  east,  and  do 
not  come  with  our  infantry,  nor  cover  the  pike.  Thinking  that  the  troops 
under  General  A.  J.  Smith's  command  had  reached  Franklin,  General 
Schofield  directed  me  to  have  them  pushed  down  the  Franklin  pike  to 
Spring  Hill,  by  daylight  to-morrow.  I  left  General  Schofield  two  hours 
ago,  at  Thompson's  Station. 

W.  J.  TWININGS, 
Captain,  Aid-de-Camp,  and  Chief  Engineer,  Army  of  Ohio. 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC.  219 

EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  THOMAS'  REPORT. 

The  important  result  of  this  signal  victory  can  not  be  too  highly  appre- 
ciated, for  it  not  only  seriously  checked  the  enemy's  advance  and  gave  Gen- 
eral Schofield  time  to  move  his  troops  and  all  his  property  to  Nashville, 
but  it  also  caused  deep  depression  among  the  men  of  Hood's  army, 
making  them  doubly  cautious  in  their  subsequent  movements.  Not 
willing  to  risk  a  renewal  of  the  battle  on  the  morrow,  and  having  accom- 
plished the  object  of  the  day's  operations — viz.,  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of 
his  trains — General  Schofield,  by  my  advice  and  direction,  fell  back  during 
the  night,  to  Nashville;  in  front  of  which  city,  line  of  battle  was  formed, 
by  noon  of  the  1st  of  December,  on  the  heights  immediately  surrounding 
Nashville. 


EXTRACTS  FROM  GENERAL  SCHOFIELD'S   REPORT. 

The  troops  rested  in  this  position  on  the  28th,  and  I  had  strong  hopes 
of  being  able  to  hold  the  line  of  Duck  river  until  reinforcements  should 
arrive;  but  I  learned  from  General  Wilson,  about  2  A.  M.  on  the  29th,  that 
the  enemy's  cavalry  had  forced  a  crossing  near  the  Lewisburg  pike,  and 
about  daylight  in  the  morning,  that  his  infantry  was  also  crossing  at 
Huey's  Mills,  five  miles  above  Columbia,  from  which  a  road  leads  into  the 
Franklin  pike,  at  Spring  Hill.  The  enemy  might  endeavor  to  reach  the 
latter  place  in  advance  of  me,  and  thus  cut  off  my  retreat,  or  strike  me 
in  flank  near  Duck  river,  or  both.  He  had  already  forced  a  column  of 
cavalry  between  General  Wilson  and  me,  and  cut  off  all  communication 
between  us.  I  therefore  sent  General  Stanley  with  a  division  of  infantry 
to  Spring  Hill,  to  hold  that  point  and  cover  the  trains  ;  General  Cox  was 
left  in  his  position,  to  hold  the  crossing  at  Columbia ;  Generals  Wood  and 
Kimball  were  put  in  line  facing  Huey's  Mills,  with  a  brigade  thrown  for- 
ward to  reconnoiter,  and  General  Ruger  was  ordered  to  move  on  to  the 
pike,  in  rear  of  Rutherford's  creek,  leaving  one  regiment  to  hold  the  ford 
near  the  railroad  bridge,  the  bridges  having  been  destroyed. 

».:         .^-  ^        .#*'*,.#..#.  v        -#* 

About  3  P.  M.  I  became  satisfied  that  the  enemy  would  not  attack  my 
position  on  Duck  river,  but  was  pushing  two  corps  direct  for  Spring  Hill. 
I  then  gave  the  necessary  orders  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  after 
dark,  and  took  General  Ruger' s  troops  and  pushed  for  Spring  Hill,  to  re- 
open communication  with  General  Stanley,  and  was  followed  at  a  short 
distance  by  the  head  of  the  main  column.  I  struck  the  enemy's  cavalry 
at  dark,  about  three  miles  from  Spring  Hill,  but  we  brushed  them  away 
without  difficulty,  and  reached  Spring  Hill  about  seven  o'clock.  .  .  . 

I  arrived  at  Franklin  with  the  head  of  the  column  a  little  before  day- 
light on  the  30th,  and  found  no  wagon-bridge  for  crossing  the  river,  and 
the  fords  in  very  bad  condition.  I  caused  the  railroad  bridge  to  be  pre- 
pared for  crossing  wagons,  and  had  a  foot-bridge  built  for  infantry,  which 
fortunately  proved  available  for  wagons,  and  used  the  ford  as  much  as 
possible.  I  hoped,  in  spite  of  the  difficulties,  to  get  all  my  material,  in- 


220  BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,  ETC. 

eluding  the  public  property  and  a  large  wagon  train,  across  the  river,  and 
move  the  army  over  before  the  enemy  could  get  up  force  enough  to 
attack  me ;  but  I  put  the  troops  in  position  as  they  arrived  on  the  south 
side — the  Twenty-third  Corps  on  the  left  and  center,  covering  the  Colum- 
bia and  Lewisburg  pikes,  and  General  Kimball's  division  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  on  the  right,  both  flanks  resting  on  the  river.  Two  brigades  of 
Wagner's  division  were  left  in  front  to  retard  the  enemy's  advance,  and 
General  Wood's  division,  with  some  artillery,  was  moved  to  the  north 
bank  of  the  river,  to  cover  the  flanks,  should  the  enemy  attempt  to  cross 
above  or  below.  The  enemy  followed  close  after  our  rear-guard ;  brought 
up  and  deployed  two  full  corps  with  astonishing  celerity,  and  moved 
rapidly  forward  to  the  attack.  Our  outposts,  imprudently  brave,  held 
their  ground  too  long,  and  hence  were  compelled  to  come  in  at  a  run. 
In  passing  over  the  parapet,  they  carried  with  them  the  troops  of  the 
line  for  a  short  space,  and  permitted  a  few  hundred  of  the  enemy  to  get 
in ;  but  the  reserves  sprang  forward,  regaining  the  parapet,  and  capturing 
those  of  the  enemy  who  had  passed  it.  The  enemy  assaulted  persistently 
and  continuously  with  his  whole  force,  from  about  3.30  p.  M.  until  after 
dark,  and  made  numerous  intermittent  attacks  at  a  few  points  until 
about  10  o'clock  p.  M.  He  was  splendidly  repulsed  along  the  whole  line 
of  attack.  .  .  . 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  more  than  half  our  loss  occurred  in  Wagner's 
division  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  which  did  not  form  part  of  the  main  line 
of  defense.  This  loss  arose  in  two  brigades  of  that  division,  from  their 
remaining  in  front  of  the  line  after  their  proper  duty  as  outposts  had 
been  accomplished,  and  after  they  should  have  taken  their  position  in 
reserve;  and  in  the  other  brigade  (Colonel  Opdycke's),  in  its  hand-to- 
hand  encounter  with  the  enemy  over  the  parapet,  which  had  been  tem- 
porarily lost  by  the  precipitate  retreat  of  the  other  two  brigades. 
********* 

My  expo.rir.nce  on  the  29th  had  shown  how  entirely  inferior  a  force 
my  cavalry  was  to  that  of  the  enemy,  and  that  even  my  immediate  flank 
and  rear  were  insecure,  while  my  communication  with  Nashville  was  en- 
tirely without  protection.  I  could  not  even  rely  upon  getting  up  ammu- 
nition necessary  for  another  battle.  To  remain  longer  at  Franklin,  was 
to  seriously  hazard  the  loss  of  my  army,  by  giving  the  enemy  another 
chance  to  cut  me  off  from  reinforcements,  which  he  had  made  three 
desperate  futile  attempts  to  accomplish.  I  had  detained  the  enemy  long 
enough  to  enable  you  to  concentrate  your  scattered  troops  at  Nashville,  and 
had  succeeded  in  inflicting  upon  him  very  heavy  losses,  which  was  the 
primary  object.  I  had  found  it  impossible  to  detain  him  long  enough  to 
get  reinforcements  at  Franklin.  Only  a  small  portion  of  the  infantry 
and  none  of  the  cavalry  could  reach  me  in  time  to  be  of  any  use  in 
battle,  which  must  have  been  fought  on  the  1st  of  December,  for  these 
reasons.  After  consulting  with  corps  and  division  commanders,  and  ob- 
taining your  approval,  I  determined  to  retire  the  night  of  the  30th  toward 
Nashville. 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN,    ETC.  221 

EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  STANLEY'S  REPORT. 

From  1  o'clock  until  4  p.  M.  in  the  evening,  the  enemy's  entire  force 
was  in  sight,  and  forming  for  attack;  yet,  in  view  of  the  strong  position 
we  held;  and  reasoning  from  the  former  course  of  the  rebels  during  the 
campaign,  nothing  appeared  so  improbable  as  that  they  would  assault. 

I  felt  so  confident  in  this  belief,  that  I  did  not  leave  General  Schofield's 
headquarters  until  the  firing  commenced.  About  4  o'clock  the  enemy 
advanced  with  his  whole  force,  at  least  two  corps,  making  a  bold  and 
persistent  assault,  which,  upon  part  of  the  line,  lasted  forty  minutes, 
when  Wagner's  division  fell  back  from  the  heights  south  of  Franklin. 
Opdycke's  brigade  was  placed  in  reserve,  in  rear  of  our  main  line  on  the 
Columbia  pike;  Lane's  and  Corfrad's  brigades  were  deployed,  the  former 
on  the  right,  the  other  on  the  left  of  the  pike,  and  about  three  hundred 
yards  in  advance  of  the  main  line.  By  whose  mistake  I  can  not  tell,  it 
certainly  was  never  a  part  of  my  instructions,  but  these  brigades  had 
orders  from  General  Wagner  not  to  retire  to  the  main  line  until  forced 
to  do  so  by  the  fighting  of  the  enemy. 

Speaking  of  the  effect  of  their  retreat,  General  Stanley  said:  "It  was  at 
that  moment  I  arrived  at  the  scene  of  disorder,  coming  from  the  town 
on  the  Columbia  pike.  The  moment  was  critical  beyond  any  I  have  ever 
known  in  battle.  Could  the  enemy  hold  that  part  of  the  line,  he  was 
nearer  our  two  bridges  than  the  extremities  of  our  line.  Colonel  Opdycke's 
brigade  was  lying  down  about  one  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  the  works. 
I  rode  quickly  to  the  left  regiment  and  called  to  them  to  charge ;  at  the 
same  time  I  saw  Colonel  Opdycke  near  the  center  of  his  line,  urging  his 
men  forward.  I  gave  the  colonel  no  order,  as  I  saw  him  engaged  in 
doing  the  very  thing  to  save  us,  namely,  to  get  possession  of  our  line 
again." 


EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  J.  H.  WILSON'S  REPORT. 
At  1  A.  M.  (November  29),  I  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Schofield,  in- 
forming him  that  the  force  at  Huey's  Mill  was  Forrest's  cavalry,  consisting 
of  Chalmers',  Jackson's,  and  Buford's  divisions,  and  Biffle's  regiment; 
that  the  rebel  infantry  were  to  have  began  crossing  two  hours  before,  by 
three  pontoon  bridges  under  construction  at  the  same  place.  Believing 
the  information  to  be  perfectly  correct,  I  therefore  suggested  that  our 
infantry  should  reach  Spring  Hill  by  10  A.  M.  of  that  day. 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  AND  PURSUIT  OF  THE  ROUTED  ENEMY. 

THE  arrival  of  General  Steedman  with  his  command  from 
Chattanooga,  December  1st,  in  the  evening,  completed  the 
concentration  of  forces,  which  had  been  so  unexpectedly  de- 
layed. Three  lines  of  defence  had  been  abandoned  because 
the  promised  troops  had  not  appeared  in  Tennessee.  And 
now  that  the  concentration  had  been  effected,  the  improvised 
army  contained  three  corps,  each  one  of  which  represented  a 
distinct  department;  a  provisional  division  made  up  of  de- 
tachments from  almost  every  organization,  large  and  small, 
embraced  in  the  sixty -five  thousand  men,  then  on  "  the  march 
to  the  sea ;"  an  infusion  of  raw  infantry  regiments  ;  the  greater 
portion  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, but  still  largely  dismounted ;  and  colored  soldiers,  who 
were  to  have  their  first  opportunity  in  the  central  theater  of 
war,  to  fight  by  brigades. 

General  Thomas  had  held  General  Steedman's  command, 
on  the  line  of  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  railroad  for  two 
reasons — one,  the  complications  in  East  Tennessee,  of  which  a 
narrative  will  be  given  in  another  chapter ;  and  the  other,  the 
probability  that  General  Hood  would  strike  that  important 
railroad  south  of  Nashville.  Having  arrived,  General  Steed- 
man  took  position  about  a  mile  in  advance  of  the  left  center 
of  the  main  line,  and  east  of  the  Nolens ville  turnpike.  Gen- 
eral Wilson,  with  his  cavalry,  had  previously  taken  a  strong 
position  at  Thomson's  Chapel,  on  the  Nolensville  turnpike, 
covering  the  space  between  General  Schofield's  left  and  the 
Cumberland  river. 

General  Hood  being  still  greatly  superior  in  cavalry,  there 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  223 

was  danger  that  he  would  detach  a  large  portion  of  it  to  inter- 
rupt the  vital  communications  with  Louisville.  To  guard 
against  the  passage  of  his  cavalry  over  the  Cumberland,  above 
Nashville,  General  Hammond's  brigade  of  cavalry  was  sent 
to  Gallatin  on  the  2d,  to  watch  the  river  as  far  up  as  Carthage. 
And  the  day  following  General  Thomas  threw  all  the  remain- 
ing cavalry  across  to  Edgefield,  and  then  General  Steedman's 
command  covered  the  space  between  General  Schofield's  left 
and  the  river. 

General  Hood's  infantry,  did  not  approach  Nashville  until 
the  3d,  when  General  Thomas'  outposts  were  driven  in,  and 
soon  after  the  enemy  began  to  establish  his  main  line.  The 
next  morning  his  salient  was  seen  on  Montgomery  Hill,  within 
six  hundred  yards  of  the  center  of  the  national  line.  Gen- 
eral Hood's  investing  lines  occupied  the  high  ground  on  the 
southeast  side  of  Brown's  creek,  extending  from  the  Nolens- 
ville  turnpike,  across  the  Granny  White  and  Franklin  turn- 
pikes, in  a  southwesterly  direction,  to  the  hills  south  and  south- 
west of  Richland  creek,  and  down  that  creek  to  the  Hillsboro 
turnpike.  From  his  right,  on  the  Nolensville  road  to  the 
river,  above  the  city,  and  from  his  left,  on  the  Hillsboro  road 
to  the  river  below,  his  cavalry  were  posted.  Intent  upon  com- 
pleting and  strengthening  his  line,  General  Hood  made  no  re- 
sponse to  the  fire  of  artillery,  which  opened  upon  him  from 
several  points.  It  was  doubtless  necessary,  too,  that  he  should 
be  economical  in  the  use  of  his  ammunition,  as  it  was  difficult 
for  him  to  replenish  from  his  base  at  Corinth. 

Although  not  active  at  Nashville,  General  Hood  was  enter- 
prising in  other  directions.  He  sent  Bate's  division  of  Cheat- 
ham's  corps  to  reduce  Murfreesboro  and  other  minor  points 
in  the  vicinity,  and  on  the  4th  the  block-house,  at  Overall's 
creek,  five  miles  north  of  Murfreesboro,  was  attacked  by  this 
force.  But  such  was  the  strength  of  the  block-house  con- 
structed for  the  defense  of  the  railroad  bridge,  that  although 
seventy-four  artillery  shots  were  fired  against  it,  the  garrison 
held  out  until  General  Milroy  arrived  with  reinforcements 
from  Murfreesboro,  consisting  of  three  regiments  of  infantry, 
four  companies  of  cavalry,  and  a  section  of  artillery.  General 
Bate  was  then  attacked  and  driven  away.  During  the  5th, 


224  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

6th,  and  7th,  having  been  reinforced  by  a  division  from  Lee's 
corps,  and  twenty-five  hundred  cavalry,  General  Bate  demon- 
strated heavily  against  Fortress  Rosecrans,  near  Murfrees- 
boro,  held  by  eight  thousand  men,  under  General  Rousseau. 
The  enemy  declining  to  make  a  direct  attack,  General  Milroy 
was  sent  against  him  on  the  8th,  with  seven  regiments  of  in- 
fantry. He  was  found  on  the  Wilkinson  turnpike  behind  rail 
barricades,  which  were  carried  by  assault — General  Milroy 
capturing  two  hundred  and  seven  prisoners  and  two  guns,  and 
suffering  a  loss  of  thirty  men  killed,  and  one  hundred  and 
seventy -five  wounded.  The  same  day  Buford's  cavalry,  after 
shelling  Murfreesboro,  entered  the  town,  but  were  driven  out 
by  a  regiment  of  infantry  and  a  section  of  artillery.  The 
whole  force  then  moved  to  Lebanon  and  down  the  bank  of 
the  Cumberland  river  to  Nashville,  threatening  to  cross,  to  in- 
terrupt the  Louisville  and  Nashville  railroad. 

A  portion  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  under  General  Lyon,  suc- 
ceeded in  crossing  the  Cumberland  river  above  Clarksville,  on 
the  9th.  The  object  of  the  movement  was  to  reach  the  Louis- 
ville and  Nashville  railroad,  at  some  point  in  Kentucky,  and 
to  prevent  its  accomplishment  General  Thomas  directed  Gen- 
eral McCook,  who  was  in.  Kentucky,  to  remount  Watkins'  and 
La  Grange's  brigades  of  cavalry,  and  to  look  after  Lyon  with 
these  brigades. 

Daring  the  first  half  of  December,  General  Grant  felt  great 
uneasiness  with  regard  to  the  situation  in  Tennessee,  fearing 
that  General  Hood  would  pass  round  Nashville  and  march 
into  Kentucky  reproducing  the  scenes  and  issues  of  the  sum- 
mer and  autumn  of  1862.  Believing  that  General  Thomas 
should  have  delivered  battle  immediately  after  the  engagement 
at  Franklin,  he  urged  him  thereafter,  from  day  to  day,  to  at- 
tack General  Hood.-  General  Thomas,  on  the  other  hand, 
thought  it  advisable  to  remount  his  cavalry  and  make  other 
preparations,  that  he  might  be  assured  of  victory,  before  as- 
suming the  offensive,  and  at  the  same  time  gain  the  full  results 
of  victory  by  a  vigorous  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  when  defeated 
and  routed.  He  was  confident  of  final  success,  and  was  vigi- 
lant in  guarding  the  river  with  his  cavalry,  and  secured  the 
services  of  the  gunboats  of  the  Eleventh  Division  of  the  Mis- 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  225 

sissippi  Squadron,  under  Lieutenant-Commander  Leroy  Fitch, 
to  patrol  the  river  above  and  below  the  city.  During  the 
first  eight  days  of  the  month,  General  "Wilson  had  raised  his- 
cavalry  to  good  strength,  by  the  influx  of  new  horses  and 
by  ransacking  the  corrals  for  convalescent  animals,  and  in 
this  time  much  had  been  done  to  supply  the  army  with  the 
transportation  essential  to  successful  pursuit,  and  with  pon- 
toons for  the  full  rivers.  But  delay  for  any  cause  was  dis- 
pleasing to  General  Grant,  as  besides  the  supposed  danger 
to  Kentucky,  the  troops  under  General  Canby  on  the  Mis- 
sissippi river,  intended  for  co-operation  with  General  Sher- 
man, were  detained  to  prevent  the  trans-Mississippi  Confed- 
erate forces,  from  joining  General  Hood,  and  on  the  9th  of 
December  at  the  suggestion  of  the  lieutenant-general,  an 
order  was  issued  by  the  President,  relieving  General  Thomas, 
and  placing  General  Schofield  in  command.  General  Thomas 
himself  preferred  to  be  relieved  rather  than  be  responsible  for 
a  battle  fought  under  unfavorable  conditions.  The  order  re- 
lieving him,  however,  was  subsequently  suspended ;  but  there 
was  no  respite  to  the  urgent  communications  requiring  the 
deliverance  of  battle  without  delay. 

General  Thomas  at  first  hoped  to  be  ready  for  battle  on  the 
7th,  but  on  account  of  delay  in  remounting  his  cavalry,  he 
was  not  ready  until  the  9th.  But  with  the  completion  of  his 
preparations  there  came  a  sleet  which  rendered  the  movement 
of  troops  for  any  purpose,  especially  for  battle,  an  impossi- 
bility. Reconnoissances  on  the  llth  and  13th — the  first  by 
Colonel  J.  G.  Mitchell,  and  the  second  by  Colonel  A.  G.  Mal- 
loy — developed  the  fact  that  infantry  could  move  only  with  the 
greatest  difficulty  upon  the  surface  of  the  uneven  ground. 
On  the  9th,  General  Thomas  ordered  General  Wilson  to  move 
his  command  to  the  south  side  of  the  river  to  take  position 
between  the  Hillsboro  and  Harding  turnpikes,  to  be  in  readi- 
ness to  participate  in  the  attack,  projected  for  the  next  clay  ; 
but  even  this  movement  could  not  be  executed  upon  the  ice 
with  cavalry,  except  with  horses  shod  expressly  for  such  a 
surface.  As  the  refusal  of  General  Thomas  to  give  battle, 
after  a  peremptory  order  on  the  6th  to  attack  without  waiting 

VOL.   II — 15 


226  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

longer  for  a  remount  for  his  cavalry,  called  for  the  order  re- 
lieving him  from  command,  with  General  Schofield  as  his  suc- 
cessor, so  his  unwillingness  to  attack  upon  the  ice  first 
elicited  an  order  from  General  Grant,  on  the  llth,  to  delay  no 
longer  for  weather  or  reinforcements,  and  then  another  on  the 
13th,  directing  Major-General  John  A.  Logan  to  proceed  to 
Nashville,  reporting  arrival  at  Louisville  and  Nashville.  And 
on  the  15th,  General  Grant  reached  "Washington,  on  his  way 
to  Nashville  to  take  command  in  person. 

However,  hy  midday  on  the  14th,  the  ice  had  so  far  melted  . 
that  General  Thomas  resolved  upon  attacking  the  enemy  the 
next  day,  and  at  3  p.  M.  he  called  together  his  corps  com- 
manders to  announce  to  them  his  plan  of  battle,  and  give 
them  instructions  with  regard  to  the  specific  action  of  their 
respective  commands  in  its  execution.  The  following  is  the 
text:  ",  Major-General  A.  J.  Smith,  commanding  detachment 
of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  after  forming  his  troops  on 
and  near  the  Harding  pike  in  front  of  his  present  position,  will 
make  a  vigorous  assault  upon  the  enemy's  left.  Major-Gen- 
eral Wilson,  commanding  the  cavalry  corps  Military  Division 
of  the  Mississippi,  with  three  divisions,  will  move  on  and  sup- 
port General  Smith's  right,  assisting  as  far  as  possible  in  car- 
rying the  left  of  the  enemy's  position,  and  be  in  readiness  to 
throw  his  force  upon  the  enemy  the  moment  a  favorable 
opportunity  occurs.  Major-General  Wilson  will  also  send  one 
division  on  the  Charlotte  pike,  to  clear  that  road  of  the  enemy 
and  observe  in  the  direction  of  Bell's  landing,  to  protect  our 
right  rear  until  the  enemy's  position  is  fairly  turned,  when  it 
will  rejoin  the  main  force.  Brigadier-General  T.  J.  Wood, 
commanding  Fourth  Corps*  after  leaving  a  strong  skirmish 
line  in  his  works  from  Lawrens'  Hill  to  his  extreme  right,  will 
form  the  remainder  of  the  Fourth  Corps  on.  the  Hillsboro 
pike  to  support  General  Smith's  left,  and  operate  on  the  left 
and  rear  of  the  enemy's  advanced  position  on  Montgomery 
Hill.  Major-General  Schofield,  commanding  Twenty-third 
Army  Corps,  will  replace  Brigadier-General  Kimball's  di- 
vision of  the  Fourth  Corps  with  his  troops,  and  occupy  the 
trenches  from  Fort  Negley  to  Lawrens'  Hill  with  a  strong 
skirmish  line.  He  will  move  wijh  the  remainder  of  his  force 

*  Gen.  D.  S  Stanley  was  absent  on  account  of  wounds  received  at  Franklin. 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  227 

in  front  of  the  works,  and  co-operate  with  General  Wood, 
protecting  the  latter's  left  flank  against  an  attack  hy  the 
<enemy.  Major-General  Steedman,  commanding  District  of 
Etowah,  will  occupy  the  interior  line  in  rear  of  his  present 
position,  stretching  from  the  reservoir  on  the  Cumberland 
river  to  Fort  Negley,  with  a  strong  skirmish  line,  and  mass  the 
remainder  of  his  force  in  its  present  position,  to  act  according 
to  the  exigencies  which  may  arise  during  these  operations. 
Brigadier-General  Miller,  with  troops  forming  the  garrison  of 
Nashville,  will  occupy  the  interior  line  from  the  battery  on 
hill  210,  to  the  extreme  right,  including  the  inclosed  work  on 
the  Hyde's  Ferry  road.  The  quartermaster's  troops,  under 
the  command  of  Brigadier-General  Donaldson,  will,  if  neces- 
sary, be  posted  on  the  interior  line  from  Fort  Morton  to  the 
battery  on  hill  210.  The  troops  occupying  the  interior  line 
will  be  under  the  direction  of  Major-General  Steedman,  who 
is  charged  with  the  immediate  defense  of  Nashville  during  the 
operations  around  the  city.  Should  the  weather  permit,  the 
troops  will  be  formed  to  commence  operations  at  6  A.  M.  on 
the  15th,  or  as  soon  thereafter  as  practicable." 

General  Thomas  modified  this  plan,  by  ordering  General 
Steedman  to  make  a  most  positive  feint  against  the  enemy's 
right,  to  divert  his  attention  from  the  dominant  movement 
against  his  left,  and  also  by  calling  General  Schofield's  corps, 
first  to  the  reserve,  and  afterward  directing  it  to  move  upon 
General  Smith's  right,  after  other  movements  had  been  suc- 
cessfully accomplished. 

The  weather  and  the  ice,  which  from  the  9th  had  prevented 
General  Thomas  from  assuming  the  offensive,  had  also  for  six 
days  barred  all  activity  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  who  was 
meditating  a  movement  *  round  Nashville  from  the  conscious- 
ness that  he  could  not  successfully  assault  the  army  intrenched 
"before  it.  The  morning  of  the  15th  being  favorable  for  the 
tactical  dispositions  required  by  General  Thomas'  plan  of 
operations,  the  two  armies  were  thrown  into  deadly  conflict, 

*  This  statement  is  not  supported  by  official  testimony,  but  upon  the 
declarations  of  prisoners  and  citizens  within  General  Hood's  lines.  Het 
too,  was  delayed  bv  the  ice-covered  ground. 


228  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

to  contest  not  only  the  possession  of  Tennessee,  but  to  decide 
the  supremacy  of  the  national  arms  in  all  the  West. 

At  4  A.  M.  on  the  15th,  the  provisional  division  composed 
.of  troops  from  corps  and  other  organizations  of  General  Sher- 
man's army,  under  command  of  Brigadier-General  Cruft, 
moved  forward  and  relieved  the  Fourth  and  Twenty-third 
Corps,  occupied  their  exterior  line  of  works,  and  picketed  the 
front  of  this  line  from  the  Acklin  place  to  Fort  !N"egley,  com- 
manding the  approaches  to  the  city  hy  the  Granny  "White, 
Franklin,  and  Kolensville  turnpikes.  At  the  same  hour,  Gen- 
eral J.  F.  Miller  occupied  the  works  with  the  garrison  of  the 
city,  from  Fort  Negley  to  the  Lebanon  turnpike,  covering  the 
approaches  by  the  Murfreesboro,  Chicken,  and  Lebanon  turn- 
pikes. Brigadier-General  Donaldson,  with  his  command,  occu- 
pied the  defenses  from  General  Cruft's  right  to  the  Cumber- 
land river,  commanding  the  approaches  by  the  Harding, 
Hillsboro,  and  Charlotte  turnpikes.  General  Steedman  was 
instructed  to  support  General  Wood's  left,  when  his  corps 
should  take  position,  and  make  a  vigorous  demonstration  in 
his  front  to  cover  the  grand  effort  to  turn  the  enemy's  left 
flank. 

About  daylight  the  other  commands  began  to  move  to  their 
several  positions  as  prescribed  in  the  modified  plan  of  battle. 
General  Smith  advanced  his  second  division,  Brigadier- 
General  Garrard  commanding,  on  the  Harding  turnpike,  and 
deployed  to  the  left  of  that  road;  he  threw  forward  his  rirst 
division,  Brigadier-General  J.  McArthur  commanding,  on  the 
Harding  and  Charlotte  turnpikes,  and  formed  it  on  the  right 
of  Garrard;  his  third  division,  Colonel  J.  B.  Moore,  Thirty- 
third  Wisconsin  commanding,  he  held  in  reserve  opposite  the 
junction  of  the  right  and  left  flanks  of  the  other  two  divisions. 
Owing  to  the  divergence  of  the  roads  upon  which  he  moved, 
and  the  stubborn  resistance  of  the  enemy,  McArthur  did  not 
get  into  position  until  8  A.  M.  He  silenced  a  batttery,  and 
skirmished  heavily  as  he  advanced. 

General  Wood  formed  the  Fourth  Corps,  with  the  Second 
division,  Brigadier-General  Elliott  commanding,  on  the  right ; 
the  First  division,  Brigadier-General  Kimball  commanding, 
in  the  center;  and  the  third  division,  Brigadier-General  S. 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  229 

Beatty  commanding,  on  the  left.  Elliott's  right  was  refused, 
in  echelon  with  Smith's  left.  The  other  divisions  were  formed 
in  similar  manner — the  right  of  each  in  echelon — to  facilitate 
the  wheel  of  the  whole  line  to  the  right,  on  the  left  of  the 
Fourth  Corps  as  a  pivot.  The  formation  of  the  Fourth  Corps 
was  a  double  battle-line — the  first  deployed,  and  the  second  in 
column,  by  division,  opposite  the  intervals  in  the  first.  The 
front  was  covered  with  a  line  of  skirmishers,  and  a  similar 
force  remained  in  the  works  in  the  rear. 

The  Twenty-third  Corps,  when  relieved  from  position  on 
the  left  of  the  Fourth,  moved  to  the  right  of  "Wood.  The 
Third  division,  Brigadier-General  J.  D.  Cox  commanding, 
excepting  one  brigade  left  to  support  General  Steedman, 
moved  by  the  Hillsboro  turnpike,  and  formed  in  the  rear  of 
Elliott's  right;  the  Second  (recently  General  Ruger's),  Major- 
General  D.  IN.  Couch  commanding,  advanced  on  the  Harding 
turnpike,  and  took  position  in  rear  of  Garrard's  left. 

When  the  infantry  on  the  right  had  given  room  for  the 
movements  of  the  cavalry,  General  Wilson  at  once  assumed 
position.  The  Fifth  division,  Brigadier-General  E.  Hatch 
commanding,  took  position  on  the  right  of  Mc^-rthur,  of 
Smith's  corps.  General  Croxton,  with  his  brigade  of  the  First 
division,  formed  on  the  right  of  Hatch.  The  Seventh  divis- 
ion, one  brigade  mounted,  Brigadier  J.  F.  .Knipe  commanding, 
was  held  in  reserve,  to  render  aid  wherever  emergency  might 
demand.  The  Sixth  division,  Brigadier  R.  W.  Johnson  com- 
manding, one  brigade  mounted,  was  ordered  to  move  by  the 
Charlotte  turnpike,  to  clear  that  road  of  the  enemy,  and  keep- 
ing connection  with  Croxton  by  skirmishers  or  patrols,  to  push 
as  far  as  Davidson's  house,  eight  miles  from  the  city,  so  as  to 
cover  the  remainder  of  the  corps  from  the  enemy's  cavalry, 
and  look  well  to  the  guns  of  the  enemy  at  Bell's  landing, 
commanding  the  Cumberland  river,  and  the  force  supporting 
them. 

A  dense  fog  hung  over  the  two  armies  during  the  early 
morning,  which,  with  the  undulations  of  the  ground,  con- 
cealed the  movements  of  the  national  army,  though  from 
these  causes  the  evolutions  were  also  greatly  retarded.  When, 
about  noon,  the  fog  lifted,  there  was  doubtless  to  General 


230  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

Hood  an  unexpected  revelation.  He  had  thus  far  in  the  cam- 
paign monopolized  the  offensive,  and  during  the  days  of  en- 
forced inaction,  he  had  been  maturing  his  plans  to  turn 
Nashville  and  move  into  Kentucky.  This  would  have  been 
an  exceedingly  rash  adventure,  and  after  his  experience  at 
Franklin,  where  three  divisions  beat  back  his  army,  with  the 
help  of  extemporized  intrenchments,  he  could  not,  even  in  the 
wildest  forecast  of  the  consequences  of  an  attempt  to  carry 
Nashville,  with  its  elaborate  fortifications,  held  by  an  army 
of  equal  strength,  decide  to  take  such  a  risk.  Neither  could 
he  stay  long  before  the  city,  and  supply  his  army.  It  was 
imperative  that  he  should  move  in  some  direction,  and  in  his 
desperate  extremity,  he  no  doubt  meditated  an  early  advance 
into  Kentucky,  hoping,  despite  all  the  dangerous  contin- 
gencies, that  he  could  at  least  escape  destruction.  He  had 
not  anticipated  the  necessity  of  so  soon  acting  on  the  defen- 
sive, and  even  when  he  saw  an  army  deployed  before  him  in 
aggressive  attitude,  he  did  not  expect  an  attack  upon  his  left 
flank.  The  troops  opposite  his  right,  during  the  twelve 
days  of  his  nominal  investment,  alone  had  made  the  pretense 
of  aggression,  in  contesting  the  defenses  which  General 
Steedman  had  constructed  when  he  was  before  Wilson,  on 
the  left  of  the  national  line.  And  now,  while  the  strength  of 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  on  his  left,  he  was  to  be- 
still  further  misled  by  a  feint,  which,  from  its  spirit  and 
force,  might  easily  be  mistaken  for  a  positive  assault. 

When-  the  combination  to  turn  General  Hood's  left  had 
been  fully  completed,  Brigadier-General  Whipple,  chief  of 
staff  to  General  Thomas,  bore  an  order  to  General  Steedman 
to  advance  against  his  right,  in  semblance  of  actual  assault.. 
General  Steedman  had  previously  formed  a  column  for  this 
movement,  composed  of  three  strong  detachments — the  first 
under  Colonel  T.  J.  Morgan,  embracing  his  own  regiment,, 
the  Fourteenth  Colored,  the  Seventeenth,  Forty -fourth,  and  a 
detachment  of  the  Eighteenth;  the  second  under  Colonel 
Thompson,  including  his  own  regiment,  the  Twelfth  Colored, 
and  the  Thirteenth  and  One  Hundredth ;  and  the  third  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Grosvenor,  of  the  Eighteenth  Ohio,  com- 
posed of  his  regiment,  the  Sixty-eighth  Indiana,  and  the  Sec- 


BATTLE    OF    NASHVILLE,  ETC.  231 

ond  battalion  of  the  Fourteenth  Army  Corps ;  and  in  addi- 
tion, the  Eighteenth  Ohio  and  Twentieth  Indiana  batteries. 
At  8  A.  M.  the  detachments  of  Morgan  and  Grosvenor,  the 
former  commanding  both,  moved  forward  from  the  Murfrees- 
boro  turnpike  to  Riddle's  hill,  drove  in  the  enemy's  pickets,  and 
assaulted  his  works,  between  the  turnpike  and  the  Nashville 
and  Chattanooga  railroad.  These  troops  gained  a  lodgment 
in  the  works,  but  were  exposed,  while  holding  them,  to  a  se- 
vere tire  from  General  Hood's  massed  forces  on  that  flank, 
and  General  Steedman  withdrew  them.  The  charge  was  so 
gallantly  made,  that  General  Hood  was  so  deceived  as  to  its 
ultimate  aim,  that  he  drew  troops  from  his  center  and  left  to 
give  strength  to  his  seemingly  endangered  flank. 

Soon  after  this  action  on  the  extreme  left,  the  forces  on  the 
opposite  flank  moved  forward  on  the  Harding  and  Hillsboro 
roads  with  resistless  force,  in  executing  the  grand  initiative  of 
the  battle.  McArthur's  division  moved  rapidly  behind  its 
skirmishers,  who  were  soon  sharply  engaged,  arid  gradually 
wheeling  to  the  left,  the  direction  of  the  line,  was  parallel  to 
the  Harding  road.  Advancing  thence  a  short  distance,  the 
division  was  before  a  detached  earthwork  of  the  enemy,  situ- 
ated on  the  top  of  a  hill,  and  inclosing  four  brass  guns.  This 
fort  w^as  covered  by  a  stronger  one,  some  four  hundred  feet  to 
the  right,  and  containing  the  same  number  of  guns.  In  the 
meantime,  Hatch's  division  of  cavalry,  with  its  left  connected 
with  McArthur's  right,  had  swept  round  on  a  longer  curve  and 
was  in  readiness  to  co-operate  in  assaulting  the  forts.  Hatch 
had  previously  engaged  Ecton's  brigade  of  infantry  beyond 
RMiland  creek,  and  had  driven  it  past  Harding's  house,  near 
which  Colonel  Spalding,  commanding  the  Twelfth  Tennessee 
Cavalry,  charged  and  captured  forty-three  prisoners  and  the 
headquarter-train  of  Chalmers'  division.  Hatch's  right  bri- 
gade, under  Colonel  Coon,  having  diverged  too  far  from  the 
direction  of  the  general  movement,  was  now  moved  by  the 
left  flank  till  it  joined  his  other  brigade  on  the  flank  of  the 
four-gun  redoubt,  which  covered  the  extremity  of  the  enemy's 
line.  Here,  by  direction  of  General  Hatch,  Coon's  brigade 
dismounted  to  charge,  planting  its  battery — "  I,"  First  Illinois 
Artillery — so  as  to  enfilade  the  enemy's  line.  Four  batteries 


232  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

then  opened  upon  the  guns  in  the  redoubt  and  soon  silenced 
them,  and  Coon's  brigade  charged  the  supporting  infantry 
force,  and  though  under  the  fire  of  the  second  redoubt,  cap- 
tured the  four  guns.  The  skirmishers  of  McMillen's  and  Hub- 
bard's  brigades  of  McArthur's  division  were  also  charging 
from  an  opposite  direction,  and  entering  the  redoubt  at  the 
same  moment  contributed  to  the  successful  issue.  One  hun- 
dred and  fifty  prisoners  were  taken  with  the  guns. 

The  two  divisions  immediately  moved  to  the  right,  cavalry 
and  infantry  vieing  with  each  other  in  the  effort  to  carry  the 
stronger  redoubt  on  a  hill  whose  acclivity  greatly  increased 
the  hazard  of  an  assault.  This  position,  however,  was  carried 
in  the  same  manner  as  the  other.  Coon's  brigade,  armed  with 
the  Spencer  rifle,  supported  by  two  fresh  brigades,  charged 
up  the  hill  and  drove  the  enemy  from  position ;  while  Mc- 
Arthur's brigades  were  in  such  close  proximity,  in  a  sweeping 
charge,  as  to  lay  claim  to  the  guns  and  two  hundred  and  fifty 
prisoners. 

During  these  successful  movements,  by  the  direction  of  Gen- 
eral Thomas,  General  Schofield  moved  his  corps  to  the  right 
of  General  Smith,  and  formed  it  for  battle.  This  change  be- 
came necessary,  as  the  latter  had  moved  farther  to  the  left 
than  had  been  anticipated,  and  the  enemy's  true  flank  had  not 
been  found.  General  Schofield  was  directed  to  attack  his 
flank,  which  rested  upon  a  group  of  hills  near  the  Hillsboro 
turnpike,  that  the  cavalry  might  operate  in  his  rear.  In  order 
to  preserve  continuity  of  line,  General  Smith  threw  Ward's 
brigade  of  his  reserve  division  to  the  front,  to  fill  a  space  of  a 
half  mile  between  his  right  and  Schofield's  left ;  and  to  give 
full  space  to  General  Schofield,  General  Hatch  moved  to  the 
right,  across  the  Hillsboro  turnpike,  and  with  his  other  bri- 
gade attacked  the  enemy  on  another  range  of  hills,  drove  him 
from  it,  and  captured  a  battery  in  the  valley  beyond.  In  the 
meantime,  Generals  Schofield  and  Smith  advanced  their  lines. 
Colonel  Hill's  brigade  of  McArthur's  division  carried  a  small 
earthwork  containing  two  guns,  but  lost  its  commander  in  the 
assault.  Colonel  Wolf's  brigade  of  Garrard's  division  crossed 
the  Hillsboro  turnpike  and  gained  the  works  on  the  left. 
General  Schofield  moved  to  the  right  of  the  two  redoubts  first 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  233 

captured,  crossed  the  Hillsboro  road  and  a  valley  beyond,  and 
carried  a  series  of  hills  overlooking  the  Granny  White  turn- 
pike— one  of  the  two  remaining  lines  of  retreat  available  to 
the  enemy.  The  charge  was  made  by  General  Cooper's  bri- 
gade of  Couch's  division.  The  enemy  here  made  his  first 
attempt  on  his  left  to  give  a  counter-blow.  He  had  previously 
massed  a  heavy  force  on  his  left  to  hurl  it  against  General 
Thomas'  right  flank.  When  General  Cooper  had  crossed  the 
valley  to  carry  the  hills  beyond,  this  force  appeared  in  his  rear 
in  the  low  ground.  General  Couch  then  sent  Mehringer's 
brigade  against  it,  and  though  the  enemy  was  of  superior 
strength,  Colonel  Mehringer  checked  him  until  Doolittle's  and 
Casement's  brigades  of  Cox's  division  advanced  in  his  sup- 
port. The  engagement  was  continued  with  sharp  fighting 
until  dark. 

The  action  of  the  Fourth  Corps  was  equally  successful.  As 
soon  as  General  Smith  became  engaged  on  General  Wood's 
right,  the  latter  moved  his  corps  toward  Montgomery  Hill,  the 
salient  of  the  enemy's  defensive  line.  This  position  was  very 
strong,  being  an  irregular  cone  rising  about  one  hundred  feet 
above  the  general  level  of  the  country.  The  ascent,  except  on 
the  left  and  rear,  is  quite  abrupt,  and  was  covered  with  forest 
trees.  The  intrenchments  concealed  the  hill  a  little  below  the 
crest,  and  the  approaches  were  covered  with  abatis  and  sharp- 
ened stakes  firmly  planted  in  the  ground.  During  the  forma- 
tion of  the  corps  for  assault,  the  guns  in  position  expressed 
defiance,  and  in  response  and  menace  General  Wood's  guns 
opened  with  vigor.  As  the  corps  advanced,  it  swung  to  the 
left,  in  order  that  the  more  easy  ascent  should  be  in  fronl 
of  Beatty's  division,  which  had  been  required  to  furnish  an 
assaulting  column,  of  which  Colonel  Post's  brigade  was  desig 
nated  for  the  front  and  Colonel  Streight's  for  immediate  sup 
port.  At  1  p.  M.  Colonel  Post  dashed  up  the  hill  and  over  the 
intrenchments  on  the  summit,  and  held  the  enemy's  stronghold 
This  action  was  anterior  to  the  more  positive  success  of  Smith 
and  Wilson  on  the  right,  and  opened  the  way  for  General  Scho- 
field  to  move  to  the  right  of  General  Smith.  When  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps  was  transferred  to  the  right,  General  Thomas  di- 
rected General  Wood  to  throw  his  reserves  on  his  right,  to  extend 


234  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

his  line  to  as  great  an  extent  as  was  compatible  with  the  se- 
curity of  his  front.  In  obedience,  General  Wood  put  the  re- 
serve brigade  of  each  division  on  his  right,  and  then  engaged 
the  enemy  with  his  entire  corps.  He  brought  three  batteries 
into  play  and  pressed  forward  a  strong  skirmish  line,  but  at 
first  made  no  threat  of  assaulting.  Soon,  however,  he  made 
preparations  to  carry  the  enemy's  works  in  his  front ;  moving 
his  right  division,  whose  right  had  extended  in  rear  of  General 
Smith's  left,  farther  to  his  own  left,  and  then  advanced  it  and 
his  central  division,  so  as  to  bring  KimbalPs  division  opposite 
a  fortified  hill  near  the  center  of  General  Hood's  main  line. 
Placing  two  batteries  so  as  to  throw  a  converging  fire  upon 
the  hill,  he  used  them  vigorously  for  an  hour,  and  then  ordered 
General  Kimball  to  charge  with  his  whole  division.  With  loud 
cheers,  the  division  ascended  the  hill  and  leaped  over  the  in- 
trenchments,  capturing  several  pieces  of  artillery,  stands  of 
colors,  and  a  large  number  of  prisoners.  At  the  same  time, 
General  Elliott  carried  the  intrenchments  in  his  front,  and  Gen- 
eral Beatty  crowned  the  enemy's  works  before  his  division  with 
captures  of  artillery  and  prisoners.  In  this  general  advance, 
the  right  of  General  Wood's  line  became  involved  with  the 
left  of  General  Smith's,  and  conflicting  claims  for  the  fruits  of 
victory  were  preferred.  At  5  p.  M.  General  Wood  received  an 
order  from  General  Thomas  to  move  to  the  Franklin  turnpike, 
two  and  a  half  miles  distant,  and  facing  southward,  to  drive 
the  enemy  across  it.  The  corps  moved  as  directed,  but  the 
night  fell  too  soon  for  it  to  reach  its  destination,  but  it  bivou- 
acked on  a  line  parallel  to  the  Granny  White  turnpike  con- 
necting with  General  Smith's  left. 

On  the  extreme  left,  other  advantages  were  gained  after 
the  feint  of  the  morning.  Colonels  Morgan  and  Grosvenor 
pressed  the  enemy  from  Raine's  house  and  held  the  position, 
using  the  buildings  for  defense.  Colonel  Thompson,  with 
his  detachment,  advanced  across  Brown's  creek,  between  the 
Murfreesboro  and  Nolensville  turnpikes,  and  carried  the  left 
of  the  front  line  of  fortifications  on  the  latter  road,  holding  his 
ground  firmly.  In  this  succession  of  aggressive  movements, 
the  colored  troops  were  prominent  and  successful. 

During  the  day  the  enemy  had  been  driven  from  his  original 


BATTLE   OF   NASHYILLE,  ETC.  235 

line  of  works,  and  forced  back  to  a  position  on  the  Harpeth 
hills,  and  his  left  had  been  completely  turned,  though  he  still 
held  two  lines  of  retreat-*-one  on  the  Granny  White  road,  and 
the  other  on  the  direct  road  to  Franklin.  Seventeen  pieces  of 
artillery  had  been  taken  from  him,  also  twelve  hundred  pris- 
oners and  several  hundred  small  arms.  The  cavalry  had  cleared 
its  front,  covered  the  extremity  of  the  infantry  line,  enveloped 
the  enemy's  left  flank  and 'taken  it  in  reverse,  and  had  only 
failed  in  the  extreme  possibility  of  reaching  the  Franklin  turn- 
pike in  rear  of  Hood's  army.  General  Wilson  at  dark  directed 
General  Hatch  to  bivouac  on  the  Hillsboro  road,  to  cover  Gen- 
eral Smith's  right  flank.  He  placed  General  Knipe's  division 
on  Hatch's  right ;  Hammond's  brigade  had  reached  the  six- 
mile  post  on  the  Hillsboro  road,  and  turned  thence  up  a  branch 
of  Blchland  creek  for  three  miles,  bivouacking  on  the  Granny 
White  turnpike.  General  Johnson's  division  had  moved  far 
to  the  right  during  the  day,  to  co-operate  with  the  gunboats 
in  dislodging  the  enemy  from  Bell's  landing,  and  bivouacked 
in  the  vicinity,  in  prospect  of  co-opera-ting  with  Lieutenant- 
Commander  Fitch  in  an  attack  the  next  morning.  General 
Croxton  had  moved  on  Johnson's  left  for  several  miles,  and 
having  turned  to  the  left,  rested  for  the  night  at  the  six-mile 
post  on  the  Charlotte  turnpike.  The  brigade  of  dismounted 
cavalry  took  position  on  the  Hillsboro  turnpike,  to  cover  Hatch 
and  Hammond  against  a  possible  advance  of  the  enemy's  cav- 
alry on  that  road. 

The  whole  army  bivouacked  with  assurance  of  complete 
victory  on  the  morrow.  The  authorities  at  Washington  and 
the  people  of  the  country,  after  ten  days  of  impatience  at 
General  Thomas'  delay  in  preparation  for  a  battle  now  so  glori- 
ously begun,  were  in  full  sympathy  with  the  troops  lying  on 
their  arms  before  the  defeated  enemy.  General  Grant,  on  his 
way  to  Nashville  from  City  Point,  Virginia,  stopped  at  Wash- 
ington, while  General  Logan,  farther  advanced  toward  the 
same  destination,  halted  at  Louisville.  Official  congratu- 
lations from  the  President,  Secretary  of  War,  and  Lieutenant- 
General  sped  their  swift  way  to  General  Thomas  and  his  army. 
The  defeat,  total  and  immediate,  of  'one  of  the  two  great 
armies  upon  which  the  existence  of  the  rebellion  depended 


236  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

was  now  assured,  and  the  reaction  from  the  historic  uneas- 
iness which  had  obtained  throughout  the  country  with  re- 
gard to  the  situation  at  Nashville  to  the  extreme  of  hope- 
fulness with  respect  to  the  immediate  issue  and  the  ultimate 
consequences  of  the  battle,  was  one  of  the  most  marked  revul- 
sions of  opinion  and  feeling  during  the  war.  The  army  had 
felt  no  uneasiness,  and  now  looked  forward  with  calm  as- 
surance to  the  result  which  had  been  anticipated  during  all 
the  days  of  peparation  for  battle. 

During  the  night,  General  Hood  drew  back  his  center  and 
right  to  a  stronger  position,  his  right  then  resting  on  Overton 
hill,  and  his  left  remaining  on  the  Harpeth  or  Brentwood 
range.  His  line  extended  along  the  base  of  the  hills,  his  artil- 
lery was  massed  at  points  most  available  for  its  effective  use, 
and  his  troops  spent  the  night  in  fortifying  the  position.  The 
battle-front  now  presented  by  the  enemy  was  on  its  left  nearly 
perpendicular  in  trend  to  the  right  of  the  national  line,  the 
latter  having  so  far  wheeled  to  the  left  that  its  direction  was 
nearly  at  right  angles  to  its  original  linear  course.  This  rela- 
tion of  the  army  lines  made  General  Schofield  fearful  with  re- 
gard to  his  right  flank,  and  during  the  night  he  requested  re- 
inforcements from  General  Smith,  who  sent  to  him  Colonel 
Moore's  division.  Before  daylight,  Colonel  Moore  was  in  re- 
serve on  General  Schofield's  right. 

As  General  Hood's  retreat  was  now  probable,  General 
Thomas  gave  orders  for  movements  on  the  16th  having  ref- 
erence to  attack  should  he  accept  battle,  and  to  pursuit  should 
he  retreat.  Each  corps  was  ordered  to  move  forward  rapidly 
at  6  A.  M.  until  the  enemy  should  be  met.  As  General  Hood's 
left  remained  in  proximity  to  General  Schofield's  line,  he  did 
not  move  early  in  the  morning.  The  Fourth  Corps  advanced 
promptly  as  ordered  toward  the  Franklin  road.  The  enemy's 
skirmishers  were  soon  encountered,  but  were  speedily  driven 
back,  and  the  Franklin  road  was  gained.  Here  the  corps  was 
deployed — Elliott's  division  across  the  road  facing  southward, 
Beatty's  on  the  left,  and  KimbalPs  in  reserve  behind  Elliott. 
It  then  advanced  rapidly  three-fourths  of  a  mile,  and  met  a 
strong  skirmish  line  behind  barricades,  the  main  line  being 
plainly  in  view  a  half  mile  beyond.  Simultaneously  with  the 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  237 

movement  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  General  Steedman  advanced  011 
the  left,  and  General  Smith  on  the  right.  The  former  soon 
found  that  the  enemy  had  left  his  front,  and  pressing  forward, 
took  position  between  the  Nolensville  turnpike  and  General 
Wood's  left,  his  own  right  resting  on  the  railroad,  and  his  left 
on  the  ]N"olensville  road.  To  cover  his  rear  against  dashes  of 
cavalry,  he  ordered  Mitchell's  brigade  of  Craft's  division  from 
the  defenses,  to  occupy  Riddle's  hill.  General  Smith  ad- 
vanced with  two  divisions,  Garrard's  and  McArthur's,  going 
into  position  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery,  about 
eight  hundred  yards  from  his  main  line.  The  Twenty -third 
Corps  was  still  at  right  angles  with  this  his  new  offensive  line, 
facing  eastward.  General  Smith's  right  was  opposite  very 
strong  intrenchments  of  the  enemy — in  fact,  wras  at  the  base 
of  the  hill  upon  which  they  rested.  He  simply  held  position 
until  1  P.  M.,  waiting  for  General  Schofield,  who  was  to  take 
the  initiative  againt  General  Hood's  left.  There  being  an  in- 
terval between  his  left  and  General  "Wood's  right,  the  latter 
threw  into  it  Kimball's  division,  and  completed  the  continuous 
alignment  of  the  infantry  from  left  to  right.  In  the  meantime, 
the  artillery  from  all  parts  of  the  line  kept  up  a  measured  fire, 
and  even  muskets  were  used  freely  to  induce  the  enemy  to  ex- 
pend his  limited  ammunition. 

Pending  the  movements  of  the  infantry  to  perfect  their 
array,  General  Wilson  was  active  in  the  formation  of  the  cav- 
alry on  the  right.  Early  in  the  morning,  Hammond's  pickets 
on  the  Granny  White  turnpike  had  been  attacked  and  driven 
back ;  but  in  compliance  with  orders,  General  Hammond  had 
strengthed  his  line  and  regained  his  position.  During  this 
action,  Hatch's  division  had  been  directed  to  the  enemy's  rear, 
passing  to  Hammond's  left.  The  country  being  hilly  and 
covered  with  a  dense  forest,  was  impracticable  for  the  move- 
ment of  cavalry,  mounted,  and  hence  the  whole  force  was  dis- 
mounted and  pushed  forward.  General  Croxton  moved  to  the 
front  to  support  either  Hatch  or  Hammond,  and  General 
Johnson,  who  had  ascertained  early  in  the  morning  that  the 
enemy  had  abandoned  Bell's  landing,  had  been  ordered  to 
move  across  to  the  Hillsboro  turnpike.  By  noon,  the  cavalry 


238  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

formed  a  continuous  line  from  General  Schofield's  right  to  the 
•Granny  White  turnpike.  General  Thomas'  object  now  was 
to  turn  both  flanks  of  the  enemy.  His  flanks  were  stronger 
than  his  center,  but  success -in  turning  either  or  both  prom- 
ised better  results  than  to  break  through  his  center,  as  they 
covered  his  lines  of  retreat.  Could  one  or  the  other  be  turned, 
there  was  the  possibility  of  reaching  his  rear  and  cutting  off  his 
retreat,  and  could  both  be  turned  at  once,  he  would  be  thrown 
in  confusion  on  his  only  line  of  retreat  through  the  Brentwood 
Pass,  and  the  probability  would  be  doubly  strong  of  cutting 
him  off.  Having  rode  along  his  line  from  Wood  to  Schofield, 
he  ordered  the  latter  and  Smith  to  attack  the  enemy's  left,  and 
the  former  and  Steedman  to  move  against  Overton  hill. 

The  Brentwood  hills,  rising  about  three  hundred  and  fifty 
feet  above  the  level  of  the  country,  consist  of  two  ranges 
trending  from  their  northernmost  summits,  on  the  one  hand 
to  the  southeast,  and  on  the  other  to  the  southwest,  and  ter- 
minating on  opposite  sides  of  the  Brentwood  Pass,  through 
which  the  direct  road  to  Franklin  courses,  and  situated  about 
nine  miles  from  Nashville.  These  hills  were  the  background 
for  General  Hood's  army ;  his  battle  line  coursed  over  the 
detached  hills  in  front,  covered  in  great  part  with  native  for- 
ests. Overton  hill  commanded  the  Franklin  turnpike,  run- 
ning along  its  base,  and  was  intrenched  around  its  northern 
slope,  half-way  from  base  to  summit,  with  a  flank  running 
round  its  eastern  descent,  and  the  approaches  were  obstructed 
by  abatis  and  other  entanglements.  This  position  was  ex- 
ceedingly strong,  and  the  troops  holding  it  had  been  heavily 
reinforced  during  the  forenoon. 

General  Wood  sent  Colonel  Post  to  reconnoiter  the  position, 
who  reported  that  the  northern  slope  was  most  favorable  for 
assault.  As  before,  his  brigade  was  chosen  to  form  the  head 
of  the  assaulting  column,  with  Streight's  in  support.  General 
Steedman  designated  Thompson's  brigade  of  colored  troops, 
and  Grosvenor's,  to  co-operate  in  the  assault.  As  preparatory 
to  the  advance  of  these  columns,  Major  Goodspeed,  chief  of 
artillery  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  was  ordered  to  pour  a  converg- 
ing tire  upon  the  enemy's  batteries,  and  continue  it  as  long  as 
it  could  be  done  with  safety  to  the  advancing  troops.  At  3 


BATTLE    OF    NASHVILLE,  ETC.  239 

p.  M.  the  assaulting  columns  moved  up  the  steep  ascent,  cov- 
ered with  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers,  to  draw  the  enemy's 
fire  and  annoy  his  gunners.  The  instructions  required  that 
the  columns  should  move  steadily  until  near  the  intrench- 
ments,  and  then  to  dash  up  the  ascent  and  leap  the  abatis 
and  parapets.  The  movement  promised  success  until  the 
moment  of  final  issue.  The,  leading  men  in  each  column 
reached  the  parapets,  and  a  few  had  gained  the  works,  when 
the  enemy's  reserves  opened  a  fire  so  destructive  as  to  drive 
back  both  lines  with  heavy  loss.  The  colored  soldiers  suffered 
equally  with  the  veteran  white  troops,  and  with  them  shared 
the  glory  of  a  gallant  but  unsuccessful  assault.  The  survivors 
were  reformed  at  the  base  of  the  hill,  in  readiness  for  another 
attack ;  but  Colonel  Post  was  not  for  the  third  time  to  lead,  as 
had  received  a  severe  wound. 

The  advance  on  the  right  soon  followed  the  attack  upon 
Overton  hill.  It  had  been  anticipated  that  the  Twenty-third 
Corps,  facing  east,  would  first  advance  ;  but  there  was  so  much 
delay  that  General  McArthur  requested  permission  to  carry 
the  strong  position  before  him  and  General  Schofield  equally, 
and  although  General  Thomas  desired  him  to  wait  until  he 
could  hear  from  General  Schofield,  and  went  himself  to  the 
right,  McArthur,  fearing  that  an  opportunity  would  be  lost, 
directed  Colonel  McMillen  to  charge  with  his  brigade  and 
take  by  storm,  the  hill  upon  which  rested  the  left  flank  of 
the  main  line  of  the  enemy.  McMillen  was  directed  to  ascend 
from  the  west,  while  the  other  brigades  of  the  division  should 
attack  in  front,  when  he  should  be  half-way  up  to  the  summit. 
Colonel  McMillen  ordered  his  men  to  refrain  from  firing  a 
shot,  and  from  all  cheering,  until  they  had  gained  the  works. 
The  One  hundred  and  Fourteenth  Illinois,  Ninth  Indiana,  and 
Eighth  Minnesota  formed  his  first  line,  and  the  Seventy-second 
Indiana  and  the  Ninety-fifth  Ohio  his  second.  A  heavy  line 
of  skirmishers  moved  rapidly  forward,  and  as  it  advanced,  the 
artillery,  in  sympathy,  gave  roar  after  roar  with -quick  repeti- 
tion, while  between  these  sheets  of  flame  and  smoke,  in  the 
stern  silence  of  desperate  valor,  the  brigade  moved  up  the  hill. 
Hubbard,  "  eager  in  emulation,"  started  directly  up,  followed 
by  Hill's  brigade  with  another  leader,  and  all  by  Garrard's 


240  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

division.     The  enemy  opened  with  musketry,  and  the  death- 
dealing  short-range  missiles  of  his  artillery ;  but  on,  without 
halt  or  waver,  moved  the  columns,  and  soon  the  position  was 
carried,  with  three  general  officers  and  a  large  number  of 
lower  grades,  and  a  corresponding  number  of  men  as  prisoners, 
and  twenty-seven  pieces  of  artillery,  and  twelve  stands  of 
colors.     The  shout  of  these  divisions  in  victory  called  forth 
responsive   cheers   from  those   charging   on   right   and  left. 
Wilson,  with  his  dismounted  troopers,  swept  eastward,  and, 
with  Coon's  brigade,  gained  the  hill,  against  which  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps  was  advancing.     Soon  after,  Doolittle's  brigade  of 
Cox's  division  crowned  a  fortified  position  on  the  right  of  the 
salient  of  the  enemy's  left  flank,  the  division  capturing  eight 
guns  and  from  two  hundred  and  fifty  to  three  hundred  pris- 
oners.    The  noise  of  Smith's  victory  moved  Wood  and  Steed- 
man  to  renew  their  assault  upon  Overton  hill — their  entire 
commands  rushing  forward  and  sweeping  all  before  them,  on 
the  summit  and  beyond  as  they  moved  in  rapid  pursuit. 
Beatty's  division  crowned  the  hill,  and  captured  four  pieces  of 
artillery,  a  large  number  of  prisoners,  and  two  stands  of  colors ; 
Kimball's  cleared  the  intrenchments  in  its  front,  and  captured 
a  large  number  of  prisoners  and  small  arms ;  and  Elliott's  car- 
ried the  line  throughout  its  front,  and  captured  five  guns  and 
several  hundred  prisoners   and  small  arms.      This  general 
charge  was  resistless,  and  the  enemy  was  hurled  from  every 
position  in  utter  rout  and  demoralization.     The  success  of 
the  first  day  was  the  inspiration  of  the  second,  and  officers 
and  men  vied  with  each  other  in  personal  daring  and  persist- 
ent, steady  courage.     General  Hood  must  have  regarded  his 
second  position  stronger  than  his  first,  or  he  would  not  have 
attempted  to  hold  it,  for  all  other  conditions  of  the  second 
battle  were  much  more  unfavorable  to  successful  resistance 
than  those  of  the  first.     The  prestige  was  with  the  national 
army,  and,  on  the  second  day  of  his  last  battle,  he  ought  to 
have  known  that  a  victorious  iniatitive  by  a  Northern  army 
had  more  significance  than  when  attained  by  a  Southern  one. 
The  Northern  armies  seldom  lost  a  battle  which  had  a  prom- 
ising beginning,  and  they  often  gained  them,  after  the  South- 
ern people  had  been  electrified  by  the  rash  assumption  of  vie- 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  241 

tory  by  their  generals,  when  afterward,  on  the  same  field, 
their  initial  success  was  turned  into  positive  defeat,  by  the 
pluck  and  persistence  of  Northern  soldiers. 

When  General  Wilson's  command  had  gained  their  saddles, 
which  unfortunately  was  delayed  in  consequence  of  the  fact, 
that  they  had  gone  far  from  their  horses,  as  those  leading  them 
made  slow  progress  over  the  broken  ground  and  dense  forests, 
Hatch  and  Knipe  hurried  in  pursuit.  General  Hatch  was  di- 
rected to  move  on  the  Granny  White  road  and  make  effort  to 
reach  the  Franklin  turnpike  that  night.  He  had,  however, 
proceeded  but  a  short  distance,  when  he  met  Chalmers'  divis- 
ion, strongly  posted  across  the  road  behind  a  barricade  of  rails. 
Dismounting  a  portion  of  his  command,  he  deployed  on  both 
sides  of  the  road.  While  his  skirmishers  were  advancing, 
Colonel  Spalding  charged,  broke  the  line,  and  scattered  the 
force  in  all  directions,  capturing  Brigadier-General  Rucker, 
for  the  time  in  command  of  the  division.  The  cavalry  then 
bivouacked  for  the  night — Hatch,  Knipe,  and  Croxton  on  the 
Granny  White  road,  and  Johnson  on  the  Hillsboro  road,  near 
the  Harpeth  river. 

The  Fourth  Corps  followed  the  enemy  on  the  Franklin 
turnpike,  and  the  frequent  discharges  of  its  artillery  increased 
the  confusion  of  the  retreat.  At  dark  the  corps  bivouacked 
a  mile  from  the  village  of  Brentwood.  The  line  of  retreat 
revealed  the  fact  that  General  Hood's  army  had  abandoned 
itself  to  a  most  disorderly  withdrawal.  Small  arms  and  ac- 
couterments  were  strewn  thickly  along  the  road,  while  no 
effort  was  made  to  carry  off  the  wounded  or  dispose  of  the 
dead.  The  army  was  not  only  defeated,  but  it  was  broken 
and  crushed,  and  had  the  conditions  of  pursuit  proved  favor- 
able, even  the  fragments  would  have  been  gathered  in  capture. 

The  action  of  the  15th  removed  from  all  in  the  North  the 
fear  of  disaster  at  Nashville,  or  the  invasion  of  Kentucky. 
That  of  the  16th  announced  the  overthrow  of  the  rebellion  in 
the  West,  and  foretold  its  speedy  utter  annihilation.  There 
was  now  no  formidable  Confederate  army  between  the  Missis- 
sippi river  and  Virginia.  One  of  the  two  armies,  upon  whose 
organic  life,  strength  and  activity  the  rebellion  rested,  was 

VOL.  II — 16 


242  BATTLE    OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

fleeing  southward  in  disorganization  and  dismay.  On  no 
other  field  of  the  war  had  two  armies  of  equal  proportions 
fought  with  similar  issue.  Drawn  battle  or  indecisive  victory 
had  usually  resulted.  But  now,  the  Confederate  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  which  had  fought  with  historic  honor  at  Donel- 
•son,  Shiloh,  Perryville,  Murfreesboro,  Chickamauga,  Lookout 
Mountain,  Missionary  Ridge,  Hesaca,  New  Hope  Church, 
KenesaW  Mountain,  Peach  tree  Creek,  Atlanta,  Jonesboro,  in 
all  the  minor  battles  of  "  the  hundred  days  under  fire,"  and  at 
Franklin  and  Nashville,  found  its  grave  on  a  field  in  close 
proximity  to  its  first  line  of  defense.  Neither  was  its  demor- 
alization rife  before  its  last  conflict.  There  were  too  many 
officers  and  men  captured  with  swords,  guns,  and  colors,  within 
their  intrenchments,  to  warrant  the  supposition  that  this  his- 
toric army,  with  its  traditions  of  valor  and  unity  on  every 
previous  field,  came  far  north  in  the  mere  semblance  of  the 
boldest  aggression,  to  throw  down  its  arms  in  shameless  dis- 
regard of  its  glorious  antecedents.  There  was,  indeed,  less 
loss  of  life  to  the  victors  than  usual,  but  may  not  this  result 
find  explanation  in  the  nice  adjustment  of  strategic  and  tac- 
tical combinations  and  the  almost  unprecedented  vigor  of  as- 
sault. Successful  assaults  are  never  as  costly  as  those  which 
fail,  all  other  things  being  equal.  Thompson's  brigade  of 
colored  troops  lo^t  twenty-five  per  cent,  of  its  strength  in 
thirty  minutes,  on  the  slope  of  Overton  hill ;  but  had  not  the 
gallant  leader  of  the  main  column  fallen  at  the  critical  mo- 
ment when  a  leader's  presence  and  heroism  is  the  ruling  condi- 
tion of  successful  assault,  the  soldiers  who  fell  on  the  parapets 
and  within  the  enemy's  lines  might  have  lived  to  plant  their 
banners  in  room  of  those  of  treason  and  rebellion.  The  story 
is  half  told,  and  the  philosophy  of  the  victory  is  half  revealed, 
by  the  declaration  of  a  captured  general  officer,  "  that  powder 
and  lead  were  inadequate  to  resist  such  a  charge."  The  other 
half  of  the  history  of  the  battle,  and  the  cause  of  victory, 
come  to  light  in  the  palpable  co-operation  of  the  chief  sub- 
ordinates with  the  commander-in-chief  in  the  execution  of  a 
definite  plan  of  battle,  and  the  personal  supervision  of  the 
vital  movements  by  General  Thomas.  There  were  no  exposed 
flanks,  and  no  opportunities  for  stunning  offensive  returns. 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  243 

"There  was  only  one  unsuccessful  assault,  and  that  was  upon 
the  strongest  position  of  the  enemy,  manned  by  the  heaviest 
concentration  on  his  line.  No  battle  of  the  war  manifests 
more  complete  prevision  of  contingencies,  or  more  full  pro- 
vision for  emergencies  and  possibilities.  This  battle  moved 
on  gloriously  from  i£s  initial  feint  to  the  final  charge,  in  the 
revelation  of  the  highest  type  of  generalship  and  the  highest 
martial  virtues  of  an  entire  army.  Its  immediate  fruits  were 
four  thousand  four  hundred  and  sixty-two  prisoners,  including 
one  major-general  and  three  brigadiers,  and  two  hundred  and 
eighty  officers  of  lower  grades,  all  the  wounded  upon  the  field, 
fifty-three  pieces  of  artillery,  thousands  of  small  arms,  and 
twenty -five  battle-flags. 

General  Thomas  and  the  officers  and  men  of  his  army  were 
fully  alive  to  the  importance  of  vigorous  pursuit.  But  it  had 
been  impossible  to  make  full  preparations  before  the  battle, 
and  the  bridges  on  the  line  of  retreat  being  at  the  mercy  of 
the  enemy,  the  difficulties  in  prospect  were  by  no  means  slight. 
It  was  the  season  of  rain,  and  there  were  bad  roads,  and  the 
rivers  and  creeks  which  crossed  the  line  of  pursuit  were  full, 
as  well  as  bridgeless  in  prospect.  In  the  conduct  of  the  pur- 
suit, General  Thomas  was  put  under  orders  and  exhortations, 
as  he  had  previously  been  to  fight  the  battle  before  he  con- 
sidered himself  prepared  and  the  conditions  promising. 
During  the  evening  of  the  16th,  he  gave  orders  for  the  move- 
ments of  the  next  day,  and  in  one  single  direction  to  a  staff 
officer  he  failed  to  express  what  he  intended.  Being  roused 
from  rest  in  his  tent,  by  an  officer  who  was  to  receive  instruc- 
tions regarding  the  movement  of  the  pontoon  train,  he  di- 
rected it  upon  the  Murfreesboro  road  instead  of  the  one  to 
Franklin.  He  did  not  discover  his  mistake  until  the  next 
morning,  when  he  asked  as  he  was  riding  on  the  latter  road, 
if  the  train  had  passed  to  the  front.  It  was  immediately  re- 
called from  the  wrong  road,  and  hurried  forward,  but  never- 
theless a  serious  delay  resulted. 

Having  given  orders  for  the  care  of  the  wounded,  and  the 
collection  of  the  captured  and  abandoned  property,  General 
Thomas  commenced  the  pursuit  early  in  the  morning  of  the 
17th.  The  Fourth  Corps  pushed  on  to  Franklin  through 


244  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

Brentwood,  and  the  cavalry  followed  the  Granny  White  road 
to  the  junction  of  the  two  roads,  and  then  General  Wilson 
hurried  past  the  infantry.  In  moving  upon  Franklin,  General 
Wilson  kept  General  Knipe's  command  on  the  direct  road, 
and  sent  Generals  Hatch  and  Croxton  to  cross  the  Harpeth 
above  the  town. 

General  Knipe  found  the  enemy  strongly  posted  at  Hollow 
Tree  Gap,  four  miles  north  of  Franklin,  and  charging  him, 
front  and  flank,  carried  the  position,  and  captured  four  hun- 
dred and  thirteen  men -and  three  flags.  At  Franklin,  he  again 
made  a  show  of  resistance,  but  upon  Johnson's  approach  on 
the  south  bank  of  the  river,  he  retreated  toward  Columbia. 

Beyond  the  town,  Generals  Knipe  and  Hatch  moved  in  par- 
allel columns  on  the  Columbia  and  Carter's  Creek  roads,  while 
Johnson  followed  Knipe,  and  Croxton  advanced  on  the  Lewis- 
burg  road.  The  extreme  flanking  columns  were  instructed  to 
press  round  the  flanks  of  the  enemy's  rear-guard,  composed 
almost  entirely  of  infantry,  while  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers 
should  attack  in  the  rear — the  object  being  to  break  up  the 
last  organized  force  which  was  covering  the  fugitive  and 
broken  columns  in  rapid  retreat.  This  rear-guard,  however, 
proved  very  efficient  and  subtle,  preventing  any  successful 
flanking,  and  skirmishing  with  spirit  in  the  rear,  while  moving 
rapidly.  Late  in  the  evening,  the  enemy  took  a  strong  posi- 
tion in  the  open  field,  about  one  mile  from  the  West  Harpeth. 
The  rapid  movement  of  the  cavalry  had  thrown  them  into 
some  confusion  and  intervolution  with  the  enemy,  which, 
with  the  fog  arid  falling  darkness,  caused  some  doubt  as  to  the 
fact  that  the  force  in  front  was  the  rear-guard  of  the  enemy. 
The  consequent  hesitation  gave  the  enemy  opportunity  to 
form  his  line  and  post  his  batteries.  As  soon  as  the  true  state 
of  affairs  was  ascertained,  General  Wilson  ordered  Hatch  and 
Knipe  to  charge  both  flanks.  The  batteries  from  both  sides 
opened  briskly,  when  Lieutenant  Hedges,  commanding  the 
Fourth  United  States  Cavalry,  with  his  regiment  in  column  by 
fours,  dashed  forward  in  a  saber  charge,  and  broke  through  the 
battery.  Hatch's  division  and  Hammond's  brigade,  dismounted, 
charged  at  the  same  time,  and  the  enemy  was  completely 
routed.  Lieutenant  Hedges  was  three  times  captured,  but 


BATTLE    OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  245 

-escaped  at  last.  The  pursuit  was  vigorous,  notwithstanding 
the  darkness.  General  Hatch,  with  the  Tenth  Indiana  Cav- 
alry, forded  the  West  Harpeth,  and  struck  the  enemy  in  flank. 
Being  pressed  on  all  sides,  the  enemy  abandoned  his  guns, 
and  fled  in  disorder,  under  cover  of  the  darkness.  This  rear- 
guard was  Stevenson's  division  pf  Lee's  corps,  under  Forrest. 

The  Fourth  Corps  reached  Franklin  a  little  after  noon,  but 
the  river  had  risen  so  rapidly  after  the  cavalry  had  crossed, 
that  the  infantry  were  delayed  to  extemporize  a  bridge.  Gen- 
eral Steedman  followed  General  "Wood,  and  encamped  near 
by  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Harpeth ;  the  other  two  corps 
were  in  the  rear.  Trains  followed,  with  rations  for  ten  days, 
and  a  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition  to  each  man. 

Early  on  the  18th,  General  Wilson  pursued  and  endeavored, 
with  Johnson's  and  Croxton's  commands,  to  strike  the  enemy 
at  Spring  Hill,  but  he  had  passed  on  over  Rutherford's  creek, 
destroying  the  bridges  behind  him.  The  roads,  even  the  turn- 
pikes, had  become  exceedingly  bad  from  the  heavy  rains  and 
their  use  by  the  enemy,  and  in  consequence  the  pursuit  was 
greatly  retarded.  General  Wood  crossed  the  Harpeth  in  the 
morning,  and  joined  General  Wilson  at  night  at  Rutherford's 
€reek. 

The  difficulties  of  the  pursuit  were  now  fully  apparent,  and 
anticipating  the  failure  of  all  efforts  to  intercept  Hood's  army 
with  his  own  in  direct  advance,  General  Thomas,  on  the  18th, 
ordered  General  Steedman  to  march  his  command  to  Murfrees- 
boro  ;  that  passing  through  Stevenson  by  rail,  he  should  take 
the  troops  of  General  R.  S.  Granger,  including  the  former  gar- 
risons of  Huntsville,  Athens,  and  Decatur,  and  proceed  to  the 
latter  place.  His  instructions  required  that  he  should  re- 
occupy  the  important  posts  on  that  line,  abandoned  at  the  time 
•of  General  Hood's  advance,  and  with  the  remainder  of  his 
forces  cross  the  Tennessee  river,  and  threaten  the  enemy's  com- 
munications west  of  Florence. 

On  the  morning  of  the  19th,  Generals  Wilson  and  Wood 
advanced  to  Rutherford's  creek,  whose  deep  swift  current 
formed  a  better  rear-guard  for  the  enemy  than  his  dispirited 
infantry  and  cavalry.  During  the  day,  several  efforts  were 
made  to  cross  the  stream,  but  all  were  fruitless.  The  rain  con- 


246  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

tinned  and  the  pontoon  train  was  still  in  the  rear.  While  the 
leading  columns  were  thus  detained,  General  Smith  reached 
Spring  Hill,  and  General  Schofield  crossed  the  Harpeth  at 
Franklin. 

The  next  morning,  General  Hatch  formed  a  floating  bridge 
from  the  debris  of  the  railroad  bridge,  and  crossing  with  his 
division  advanced  rapidly  to  Columbia,  to  find  that  the  enemy 
had  succeeded,  the  evening  previous,  in  passing  Duck  river 
and  lifting  his  pontoon  bridge.  General  Wood  also  crossed 
by  various  expedients  and  encamped  near  Columbia. 

The  pontoon  train  reached  Rutherford's  creek  at  noon  on 
the  21st.  A  bridge  was  immediately  thrown,  and  the  troops 
and  trains  passed  over  and  moved  to  Columbia.  The  weather 
now  changed  from  excessive  rain  to  extreme  cold ;  and  this 
greatly  retarded  the  throwing  of  the  bridge  over  Duck  river. 
The  rapid  subsidence  of  the  water  caused  repeated  alterations 
in  the  length  of  the  bridge,  and  protracted  the  delay.  Gen- 
eral Wood,  however,  crossed  in  the  evening  of  the  23d,  and 
encamped  two  miles  south  of  Columbia.  The  cavalry  crossed 
the  next  day  and  the  pursuit  was  resumed ;  but  by  this  time 
General  Hood  had  reformed  his  rear-guard,  and  this  accom- 
plishment was  one  of  the  conditions  of  his  escape.  All  his 
best  troops  had  been  thrown  to  his  rear,  and  the  interval 
between  his  disorganized  forces  and  their  pursuers  had  been 
greatly  increased.  Such,  too,  was  the  topography  of  the  coun- 
try, that  a  small  force  could  compel  the  deployment  of  the 
leading  troops,  with  loss  of  time.  Another  difficulty  was  the 
impossibility  of  moving  the  cavalry  off  the  turnpike  on  the 
flanks  of  the  infantry  column,  as  General  Thomas  had  directed, 
on  account  of  the  softness  of  the  soil.  As  a  consequence,  the 
infantry  fell  in  rear  of  the  cavalry ;  and  in  this  order  Gen- 
erals Wilson  and  Wood  moved  toward  Pulaski.  The  former 
encountered  the  enemy  in  the  vicinity  of  Lynnville,  and  the 
country  being  open  he  was  driven  rapidly.  At  Buford's  Sta- 
tion, while  Hatch  was  pressing  directly  forward,  Croxton  struck 
the  enemy's  flank,  when  he  was  thrown  into  rapid  retreat, 
A  number  of  prisoners  were  captured,  and  General  Buford  was 
wounded. 

The  enemy  moved  hurriedly  through  Pulaski,  closely  fol- 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  247 

lowed  by  Colonel  Harrison's  brigade.  Harrison's  quick  move- 
ment compelled  the  enemy  to  leave  the  bridge  over  Blchland 
creek,  and  hurrying  forward  he  found  him  intrenched  at  the 
head  of  a  ravine  through  which  the  road  passed.  Here  his 
infantry  leaped  quickly  from  the  intrenchments,  brushed  back 
Harrison's  skirmishers,  and  captured  one  gun  of  Smith's  bat- 
tery— "I,"  Fourth  United  States  Artillery.  The  enemy 
retained  the  gun,  but  left  fifty  prisoners  when  Hatch  and 
Hammond  moved  upon  his  flanks.  On  the  26th,  the  pursuit 
was  continued  to  Sugar  creek,  where  the  enemy  was  again 
found  in  intrenchments,  but  which  he  abandoned  upon  the 
development  of  a  line  of  attack. 

Here  the  pursuit  was  abandoned,  as  it  had  been  ascertained 
that  General  Hood's  infantry  forces  had  effected  the  passage 
of  the  Tennessee  river  at  Bainbridge.  The  gunboats  under 
Admiral  Lee  had  reached  Chickasaw,  Mississippi,  on  the  24th, 
and  soon  after  captured  two  guns  from  a  battery  at  Florence. 
General  Steedman  reached  Decatur  on  the  28th,  having  met 
resistance  in  crossing  the  river  at  that  place. 

When  the  pursuit  terminated,  General  Thomas  gave  orders 
for  the  disposition  of  his  forces  in  winter  cantonments,  on  the 
line  of  the  Tennessee  river,  having  ulterior  aggressive  aims. 
His  orders  located  the  Fourth  Corps  at  Huntsville  and  Athens, 
Alabama ;  the  Twenty-third  Corps  at  Dalton,  Georgia ;  General 
Smith's  corps  at  Eastport,  Mississippi,  and  General  "Wilson's 
cavalry  at  Huntsville  and  Eastport.  On  the  30th,  he  an- 
nounced in  orders  the  conclusion  of  the  campaign,  and  con- 
gratulated his  army  upon  its  eminent  success. 

This  was  the  last  invasion  of  the  State  of  Tennessee  by  the 
Confederate  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  composed  largely  of 
troops  from  that  state,  many  of  whom,  in  the  final  rout,  scat- 
tered in  all  directions,  and  never  again  stood  under  their  ban- 
ners. Indeed,  the  banners  of  this  army,  as  such,  were  never 
again  borne  in  battle.  Exclusive  of  the  multitudes  who  wan- 
dered from  his  army,  General  Hood  lost  by  capture  thirteen 
thousand  one  hundred  and  eighty-nine  men,  including  seven 
general  officers,  sixteen  colonels,  and  nearly  one  thousand  of 
lower  grades,  and  two  thousand  by  formal  desertion.  He  lost 
seventy-two  pieces  of  serviceable  artillery,  seventy  stands  of 


248  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

colors,  and  immense  quantities  of  small  arms,  wagons,  pon- 
toons, and  other  material.  If,  to  the  fifteen  thousand  men 
reported  as  prisoners  and  deserters,  there  should  be  added  his 
losses  in  battle  and  the  never-reported  desertions,  it  is  safe 
to  conclude  that  scarcely  one-half  of  his  army  recrossed  the 
Tennessee  river.  The  portion  of  it  which  did  cross,  was  too 
dispirited  to  give  further  support  to  the  sinking  cause. 

In  the  whole  campaign,  General  Thomas  lost,  in  all  the 
forms  of  casualty,  about  ten  thousand  men,  a  large  portion 
of  this  aggregate  having  been  slightly  wounded. 

This  campaign,  as  also  the  Atlanta  campaign,  had  intimate 
relations  with  the  operations  of  General  Canby  on  the  Missis- 
sippi river.  Twice  had  the  Confederate  President  ordered  the 
armies  under  Generals  Smith  and  Magruder,  west  of  the  great 
river,  to  cross  to  the  east — once  to  aid  General  Johnston 
against  General  Sherman,  and  again,  to  join  General  Hood  in 
his  projected  advance  through  Kentucky.  General  Canby 's 
success  in  preventing  the  transfer  of  these  forces  in  the  two 
cases,  eliminated  from  each  the  ruling  condition  of  success. 
He  achieved  this  result  by  holding  the  best  crossings  with 
strong  detachments,  and  keeping  a  floating  a*rmy,  in  con- 
junction with  the  gunboat  fleet,  in  constant  motion  up  and 
down  the  river. 


NASHVILLE,  November  29,  1864. 
Major- General  JSteedman,  Stevenson: 

Your  dispatch  of  11.30  A.  M.  to-day  received.  Concentrate  your  troops 
at  Cowan,  as  previously  directed,  and  if  the  enemy  moves  over  to  the  N. 
&  C.  railroad,  act  according  to  instructions  given  in  my  telegram  of  the 
25th.  When  General  Smith  arrives,  and  he  begins  to  push  the  enemy 
back,  you  can  then  proceed  to  execute  the  Tuscumbia  expedition. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 

NASHVILLE,  November  30,  1864 — 3  p.  M. 
AdmiralS.  P.  Lee: 

As  soon  as  the  iron-clads  return  to  Paducah,  please  order  them  into 
the  Cumberland  river,  to  patrol  that  river  and  convoy  transports  up  and 
down.  Hood  at  present  has  a  cavalry  force  so  much  larger  than  mine 
that  I  have  been  compelled  to  fall  back  and  concentrate  on  Nashville. 
But  as  soon  as  I  can  get  my  cavalry  back  from  Louisville,  I  feel  confident 
I  can  drive  him  back. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  249 

NASHVILLE,  December  1,  1864 — 9.30  p.  M. 
Admiral  S.  P.  Lee  : 

Your  communication  by  Commander  Fitch  and  telegram  of  1  P.  M..  this 
date  are  received,  and  I  am  much  indebted  to  you  for  having  changed 
the  destination  of  the  iron-clads.  Commander  Fitch  thinks  if  the  iron- 
clads you  expect  at  Smithland  were  stationed  at  Clarksville,  the  river 
then  would  be  made  perfectly -safe.  Will  you  please  order  them  to 

Clarksville  ? 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  8.  V.  Commanding. 

NASHVILLE,  December  3,  1864. 
Admiral  S.  P.  Lee,  Mound  City : 

Your  telegram  of  yesterday  received  last  night.  My  force  of  cavalry 
and  infantry  at  Franklin  being  so  much  less  than  that  of  the  enemy,  I 
determined  to  fall  back  to  this  place  to  concentrate  my  infantry  and  give 
time  to  General  Wilson  to  arm  and  equip  sufficient  cavalry  to  meet  For- 
rest. I  have  here  now  nearly  as  much  infantry  as  Hood,  and  in  a  few 
days  hope  to  have  cavalry  enough  to  enable  me  to  assume  the  offensive. 
In  the  meantime,  Captain  Fitch  has  cheerfully  complied  with  my  request 
to  patrol  the  river  above  and  below  the  city.  I  am  therefore  in  hopes  we 
shall,  in  a  few  days,  be  able  to  take  the  offensive  on  pretty  even  terms 
with  the  enemy.  I  regret  much  that  my  telegram  of  the  30th  implied 
an  order  to  you,  which  was  not  intended.  With  many  thanks  for  your 
previous  prompt  co-operations, 

I  am,  yours  truly, 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

December  9,  1864. 
Major-General  J.  M.  Schofald,  Commanding  Twenty-third  Army  Corps  : 

Owing  to  the  severity  of  the  storm  raging  to-day,  it  is  found  necessary 
to  postpone  the  operations  designed  for  to-morrow  morning  until  the 
breaking  up  of  the  storm.  I  desire,  however,  that  everything  be  put  in 
condition  to  carry  out  the  plan  contemplated  as  soon  as  the  weather  will 
permit  it  to  be  done,  so  that  we  can  act  instantly  when  the  storm  clears 
away.  Acknowledge  receipt. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 

Sent  to  Major-General  A.  J.  Smith,  commanding  detachment  Army  of 
Tennessee;  Major-General  J.  B.  Steedman,  commanding  District  of 
Etowah,  and  Brigadier-General  Thomas  J.  Wood,  commanding  Fourth 
Army  Corps. 


250  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

December  10,  1864. 
Brigadier- General  Thomas  J.  Wood,  Commanding  Fourth  Army  Corps  : 

What  is  the  condition  of  the  ground  between  the  enemy's  line  and 
your  own  ?  Is  it  practicable  for  men  to  move  about  on  it  with  facility  ? 
I  would  like  your  opinion  about  it. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-  General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


NASHVILLE,  December  11,  1864. 
Major-Generals  Schqfield,  Steedman,  Smith,  and  Brigadier-General  Wood: 

Have  your  commands  put  in  readiness  to-morrow  for  operations.  I 
wish  to  see  you  at  my  headquarters  at  3  p.  M.  to-morrow.  Acknowledge 
receipt. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


NASHVILLE,  December  1,  1864 — 9.30  P.  M 
Major-General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

After  General  Schofield's  fight  of  yesterday,  feeling  convinced  that  the 
enemy  very  far  outnumbered  him  both  in  infantry  and  cavalry,  I  deter- 
mined to  retire  to  the  fortifications  around  Nashville,  until  General  Wilson 
can  get  his  cavalry  equipped.  He  has  now  but  about  one-fourth  the 
number  of  the  enemy,  and  consequently  is  no  match  for  him.  I  have 
two  iron-clads  here  with  several  gunboats,  and  Commander  Fitch  assures 
me  that  Hood  can  neither  cross  the  Cumberland  nor  blockade  it.  I 
therefore  think  it  best  to  wait  here  until  Wilson  can  equip  all  his  cavalry. 
If  Hoocl  attacks  me  here,  he  will  be  more  seriously  damaged  than  he  was 
yesterday.  If  he  remains  until  Wilson  gets  equipped,  I  can  whip  him, 
and  will  move  against  him  at  once.  I  have  Murfreesboro  strongly  held, 
and  therefore  feel  easy  in  regard  to  its  safety.  Chattanooga,  Bridgeport,. 
Stevenson,  and  Elk  river  bridges  have  strong  garrisons. 

(Signed,)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

WASHINGTON,  December  2 — 10.30  A.  M. 
Lieutenant- General  Grant,  City  Point : 

The  President  feels  solicitous  about  the  disposition  of  Thomas,  to  lay 
in  fortifications  for  an  indefinite  period  "until  Wilson  gets  equipments." 
This  looks  like  the  McClellan  and  Rosecrans  strategy  of  do  nothing,  and 
let  the  enemy  raid  the  country.  The  President  writes  you  to  consider 

the  matter. 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

Secretary  of  War. 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  251 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  2,  1864 — 11  A.  M. 
Major-General  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  Nashville : 

If  Hood  is  permitted  to  remain  quietly  about  Nashville,  we  will  lose 
all  the  roads  back  to  Chattanooga,  and  possibly  have  to  abandon  the  line 
of  the  Tennessee  river.  Should  he  attack  you,  it  is  all  well,  but  if  he 
does  not,  you  should  attack  him  before  he  fortifies.  Arm  and  put  in  the 
trenches  your  quartermaster's  employes,  citizens,  etc. 

(Signed,)  U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  2,  1864—1.30  P.  M. 
Major-General  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  Nashville: 

With  your  citizen  employes  armed,  you  can  move  out  of  Nashville  with 
all  your  army,  and  force  the  enemy  to  retire  or  fight  upon  ground  of  your 
own  choosing.  After  the  repulse  of  Hood  at  Franklin,  it  looks  to  me 
that  instead  of  falling  back  to  Nashville,  we  should  have  taken  the  offensive 
against  the  enemy,  but  at  this  distance  may  err  as  to  the  method  of  deal- 
ing with  the  enemy.  You  will  suffer  incalculable  injury  upon  your  rail- 
roads, if  Hood  is  not  speedily  disposed  of.  Put  forth,  therefore,  every  pos- 
sible exertion  to  attain  this  end.  Should  you  get  him  to  retreating,  give 

him  no  peace. 

(Signed,)  U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  2,  1864 — 10  p.  M. 
General  TI.  S.  Grant,  City  Point,  Va.  : 

Your  two  telegrams  of  11  A.  M.  and  1.30  P.  M.  to-day  are  received.  At 
the  time  Hood  was  whipped  at  Franklin,  1  had  at  this  place  but  about  five 
thousand  (5,000)  men  of  General  Smith's  command,  which,  added  to  the 
force  under  General  Schofield,  would  not  have  given  me  more  than 
twenty-five  thousand  (25,000)  men.  Besides,  General  Schofield  felt  con- 
vinced that  he  could  not  hold  the  enemy  at  Franklin  until  the  five  thou- 
sand could  reach  him.  As  General  Wilson's  cavalry  force  also  numbered 
only  about  one-fourth  that  of  Forrest,  I  thought  it  best  to  draw  the  troops 
back  to  Nashville,  and  await  the  arrival  of  the  remainder  of  General 
Smith's  force,  and  also  a  force  of  about  five  thousand  (5,000)  commanded 
by  General  Steedman,  which  I  had  ordered  up  from  Chattanooga.  The 
division  of  General  Smith  arrived  yesterday  morning,  and  General  Steed- 
man's  troops  arrived  last  night.  I  now  have  infantry  enough  to  assume 
the  offensive,  if  I  had  more  cavalry ;  and  will  take  the  field  anyhow  as 
soon  as  the  remainder  of  General  McCook's  division  of  cavalry  reaches 
here,  which  I  hope  it  will  in  two  or  three  days. 

We  can  neither  get  reinforcements  nor  equipments  at  this  great  dis- 
tance from  the  North  very  easily,  and  it  must  be  remembered  that  my 
command  was  made  up  of  the  two  weakest  corps  of  General  Sherman's 


252  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

army,  and  all  the  dismounted  cavalry  except  one  brigade;  and  the  task4 
of  reorganizing  and  equipping  has  met  with  many  delays,  which  have  en- 
abled Hood  to  take  advantage  of  my  crippled  condition.     I  earnestly 
hope,  however,  in  a  few  more  days,  I  shall  be  able  to  give  him  a  fight. 
(Signed,)    *  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  5,  1864—6.30  p.  M. 
Major-General  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  Nashville,  Tenn.  : 

Is  there  not  danger  of  Forrest's  moving  down  the  Tennessee  river 
where  he  can  cross  it?  It  seems  to  me,  while  you  should  be  getting  up 
your  cavalry  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  look  after  Forrest,  Hood  should  be 
attacked  where  he  is. 

Time  strengthens  him,  in  all  probability,  as  much  as  it  does  you. 
(Signed,)  U.  S.  GEANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 

NASHVILLE,  December  6,  1864. 
Lieutenant- General  U.  S.  Grant,  City  Point: 

Your  telegram  of  6.30  p.  M.,  December  5th,  is  just  received.  As  soon 
as  I  get  up  a  respectable  force  of  cavalry  I  will  march  against  Hood. 
General  Wilson  has  parties  out  now  pressing  horses,  and  I  hope  to  have 
some  six  or  eight  thousand  cavalry  mounted  in  three  days  from  this  time. 
General  Wilson  has  just  left  me,  having  received  instructions  to  hurry  the 
cavalry  to  remount  as  rapidly  as  possible.  I  do  not  think  it  prudent  to 
attack  Hood  with  less  than  six  thousand  (6,000)  cavalry  to  cover  my 
flanks,  because  he  has  under  Forrest  at  least  twelve  thousand  (12,000). 
I  have  no  doubt  Forrest  will  attempt  to  cross  the  river,  but  I  am  in  hopes 
the  gunboats  will  be  able  to  prevent  him.  The  enemy  has  made  no  new 
developments  to-day.  Breckinridge  is  reported  at  Lebanon  with  six 
thousand  (6,000)  men,  but  I  can  not  believe  it  possible. 

(Signed,)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  6,  1864—4  p.  M. 
Major-General  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  Nashville : 

Attack  Hood  at  once,  and  wait  no  longer  for  a  remount  for  your  cav- 
alry. There  is  great  danger  in  delay,  resulting  in  a  campaign  back  to  the 
Ohio. 

(Signed,)  U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 

NASHVILLE,  December  6,  1864 — 9  P.  M. 
Lieutenant- General  U.  S.  Grant,  City  Point : 

Your  dispatch  of  4  P.  M.  this  day  received.  I  will  make  the  necessary 
disposition  and  attack  Hood  at  once,  agreeably  to  your  orders,  though  I 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  253 

believe  it  will  be  hazardous  with  the  small  force  of  cavalry  now  at  my 
service. 

(Signed,)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major- General  U.  iS.  V.  Commanding. 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

WASHINGTON,  December  7,  1864—10.20  A.  M. 
Lieutenant- General  Grant : 

You  remember  that  when  Steele  was  relieved  by  Canby  he  was  ordered 
to  Cairo,  to  report  to  this  department.  What  shall  be  done  with  him  ? 
The  order  superseding  Rosecrans  by  Dodge  has  been  issued.  Thomas 
seems  unwilling  to  attack  because  it  is  hazardous,  as  if  all  war  was  any 
but  hazardous.  If  he  waits  for  Wilson  to  get  ready,  Gabriel  will  be  blow- 
ing his  last  horn. 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON. 


CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  8,  1864. 
Major-General  Hatteck,  Washington  : 

Please  direct  General  Dodge  to  send  all  the  troops  he  can  spare  to  Gen- 
eral Thomas.  With  such  an  order,  he  can  be  relied  on  to  send  all  that 
can  properly  go.  They  had  probably  better  be  sent  to  Louisville,  for  I  fear 
either  Hood  or  Breckinridge  will  go  to  the  Ohio  river.  I  will  submit 
whether  it  is  not  advisable  to  call  on  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois,  for 
60,(JOO  men  for  thirty  days.  If  Thomas  has  not  struck  yet,  he  ought  to 
be  ordered  to  hand  over  his  command  to  Schofield.  There  is  no  better 
man  to  repel  an  attack  than  Thomas,  but  I  fear  he  is  too  cautious  to  take 

the  initiative. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  December  8,  1864. 
Lieutenant-General  Grant,  City  Point: 

If  you  wish  General  Thomas  relieved,  give  the  order.  No  one  here 
will,  I  think,  interfere.  The  responsibility,  however,  will  be  yours,  as  no 
one*  here,  so  far  as  I  am  informed,  wishes  General  Thomas  removed. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 
Major- General,  Chief  of  Staff. 


NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  7,  1864 — 9  p.  M. 
Major-General  H.  W.  HallecJc,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

The  enemy  has  not  increased  his  force  on  our  front.  Have  sent  gun- 
boats up  the  river  above  Carthage.  One  returned  to-day,  and  reported 
no  signs  of  the  enemy  on  the  river  bank  from  forty  miles  above  Carthage 
to  this  place.  Captain  Fitch,  U.  S.  navy,  started  down  the  river  yester- 
day, with  a  convoy  of  transport  steamers,  but  was  unable  to  get  them 
down,  the  enemy  having  planted  three  batteries  on  a  bend  of  the  river, 
between  this  and  Clarksville.  Captain  Fitch  was  unable  to  silence  all 


254  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

three  of  the  batteries  yesterday,  and  will  return  again  to-morrow  morn- 
ing, and,  with  the  assistance  of  the  Cincinnati,  now  at  Clarksville,  I  am 
in  hopes  will  now  be  able  to  clear  them  out.  So  far  the  enemy  has  not 
materially  injured  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  railroad. 

(Signed),  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  8,  1864 — 7.30  p.  M. 
Major-General  Gep.  H.  Thomas,  Nashville : 

Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  received.  It  looks  to  me  evidently  the 
^nerny  are  trying  to  cross  the  Cumberland,  and  are  scattered.  Why  not 
attack  at  once  ?  By  all  means  avoid  the  contingency  of  a  foot-race  to  see 
which,  you  or  Hood,  can  beat  to  the  Ohio.  If  you  think  necessary,  call 
on  the  governors  of  states  to  send  a  force  into  Louisville  to  meet  the 
enemy  if  he  should  cross  the  river.  You  clearly  never  should  cross,  ex- 
cept in  rear  of  the  enemy.  Now  is  one  of  the  fairest  opportunities  ever 
presented  of  destroying  one  of  the  three  armies  of  the  enemy.  If  de- 
stroyed, he  can  never  replace  it.  Use  the  means  at  your  command,  and 
you  can  do  this  and  cause  a  rejoicing  from  one  .end  of  the  land  to  the 
other.  *  •'.. 

(Signed,)  U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  8,  1864 — 10  p.  M. 
Major-General  Halleck,  Washington : 

Your  dispatch  of  9  P.  M.  just  received.  I  want  General  Thomas  re- 
minded of  the  importance  of  immediate  action.  I  sent  him  a  dispatch 
this  evening,  which  will  probably  urge  him  on.  I  would  not  say  relieve 
him  until  I  hear  further  from  him. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

lieutenant-  General. 
% 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  8,  1864 — 11. 30  P.  M. 
Lieutenant- General  U.  S.  Grant,  City  Point,  Va.  : 

Your  dispatch  of  7.30  p.  M.  is  just  received.  I  can  only  say,  in  further 
extenuation  why  I  have  not  attacked  Hood,  that  I  could  not  concentrate 
my  troops,  and  get  their  transportation  in  order,  in  shorter  time  than  it 
has  been  done,  and  am  satisfied  I  have  made  every  effort  that  was  possible 
to  complete  the  task. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

WASHINGTON,  December  9,  1864—10.30  A.  M. 
Major- General  George  H.  Thomas,  Nashville,  Tenn.  : 

Lieutenant-General  Grant  expresses  much  dissatisfaction  at  your  delay 
in  attacking  the  enemy.  If  you  wait  till  General  Wilson  mounts  all  his 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  255 

cavalry,  you  will  wait  till  doomsday,  for  the  waste  equals  the  supply. 
Moreover,  you  will  be  in  the  same  condition  that  Rosecrans  was  last  year, 
with  so  many  animals  that  you  can  not  feed  them.  Reports  already  come 
in  of  .a  scarcity  of  forage. 

(Signed,)  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Major-General  and  Chief  of  Staff". 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  9,  1864 — 11  A.  M. 
Major-General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Dispatch  of  8  P.  M.  last  evening,  from  Nashville,  shows  the  enemy  scat- 
tered for  more  than  seventy  miles  down  the  river,  and  no  attack  yet  made 
by  Thomas.  Please  telegraph  orders  relieving  him  at  once,  and  placing 
Schofield  in  command.  Thomas  should  be  ordered  to  turn  over  all  orders 
and  dispatches  received  since  the  battle  of  Franklin,  to  Schofield. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 

[GENERAL  ORDERS  NO.  — .] 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

,  WASHINGTON,  December  9,  1864. 

The  following  dispatch  having  been  received  from  Lieutenant-General 
Grant,  viz,  "  Please  telegraph  orders  relieving  him  (General  Thomas)  at 
once,  and  placing  (General)  Schofield  in  command,"  the  President  orders : 

I.  That  Major-General  J.  M.  Schofield  relieve  at  once  Major-General 
G.  H.  Thomas  in  cdmmand  of  the  Department  and  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land. 

II.  General  Thomas  will  turn  over  to  General  Schofield  all  orders  and 
instructions  received  by  him  since  the  battle  of  Franklin. 

E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General. 


NASHVILLE,  December  9,  1864—2  p.  M. 
Major-General  H.  W.  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Your  dispatch  of  10.30  A.  M.  this  date  is  received.  I  regret  that  Gen- 
eral Grant  should  feel  dissatisfaction  at  my  delay  in  attacking  the  enemy. 
I  feel  conscious  that  I  have  done  everything  in  my  power  to  prepare,  and 
that  the  troops  could  not  have  been  gotten  ready  before  this.  And  if  he 
should  order  me  to  be  relieved,  I  will  submit  without  a  murmur. 

A  terrible  storm  of  freezing  rain  has  come  on  since  daylight,  which 
will  render  an  attack  impossible  till  it  breaks. 

(Signed,)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


256  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  9,  1864 — 1  p.  M. 
Lieutenant- General  U.  S.  Grant,  City  Point : 

Your  dispatch  of  8.30  P.  M.  of  the  8th  is  just  received.  I  have  nearly 
completed  my  preparations  to  attack  the  enemy  to-morrow  morning,  but 
a  terrible  storm  of  freezing  rain  has  come  on  to-day,  which  will  make  it 
impossible  for  our  men  to  fight  to  any  advantage.  I  am  therefore  com- 
pelled to  wait  for  the  storm  to  break,  and  make  the  attack  immediately 
after.  Admiral  Lee  is  patrolling  the  river  above  and  below  the  city,  and 
I  believe  will  be  able  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  crossing.  There  is  no 
doubt  but -Hood's  forces  are  considerably  scattered  along  the  river,  with 
the  view  of  attempting  a  crossing,  but  it  has  been  impossible  for  me  to 
organize  and  equip  the  troops  for  an  attack  at  an  earlier  time.  Major- 
General  Halleck  informs  me  that  you  are  very  much  dissatisfied  with  my 
delay  in  attacking.  I  can  only  say  I  have  done  all  in  my  power  to  pre- 
pare, and  if  you  should  deem  it  necessary  to  relieve  me,  I  shall  submit 
without  a  murmur. 

(Signed,)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


WAR  DEPARTMENT,  WASHINGTON,  December  9,  1864 — 4  p.  M. 
Lieutenant-General  Grant,  City  Point : 

Orders  relieving  General  Thomas  had  been  made  out  when  his  telegram 
of  this  P.  M.  was  received.  If  you  still  wish  these  orders  telegraphed  to 
Nashville,  they  will  be  forwarded. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Chief  of  Staff. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  9,  1864 — 5.30  p.  M. 
Major-General  Halleck,  Washington  : 

General  Thomas  has  been  urged  in  every  possible  way  to  attack  the 
enemy ;  even  to  the  giving  the  positive  order.  He  did  say  he  thought 
he  should  be  able  to  attack  on  the  7th,  but  he  did  not  do  so,  nor  has  he 
given  a  reason  for  not  doing  it.  I  am  very  unwilling  to  do  injustice  to 
an  officer  who  has  done  so  much  good  service  as  General  Thomas  has, 
however,  and  will  therefore  suspend  the  order  relieving  him  until  it  is 
seen  whether  he  will  do  anything.  * 

U.  S.  GEANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  9,  1864—7.30  P.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas,  Nashville : 

Your  dispatch  of  1  P.  M.  to-day  is  received.  I  have  as  much  confidence 
in  your  conducting  the  battle  rightly  as  I  have  in  any  other  officer,  but  it 
has  seemed  to  me  you  have  been  slow,  and  I  have  had  no  explanation  of 
affairs  to  convince  me  otherwise.  Keceiving  your  dispatch  to  Major- 
General  Hallack  of  2  P.  M.  before  I  did  the  first  to  me,  I  telegraphed  to 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  257 

suspend  the  order  relieving  you,  until  we  should  hear  further.  I  hope 
most  sincerely  that  there  will  be  no  necessity  of  repeating  the  order,  and 
that  the  facts  will  show  that  you  have  been  right  all  the  time. 

(Signed,)  U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  11,  1864—4  p.  M. 
Major-General  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  Nashville  : 

If  you  delay  attacking  longer,  the  mortifying  spectacle  will  be  wit- 
nessed of  a  rebel  army  moving  for  the  Ohio,  and  you  will  be  forced  to 
act,  accepting  such  weather  as  you  find.  Let  there  be  no  further  delay. 
Hood  can  not  stand  even  a  drawn  battle  so  far  from  his  supplies  of  ord- 
nance stores.  If  he  retreats  and  you  follow,  he  must  lose  his  material 
and  most  of  his  army.  I  am  in  hopes  of  receiving  a  dispatch  from  you 
to-day  announcing  that  you  have  moved.  Delay  no  longer  for  weather 
or  reinforcements. 

,  U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  11,  1864 — 10.30  p.  M. 
Lieutenant-General  U.  S.  Grant,  City  Point,  Va. : 

Your  dispatch  of  4  p.  M.  this  day  is  just  received.  I  will  obey  the  order 
as  promptly  as  possible,  however  much  I  may  regret  it,  as  the  attack  will 
have  to  be  made  under  every  disadvantage.  The  whole  country  is  cov- 
ered with  a  perfect  sheet  of  ice  and  sleet,  and  it  is  with  difficulty  the 
troops  are  able  to  move  about  on  level  ground.  It  was  my  intention  to 
attack  Hood  as  soon  as  the  ice  melted,  and  would  have  done  so  yesterday 
had  it  not  been  for  the  storm. 

(Signed,)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  12,  1864—10.30  p,  M. 
Major-General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

I  have  the  troops  ready  to  make  the  attack  on  the  enemy  as  soon  as  the 
sleet  which  now  covers  the  ground  has  melted  sufficiently  to  enable  the 
men  to  march.  As  the  whole  country  is  now  covered  with  a  sheet  of  ice 
so  hard  and  slippery,  it  is  utterly  impossible  for  troops  to  ascend  the 
slopes,  or  even  move  over  level  ground  in  anything  like  order.  It  has 
taken  the  entire  day  to  place  my  cavalry  in  position,  and  it  has  only 
been  finally  effected  with  imminent  risk,  and  many  serious  accidents,  re- 
sulting from  the  numbers  of  horses  falling  with  their  riders  on  the  road. 
Under  these  circumstances,  I  believe  that  an  attack  at  this  time  would 
only  result  in  a  useless  sacrifice  of  life. 

(Signed,)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 

VOL.  n — 17 


258  BATTLE   OF  NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

[SPECIAL  ORDERS,  NO.  149.] 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMIES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  13,  1864. 

I.  Major-General  John  A.  Logan,  United  States  Volunteers,  will  proceed 
immediately  to  Nashville,  Tennessee,  reporting  by  telegraph  to  the  lieu- 
tenant-general his  arrival  at  Louisville,  Kentucky,  and  also  his  arrival  at 
Nashville,  Tennessee. 

•*•*•*###•*•** 

By  command  of  Lieutenant-General  Grant. 

(Signed,)  T.  S.  BOWERS, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

Major-General  Gco.  H.  Thomas,  Nashville : 

It  has  been  seriously  apprehended  that  while  Hood,  with  a  part  of  his 
forces,  held  you  in  check  near  Nashville,  he  would  have  time  to  co-operate 
against  other  important  points,  left  only  partially  protected.  Hence, 
Lieutenant-General  Grant  was  anxious  that  you  should  attack  the  rebel 
forces  in  your  front,  and  expresses  great  dissatisfaction  that  his  order  had 
not  been  carried  out.  Moreover,  so  long  as  Hood  occupies  a  threatening 
position  in  Tennessee,  General  Canby  is  obliged  to  keep  large  forces  on 
the  Mississippi  river  to  protect  its  navigation,  and  to  hold  Memphis, 
Vicksburg,  etc.,  although  General  Grant  had  directed  a  part  of  these 
forces  to  co-operate  with  Sherman. 

Every  day's  delay  on  your  part,  therefore,  seriously  interferes  with 
'General  Grant's  plans. 

(Signed,)  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Major- General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

i 

NASHVILLE,  December  14,  1864 — 8  P.  M. 
Major-General  H.  W.  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Your  telegram  of  12.30  M.  to-day  is  received.  The  ice  having  melted 
away  to-day,  the  enemy  will  be  attacked  to-morrow  morning.  Much  as  I 
regret  the  apparent  delay  in  attacking  the  enemy,  it  could  not  have  been 
done  before  with  any  reasonable  prospect  of  success. 

(Signed,^     •  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  15,  1864—9  p.  M. 
Major-General  Halleck,  Chief  of  Staff: 

Attacked  enemy's  left  this  morning;   drove  it  from  the  river,  below 
city,  very  nearly  to  Franklin  pike,  distance  about  eight  miles. 

(Signed,)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-  General. 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  259 

WASHINGTON,  December  15,  18o4 — 11.30  p.  M. 
Major- General  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  Nashville : 

I  was  just  on  my  way  to  Nashville,  but  receiving  a  dispatch  from  Van 
Duzen,  detailing  your  splendid  success  of  to-day,  I  shall  go  no  farther. 
Push  the  enemy  now,  and  give  him  no*  rest  until  he  is  entirely  destroyed. 
Your  army  will  cheerfully  suffer  many  privations  to  break  up  Hood's 
^irmy,  and  make  it  useless  for  future  operations.  Do  not  stop  for  trains 
or  supplies,  but  take  them  from  the  country,  as  the  enemy  has  done. 
Much  is  now  expected. 

(Signed,)  U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


[GENERAL  ORDERS,  NO.  160.] 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NEAR  NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  16,  1864. 

The  major-general  commanding,  with  pride  and  pleasure,  publishes 
the  following  dispatches  to  the  army,  and  adds  thereto  his  own  thanks 
to  the  troops  for  the  unsurpassed  gallantry  and  good  conduct  displayed 
by  them  in  the  battles  of  yesterday  and  to-day.  A  few  more  examples 
of  devotion  and  courage  like  these,  and  the  rebel  army  of  the  West,  which 
you  have  been  fighting  for  three  years  will  be  no  more,  and  you  may 
reasonably  expect  an  early  and  honorable  peace : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  December  16 — 11.20  A.  M. 

To  Major-General  Thomas  : 

Please  accept  for  yourself,  officers,  and  men  the  nation's  thanks  for 
your  work  of  yesterday.  You  made  a  magnificent  beginning.  A  grand 
consummation  is  within  your  easy  reach.  Do  not  let  it  slip. 

A.  LINCOLN. 

WASHINGTON,  December  15,  1864 — 12  MIDNIGHT. 
Major-General  Thomas: 

I  rejoice  in  tendering  to  you,  and  the  gallant  officers  and  soldiers  of 
your  command,  the  thanks  of  this  department  for  the  brilliant  achieve- 
ment of  this  day,  and  hope  that  it  is  the  harbinger  of  a  decisive  victory 
that  will  crown  you  and  your  army  with  honor,  and  do  much  toward 
closing  the  war.  We  shall  give  you  a  hundred  (100)  guns  in  the  morning. 

E.  M.  ST ANTON, 
Secretary  of  War. 

WASHINGTOM,  December  15,  1864 — 12  MIDNIGHT. 
Major-General  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  Nashville : 

Your  dispatch  of  this  evening  just  received.  I  congratulate  you  and 
the  army  under  your  command  for  to-day's  operations,  and  feel  a  convic- 
tion that  to-morrow  will  add  more  fruits  to  your  victory. 

(Signed,)  U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 
By  command  of  Major-General  Thomas. 

WM.  D.  WHIPPLE, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General. 


260  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND 
Six  MILES  FROM  NASHVILLE,  December  16,  1864. 
The  President  of  the  United  States,  Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton,  and  General  U.  S.  Grant, 

Washington,  D.  C. : 

This  army  thanks  you  for  your  approbation  of  its  conduct  yesterday, 
and  to  assure  you  that  it  is  not  misplaced,  I  have  the  honor  to  report 
that  the  enemy  has  been  pressed  at  all  points  to-day  on  his  line  of  retreat 
through  the  Brentwood  hills,  and  Brigadier-General  Hatch,  of  Wilson's 
corps  of  cavalry,  on  the  right,  turned  the  enemy's  left  and  captured  a 
large  number  of  prisoners;  number  not  yet  reported.  Major-General 
Schofield's  troops,  next  on  the  left  of  cavalry,  carried  several  heights, 
captured  many  prisoners  and  six  pieces  of  artillery.  Brevet  Major-General 
Smith,  next  on  the  left  Major-General  Schofield,  carried  the  salient  point 
of  the  enemy's  line,  with  McMillen's  brigade  of  McArthur's  division, 
capturing  sixteen  pieces  of  artillery,  two  brigadier-generals,  and  about 
two  thousand  prisoners.  Brigadier-General  Garrard's  division  of  Smith's 
command,  next  on  the  left  of  McArthur's  division,  carried  the  enemy's 
intrenchments,  capturing  all  the  artillery  and  troops  on  the  line.  Brig- 
adier-General Wood's  corps,  on  the  Franklin  pike,  took  up  the  assault, 
carried  the  enemy's  intrenchments  in  his  front,  captured  eight  (8)  pieces, 
something  over  six  hundred  prisoners,  and  drove  the  enemy  within  one 
mile  of  the  Brentwood  Pass.  Major-General  Steedman,  commanding  de- 
tachments of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  most  nobly  sup- 
ported General  Wood's  left,  and  bore  a  most  honorable  part  in  the 
operations  of  the  day.  I  have  ordered  the  pursuit  to  be  continued  in 
the  morning  at  daylight,  although  the  troops  are  very  much  fatigued. 
The  greatest  enthusiasm  prevails.  I  must  not  forget  to  report  the  opera- 
tions of  Brigadier-General  Johnson,  in  successfully  driving  the  enemy, 
with  co-operation  of  the  gunboats,  under  Lieutenant-Commander  Fitch, 
from  their  established  batteries  on  the  Cumberland  river  below  the  city 
of  Nashville,  and  the  of  services  of  Brigadier-General  Croxton's  brigade,  in 
covering  and  relieving  our  right  and  rear  in  the  operations  of  yesterday 
and  to-day.  Although  I  have  no  report  of  the  number  of  prisoners  cap- 
tured by  Johnson's  and  Croxton's  commands,  I  know  they  have  made  a 
large  number.  I  am  glad  to  be  able  to  state  that  the  number  of  prisoners 
captured  yesterday  greatly  exceeds  the  number  reported  by  me  last 
evening.  The  roads,  fields,  and  intrenchments  are  strewn  with  the  en- 
emy's abandoned  small  arms,  abandoned  in  their  retreat.  In  conclusion, 
I  am  happy  to  state  that  all  this  has  been  effected  with  but  a  very  small 
loss  to  us.  Our  loss  does  not  probably  exceed  three  thousand,  very  few 
killed. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


•- 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  261 

WASHINGTON,  December  18,  1864 — 12  M. 
Major-General  Thomas : 

The  armies  operating  against  Richmond  have  fired  two  prolonged  guns 
in  honor  of  your  great  victory.  Sherman  has  fully  established  his  base 
on  Ossabaw  Sound,  with  Savannah  fully  ^invested.  I  hope  to  be  able  to  fire 
a  salute  to-morrow  in  honor  of  the  fall  of  Savannah.  In  all  your  opera- 
tions, we  hear  nothing  of  Forrest.  Great  precaution  should  be  taken  to 
prevent  him  crossing  the  Cumberland  or  Tennessee  rivers  below  Eastport. 
After  Hood  is  driven  as  far  as  possible  to  follow  him,  you  want  to  re- 
occupv  Decatur  and  all  other  abandoned  points. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


WASHINGTON,  December  21,  1864 — 12  M. 
Major-General  Geo.  H.  Thomas: 

Permit  me,  general,  to  urge  the  vast  importance  of  a  hot  pursuit  of 
Hood's  army.  Every  possible  sacrifice  should  be  made,  and  your  men 
for  a.  few  days  will  submit  to  any  hardships  and  privations  to  accomplish 
the  great  result.  If  you  can  capture  or  destroy  Hood's  army,  General 
Sherman  can  entirely  crush  out  the  rebel  military  force  in  all  the  South- 
ern States.  He  begins  a  new  campaign  about  the  first  of  January,  which 
will  have  the  most  important  results  if  Hood's  army  can  now  be  used 
up.  A  most  vigorous  pursuit  on  your  part  is  therefore  of  vital  impor- 
tance to  General  Sherman's  plans.  No  sacrifice  must  be  spared  to  obtain 
BO  important  a  result. 

(Signed,)  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Major-General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

IN  THE  FIELD,  December  21,  1864. 
Major-General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Your  dispatch  of  12  M.  this  day  is  received.  General  Hood's  army  is 
being  pursued  as  rapidly  and  as  vigorously  as  it  is  possible  for  one  army 
to  pursue  another.  We  can  not  control  the  elements,  and  you  must  re- 
member that,  to  resist  Hood's  advance  into  Tennessee,  I  had  to  reorganize 
and  almost  thoroughly  equip  the  force  now  under  my  command.  I  fought 
the  battles  of  the  15th  and  16th  insts.  with  the  troops  but  partially  equip- 
ped, and  notwithstanding  the  inclemency  of  the  weather  and  the  partial 
equipment,  have  been  enabled  to  drive  the  enemy  beyond  Duck  river, 
crossing  two  streams  with  my  troops,  and  driving  the  enemy  from  posi- 
tion to  position,  without  the  aid  of  pontoons,  and  with  but  little  transpor- 
tation to  bring  up  supplies  of  provisions  and  ammunition.  I  am  doing 
all  in  my  power  to  crush  Hood's  army,  and,  if  it  be  possible,  will  destroy 
it.  But  pursuing  an  enemy  through  an  exhausted  country,  over  mud 
roads  completely  sogged  with  heavy  rains,  is  no  child's  play,  and  can  not 
~be  accomplished  as  quickly  as  thought  of.  I  hope,  in  urging  me  to  push 
the  enemy,  the  department  remembers  that  General  Sherman  took  with 
him  the  complete  organization  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi, 


262  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

well  equipped  in  every  respect,  as  regards  ammunition,  supplies,  and 
transportation,  leaving  me  only  two  corps,  partially  stripped  of  their 
transportation,  to  accommodate  the  force  taken  with  him,  to  oppose  the 
advance  into  Tennessee  of  that  army  which  had  resisted  the  advance  of 
the  army  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi  on  Atlanta,  from  the 
commencement  of  the  campaign  till  its  close,  and  which  is  now  in  addi- 
tion aided  by  Forrest's  cavalry.  Although  my  progress  may  appear  slow, 
I  feel  assured  that  Hood's  army  can  be  driven  from  Tennessee,  and  event- 
ually driven  to  the  wall  by  the  force  under  my  command.  But  too  much 
must  not  be  expected  of  troops  which  have  to  be  reorganized,  especially 
when  they  have  the  task  of  destroying  a  force,  in  a  winter's  campaign, 
which  was  able  to  make  an  obstinate  resistance  to  twice  its  numbers  in 
spring  and  summer.  In  conclusion,  I  can  safely  state  that  the  army  is 
willing  to  submit  to  any  sacrifice  to  oust  Hood's  army,  or  to  strike  any 
other  blow  which  may  contribute  to  the  destruction  of  the  rebellion. 
(Signed,)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-  General. 

CITY  POINT,  December  22,  1864. 
Major-General  Geo.  H.  Thomas : 

You  have  the  congratulations  of  the  public  for  the  energy  with  which 
you  are  pushing  Hood.  I  hope  you  will  succeed  in  reaching  his  pontoon 
bridge  at  Tuscumbia  before  he  gets  there.  Should  you  do  so,  it  looks  to 
me  that  Hood  is  cut  off.  If  you  succeed  in  destroying  Hood's  army,  there 
will  be  but  one  army  left  to  the  so-called  Confederacy  capable  of  doing 
us  harm.  I  will  take  care  of  that,  and  try  to  draw  the  sting  from  it,  so 
that  in  the  spring  we  shall  have  easy  sailing.  You  have  now  a  big  oppor- 
tunity, which  I  know  you  are  availing  yourself  of.  Let  us  push  and  do 
all  we  can  before  the  enemy  can  derive  benefit  either  from  the  raising 
of  negro  troops  on  the  plantations,  or  white  troops  now  in  the  field. 
(Signed,)  U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


WASHINGTON,  December  22,  1864 — 9  p.  M. 
Major-General  Geo.  H.  Thomas : 

I  have  seen  to-day  General  Halleck's  dispatch  of  yesterday,  and  your 
reply.  It  is  proper  for  me  to  assure  you  that  this  department  has  the 
most  unbounded  confidence  in  your  skill,  vigor,  and  determination  to 
employ  to  the  best  advantage  all  the  means  in  your  power  to  pursue  and 
destroy  the  enemy.  No  department  could  be  inspired  with  more  pro- 
found admiration  and  thankfulness  for  the  great  deed  which  you  have 
already  performed,  or  more  confiding  faith  that  human  effort  could  do  no 
more,  and  no  more  than  will  be  done  by  you  and  the  accomplished  gal- 
lant officers  and  soldiers  of  your  command. 

(Signed,)  E.  M.  STANTON. 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  263 

WASHINGTON,  December  22,  1864 — 9  p.  M. 
Major- General  Thomas : 

In  order  that  the  department  may,  as  fully  as  the  case  will  permit,  award 
due  promotions  to  your  army,  please  forward,  some  time  before  the  5th  of 
next  month,  a  list  of  such  promotions  as  you  desire  to  recommend.  There 
is  no  vacancy  in  the  number  of  major-generals  by  law,  and  only  two — 
but  brevets  can  be  granted,  and  some  vacancies  may  be  created  by  muster- 
ing out  useless  officers. 

E.  M.  STANTON, 

Secretary  of  War. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 
•'  COLUMBIA,  December  23,  1864 — 8  P.  M. 

Major-General  H.  W.  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

The  troops  are  still  crossing  Duck  river,  and  all  close  up  to  the  enemy's 
rear-guard,  on  the  Pulaski  road.  I  hope  to  get  the  whole  force  across  to- 
morrow, and  continue  the  pursuit.  The  railroad  bridges  between  Spring 
Hill  and  this  place,  five  in  number,  have  been  destroyed,  but  the  con- 
struction corps  is  hard  at  work,  and  I  am  in  hopes  will  have  the  road  re- 
paired up  to  Columbia  in  the  course  of  four  or  five  days.  The  railroad 
between  Chattanooga  and  Murfreesboro  is  in  running  order,  and  I  am 
assured  that  the  road  between  Nashville  and  Murfreesboro  will  be  re- 
paired in  a  few  days.  General  McCook  has  routed  and  scattered  the  rebel 
General  Lyon,  who  succeded  in  crossing  the  Cumberland  river,  and  with 
General  Long,  will  soon  join  General  Wilson,  thus  increasing  my  cavalry 
force  sufficiently  to  enable  me  to  completely  destroy  Forrest,  if  I  can 
overtake  him,  which  I  shall  make  every  exertion  to  do. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

December  23,  1864—8  p.  M. 
Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Your  two  dispatches  of  9  P.  M.,  22d,  are  received.  I  am  profoundly 
thankful  for  the  hearty  expression  of  your  confidence  in  my  determina- 
tion, and  desire  to  do  all  in  my  power  to  destroy  the  enemy,  and  put 
down  the  rebellion ;  and  in  the  name  of  this  army,  I  thank  you  for  the 
complimentary  notice  you  have  taken  of  all  connected  with  it,  for  the 
deeds  of  valor  they  have  performed.  I  will  forward  the  list  of  merito- 
rious officers  to-morrow  or  next  day. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


264  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  SAVANNAH,  GA.,  December  23,  1864. 

DEAR  GENERAL  : — Major  Dixon  arrived  last  night,  bringing  your  letter 
of  the  10th  December,  for  which  I  am  very  much  obliged,  as  it  gives  me 
a  clear  and  distinct  view  of  the  situation  of  affairs  at  Nashville  up  to  that 
date.  I  have  also  from  the  War  Department  a  copy  of  General  Thomas' 
dispatch,  giving  an  account  of  the  attack  on  Hood  on  the  15th,  which  was 
successful,  but  not  complete.  I  await  further  accounts  with  anxiety,  as 
Thomas'  complete  success  is  necessary  to  initiate  my  plans  for  this  cam- 
paign, and  I  have  no  doubt  that  my  calculation,  that  Thomas  had  in  hand 
(including  A.  J.  Smith's  troops)  a  force  large  enough  to  whip  Hood  in 
fair  fight,  was  correct  I  approved  of  Thomas'  allowing  Hood  to  come 
north  far  enough  to  enable  him  to  concentrate  his  own  men,  though  I 
would  have  preferred  that  Hood  should  have  been  checked  about  Colum- 
bia. Still,  if  Thomas  followed  up  his  success  of  the  15th,  and  gave  Hood 
a  good  whaling,  and  is  at  this  moment  following  him  closely,  the  whole 
campaign  in  my  division  will  be  even  more  perfect  than  the  Atlanta  cam- 
paign, for  at  this  end  of  the  line  I  have  realized  all  I  had  reason  to  hope 
for,  except  in  the  release  of  our  prisoners,  which  was  simply  an  impos- 
sibility. 

December  24. — I  have  just  received  a  letter  from  General  Grant,  giving 
a  detail  of  General  Thomas'  operations  up  to  the  18th,  and  I  am  gratified 
beyond  measure  at  the  result. 

Show  this  letter  to  General  Thomas,  and  tell  him  to  consider  it  ad- 
dressed to  him,  as  I  have  not  time  to  write  more  now.  I  want  General 
Thomas  to  follow  Hood  to  and  beyond  the  Tennessee,  and  not  hesitate 
to  go  on  as  far  as  Columbus,  Mississippi,  or  Selma,  Alabama,  as  I  know 
that  he  will  have  no  trouble  whatever  in  subsisting  his  army  anywhere 
below  Sand  Mountain,  and  along  the  Black  Warrior.  In  the  poorest  part 
of  Georgia,  I  found  no  trouble  in  subsisting  my  army  and  animals,  some 
of  my  corps  not  issuing  but  one  (1)  day's  bread  from  Atlanta  to  Sa- 
vannah. 

Keep  me  fully  advised  by  telegraph,  via  New  York,  of  the  situation  of 
affairs  in  Tennessee.  I  will  be  here  probably  ten  (10)  days  longer,  and  in 
communication  for  a  longer  time. 

I  am,  very  truly  yours, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 

General  J.  D.  Webster,  Nashville,  Term. 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

PULASKI,  TENX.,  December  28,  1864. 
Major-General  Steedman,  Decatur,  Ala, : 

Your  dispatch  of  the  27th  received.  I  am  very  much  gratified  with 
your  operations  against  Decatur.  The  roads  from  here  to  Florence  are  in 
an  almost  impassable  condition,  and  the  country  is  so  completely  devas- 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  265 

tated  that  we  scarcely  get  any  supplies ;  but  the  enemy  has  been  as  vig- 
orously pursued  as  circumstances  will  admit.  It  is  reported  that  Hood 
crossed  at  Lamb's  ferry  and  Bainbridge,  with  what  force  he  could  get  off. 
He  is  represented  as  being  in  a  most  Deplorable  condition.  I  shall  try  to 
intercept  him  at  luka,  if  he  retreats  that  way,  and  I  want  you  to  push  a 
strong  reconnoissance  toward  Lamb's  ferry,  to  see  if  he  has  retreated  by 

way  of  Courtland  and  Moulton. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


[GENERAL  ORDERS,  NO.  169.] 

PULASKI,  December  29,  1864. 

SOLDIERS  : — The  major-general  commanding  announces  to  you  that  the 
rear-guard  of  the  flying  and  dispirited  enemy  was  driven  across  the  Ten- 
nessee river,  on  the  night  of  the  27th  instant.  The  impassable  state  of 
the  roads,  and  consequent  impossibility  to  supply  the  army,  compels  a 
closing  of  the  campaign  for  the  present. 

Although  short,  it  has  been  brilliant  in  its  achievements,  and  unsur- 
passed in  its  results  by  any  other  of  this  war,  and  is  one  of  which  all  who 
participated  therein  may  be  justly  proud.  That  veteran  army  which, 
though  driven  from  position  to  position,  opposed  a  stubborn  resistance  to 
much  superior  numbers  during  the  whole  of  the  Atlanta  campaign,  taking 
advantage  of  the  absence  of  the  largest  portion  of  the  army  which  had  been 
opposed  to  it  in  Georgia,  invaded  Tennessee,  buoyant  with  hope,  expect- 
ing Nashville,  Murfreesboro,  and  the  whole  of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky 
to  fall  into  its  power,  an  easy  prey,  and  scarcely  fixing  a  limit  to  its  con- 
quests. After  having  received,  at  Franklin,  the  most  terrible  check  that 
army  has  received  during  this  war,  and  later,  at  Murfreesboro,  in  its  at- 
tempt to  capture  that  place,  it  was  finally  attacked  at  Nashville,  and, 
although  your  forces  were  inferior  to  it  in  numbers,  was  hurled  back  from 
the  coveted  prize,  on  which  it  had  been  permitted  to  look  from  a  distance, 
and  finally  sent  flying,  dismayed  and  disordered,  whence  it  came,  impelled 
by  the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  and  thinking  only  of  how  it  could 
relieve  itself  for  short  intervals  from  your  persistent  and  harassing  pur- 
suit, by  burning  the  bridges  over  the  swollen  streams,  as  it  passed  them, 
until,  finally,  it  had  placed  the  broad  waters  of  the  Tennessee  river  be- 
tween you  and  its  shattered,  diminished,  and  discomfited  columns,  leav- 
ing its  artillery  and  battle-flags  in  your  victorious  hands — lasting  trophies 
of  your  noble  daring,  and  lasting  monuments  of  the  enemy's  disgrace  and 
defeat. 

You  have  diminished  the  forces  of  the  rebel  army  since  it  crossed  the 
Tennessee  river  to  invade  the  state,  at  the  least  estimate,  fifteen  thousand 
men,  among  whom  were  killed,  wounded,  and  captured  eighteen  general 
officers. 

Your  captures  from  the  enemy,  as  far  as  reported,  amount  to  sixty-eight 
pieces  of  artillery,  ten  thousand  prisoners,  as  many  stand  of  small  arms — 


266  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

several  thousand  of  which  have  been  gathered  in,  and  the  remainder 
strew  the  route  of  the  enemy's  retreat — and  between  thirty  and  forty 
flags,  besides  compelling  him  to  destroy  much  ammunition  and  abandon 
many  wagons;  and,  unless  he  is  mad,  he  must  forever  abandon  all  hope 
of  bringing  Tennessee  again  within  the  lines  of  the  accursed  rebellion. 

•A  short  time  will  now  be  given  you  to  prepare  to  continue  the  work 
so  nobly  begun. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Thomas. 

W.  D.  WHIPPLE, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General. 


EXTRACTS  FROM  GENERAL  GEO.  H.  THOMAS'  REPORT. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th  of  December,  the  weather  being  favorable, 
the  army  was  formed,  and  ready  at  an  early  hour  to  carry  out  the  plan 
of  battle  promulgated  in  the  special  field  orders  of  the  14th.  The  forma- 
t/on of  troops  was  partially  concealed  from  the  enemy  by  the  broken 
nature  of  the  ground,  as  also  by  a  fog,  which  lifted  toward  noon. 

*•#'•--*•  :»':  ''    *  :  '.**#* 

Finding  General  Smith  had  not  taken  as  much  distance  to  the  right  as 
i  expected  he  would  have  done,  I  directed  General  Schofield  to  move  his 
command  (the  Twenty-Third  Corps)  from  position  in  reserve,  to  which  it 
had  been  assigned,  over  to  the  right  of  General  Smith,  enabling  the  cav- 
alry thereby  to  operate  more  freely  to  the  enemy's  rear.  This  was  rap- 
idly accomplished  by  General  Schofield,  and  his  troops  participated,  in 
the  closing  operations  of  the  day. 

»:  ••'•*. '•'•»»'•»»•*'» 

Our  line  at  nightfall  was  readjusted,  running  parallel  to  and  east  of  the 
Hillsboro  pike — Schofield' s  command  on  the  right,  Smith's  in  the  center, 
and  Wood's  on  the  left,  with  cavalry  on  the  right  of  Schofield,  Steedman 
holding  the  position  he  had  gained  early  in  the  morning.  The  total  result 
of  the  day's  operations  was  the  capture  of  sixteen  pieces  of  artillery  and 
twelve  hundred  prisoners,  besides  several  hundred  stands  of  small  arms, 
and  about  forty  (40)  wagons.  The  enemy  had  been  forced  back  at  all 
points  with  heavy  loss.  Our  casualties  were  unusually  light.  The  beha- 
vior of  the  troops  was  unsurpassed  for  steadiness  and  alacrity  in  every 
movement,  and  the  original  plan  of  battle,  with  but  few  alterations, 
strictly  adhered  to.  The  whole  command  bivouacked  in  line  of  battle 
during  the  night,  on  the  ground  occupied  at  dark,  while  preparation's 
were  made  to  renew  the  battle  at  an  early  hour  on  the  morrow. 

•*-**#****-* 

Immediately  following  the  effort  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  Generals  Smith's 
and  Schofield's  commands  moved  against  the  enemy's  works  in  their  re- 
spective fronts,  carrying  all  before  them,  irreparably  breaking  his  lines  in 
a  dozen  places,  and  capturing  all  his  artillery  and  thousands  of  prisoners — 
among  the  latter,  four  (4)  general  officers.  Our  loss  was  remarkably 
small,  scarcely  mentionable.  All  of  the  enemy  that  did  escape  were  pur- 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  267 

sued  over  the  tops  of  Brentwood  and  Harpeth  hills.  General  Wilson's 
cavalry,  dismounted,  attacked  the  enemy  simultaneously  with  Schofield 
and  Smith,  striking  him  in  reverse,  and  gaining  firm  possession  of 
Granny  White  pike,  cut  off  his  retreat  by  that  route.  Wood's  and  Steed- 
man's  troops  hearing  the  shouts  of  victory  coming  from  the  right,  rushed 
impetuously  forward,  renewing  the  assault  on  Overton's  hill,  and  although 
meeting  a  very  heavy  fire,  the  onset  was  irresistible,  artillery  and  many 
prisoners  falling  into  our  hands.  The  enemy,  hopelessly  broken,  fled  in 
confusion  through  Brentwood  Pass,  the  Fourth  Corps  in  close  pursuit, 
which  was  continued  for  several  miles,  when  darkness  closed  the  scene, 
and  the  troops  rested  from  their  labors. 

•K-  -3f  •*  #•  #  •*  *  *  •* 

During  the  two  days'  operations  there  were  4,462  prisoners  captured, 
including  287  officers  of  all  grades  from  that  of  major-general,  fifty-three 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  thousands  of  small  arms.  The  enemy  abandoned 
on  the  field  all  of  his  dead  and  wounded. 


EXTEACT  FROM  GENERAL  SCHOFIELD'S  REPORT. 

On  the  night  of  the  15th  I  waited  upon  the  major-general  commanding, 
at  his  headquarters,  and  received  his  orders  for  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy 
on  the  following  day.  Our  operations  during  the  15th  had  swung  the 
right  and  center  forward,  so  that  the  general  direction  of  the  line  was 
nearly  perpendicular  to  that  before  the  attack,  only  the  right  was  in  con- 
tact with  the  enemy,  and  was  therefore  much  exposed.  Apprehensive 
that  the  enemy,  instead  of  retreating  during  the  night,  would  mass  and 
attack  our  right  in  the  morning,  I  requested  that  a  division  of  infantry 
be  sent  to  reinforce  the  right,  which  was  ordered  accordingly  from  Major- 
General  Smith's  command.  In  response  to  this  order,  General  Smith 
sent  five  regiments  and  a  battery  (about  1,600  men),  which  were  put  in 
reserve  near  the  right.  In  the  morning  it  was  found  that  the  enemy  still 
held  his  position  in  our  front,  of  which  the  hill  in  front  of  General  Couch 
was  the  key,  and  bad  thrown  up  considerable  breastworks  during  the 
night.  He  had  also  increased  the  force  on  his  left  during  the  night,  and 
continued  to  mass  troops  during  the  early  part  of  the  day.  During  the 
morning,  therefore,  our  operations  were  limited  to  preparations  for  de- 
fense and  co-operation  with  cavalry,  which  was  operating  to  strike  the 
Granny  White  pike,  in  rear  of  the  enemy. 

About  noon,  the  troops  on  my  left  (Generals  Smith  and  Wood)  having 
advanced  and  come  in  contact  with  the  enemy  in  his  new  position,  the 
enemy  again  withdrew  from  his  'left  a  considerable  force  to  strengthen 
his  right  and  center,  when  I  ordered  General  Cox  to  advance,  in  conjunc- 
tion with  cavalry,  and  endeavor  to  carry  a  high  wooded  hill  beyond  the 
flank  of  the  enemy's  intrenched  line  and  overlooking  the  Granny  White 
pike.  The  hill  was  occupied  by  the  enemy  in  considerable  force,  but  was 
not  intrenched.  My  order  was  not  executed  with  the  promptness  or  en- 


268  BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC. 

ergy  which  I  had  expected,  yet  probably  with  as  much  as  I  had  reason  to 
expect,  considering  the  attenuated  character  of  General  Cox's  line  and 
the  great  distance  and  rough  ground  over  which  the  attacking  force  had 
to  move.  The  hill  was,  however,  carried  by  General  Wilson's  cavalry 
(dismounted),  whose  gallantry  and  energy  on  that  and  other  occasions, 
which  came  under  my  observations,  can  not  be  too  greatly  praised. 
Almost  simultaneously  with  this  attack  on  the  extreme  right,  the  salient 
hill,  in  front  of  General  Couch,  was  attacked  and  carried  by  General 
Smith's  troops,  supported  by  a  brigade  of  General  Couch's  division,  and 
the  fortified  hill  in  front  of  General  Cox,  which  constituted  the  extreme 
flank  of  the  enemy's  intrenched  line,  was  attacked  and  carried  by  Colonel 
Doolittle's  brigade  of  General  Cox's  division,  the  latter  capturing  eight 
pieces  of  artillery  and  two  to  three  hundred  prisoners. 


EXTKACT  FROM  GENERAL  SMITH'S  REPORT. 

During  the  night  a  request  coming  from  General  Schoefield,  command- 
ing Twenty-third  Corps,  for  reinforcements,  I  sent  him  the  Third  division, 
Colonel  J.  B.  Moore  commanding,  just  before  daylight.  On  the  morning 
of  the  16th,  advancing  my  line  in  the  same  order  as  on  the  previous  day, 
the  First  on  the  right  and  the  Second  divison  on  the  left,  it  was  discovered 
that  the  enemy  had  taken  position  at  the  base  of  a  chain  of  hills,  called 
the  Brentwood  hills,  with  a  front  nearly  perpendicular  to  our  lines,  and 
had  strongly  intrenched  themselves  by  throwing  up  breastworks  and 
massing  artillery  in  every  available  position.  Changing  my  front  by  a 
half-wheel,  by  brigades  the  command  moved  slowly  in  echelon  from  the 
right,  so  as  not  to  break  connections  with  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  took  a 
position  directly  in  front  of  the  enemy,  at  a  distance  of  about  six  hun- 
dred yards,  my  right  resting  at  the  base  of  a  hill,  on  the  top  of  which  was 
the  enemy's  left,  and  my  line  being  the  whole  front  of  the  two  divisions, 
extending  about  one  mile.  The  enemy  opening  a  heavy  artillery  fire 
upon  my  brigades,  as  they  went  into  position,  all  the  batteries  of  the  First 
and  Second  divisions,  six  in  number,  were  brought  into  action  at  a  dis- 
tance of  about  eight  hundred  yards,  and  after  a  fierce  cannonading  of 
about  two  hours,  succeeded  in  quieting  the  enemy's  guns  in  our  front. 
The  Twenty-third  Corps  was  on  my  right  in  the  intrenchments,  thrown 
up  by  them  the  night  before,  and  nearly  at  right  angles  with  my  present 
line.  Expecting  that  corps  to  take  the  initiative,  as  they  were  on  the 
flank  of  the  enemy,  I  held  the  command  in  its  present  position,  keeping 
up  a  slow  artillery  fire  at  their  line  without  eliciting  any  reply.  About 
1  o'clock  I  received  a  request  from  General  Schofield,  and  a  few  min- 
utes later  an  order  from  you,  to  send  another  division  to  his  assistance, 
he  having  retained  the  one  sent  at  daylight  that  morning,  not  having  any 
reserve,  and  my  whole  line  being  in  front  of  the  enemy,  and  liable  to  be 
attacked  and  broken  at  any  point  wherever  a  brigade  should  be  with- 
drawn, I  therefore  sent  a  staff  officer  to  him  to  state  the  condition  of 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE,  ETC.  269 

my  command,  and  ascertain  if  he  cou^d  not  get  along  without  my  divis- 
ion. The  officer  reported  to  me  that  General  Schofield's  line  was  not  en- 
gaged, and  upon  my  condition  being  reported  to  him,  he  said  he  did 
not  need  the  additional  force,  consequently  it  was  not  sent.  About  3 
o'clock  P.  M.  General  Me  Arthur  sent  word  that  he  could  carry  the  hill  on 
his  left  by  assault.  Major-General  Thomas  being  present,  the  matter  was 
referred  to  him,  and  I  was  requested  to  delay  the  movement  until  he 
could  hear  from  General  Schofield,  to  whom  he  had  sent.  General  Mc- 
Arthur  not  receiving  any  reply,  and  fearing  if  the  attack  should  be  longer 
delayed  the  enemy  would  use  the  right  to  strengthen  his  works,  directed 
the  First  brigade,  Colonel  N.  L.  McMillen,  Ninty-fifth  Ohio  Infantry,  to 
storm  the  hill  on  which  was  the  left  of  the  enemy's  line,  and  the  Second 
and  Third  brigades  of  the  division  to  attack  in  front,  when  the  first  should 
be  half-way  up  the  hill. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

MINOR  OPERATIONS  HAVING  RELATIONS  MORE  OR  LESS  INTIMATE 
WITH  THOSE  OF  THE  MAIN  ARMY  DURING  NOVEMBER  AND  DE- 
CEMBER. 

GENERAL  STEEDMAN  knew,  upon  reaching  Decatur,  that  it  was 
too  late  to  embarrass  the  enemy  in  crossing  the  Tennessee  river, 
but  he  determined  to  move  toward  his  line  of  retreat  south  of 
the  river.  He  had  been  joined  at  Stevenson  by  Colonel  W. 
J.  Palmer,  of  the  Fifteenth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  with  a  force 
composed  of  his  own  regiment  and  detachments  from  the  Sec- 
ond Tennessee,  and  the  Tenth,  Twelfth,  and  Thirteenth  Indiana 
Cavalry,  in  all  about  six  hundred  and  fifty  men.  At  8  p.  M.  on 
the  28th,  Colonel  Palmer  moved  from  Decatur  toward  Court- 
land.  He  encountered  the  enemy  at  a  point  two  miles  distant, 
and  attacking  with  his  advance  of  thirty  men  pressed  him  back. 
The  force  was  Colonel  "Wines'  regiment  of  Roddy's  command, 
and  this  commander  was  resisting  to  cover  his  artillery,  but 
against  thirty  men,  yielded  his  position  and  two  pieces  of  artil- 
lery. Colonel  Palmer  the  next  day  divided  his  force,  sending 
Colonel  Prosser  with  the  detachments  on  the  main  road,  and 
moving  with  his  own  regiment  on  the  Brown's  Ferry  road. 
Colonel  Prosser  soon  met  Roddy's  whole  force  drawn  up  in  two 
lines,  and  without  hesitation  charged,  broke  his  lines,  captured 
forty-five  men,  and  drove  the  enemy  through  Courtland. 

At  Leighton,  on  the  30th,  Colonel  Palmer  learned  that  Gen- 
eral Hood's  pontoon  train  of  tw.o  hundred  wagons  had  passed 
through  the  day  before  en  route  for  Columbus,  Mississippi. 
General  Roddy  was  in  the  rear  to  protect  this  'train,  and  al- 
though Colonel  Palmer  felt  safe  in  disregarding  him  in  making 
an  effort  to  capture  it,  it  was  necessary  that  he  should  shun 
(270) 


NOVEMBER  AND  DECEMBER,  1864.       271 

another  cavalry  force  under  General  Armstrong,  which  was 
also  near.  Making  the  venture,/he  moved  to  the  rear  of  a  por- 
tion of  Roddy's  command,  and  captured  Colonel  Warren  and 
other  prisoners.  At  Russellville,  another  portion  was  met  and 
routed,  and  Palmer  then  pressed  on  after  the  train  and  soon 
captured  it,  consisting  of  two  hundred  wagons  and  seventy- 
eight  boats  with  appointments  complete.  Such  was  the  con- 
'  dition  of  the  roads  and  the  teams  that  it  was  not  considered 
safe  to  attempt  its  removal  from  the  presence  of  the  enemy, 
and  hence  it  was  destroyed.  Then  having  heard  that  a  supply 
train  was  moving  from  Barton  Station  to  Tuscumhia,  Colonel 
Palmer  moved  to  capture  it.  On  the  1st  of  January,  this  train, 
consisting  of  one  hundred  and  ten  wagons  and  five  hundred 
mules,  was  also  taken  in  Itawamba  county,  Mississippi,  and 
mules  enough  saved  to  mount  one  hundred  and  fifty  prisoners. 
Losing  one  man  killed  and  two  wounded,  Colonel  Palmer  re- 
turned to  Decatur. 

In  the  meantime,  General  Steedman  had  been  ordered  to 
Chattanooga.  He  put  his  sick  men  and  his  artillery  on  trans- 
ports, and  started  his  infantry  by  rail,  under  General  Cruft. 
When  the  force  reached  Hunts ville,  Colonel  Mitchell's  brigade 
was  hurried  forward  to  Larkinsville,  to  intercept,  if  possible, 
General  Lyon,  who,  with  a  portion  of  his  command,  was  in  re- 
treat from  Kentucky.  His  expedition  had  proved  disastrous 
in  the  extreme  in  its  general  issue.  He  captured  Hopkinsville, 
but  was  met  near  Greenbury  by  General  McCook,  who  had 
been  detached  from  the  main  army  to  protect  the  Louisville 
and  Nashville  railroad,  and  to  pursue  this  raiding  force.  Col- 
onel La  Grange  first  met  Lyon  with  his  brigade.  Engaging 
him  with  spirit,  after  a  short  conflict  he  threw  his  troops  into 
confusion  and  rout,  capturing  one  gun  and  some  prisoners. 
General  Lyon  then  made  a  detour  through  Elizabethtown  and 
Glasgow,  and  crossed  the  Cumberland  river  at  Burksville,  and 
thence  proceeded  through  McMinnville  and  Winchester  to  the 
Memphis  an  d  Charleston  railroad.  On  the  7th  of  January,  Gen- 
eral Cruft's  command  was  disposed  to  capture  him  or  drive  him 
across  the  Tennessee  river  at  the  approaches  to  Bellefont,  Lar- 
kinsville, and  Scottsboro ;  but  he  succeeded  in  eluding  all  the 
detachments  on  the  watch,  and  crossed  the  Tennessee  river. 


272  NOVEMBER   AND   DECEMBER,    1864. 

He  was  finally  intercepted  and  captured,  with  one  hundred  of 
his  men  and  his  remaining  gun,  at  Red  Hill.  He,  however,  es- 
caped, having  shot  the  soldier  in  charge  of  him. 

As  General  Thomas  was  in  command  of  all  the  troops  within 
the  limits  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  the  oper- 
ations in  East  Tennessee  were  subject  to  his  direction.  There 
had  been  complications  there  during  the  summer  and  early 
autumn,  and  General  Schofield  had  left  his  corps  at  Atlanta, 
to  give  attention  to  affairs  in  that  region.  General  J.  H.  Mor- 
gan had  been  killed  by  General  Gillem's  troops,  but  infantry 
had  been  subsequently  sent  there,  and  when  General  Hood  was 
menacing  Tennessee  from  Florence,  General  Breckinridge,  sup- 
ported by  Duke  and  Vaughn,  appeared  before  General  Gillem 
at  Bull's  Gap.  At  this  period,  General  Gillem,  commanding 
three  regiments  of  Tennessee  cavalry  and  a  battery,  was  acting 
under  the  immediate  instructions  of  Governor  Johnson,  having 
been  detached  for  this  duty.  On  the  13th  of  November,  Gen- 
eral Breckinridge,  with  a  force  estimated  at  three  thousand 
men,  attacked  and  routed  the  fifteen  hundred  under  General 
Gillem,  capturing  about  one  third,  including  his  battery.  Gen- 
eral Gillem  had  repulsed  two  attacks  of  the  enemy,  but  rein- 
forcements having  come,  he  concluded  to  withdraw,  and  while 
retreating  was  attacked  in  rear.  There  was  a  lack  of  co-oper- 
ation between  General  Gillem  and  General  Ammen,  which 
General  Thomas  considered  the  cause  of  the  disaster.  General 
Gillem  fell  back  upon  Knoxville  with  the  remainder  of  his 
force,  followed  closely  by  General  Breckinridge. 

In  the  emergency,  General  Thomas  directed  General  Steed- 
man  to  hold  troops  in  readiness  to  support  General  Ammen, 
at  Knoxville ;  and  General  Stoneman,  in  command  of  the  De- 
partment of  the  Ohio,  in  the  absence  of  General  Schofield, 
ordered  a  concentration  of  forces  in  Kentucky,  to  advance 
from  Lexington  to  Cumberland  Gap,  either  to  repel  the  en- 
emy, should  he  advance  into  Kentucky,  or  to  advance  into 
East  Tennessee,  should  he  continue  to  operate  there. 

On  the  18th,  General  Breckinridge  withdrew  from  the  vicin- 
ity of  Knoxville,  and  General  Ammen,  reinforced  by  fifteen 
hundred  men  from  Chattanooga,  reoccupied  Strawberry  Plains 
the  same  day.  About  the  same  time,  General  Stoneman  left 


NOVEMBER  AND   DECEMBER,   1864  273 

Louisville  to  take  the  direction  of  affairs  in  East  Tennessee, 
and  on  his  way  received  his  instructions  from  General  Thomas, 
at  Nashville.  He  was  directed  ato  concentrate  the  largest 
force  possible  against  Breckinridge,  and  either  destroy  his 
force  or  drive  it  into  Virginia,  and,  if  possible,  destroy  the 
salt-works  at  Saltville,  and  the  railroad  from  the  Tennessee 
line  as  far  into  Virginia  as  he  could  go  without  endangering 
his  command."  On  the  6th  of  December,  General  Thomas 
repeated  his  instructions  upon  the  receipt  of  information  that 
General  Breckinridge  was  retreating. 

General  Stoneman  had  been  delayed  in  consequence  of  the 
deficiency  of  his  command  in  the  essential  appointments  for 
the  service  proposed.  On  the  9th,  he  was  ready  for  active 
operations.  His  command  comprised  the  infantry  and  dis- 
mounted cavalry  under  General  Ammen,  General  Gillem's 
force,  and  the  mounted  troops  under  General  Burbridge,  forty- 
two  hundred  men.  He  first  sent  the  Fourth  Tennessee  and 
Third  North  Carolina  regiments  to  Paint  Rock,  to  hold  the 
pass  over  the  mountains  into  North  Carolina.  December  9th, 
he  moved  two  regiments  of  Ohio  artillery  from  Strawberry 
Plains  to  Blair's  Cross-roads,  and  with  General  Gillem  pro- 
ceeded to  that  point  the  next  day.  At  Bean's  Station  these 
forces  were  joined  on  the  llth  by  General  Burbridge's  com- 
mand. Hitherto  the  commander  alone  knew  the  service  and 
destination  of  the  troops,  but  here  the  men  were  supplied 
with  all  the  ammunition  and  rations  that  they  could  carry  on 
themselves  and  horses.  On  the  13th,  at  daylight,  General 
Gillem  reached  the  north  fork  of  the  Holston  river,  opposite 
Kingston.  Here  was  General  John  Morgan's  command,  un- 
der his  brother,  in  the  temporary  absence  of  General  Duke. 
After  a  sharp  conflict,  General  Gillem  crossed  the  river  and 
totally  defeated  the  enemy,  capturing  Morgan  and  a  portion 
of  his  command,  and  killing  or  dispersing  the  remainder. 
During  the  afternoon,  Burbridge  was  pushed  on  to  Bristol,  in 
the  endeavor  to  intercept  Vaughn,  who  had  held  Greenville 
for  some  time  with  a  force  estimated  at  twelve  hundred  men. 
At  night,  Generals  Stoneman  and  Gillem  followed,  arriving 
at  Bristol  early  on  the  14th. 

Fearing  that  Vaughn  would  pass  in  the  night  and  join 


274  NOVEMBER  AND   DECEMBER,    1864. 

Breckinridge,  Burbridge  was  sent  to  Abingdon  with  instruc- 
tions to  send  a  regiment  forward  to  strike  the  railroad  at 
some  point  between  Saltville  and  Wytheville.  When  General 
Gillem  had  completed  the  destruction  of  Bristol,  which  Gen- 
eral Burbridge  had  commenced,  he  moved  to  Glade  Springs, 
followed  by  Burbridge.  At  2  A.  M.  on  the  16th,  General 
Stoneman  learned  that  the  Twelfth  Kentucky  Cavalry,  sent 
forward  from  Abingdon,  after  threatening  the  salt-works,  had 
destroyed  two  trains  which  had  brought  Breckinridge  from 
Wytheville  with  reinforcements,  and  decided  to  press  on  to 
Wytheville,  destroy  it  and  the  salt-works  on  New  river,  and 
give  attention  to  the  destruction  of  Saltville  on  his  return. 
He  therefore  put  his  forces  in  motion  eastward,  and  soon  Gen- 
eral Gillem  overtook  Vaughn  at  Marion,  and  attacking,  routed 
him,  pursuing  rapidly  to  Wytheville,  capturing  his  trains,  ar- 
tillery, and  one  hundred  and  ninety-eight  men,  and  destroying 
the  town.  General  Burbridge  reached  Mount  Airy  the  next 
day,  where  Buckley's  brigade  was  dispatched  by  order  of  Gen- 
eral Stoneman  to  destroy  the  lead  mines  twenty-five  or  thirty 
miles  beyond.  Nothing  now  remained  but  the  destruction  of 
Saltville,  and  General  Stoneman,  by  a  quick  return,  interposed 
his  command  so  that  General  Breckinridge  was  cut  off  and 
forced  to  retreat  into  North  Carolina.  The  two  main  columns 
were  then  ordered  to  converge  upon  Saltville.  When  they 
were  near,  and  General  Stoneman  was  waiting  for  General 
Burbridge,  he  sent  Colonel  Stacy  with  his  regiment,  the 
Thirteenth  Tennessee,  to  dash  into  the  town  and  commence 
the  work  of  destruction  with  all  possible  noise.  The  brilliant 
dash  of  Stacy  put  the  enemy  into  retreat,  and  then  the  cele- 
brated salt-works  with  all  their  machinery  and  supplies  were 
destroyed. 

This  expedition  brought  defeat  to  the  enemy  at  every  step, 
and  destruction  to  important  manufactories  of  the  material  of 
war,  to  vast  quantities  of  material  of  every  kind,  and  to  rail- 
roads and  rolling-stock.  General  Burbridge  destroyed  five 
trains  filled  with  supplies,  a  thousand  stand  of  arms,  a  vast 
amount  of  fixed  ammunition,  and  a  large  number  of  wagons 
and  ambulances,  and  captured  seventeen  officers  and  two  hun- 
dred and  sixty  privates ;  Buckley  ruined  the  lead-works  in 


NOVEMBER  AND   DECEMBER,   1864.  275 

Wythe  county ;  Major  Harrison,  of  the  Twelfth  Kentucky 
Cavalry,  captured  two  railroad  trains,  destroyed  all  the  railroad 
bridges  from  Glade  Springs  to  Marion,  and  the  large  iron- 
works at  the  latter  place,  and  captured  several  hundred  fine 
horses;  General  Gillem's  brigade,  reinforced  by  the  Eleventh 
Michigan  and  the  Eleventh  Kentucky  Cavalry,  drove  Vaughn 
beyond  "Wytheville,  destroyed  that  town,  all  the  railroad 
bridges  from  Marion  to  Reedy  creek,  vast  amounts  of  stores 
and  supplies  of  all  kinds,  several  hundred  wagons  and  ambu- 
lances, two  locomotives  and  several  cars,  and  captured  ten 
pieces  of  field  artillery,  and  over  two  hundred  prisoners.  This 
command  made  an  average  march  of  forty-two  and  a  half 
miles  per  day,  completing  its  work  of  destruction  on  the  22d 
of  December.  Then  General  Burbridge  returned  to  Kentucky 
by  way  of  the  Big  Sandy  valley,  and  General  Gillem  to  Knox- 
ville.  ' 


WASHINGTON,  November  5,  1864 — 2  p.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas: 
How  much  force  and  artillery  had  Gillem  ? 

A.  LINCOLN, 
President  United  States. 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  November  15,  1864 — 10  p.  M. 
President  A.  Lincoln,  Washington: 

General  Gillem's  force  consisted  of  three  regiments  of  Tennessee  cav- 
alry, and  one  battery  of  six  guns,  belonging  to  the  Governor's  Guards — 
about  fifteen  hundred  men. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


NASHVILLE,  November  17,  1864. 
Major-General  Stoneman,  Louisville,  Ky. : 

Your  dispatch  of  this  date  just  received.  Your  intention  and  order  to 
General  Burbridge  to  concentrate  his  mounted  force  is  perfectly  satisfac- 
tory, and  I  wish  you  to  report  to  me  as  soon  as  he  has  the  concentration 
of  his  troops  completed. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 


276  NOVEMBER  AND  DECEMBER,   1864. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  November  17,  1864 — 4.30  P.  M. 
Major-General  Stoneman,  Louisville,  Ky. : 

Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  is  received.  I  wish  you  to  send  all  the 
mounted  force  you  can  raise  to  East  Tennessee.  I  have  directed  General 
Steedman  to  send  all  the  infantry  he  can  spare  from  Chattanooga. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  November  19,  1864. 
Brigadier-General  Ammen,  Knoxville  : 

Do  not  send  the  reinforcements  from  Chattanooga  further  than  Knox- 
ville, unless  it  is  absolutely  necessary,  as  they  are  not  able  to  march.  Re- 
turn them  to  Chattanooga  as  soon  as  you  can  dispense  with  their  services. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 

CITY  POINT,  November  27, 1864— -9  P.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas : 

Savannah  papers,  just  received,  state  that  Forrest  is  expected  in  the 
rear  of  General  Sherman,  and  that  Breckinridge  is  already  on  his  way  to 
Georgia  from  East  Tennessee.  If  this  proves  true,  it  will  give  you  a 
chance  to  take  the  offensive  against  Hood,  and  to  cut  the  railroad  up  in 
Virginia  with  a  small  cavalry  force. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


NASHVILLE,  November  28,  1864 — 10  A.  M. 
Lieutenant-General  Grant,  City  Point,  Va.  : 

Your  dispatch  of  9  P.  M.  yesterday  received.  We  can  as  yet  discover 
no  signs  of  the  withdrawal  of  Forrest  from  Tennessee,  but  he  is  closely 
watched,  and  our  movements  will  commence  against  Hood  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible, whether  Forrest  leaves  Tennessee  or  not.  My  information  from 
East  Tennessee  leads  me  to  believe  that  Breckinridge  is  either  falling 
back  to  Virginia,  or  is  on  his  way  to  Georgia.  He  now  holds  Bull's  Gap, 
but  Stoneman  is  moving  on  that  place  from  Knoxville,  and  Burbridge  from 
Cumberland  Gap.  Stoneman  already  has  orders  to  destroy  the  railroad 
into  Virginia  if  he  possibly  can. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  V.  Commanding. 

KNOXVILLE,  November  28,  1864. 
Major-General  G.  H.  Thomas: 

As  near  as  I  can  learn  from  scouts  and  deserters,  all  the  mounted  force 
Breckinridge  brought  with  him  is  now  in  the  vicinity  of  Bull's  Gap,  say 
2,500;  a  portion  of  his  dismounted  force,  under  Palmer,  say  700,  has  gone 


NOVEMBER  AND   DECEMBER,   1864.  277 

back  to  Asheville,  and  Breckinridge,  with  the  rest  of  the  force,  Bay  700,  with 
captured  wagons  and  artillery,  has  gonie  back  to  Wy  theville.  Burbridge'g 
troops  will  all  be  through  Cumberland  Gap  to-morrow.  They  have  been 
detained  by  high  water.  I  wrote  you  at  length  yesterday.  Have  you  re- 
ceived the  letter  ? 

GEO.  STONEMAN, 

Major-  Genera  I. 

KNOXVILLE,  November  28,  1864—10.30  p.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas: 

Your  telegram  of  3  P.  M.  is  received.  A  scout,  a  woman,  and  a  negro 
came  in  this  evening,  and  report  Breckinridge' s  force  at  Morristown  and 
in  that  vicinity.  Breckinridge  is  no  doubt  with  his  command.  He  had 
not  left  yesterday  in  pursuit  of  General  Sherman,  nor  do  I  think  he  in- 
tends to.  His  command  is  not  formidable,  and  he  can  not  get  much  the 
start  of  us  if  he  leaves  this  section  to  cross  the  mountains.  I  will  keep 
you  informed.  Burbridge  is  ordered  forward. 

GEO.  STONEMAN, 

Major-  General. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  November  30,  1864—11.30  A.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas: 

The  Richmond  Enquirer  of  yesterday  says  that  it  is  no  longer  contra- 
band to  state  that  Breckinridge' s  command  is  now  marching  on  a  cam- 
paign that  will  fill  Kentucky  with  dismay,  and  that  probably  by  this  time 
Burbridge  has  felt  the  shock.  The  Richmond  papers  of  the  28th  state 
that  Breckinridge  was  at  Bristol  on  the  28th. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-General. 


NASHVILLE,  December  6,  1864 — 8.30  p.  M. 
Major-General  Stoneman,  Knoxville : 

Your  dispatches  of  10.30  p.  M.,  5th  inst.,  and  12.30  p.  M.  to-day,  are  just 
received.  If  you  can  effectually  destroy  the  railroad  for  twenty-five  or 
thirty  miles  beyond  the  Virginia  line,  East  Tennessee  will,  I  think,  then 
be  perfectly  secure  from  further  invasion.  After  destroying  the  railroad 
and  the  salt-works,  if  you  can,  you  had  better  draw  your  main  force  back 
to  the  vicinity  of  Knoxville,  for  the  defense  of  East  Tennessee. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  >S.  V.  Commanding. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

THE    MARCH    TO    THE    SEA,    AND    THE    CAPTURE    OF    THE    CITY    OF 
SAVANNAH,   GEORGIA. 

GENERAL  SHERMAN'S  forces  selected  for  his  march  to  the  sea- 
coast  comprised  sixty  thousand  infantry  and  five  thousand  five 
hundred  cavalry,  and  one  piece  of  artillery  for  every  thousand 
men.  These  troops  had  been  so  thoroughly  sifted  that  they 
really  represented  a  much  larger  army  than  this  aggregate, 
with  the  usual  percentage  of  ineffective  men.  They  were  or- 
ganized into  right  and  left  wings ;  the  former  embracing  the 
Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth  Corps,  under  the  command  of 
Major-General  0.  0.  Howard,  and  the  latter  the  Fourteenth 
and  Twentieth  Corps,  under  Major-General  H.  W.  Slocum. 
The  Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth  Corps,  from  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  were  commanded  respectively  by  Major-Generals 
P.  T.  Osterhaus  and  F.  P.  Blair,  and  the  Fourteenth  and  Twen- 
tieth, from  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  were  commanded 
respectively  by  Brevet  Major-General  J.  C.  Davis  and  Brigadier- 
General  A.  S.  Williams.  The  appointments  were  ample  be- 
yond precedent,  as  selection  had  been  made  from  the  material 
of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi ;  in  fact,  each  corps 
had  complete  army  appointments,  that  each  might  have  the 
independence  of  a  separate  army. 

The  last  ten  days  of  October  and  the  first  days  of  No- 
vember had  been  devoted  to  preparation.  Supplies  had  been 
accumulated  at  Atlanta  in  such  quantities  that  there  were 
forty  days'  rations  of  beef,  sugar,  and  coffee,  twenty  days'  of 
bread,  and  a  double  allowance  of  salt  for  forty  days.  The 
amount  of  ammunition  was  ample  for  all  possibilities.  There 
was  little  forage,  only  for  three  days  in  grain ;  but  it  was 

(278) 


THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA,  279 

known  that  the  lines  of  march  penetrated  regions  abounding 
in  corn  and  fodder,  and  also  in  substantial  supplies  for  men, 
and  those  delicacies  in  great  abundance  which  do  not  often 
fall  to  soldiers.  All  the  material  at  Atlanta  not  needed  for 
the  expedition  was  sent  to  the  rear,  or  devoted  to  destruction 
with  a  large  portion  of  the  city.  The  garrisons  north  of 
Kingston  moved  to  Chattanooga,  and  the  rails  were  lifted  from 
the  railroad  track  from  Eesaca  north;  but  those  between 
Resaca  and  the  Etowah  river  were  left  in  place  in  view  of  the 
probable  occupancy  of  the  country  as  far  forward  as  the  line 
of  that  river. 

November  llth,  General  Corse,  in  obedience  to  orders,  de- 
stroyed the  bridges,  foundries,  mills,  shops,  machines,  and  all 
property  useful  in  war,  at  Eome,  Georgia.  The  next  day,  the 
telegraph  wires  extending  northward  from  Kingston  were  cut, 
and  the  several  corps  moved  rapidly  toward  Atlanta.  On 
the  14th,  the  four  corps  and  cavalry  were  grouped  around  that 
city,  and  on  the  15th,  the  Fifteenth,  Seventeenth,  and  Twen- 
tieth Corps  moved  out  upon  their  respective  lines  of  march, 
and  that  night  the  conflagration  of  a  large  portion  of  At- 
lanta gave  emphatic  announcement  that  the  grand  movement 
had  begun. 

As  the  great  objects  of  this  expedition  were  an  illustration 
of  the  weakness  of  the  Confederacy  behind  its  defensive  and 
offensive  lines,  and  the  diminution  of  its  remaining  resources 
by  the  destruction  of  railroads  and  all  property  useful  in  war, 
the  lines  of  march  diverged  widely.  Besides,  there  was  an- 
other end  to  be  secured  by  this  broad  divergent  front  in  mov- 
ing from  Atlanta — the  concealment  of  the  ultimate  objective, 
that  the  enemy  might  not  know  where  to  concentrate  his 
forces.  The  right  wing,  with  Kilpatrick's  division  of  cavalry 
on  its  right  flank,  marched  by  Jonesboro  and  McDonough, 
under  orders  to  make  a  strong  feint  upon  Macon,  and  then 
turn  eastward  and  rendezvous  at  Gordon  on  the  23d.  The 
Twentieth  Corps  advanced  by  Decatur,  Stone  Mountain,  So- 
cial Circle,  and  Madison,  to  turn  southward  to  Milledgeville, 
under  instructions  to  tear  up  the  railroad  from  Social  Circle 
to  Madison,  and  burn  the  railroad  bridge  over  the  Oconee  in 
the  same  period.  On  the  16th,  the  Fourteenth  Corps  advanced 


280,  THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

upon  Milledgeville,  through  Lithonia,  Covington,  and  Shady 
Dale. 

On  the  23d,  the  right  wing  and  the  cavalry  reached  Gordon 
and  the  left  wing  Milledgeville ;  and  this  first  stage  of  the  cam- 
paign was  the  realization  of  all  anticipations.  General  Sher- 
man had  interposed  his  army  between  Macon  and  Augusta, 
and  the  enemy,  in  his  doubt  as  to  his  destination  and  his  utter 
inability  to  oppose  him  wherever  he  might  go,  was  paralyzed 
completely.  He  had  not,  in  the  eight  days,  shown  any  great 
strength  at  any  point,  and  it  was  evident  that  no  strong  force 
was  opposing  either  of  the  two  main  columns.  His  cavalry, 
under  General  Wheeler,  which  had  been  dispatched  as  a  corps 
of  observation,  had  engaged  General  Kilpatrick  several  times, 
and  General  Cobb's  militia  and  regular  troops,  from  Macon 
•and  Savannah,  had  sallied  from  the  former  place  to  receive 
severe  punishment  from  Walcutt's  brigade ;  and  besides  these 
feeble  demonstrations  there  had  been  no  opposition,  and  it  was 
manifest  that  no  serious  resistance  could  be  organized  in  Cen- 
tral Georgia.-*  The  veteran  troops  were  either  with  General 
Hood,  in  Tennessee,  or  in  the  large  cities  on  the  seaboard,  and 
General  Sherman's  plans  had  been  discerned  too  late  for  any 
troops  in  force  to  be  directed  to  his  front.  When  General 
Beauregard,  who  was  at  Corinth  directing  the  great  concen- 
tration of  forces  which  was  to  march  in  triumph  to  the  Ohio 
river,  learned  that  General  Sherman  with  a  large  army  was 
marching  southward  from  Atlanta,  he  committed  to  General 
Hood  the  conduct  of  the  Tennessee  campaign,  and  hastened  to 
Georgia  to  arouse  the  people,  by  frantic  proclamations,  to  re- 
sist this  overwhelming  invasion.  His  own  second  great  plan 
of  aggression  from  Corinth,  Mississippi,  was  now,  as  far  as  he 
was  personally  concerned,  as  palpabale  a  failure  as  was  his 
first,  when  he  evacuated  Corinth  in  May,  1862,  with  an  army 
embracing  all  the  available  Confederate  troops  in  the  West. 
Appeals  of  similar  fervor  and  futility  were  issued  by  the  Con- 
federate authorities  at  Richmond,  including  the  President  and 
Congress — at  least  by  the  congressional  representatives  from 
Georgia — and  from  the  governor  of  the  invaded  state.  While 
there  was  a  veteran  army  between  the  homes  of  the  people 
and  the  invader,  there  was  some  basis  for  appeal ;  but  now  the 


THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA.  281 

hopelessness  of  the  situation  was  fco  apparent  that  the  people 
were  paralyzed  with  fear  and  despair,  and  noisy  proclamations 
were  as  impotent  as  the  cry  of  women  and  children. 

The  orders  for  the  second  stage  of  the  campaign  sent  the 
two  wings  on  parallel  lines  toward  Millin,  and  Kilpatrick  to 
destroy  the  railroad  between  Milledgeville  and  Augusta,  and 
then  to  hasten  to  Millin,  to  rescue  the  prisoners  supposed  to 
be  there  confined.  On  the  26th,  the  heads  of  columns  of  the 
left  wing  gained  Sandersville,  and  then  swept  eastward  toward 
the  Georgia  Central  railroad,  and  the  right  wing  moved  from 
Gordon,  on  the  line  of  the  railroad.  December  2d,  the  cen- 
tral columns  of  the  two  corps  were  at  Millin,  and  the  extreme 
corps  were  abreast.  Immense  damage  had  been  done  to  the 
railroads,  mills,  cotton-mills,  and  gins,  and  some  fighting  had 
occurred  on  the  flanks,  especially  by  the  cavalry — Kilpatrick 
having  had  several  brushes  with  Wheeler,  but  had  been  vic- 
torious, whether  in  offense  or  defense.  The  heads  of  columns 
had  also  been  slightly  annoyed,  but  not  to  an  extent  to  greatly 
embarrass  their  movements.  The  greatest  obstacles  on  the 
way  to  Millin  were  the  Ogeechee  and  Oconee  rivers,  and  an 
army  behind  these  streams  might  have  been  successful  in  re- 
sistance, but  the  enemy's  slender  forces  were  easily  dislodged, 
and  the  army  passed  over  without  delay.  There  had  been  no 
rescue  of  prisoners  from  the  enemy,  as  all  had  been  removed 
from  Millin  too  soon. 

Instructions  for  the  third  and  last  stage  required  the  con- 
vergence of  the  wings  upon  Savannah — the  left  wing  and  the 
Seventeenth  Corps  moving  on  parallel  roads,  and  the  Fif- 
teenth Corps  deflecting  to  the  right,  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Ogeechee,  to  cross  at  Eden  Station.  General  Wheeler  followed 
the  columns  on  the  east  bank,  but  their  rear  was  protected  by 
Kilpatrick's  cavalry  and  Baird's  division  of  the  Fourteenth 
Corps.  As  the  army  approached  Savannah,  the  country  be- 
came more  marshy,  and  the  roads  more  obstructed  by  fallen 
trees,  especially  where  the  roads  crossed  the  swamps  on  cause- 
ways that  traverse  the  lowlands,  which  are  overflowed  arti- 
ficially for  the  culture  of  rice.  When  within  fifteen  miles  of 
the  city,  the  columns  were  confronted  by  earthworks  and 
artillery,  in  addition  to  the  ordinary  obstructions  of  the  roads 


282  THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

and  causeways.  But  these  defenses  were  easily  turned,  and 
on  the  10th  of  December,  the  enemy  was  driven  within  the 
fortifications  of  Savannah,  and  its  investment  in  great  part  ac- 
complished. The  right  and  left  wings  closed  in  with  connected 
lines  near  the  main  defenses  of  the  city.  The  left  of  the  Twen- 
tieth Corps  rested  on  the  Savannah  river,  and  the  right  of  the 
Fourteenth  Corps  connected  with  the  left  of  the  Seventeenth, 
beyond  the  canal,  nearLawson's  plantation.  General  Slocum 
held  the  bridge  of  the  Charleston  railroad  and  the  river  itself, 
and  General  Howard  controlled  the  Gulf  railroad  and  the 
Ogeechee  down  toward  Fort  McAllister.  Thus  General  Sher- 
man held  firmly  all  the  railroads  centering  in  Savannah,  and 
the  two  rivers  forming  the  main  channels  of  supply,  and  all 
the  roads  leading  out  from  the  city,  except  the  Union  cause- 
way, over  which  the  road  to  Hardeeville  and  Charleston 
passes  from  the  shore  of  the  river  opposite  the  town. 

General  Slocum  grasped  the  Savannah  river  firmly  with  his 
left  flank,  at  a  point  about  five  miles  from  the  city,  and  planted 
batteries  so  as  to  command  the  channel.  He  was  scarcely  in 
position,  when  Captain  Gildersleeve,  of  the  One  Hundred  and 
Fiftieth  New  York,  in  command  of  a  foraging  party,  captured 
the  steamer  Ida,  having  on  board  Colonel  Lynch  of  General 
Hardee's  staff,  bearing  dispatches  to  the  gunboats  up  the  river. 
This  boat  was  burned,  to  prevent  recapture  by  the  gunboats 
patrolling  the  river  below.  E~ear  General  Slocum's  left  flank 
were  two  river  islands,  Hutchinson  and  Argyle,  whose  pos- 
session was  essential  to  his  complete  mastery  of  the  river. 
These  he  promptly  seized.  During  the  evening  of  the  16th, 
Colonel  Hawley,  of  the  Third  Wisconsin,  from  Carman's  bri- 
gade, by  order  of  General  Williams,  sent  over  two  companies 
of  his  regiment  to  Argyle  Island,  and  the  next  morning  six 
more.  While  he  was  crossing  with  the  latter,  he  discovered 
three  steamers  descending  the  river.  He  hastened  across, 
while  Winegar's  battery  from  the  Georgia  shore  opened  upon 
them.  The  boats  were  driven  back,  and  in  turning  the  two 
gunboats  disabled  their  armed  tender,  which  fell  into  Hawley's 
hands,  at  the  head  of  the  island.  The  next  day,  General 
Geary,  commanding  First  division  Twentieth  Corps,  was  di- 
rected to  occupy  the  upper  end  of  Hutchmson  Island  with  a 


THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA.  283 

detachment,  to  prevent  the  approach  of  the  enemy's  gunboats. 
A  sunken  battery  was  also  established  on  the  Georgia  shore, 
whose  guns  commanded  the  river  above  and  below  the  island, 
and  ranged  over  the  island  to  the  Carolina  shore. 

The  defenses  of  the'  enemy  had  by  this  time  been  thoroughly 
developed  by  reconnoissances  along  the  whole  front  of  the  in- 
vesting lines,  and  it  was  apparent  that  by  means  of  irrigating 
canals,  traversing  the  rice  plantations,  the  whole  region  could 
be  so  flooded  as  greatly  to  embarrass  the  advance  of  assaulting 
columns.  It  was  equally  apparent  that  there  were  but  two 
ways  to  take  the  city,  by  assault  between  the  rivers,  or  the 
completion  of  the  investment  by  closing  the  road  to  Charles- 
ton, which  was  General  Hardee's  only  avenue  of  escape,  and 
force  a  capitulation  by  starvation. 

Before,  however,  attempting  either  an  assault  or  the  com- 
pletion of  the  investment,  General  Sherman  made  a  successful 
effort  to  open  communications  with  the  fleet  known  to  be  in 
waiting  for  his  coming,  to  secure  supplies  by  the  passage  of  the 
boats  on  the  Ogeechee  river,  to  the  rear  of  his  encampments. 
He  was  not  yet  in  need,  as  he  had  large  herds  of  cattle,  and 
his  trains  were  filled  with  supplies,  which  had  been  gathered 
on  the  march  from  Atlanta  and  With  what  had  been  loaded 
in  that  city,  and  there  was  an  open  country  for  foraging  in 
his  rear.  Still  he  deemed  communication  with  the  fleet  to  be 
of  paramount  importance.  The  barrier  to  this  was  Fort 
McAllister,  a  redoubt  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ogeechee, 
holding  heavy  guns,  and  to  its  reduction  he  addressed  himself, 
while  he  intrusted  the  immediate  investment  to  his  subordi- 
nate commanders.  On  the  13th,  General  Kilpatrick  was  sent 
over  the  Ogeechee  on  a  pontoon  bridge,  under  instructions  to 
reconnoiter  Fort  McAllister  and  the  inlets  in  that  vicinity, 
and  if  practicable  to  take  the  fort ;  subsequently  he  was  di- 
rected by  General  Sherman  to  examine  St.  Catherine's  Sound 
and  open  communication  with  the  fleet.  General  Kilpatrick 
having  reported  that  Fort  McAllister  was  manned  by  two 
hundred  men,  and  the  bridge  over  the  Ogeechee,  known  as 
"  King's  Bridge,"  having  been  repaired  in  an  incredibly  short 
time  by  Colonel  BuelL  and  his  regiment — the  Fifty-eighth  In 
diana,  famous  in  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  for  such  ex- 


284  THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

ploits — General  Hazen,  commanding  the  Second  division  of  the 
Fifteenth  Army  Corps,  was  ordered  to  be  in  readiness  to  move 
against  the  fort.  Early  on  the  13th,  General  Hazen  crossed 
King's  bridge,  and  deployed  his  division  before  the  posi- 
tion, with  its  flanks  resting  on  the  river.  Having  at  3  p.  M. 
signaled  his  readiness  for  assault  to  General  Sherman,  who, 
with  General  Howard,  had  taken  post  at  Chase's  rice-mill 
for  observation  and  direction,  he  received  orders  to  make  the 
attack.  In  compliance,  General  Hazen  assaulted  at  5  p.  M.  ; 
his  troops  broke  through  the  abatis  and  leaped  over  the  para- 
pet, announcing  their  victory  by  shouts  and  the  elevation  of 
the  national  flag.  While  observing  Hazen's  operations,  Gen- 
eral Sherman  caught  sight  of  a  steamer,  which  came  to  herald 
the  proximity  of  the  fleet  at  the  very  moment  that  the  Ogeechee 
was  opened  for  its  use.  Supplies  were  now  assured,  and  the 
reduction  of  Savannah  was  the  immediate  problem  for  solu- 
tion. 

The  day  following,  Generals  Sherman  and  Foster,  the  latter 
commanding  the  forces  in  South  Carolina,  met  Admiral  Dahl- 
gren  in  conference,  and  arranged  for  co-operative  movements 
against  Savannah.  Siege-guns  were  to  be  brought  from 
Hilton  Head ;  the  fleet  was  to  bombard  the  lower  forts,  and 
the  investing  forces  were  to  carry  the  landward  defenses  of 
the  city.  At  this  time  General  Sherman  thought  that  he 
could  reach  the  "  Union  Causeway  " — General  Hardee's  only 
way  of  escape  from  his  left  flank — by  throwing  a  column  across 
the  Savannah  river.  He  therefore  returned  from  the  fleet, 
with  announced  determination,  to  assault  the  lines  of  the 
enemy  as  soon  as  the  promised  siege-guns  should  arrive. 

On  the  17th,  General  Sherman  demanded  the  surrender  of 
the  city ;  but  on  the  next  day  received  a  positive  refusal  from 
General  Hardee,  who  reminded  him  that  his  investment 
was  not  complete,  that  his  guns  were  four  miles  from  Sa- 
vannah, and  that  there  would  be  no  justification  for  capitu- 
lation while  he  had  an  open  road  to  Charleston.  He  had 
probably  less  than  fifteen  thousand  men,  a  force  that  was  in- 
adequate for  successful  defense  against  the  armies  and  fleet 
that  were  converging  upon  him,  but  the  issue  proved  that  the 
necessity  of  surrender  did  not  exist. 


THE   MAKCH   TO   THE   SEA.  285 


The  problem  of  reducing  Savannah  was  not  the  only  one 
which  now  engrossed  the  attention  of  General  Sherman,  as  a 
greater  one  had  been  devolved  upon  him  by  General  Grant — 
one  in  comparison  with  which  the  other  was  merely  inciden- 
tal. This  was  the  movement  of  General  Sherman's  army,  to 
assist  in  the  reduction  of  Richmond.  But  as  this  enterprise 
was  contingent  upon  the  accumulation  of  vessels  sufficient  to 
transport  fifty  or  sixty  thousand  men,  the  operations  against 
Savannah  were  continued  as  though  its  capture  was  paramount, 
except  that  the  ulterior  objective  induced  General  Sherman 
to  refrain  from  throwing  one  of  General  Slocum's  corps  across 
to  South  Carolina. 

Pending  the  opening  of  the  Ogeechee  and  the  coming  of 
the  siege-guns,  there  was  some  activity  on  the  left  flank  of  the 
army,  and  General  Slocum  was  urgent  to  throw  one  of  his 
corps  into  South  Carolina,  to  close  General  Hardee's  only 
avenue  of  escape.  On  the  15th,  Colonel  Hawley  crossed  to 
the  Carolina  shore  from  Argyle  Island,  with  five  companies, 
drove  the  enemy  from  Izzard's  plantation,  and  made  a  recon- 
noissance  of  the  country  two  miles  farther.  Being  isolated, 
he  thought  it  prudent  to  return,  and  in  doing  this  he  was  vig- 
orously pressed  by  the  enemy,  but  recrossed  to  the  island  in 
safety.  Upon  his  return,  he  was  reinforced  by  the  Second 
Massachusetts  regiment,  and  on  the  next  day  the  remainder 
of  the  brigade,  Colonel  Carman  commanding,  and  a  section 
of  artillery,  crossed  to  the  island  and  took  position  on  the 
eastern  point  near  the  South  Carolina  shore.  During  the 
night,  Colonel  Carman  received  orders  from  General  Williams 
to  cross  to  South  Carolina  and  take  position  near  the  river, 
threatening  the  Savannah  and  Charleston  road.  This  was 
not  accomplished  immediately  for  want  of  small  boats,  and 
barges  could  not  be  used  on  account  of  low  tide.  In  the 
meantime,  General  Wheeler  appeared  on  the  opposite  shore, 
and  opened  with  his  light  guns  upon  Carman's  troops,  the  lat- 
ter responding  during  the  17th  and  18th,  but  made  no  effort 
to  cross. 

In  view  of  these  revelations,  General  Sherman  abandoned 
the  idea  of  closing  the  road  to  Charleston  by  operations  from 
his  left  flank,  as  the  enemy  held  the  river  opposite  the  city 


286  THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

with  iron-clad  gunboats,  and  could,  as  was  conjectured,  de- 
stroy pontoons  between  Hutchinson  Island  and  the  Carolina 
shore,  and  isolate  any  force  sent  from  that  flank. 

Upon  the  abandonment  of  this  movement,  General  Slocum 
was  ordered  to  get  the  siege-guns  into  position  and  make 
preparations  for  assault.  The  approaches  to  the  city  were 
upon  the  narrow  causeways,  which  were  commanded  by  artil- 
lery ;  but  nevertheless  the  reconnoissance  from  the  left  wing 
had  convinced  General  Slocum  and  his  subordinate  command- 
ers that  the  works  in  their  front  could  be  carried.  Two  of 
General  Howard's  division  commanders  were  confident  they 
could  attack  successfully,  though  the  conditions  of  assault  on 
their  portion  of  the  line  was  less  favorable  than  on  the  left. 

In  abandoning  the  purpose  to  close  the  Charleston  road 
from  his  left  flank,  General  Sherman  did  not  forego  the  at- 
tempt to  shut  it  from  another  direction,  as  it  was  then  threat- 
ened by  one  of  General  Foster's  divisions  from  the  head  of 
Broad  river,  and  on  the  19th  he  set  sail  for  Port  Eoyal  to 
arrange  with  General  Foster  for  a  movement  upon  the  cause- 
way, so  vital  to  General  Hardee.  His  instructions,  at  depart- 
ure, to  Generals  Howard  and  Slocum  were  to  get  ready,  but 
not  to  strike  until  his  return. 

'•  At  daybreak  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  by  order  of  Gen- 
eral Williams,  commanding  the  Twentieth  Corps,  Colonel 
Carman  threw  the  Third  Wisconsin,  the  Second  Massachu- 
setts, and  the  Thirteenth  "New  York  regiments,  under  Colonel 
Hawley,  to  the  South  Carolina  shore.  These  troops  landed 
without  opposition,  and  advancing  to  Izzard's  mill,  skirmished 
into  a  good  position.  The  enemy  expressed  his  appreciation 
of  the  position,  which  he  had  lost,  by  charging  with  his  cav- 
alry to  regain  it,  but  suffered  repulse.  During  the  afternoon 
and  evening,  Colonel  Carman  sent  forward  the  remaining  reg- 
iments of  his  brigade,  and  assumed  command  at  Izzard's  mill. 
His  position  was  a  strong  one  for  defense,  but  the  ground  be- 
fore him  presented  marked  obstacles  to  an  advance.  His  front 
was  a  rice  plantation,  traversed  by  canals  and  dikes,  the  fields 
being  overflowed  to  the  depth  of  eighteen  inches.  To  move 
forward  under  these  circumstances,  it  was  necessary  to  follow 
the  dikes,  and  these  were  easily  defended.  During  the  night 


THE   MARCH   TO   T&E   SEA.  287 

he  intrenched  his  line,  which  extended  from  the  Savannah 
river,  on  his  right,  two  and  a  quarter  miles,  to  an  inlet  near 
Clyesdale  creek. 

The  next  morning,  in  ohedience  to  orders  from  General 
Jackson,  his  division  commander,  Colonel  Carman  detailed 
twelve  companies  under  Colonel  Hawley,  and  directed  in  per- 
son a  reconnoissance  to  determine  the  relation  of  his  line  to 
Clyesdale  creek.  This  creek  was  reached,  with  loss  of  one 
man.  Works  were  then  constructed  for  a  regiment ;  two  com- 
panies were  left  to  hold  them,  and  with  the  remainder  of  the 
force  an  effort  was  made  to  reach  the  Charleston  road.  This 
movement  had  been  anticipated  by  the  enemy,  and  a  strong 
force  had  been  thrown  before  Carman.  As  he  could  not  ad- 
vance without  crossing  a  canal  under  fire,  he  withdrew,  but 
remained  sufficiently  near  the  road  to  observe  the  passage  of 
vehicles  of  all  descriptions,  in  motion  toward  Charleston. 
During  the  afternoon  he  was  shelled  by  a  gunboat,  and  at  4 
p.  M.  he  was  reinforced  by  three  regiments.  He  was  so  near 
the  enemy's  pontoon  bridge,  (at  Savannah,  that  from  7  P.  M.  to 
3  A.  M.  he  could  distinctly  hear  the  retreating  army  crossing 
upon  it.  This  noise  was  also  heard  by  General  Geary  from 
his  position  below  Hutchinson's  Island.  These  facts  were 
duly  reported. 

Thus,  under  the  mantle  of  darkness,  during  a  moonless 
and  windy  night,  General  Hardee  withdrew  his  entire  force 
along  the  front  of  a  brigade  of  the  investing  army.  The 
approach  of  this  brigade  to  his  only  line  of  retreat  may  have 
hastened  his  withdrawal ;  but  his  final  haste,  whatever  its 
immediate  cause,  was  his  salvation,  and  his  stay  at  Savannah 
for  ten  days  with  such  possibilities  in  his  rear,  vindicates  him 
from  the  charge  of  abandoning  his  post  before  there  was  abso- 
lute need. 

General  Sherman  returned  on  the  22d,  to  find  the  city  of 
Savannah  in  the  quiet  possession  of  his  army.  General 
Hardee  had  destroyed  as  much  of  his  material  as  the  security 
of  his  retreat  permitted ;  but  he  left  his  guns  unspiked,  three 
steamboats,  his  railroad  rolling-stock,  twenty-five  thousand 
bales  of  cotton  belonging  to  the  Confederate  government,  and 


288  THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

vast  quantities  of  other  public  property  of  great  value,  un- 
injured. 

Except  the  failure  to  capture  General  Hardee's  army  at 
Savannah  and  release  the  prisoners  at  Millin,  the  march  from 
Atlanta  to  that  city  was  a  triumphant  success — the  full 
realization  of  all  anticipated  possibilities.  It  illustrated  with 
fearful  emphasis  the  weakness  of  the  rebellion,  for  no  force 
able  to  resist  one  of  General  Sherman's  thirteen  divisions  was 
met  on  the  way.  It  left  a  track  of  desolation  forty  miles  wide ; 
broke  up  the  railroad  system  of  Georgia  and  of  the  South,  by 
the  destruction  of  three  hundred  miles  of  track,  all  work- 
shops, station-houses,  tanks,  and  warehouses;  crippled  the 
industries  of  the  empire  state  of  the  South,  by  burning  all  the 
mills  and  factories  on  the  broad  belt  of  ruin,  and  made  other- 
wise a  heavy  draft  upon  the  resources  of  the  people,  in  con- 
suming and  transporting  supplies  in  immense  quantities,  and 
by  the  destruction  of  twenty  thousand  bales  of  cotton.  The 
general  significance  of  these  results  spread  gloom  and  despair 
over  the  South.  Coupled  with  the  victory  at  Nashville,  "  The 
March  to  the  Sea  "  brought  near  the  collapse  of  the  rebellion. 
The  death-throes  of  treason,  organized  in  magnitude  most 
grand,  were  subsequently  in  harmony  with  its  proportions  and 
persistence ;  but  all  doubt  of  its  quick  destruction  was  now 
removed.  When  General  Lee  should  surrender,  the  end 
would  come ;  and  to  hasten  this  result,  the  victorious  Western 
armies  were  under  orders  to  move  northward  by  sea  or  land, 
as  circumstances  should  determine. 


[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  115.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  KINGSTON,  GA.,  November  4,  1864. 

I.  In  view  of  the  contemplated  movement,  the  commanding  generals 
of  the  Fourteenth,  Fifteenth,  Seventeenth,  and  Twentieth  Corps  will  hold 
their  commands  prepared,  on  short  notice,  to  march,  provided  with  as 
much  bread,  salt,  sugar,  coffee,  and  ammunition  as  they  can  transport 
with  their  present  means — each  corps  independent  of  all  others,  and  in. 
dependent  of  the  general  supply  train.     .     .     . 

II.  The  general  plan  of  movement  will  be  as  follows :  As  much  notice 
as  possible  will  be  given  in  advance  to  General  Eaton  at  Atlanta,  and 


THE   MARCH   TO   TH*E   SEA.  289 

General  Steedman  at  Chattanooga,  who  are  charged  with  the  responsibil- 
ity of  causing  all  the  rolling-stock  of  the  railroad  to  be  removed  to  and 
north  of  Eesaca,  from  which  point  General  Steedman  will  cover  its  re- 
moval into  Chattanooga.  The  railroad  lying  between  Eesaca  and  the 
Etowah  bridge  will  be  left  substantially  undisturbed.  The  bridge  at 
Eesaca  and  the  iron  north  of  it  will  be  removed  by  cars  into  Chattanooga, 
and  stored  for  future  use.  The  railroad  from  the  Etowah  bridge  into 
Atlanta  will  be  destroyed.  The  Fourteenth  Corps  will  be  charged  with 
the  destruction  of  that  road  from  Etowah  to  Big  Shanty ;  the  Fifteenth 
and  Seventeenth  Corps  with  that  from  Kenesaw  to  Chattahoochee  bridge ; 
and  the  Twentieth  Corps  from  the  Chattahoochee  into  and  including  At- 
lanta. .  .  . 

III.  The  army  commanders  are  enjoined  to  observe  as  much  caution 
and  secrecy  as  possible,  and  to  act  with  the  utmost  energy,  as,  after  our 
railroad  communication  is  broken,  every  hour  of  our  time  is  essential  to 
success. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 


[SPECIAL  FIELD  OEDERS,  NO.  120.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  KINGSTON,  GA.,  November  9,  1864. 

I.  For  the  purpose  of  military  organization,  this  army  is  divided  into 
two  wings,  viz : 

The  right  wing,  Major-General  0.  0.  Howard  commanding,  the  Fif- 
teenth and  Seventeenth  Corps. 

The  left  wing,  Major-General  H.  W.  Slocum  commanding,  the  Four- 
teenth and  Twentieth  Corps. 

II.  The  habitual  order  of  march  will  be,  wherever  practicable,  by  four 
roads,  as  near  parallel  as  possible,  and  converging  at  points  hereafter  in- 
dicated in  orders.     The  cavalry,  Brigadier-General  Kilpatrick  command- 
ing, will  receive  special  orders  from  the  commander-in-chief. 

•K-*-*-***--*-** 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  KINGSTON,  GA.,  November  11, 1864. 
Major-General  Halleck,  Headquarters  "United  States  Army,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

My  arrangements  are  now  all  complete,  and  the  railroad  cars  are  being 
sent  to  the  rear.  Last  night  we  burned  all  foundries,  mills,  and  shops  of 
every  kind  in  Rome,  and  to-morrow  I  leave  Kingston  with  the  rear- 
guard for  Atlanta,  which  I  propose  to  dispose  of  in  a  similar  manner,  and 


290  THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

to  start  on  the  16th  on  the  projected  grand  raid.  All  appearances  still 
indicate  that  Beauregard  has  got  back  to  his  old  hole  at  Corinth,  and  I 
hope  he  will  enjoy  it.  My  army  prefers  to  enjoy  the  fresh  sweet-potato 
fields  of  the  Ocmulgee.  I  have  balanced  all  the  figures  well,  and  am  sat- 
isfied that  General  Thomas  has  in  Tennessee  a  force  sufficient  for  all  prob- 
abilities ;  and  I  have  urged  him,  the  moment  Beauregard  turns  south,  to 
cross  the  Tennessee  at  Decatur,  and  push  straight  for  Selma.  To-morrow 
our  lines  will  be  broken,  and  this  is  probably  my  last  dispatch.  I  would 
like  to  have  Foster  to  break  the  Savannah  and  Charleston  road  about 
Pocotaligo,  about  the  1st  of  December.  All  other  preparations  are  to 
my  entire  satisfaction. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  124.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  ATLANTA,  G-A.,  November  14,  1864. 

The  armies  will  begin  the  movement  on  Milledgeville  and  Gordon  to- 
morrow, the  15th  November,  as  follows : 

I.  The  right  wing  will  move  via  McDonough  and  Monticello  to  Gordon. 

II.  The  left  wing  (General  Slocum's)  will  move  via  Covington,  Social 
Circle,  and  Madison  to  Milledgeville,  destroying  the  railroad  in  a  most 
thorough  manner,  from  Yellow  river  to  Madison. 

III.  The  cavalry  (General  Kilpatrick  commanding)  will  move  in  con- 
cert with  the  right  wing,  feigning  strong  in  the  direction  of  Forsyth  and 
Macon,  but  will  cross  the  Ocmulgee  on  the  pontoon  bridge  of  General 
Howard. 

IV.  Each  column  will  aim  to  reach  its  destination — viz.,  Gordon  and 
Milledgeville — on  the  seventh  day's  march,  and  each  army  commander 
will,  on  arrival,  communicate  with  the  other  wing  and  the  commanding 
general,  who  will  accompany  the  left  wing. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

TUSCUMBIA,  ALA.,  November 16, 1864. 
General  S.  Cooper,  Adjutant  and  Inspector-General,  Richmond,  Vcu  : 

Reports  of  General  Wheeler  indicate  that  Sherman  is  about  to  move 
with  three  corps  from  Atlanta  to  Augusta  or  Macon ;  thence  probably  to 
Charleston  or  Savannah,  where  a  junction  may  be  formed  with  the  en- 
emy's fleet. 

The  threatened  attack  on  Wilmington,  in  that  event,  must  be  intended 
for  Charleston.  I  would  advise  that  all  available  forces  which  can  be 
spared  from  North  and  South  Carolina,  be  held  ready  to  move  to  defense 
of  Augusta,  or  crossing  of  Savannah  river,  in  conjunction  with  forces  in 
the  State  of  Georgia. 


\ 
THE   MAKCH   TO   THE    SEA.  291 

Should  Sherman  take  Charleston,  or  reach  Atlantic  coast,  he  might 
then  reinforce  Grant.  General  Taylor  has  been  ordered  to  move  with 
his  available  forces  into  Georgia,  and  assume  command  of  all  troops  oper- 
ating against  Sherman,  should  he  move  as  reported. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


CORINTH,  November  18,  1864 — VIA  SELMA. 
To  the  People  of  Georgia  : 

Arise  for  the  defense  of  your  native  soil !  Rally  around  your  patriotic 
governor  and  gallant  soldiers.  Obstruct  and  destroy  all  roads  in  Sher- 
man's front,  flank,  and  rear,  and  his  army  will  soon  starve  in  your  midst. 
Be  confident  and  resolute.  Trust  in  an  overruling  Providence,  and  suc- 
cess will  crown  your  efforts.  I  hasten  to  join  you  in  defense  of  your 
homes  and  firesides. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  COBB'S  PLANTATION,  November  22,  1864. 
GENERAL  : — I  am  directed  by  the  general-in-chief  to  write  you  as  follows: 
The  march  of  this  wing  has  been,  since  leaving  Atlanta,  in  two  columns, 
and  very  successful  up  to  this  time.  The  Fourteenth  Corps  is  now  on 
the  Hillsboro  road,  ten  (10)  ten  miles  west  of  Milledgeville,  and  the 
Twentieth  Corps  must  now  be  in  the  capital,  having  marched  by  the  Eaton- 
ton  road.  The  Georgia  railroad,  from  and  including  the  Oconee  bridge, 
west  of  Lithonia,  is  well  destroyed.  Troops  in  fine  condition,  having  fed 
high  on  sweet  potatoes  and  poultry.  Stock  is  also  doing  well,  though  the 
roads  have  been  very  heavy.  The  general  desires  you  will  report  to  him 
at  Milledgeville  to-morrow  (where  he  will  go  early),  in  detail,  your  oper- 
ations since  leaving  Atlanta,  and  also  the  position  of  your  command, 
in  view  of  his  making  further  orders.  In  the  meantime,  you  can  not  do 
too  much  permanent  damage  to  that  railroad  east  of  Macon  and  about 
Gordon.  You  will  also  notify  General  Kilpatrick  a  similar  report  is  de- 
sired of  him. 

I  am,  general,  respectfully  yours,  etc., 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 
General  Howard,  Commanding  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 


[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  127.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  MILLEDGEVILLE,  GA.,  November  23,  1864. 
The  first  movement  of  this  army  having  proved  perfectly  successful, 
and  the  weather  now  being  fine,  the  following  will  constitute  the  second 
stage  of  the  campaign,  and  the  movement  will  commence  to-morrow, 
November  24th : 


292  THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

I.  General  Kilpatrick,  with  his  cavalry  command,  unincumbered  by 
wagons,  will  move,  via  Milledgeville,  by  the  most  practicable  route  east- 
ward, break  the  railroad  between  Millin  and  Augusta,  then  turn  and 
strike  the  railroad  below  Millin ;  after  which  he  will  use  all  possible  effort 
to  rescue  our  prisoners  of  war  now  confined  near  Millin.     He  will  com- 
municate back  to  the  wings  of  the  army,  as  often  as  it  is  safe,  any  infor- 
mation of  roads  and  the  enemy  that  may  be  of  interest  to  them. 

II.  The  right  wing,  General  Howard,  will  move  substantially  along,  but 
south  of  the  railroad,  to  a  point  opposite  Sanders ville,  breaking  and  de- 
stroying in  the  most  thorough  manner  the  railroad  and  telegraph;  at 
which  point  further  orders  will  be  issued. 

III.  The  left  wing,  General  Slocum,  will  move  directly  from  Milledge- 
ville to  the  railroad  opposite  Sandersville,  and  at  once  commence  de- 
stroying the  railroad  forward  to  the  Ogeechee. 

IV.  Great  attention  should  be  paid  to  the  destruction  of  this  road,  as 
it  is  of  vital  importance  to  our  cause.      Besides  burning  bridges  and 
trestles,  the  iron  should  be  carefully  twisted  and  warped,  so  that  it 
will  be  impossible  ever  to  use  it  again;  to  this  end,  the  rate  of  travel  will 
be  reduced  to  ten  miles  a  day. 

•K*-*-**-*-*-** 

VI.  The  general-in-chief  will  accompany  the  left  wing  until  it  reaches 
Sandersville,  when  he  will  join  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 
By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  MILLEDGEVILLE,  GA.,  November  23,  1864. 
Major-General  Howard,  Commanding  Army  of  the  Tennessee  : 

By  instructions  of  the  general-in-chief,  I  give  you  the  following  direc- 
tions :  Continue  to  destroy  the  railroad  eastward  to  the  Oconee,  in  the  most 
complete  and  thorough  manner,  burning  and  twisting  every  rail,  and  the 
same  for  a  distance  to  the  west  toward  Macon ;  also  destroy  the  Oconee 
bridge.  You  may  lay  your  pontoon  over  the  Oconee,  but  do  not  cross 
any  of  your  command  until  further  orders.  Hardee  has  probably  swung 
around,  via  Albany,  for  Savannah,  which,  the  general  says,  is  all  right, 
and  he  do  n't  care  particularly.  Kilpatrick  will  be  moved  here  or  in  this 
vicinity  for  the  present.  The  probability  is  we  will  concentrate  at 
or  near  Sandersville.  Prosecute  the  railroad  destruction  in  the  most 
thorough  manner,  and  communicate  with  the  general-in-chief  frequently. 
I  am,  general,  respectfully  yours,  etc., 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 


THE   MAECH   TO   THE    SEA.  293 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  MILLIN,  GA.,  December  2,  1864. 

GENERAL  : — The  army  will  move  on  Savannah,  delaying  only  to  continue 
the  destruction  of  the  railroad  from  Millin  as  far  as  Ogeechee  Church. 
General  Howard  will  continue  to  move  along  the  south  bank  of  the 
Ogeechee,  General  Blair  along  the  railroad,  arid  General  Slocum  by  the  two 
roads  lying  north  of  the  railroad,  between  it  and  the  Savannah  river. 
The  general  wishes  you  to  confer  with  General  Slocum,  to  make  a  strong 
feint  up  in  the  direction  of  Waynesboro,  and  then  to  cover  his  rear  from 
molestation  by  dashes  of  cavalry.  I  send  you  copies  of  two  letters  from 
members  of  Wheeler's  staff,  which  will  interest  you.  After  reading,  please 
return  them  for  file  in  this  office. 

I  am,  general,  respectfully  yours,  etc., 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 
General  Kilpatrick,  Commanding  Cavalry  Division. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMIES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  3,  1864 

GENERAL: — The  little  information  gleaned  from  the  Southern  press  in- 
dicating no  great  obstacle  to  your  progress,  I  have  directed  your  mails, 
which  previously  had  been  collected  in  Baltimore,  by  Colonel  Markland, 
special  agent  of  the  post-office  department,  to  be  sent  as  far  as  the  blockad- 
ing squadron  off  Savannah,  to  be  forwarded  to  you  as  soon  as  heard  from  on 
the  coast.  Not  liking  to  rejoice  before  the  victory  is  assured,  I  abstain 
from  congratulating  you  and  those  under  your  command  until  bottom 
has  been  struck.  I  have  never  had  a  fear,  however,  for  the  result. 

Since  you  left  Atlanta,  no  very  great  progress  has  been  made  here. 
The  enemy  has  been  closely  watched  though,  and  prevented  from  de- 
taching against  you.  I  think  not  one  man  has  gone  from  here,  except  some 
twelve  or  fifteen  hundred  dismounted  cavalry.  Bragg  has  gone  from 
Wilmington.  I  am  trying  to  take  advantage  of  his  absence  to  get  pos- 
session of  that  place.  Owing  to  some  preparations  Admiral  Porter  and 
General  Butler  are  making  to  blow  up  Fort  Fisher,  and  which,  while  I 
hope  for  the  best,  do  not  believe  a  particle  in,  there  is  delay  in  getting 
this  expedition  off.  I  hope  'they  will  be  ready  to  start  by  the  7th,  and 
that  Bragg  will  not  have  started  back  by  that  time. 

In  this  letter  I  do  not  intend  to  give  you  anything  like  directions  for 
future  action,  but  will  state  a  general  idea  I  have,  and  will  get  your  views 
After  you  have  established  yourself  on  the  sea-coast.  With  your  veteran 
army  I  hope  to  get  control  of  the  only  two  through  routes  from  east  to  west, 
possessed  by  the  enemy  before  the  fall  of  Atlanta.  This  condition  will 
be  filled  by  holding  Savannah  and  Augusta,  or  by  holding  any  other  post 
to  the  east  of  Savannah  and  Branchville.  If  Wilmington  falls,  a  force 
from  there  can  co-operate  with  you. 


294  THE   MARCH   TO   THE    SEA. 

Thomas  has  got  back  into  the  defenses  of  Nashville,  with  Hood  close 
upon  him.  Decatur  has  been  abandoned,  and  so  have  all  the  roads,  ex- 
cept the  main  one  leading  to  Chattanooga.  .  .  '  , ,  [ 

I  hope  Hood  will  be  badly  crippled  or  destroyed.  After  all  becomes 
quiet,  and  the  roads  up  here  so  bad  that  there  is  likely  to  be  a  week  or 
two  that  nothing  can  be  .done,  I  will  run  down  to  the  coast  and  see  you. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  GeneraL 
Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman,  Commanding  Armies  near  Savannah. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMIES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  6,  1864. 

GENERAL: — On  reflection,  since  sending  my  letter  by  the  hands  of 
Lieutenant  Dunn,  I  have  concluded  that  the  most  important  operation 
toward  closing  out  the  great  rebellion  will  be  to  close  out  Lee  and  hi* 
army.  You  have  now  destroyed  the  roads  of  the  South,  so  that  it  will 
probably  take  them  months,  without  interruption,  to  re-establish  a 
through  line  from  east  to  west.  In  that  time,  I  think,  the  job  here  will 
be  effectually  completed.  My  idea  now  is,  that  you  establish  a  base  on 
the  coast,  fortify  and  leave  it  to  your  artillery  and  cavalry,  and  enough 
infantry  to  protect  them,  and  at  the  same  time  so  threaten  the  interior 
that  the  militia  of  the  South  will  have  to  be  kept  at  home.  With  the 
balance  of  your  command  come  here  by  water,  with  all  dispatch.  Select 
yourself  the  officer  to  leave  in  command,  but  you  I  want  in  person. 
Unless  you  see  objections  to  this  plan  which  I  can  not  see,  use  every 
vessel  going  to  you  for  the  purpose  of  transportation. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-General. 
Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman,  Commanding  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  SAVANNAH,  December  11,  1864 — 2  A.  M. 

GENERAL: — Your  dispatch  of  December  10th,  and  also  Special  Field 

Order  191,  are  just  received.     The  general-in-chief  wishes  you  to  secure 

the  trains  cut  off  on  the  Gulf  road,  and  also  describe  to  him  what  is  the 

position  of  King's  bridge  and  Dillon's  ferry  ;  neither  are  on  the  map.     I 

have  had  couriers  looking  for  you  since  5  p.  M.,  with  orders,  but  they  are 

unable  to  find  your  headquarters.     I  send  inclosed  another  copy.     The 

general  understands   the  trains  to  be  between    Way's  and    Fleming's 

Station. 

I  am,  general,  very  respectfully,  etc., 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp* 
Major-General  0.  O.  Howard,  Commanding  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 


THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA.  295 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  SAVANNAH,  December  10,  1864. 

GENERAL  : — I  received  day  before  yesterday,  at  the  hands  of  Lieutenant 
Dunn,  your  letter  of  December  3d,  and  last  night,  at  the  hands  of  Col- 
onel Babcock,  that  of  December  6th.  I  had  previously  made  you  a  hasty 
scrawl  from  the  tugboat  Dandelion  in  Ogeechee  river,  advising  you  that  the 
army  had  reached  the  sea-coast,  destroying  all  railroads  across  the  State 
of  Georgia,  and  investing  closely  the  city  of  Savannah,  and  had  made 
connection  with  the  fleet. 

Since  writing  that  note,  I  have  in  person  met  and  conferred  with  Gen- 
eral Foster  and  Admiral  Dahlgren,  and  made  arrangements  which  I 
deemed  essential  to  reduce  the  city  of  Savannah  to  our  possession ;  but 
since  the  receipt  of  yours  of  the  6th,  I  have  initiated  measures  looking 
principally  to  coming  to  you  with  fifty  or  sixty  thousand  (50,000  or  60,000) 
infantry,  and  incidentally  to  take  Savannah,  if  time  will  allow.  At  the 
time  we  carried  Fort  McAllister  so  handsomely  by  assault,  with  twenty- 
two  (22)  guns  and  its  entire  garrison,  I  was  hardly  aware  of  its  importance  ; 
but  since  passing  down  the  river  with  General  Foster,  and  up  with  Ad- 
miral Dahlgren,  I  realize  how  admirably  adapted  are  Ossabaw  Sound  and 
Ogeechee  river  to  supply  an  army  operating  against  Savannah.  Sea-going 
vessels  can  easily  come  to  King's  bridge,  a  point  on  the  Ogeechee  river, 
fourteen  and  a  half  (14£)  miles  due  west  from  Savannah,  from  which 
point  we  have  roads  leading  to  all  our  camps.  The  country  is  low  and 
sandy,  and  cut  up  with  marshes,  which  in  wet  weather  will  be  very  bad, 
but  we  have  been  so  favored  with  weather  that  they  are  all  now  compar- 
atively good,  and  heavy  details  are  constantly  employed  in  double  cordu- 
roying the  marshes,  so  that  I  have  no  fear  of  a  bad  spell  of  weather. 
Fortunately,  also,  by  liberal  and  judicious  foraging,  we  reached  the  sea- 
coast  abundantly  supplied  with  forage  and  provisions,  needing  nothing 
on  arrival  except  bread.  Of  this  we  started  from  Atlanta  with  from 
eight  to  twenty  (8  to  20)  days'  supply  for  corps,  and  some  of  the  troops  had 
only  one  (1)  day's  issue  of  bread  during  the  trip  of  thirty  (30)  days,  and 
yet  they  did  not  want,  for  sweet-potatoes  were  very  abundant,  as  well  as 
corn-meal,  and  our  soldiers  took  to  them  naturally.  We  started  with  about 
five  thousand  (5,000)  head  of  cattle,  and  arrived  with  over  ten  thousand 
(10,000) ;  of  course  consuming  mostly  turkeys,  chickens,  sheep,  hogs,  and 
the  cattle  of  the  country.  As  for  our  mules  and  horses,  we  left  Atlanta  with 
about  two  thousand  five  hundred  (2,500)  wagons,  many  of  which  were 
drawn  by  mules  which  had  not  recovered  from  the  Chattanooga  starva- 
tion ;  all  of  which  were  replaced,  the  poor  mules  shot,  and  our  transporta- 
tion is  now  in  superb  condition.  I  have  no  doubt  the  State  of  Georgia 
has  lost  by  our  operations  fifteen  thousand  (15,000)  first-rate  mules.  As 
to  horses,  Kilpatrick  collected  all  his  remounts,  and  it  looks  to  me,  in 
riding  along  our  columns,  as  though  every  officer  has  three  or  four  led 
horses,  and  each  regiment  seems  to  be  followed  by  at  least  fifty  (50) 
negroes  and  foot-sore  soldiers,  riding  on  horses  and  mules.  The  custom 
was  for  each  brigade  to  send  out  daily  a  foraging  party  of  about  fifty  (50) 


296  THE    MARCH    TO    THE    SEA. 

men  on  foot,  who  invariably  returned  mounted,  with  several  wagons 
loaded  with  poultry,  potatoes,  etc.,  and  as  the  army  is  composed  of  about 
forty  (40)  brigades,  you  can  estimate  approximately  the  quantity  of  horses 
collected.  Great  numbers  of  these  were  shot  by  my  orders,  because  of 
the  disorganizing  effect  on  our  infantry  of  having  too  many  idlers  mounted. 
General  Easton  is  now  engaged  in  collecting  statistics  on  this  subject ;  but 
I  know  that  the  government  will  never  receive  full  accounts  of  our  cap- 
tures, although  the  result  aimed  at  was  fully  attained,  viz.,  to  deprive  our 
enemy  of  them.  All  these  animals  I  will  have  sent  to  Port  Royal,  or  col- 
lected behind  Fort  McAllister,  to  be  used  by  General  Saxton  in  his  farm- 
ing operations,  or  by  the  quartermaster's  department,  after  they  are  sys- 
tematically accounted  for. 

While  General  Easton  is  collecting  transportation  for  my  troops  to 
James  river,  I  will  throw  to  Port  Royal  Island  all  of  our  means  of  trans- 
portation I  can,  and  collect  the  balance  near  Fort  McAllister,  covered  by 
the  Ogeechee  river  and  intrenchments  to  be  erected,  and  for  which  Cap- 
tain Poe,  my  chief  engineer,  is  now  reconnoitering  the  grounds ;  but,  in  the 
meantime,  I  will  act  as  I  have  begun,  as  though  Savannah  city  were  my 
only  objective — namely,  the  troops  will  continue  to  invest  Savannah  closely, 
making  attacks  and  feints  wherever  we  have  firm  ground  to  stand  upon ; 
and  I  will  place  some  thirty  (30)  pounder  Parrots,  which  I  have  got  from 
General  Foster,  in  position  near  enough  to  reach  the  center  of  the  city, 
and  then  will  demand  its  surrender.  If  General  Hardee  is  alarmed,  or 
fears  starvation,  he  may  surrender ;  otherwise,  I  will  bombard  the  city, 
but  not  risk  the  lives  of  my  own  men  by  assaults  across  the  narrow 
causeways,  by  which  alone  we  can  reach  it.  If  I  had  time,  Savannah,  with 
all  its  dependent  fortifications,  is  already  ours,  for  we  hold  all  its  avenues 
of  supply.  The  enemy  has  made  two  desperate  efforts  to  get  boats  from 
above  to  the  city,  in  both  of  which  he  has  been  foiled ;  General  Slocum, 
whose  left  flank  rests  on  the  river,  capturing  and  burning  the  first  boat, 
and  in  the  second  instance  driving  back  two  gunboats  and  capturing  the 
steamer  Resolute,  with  seven  naval  officers  and  a  crew  of  twenty-five  sea- 
men. General  Slocum  occupies  Argyle  Island  and  the  upper  end  of 
Hutchinson  Island,  and  has  a  brigade  on  the  South  Carolina  shore  oppo- 
site, and  he  is  very  urgent  to  pass  one  of  his  corps  over  to  that  shore. 
But  in  view  of  the  change  of  plan  made  necessary  by  your  orders  of  the 
6th,  I  will  maintain  things  in  statu  quo  till  I  have  got  all  my  transporta- 
tion to  the  rear  and  out  of  the  way,  and  until  I  have  sea  transportation  for 
the  troops  you  require  at  James  river,  which  I  will  accompany  and  com- 
mand in  person.  Of  course,  I  will  leave  Kilpatrick  with  his  cavalry,  say  five 
thousand  three  hundred  (5,300),  and,  it  may  be,  a  division  of  the  Fifteenth 
Corps ;  but  before  determining  this,  I  must  see  General  Foster,  and  may 
arrange  to  shift  his  force — now  over  about  the  Charleston  railroad,  at  the 
head  of  Broad  river — to  the  Ogeechee,  where,  in  co-operation  with  Kilpat- 
rick's  cavalry,  he  can  better  threaten  the  State  of  Georgia  than  from  the 
direction  of  Port  Royal.  Besides,  I  would  much  prefer  not  to  detach 
from  my  regular  corps  any  of  its  veteran  divisions,  and  would  even  prefer 


THE    MARCH   TO   THE    SEA.  297 

that  other  less  valuable  troops  should  be  sent  to  reinforce  Foster,  from 
some  other  quarter.  My  four  (4)  corps,  full  of  experience  and  full  of 
ardor,  coming  to  you  en  masse,  equal  to  sixty  thousand  (60,000)  fighting 
men,  will  be  a  reinforcement  that  Lee  can  not  disregard.  Indeed,  with  my 
present  command,  I  had  expected,  after  reducing  Savannah,  instantly 
to  march  to  Columbia,  South  Carolina,  thence  to  Raleigh,  and  thence  to 
report  to  you.  But  this  would  consume,  it  may  be,  six  weeks'  time,  after 
the  fall  of  Savannah,  whereas,  by  sea,  I  can  probably  reach  you  with  my 
men  and  arms  before  the  middle  of  January. 

As  to  matters  in  the  Southeast,  I  think  Hardee  in  Savannah  has  good 
artillerists,  some  five  thousand  (5.000)  or  six  thousand  (6,000),  good  infan- 
try, and  it  may  be,  a  mongrel  mass  of  eight  thousand  or  ten  thousand 
(8,000  or  10,000)  militia  and  fragments.  In  all  our  marching  through 
Georgia,  he  has  not  forced  me  to  use  anything  but  a  skirmish  line,  though 
at  several  points  he  had  erected  fortifications  and  made  bombastic 
threats.  In  Savannah,  he  has  tajten  refuge  in  a  line  constructed  behind 
swamps  and  overflowed  rice-fields,  extending  from  a  point  on  the  Savan- 
nah river,  about  three  miles  above  the  city,  around  to  a  branch  of  the 
Little  Ogeechee,  which  stream  is  impassable  from  its  salt  marshes  and 
boggy  swamps,  crossed  only  by  narrow  causeways  or  common  corduroy 
roads.  There  must  be  twenty-five  thousand  (25,000)  citizens,  men, 
women,  and  children,  in  Savannah,  that  must  also  be  fed,  and  how  he  is 
to  feed  them  beyond  a  few  days,  I  can  not  imagine,  as  I  know  that  his 
requisitions  for  corn,  on  the  interior  counties  of  Georgia  were  not  filled, 
and  we  are  in  possession  of  the  rice  fields  and  mills,  which  alone  could  be 
of  service  to  him  in  this  neighborhood.  He  can  draw  nothing  from 
South  Carolina,  save  from  a  small  corner  down  in  the  southeast,  and  that 
by  a  disused  wagon-road.  I  could  easily  get  posession  of  this,  but  hardly 
deem  it  worth  the  risk  of  making  a  detachment,  which  would  be  in 
danger  by  its  isolation  from  the  main  army. 

Our  whole  army  is  in  fine  condition  as  to  health,  and  the  weather  is 
splendid.  For  that  reason  alone  I  feel  a  personal  dislike  to  turning 
northward. 

I  will  keep  Lieutenant  Dunn  here  until  I  know  the  result  of  my  de- 
mand for  the  surrender  of  Savannah;  but,  whether  successful  or  not, 
shall  not  delay  my  execution  of  your  orders  of  the  6th,  which  will  de- 
pend alone  upon  the  time  it  will  require  to  get  transportation  by  sea. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  U.  S.  A. 

Lieutenant-General  U.  8.  Grant,  Commander-in- Chief,  City  Point,  Va. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  SAVANNAH,  GA.,  December  17,  1864. 

GENERAL  : — You  have  doubtless  observed  from  your  station  at  Rosedew 

that  sea-going  vessels  now  come  through  Ossabaw  Sound  and  the  Ogeechee 

to  the  rear  of  my  army,  giving  me  abundant  supplies  of  all  kinds,  and 


298  THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

more  especially  of  heavy  ordnance  necessary  to  the  reduction  of  Savan- 
nah. I  have  already  received  guns  that  can  cast  heavy  and  destructive 
shot  as  far  as  the  heart  of  your  city ;  also,  I  have  for  some  days  held  and 
controlled  every  avenue  by  which  the  people  and  garrison  of  Savannah 
can  be  supplied,  and  I  am  therefore  justified  in  demanding  the  surrender 
of  the  city  of  Savannah  and  its  dependent  forts,  and  shall  await  a  reason- 
able time  your  answer  before  opening  with  heavy  ordnance.  Should  you 
entertain  the  proposition,  I  am  prepared  to  grant  liberal  terms  to  the  in- 
habitants and  garrison ;  but  should  I  be  forced  to  resort  to  assault,  or  the 
slower  and  surer  process  of  starvation,  I  shall  then  feel  justified  in  resort- 
ing to  the  harshest  measures,  and  shall  make  little  effort  to  restrain  my 
army  burning  to  avenge  the  great  national  wrong  they  attach  to  Savan- 
nah and  other  large  cities,  which  have  been  prominent  in  dragging  our 
country  into  civil  war. 

I  inclose  you  a  copy  of  General  Hood's  demand  for  the  surrender  of 
the  town  of  Eesaca,  to  be  used  by  you  for  what  it  is  worth. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  your  obedient  servant, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 

General  William  J.  Hardee,  Commanding  Confederate  Forces  in  Savannah. 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  SOUTH  CAROLINA  AND  GEORGIA  AND  FLORIDA, 

SAVANNAH,  GA.,  December  17,  1864. 
Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman,  Commanding  Federal  Forces  near  Savannah: 

GENERAL: — I  have  to  acknowledge  receipt  of  a  communication  from 
you  of  this  date,  in  which  you  demand  "the  surrender  of  Savannah  and 
its  dependent  forts,"  on  the  ground  that  you  "have  received  guns  that 
can  cast  heavy  and  destructive  shot  into  the  heart  of  the  city;"  and  for 
the  further  reason  that  you  "have  for  some  days  held  and  controlled 
every  avenue  by  which  the  people  and  garrison  can  be  supplied."  You 
add,  that  should  you  "be  forced  to  resort  to  assault,  or  to  the  slower  and 
surer  process  of  starvation,  you  will  then  feel  justified  in  resorting  to  the 
harshest  measures,  and  will  make  little  effort  to  restrain  your  army," 
etc.,  etc. 

The  position  of  your  forces  half  a  mile  beyond  the  outer  line  for  the 
land  defense  of  Savannah  is,  at  the  nearest  point,  at  least  four  miles  from 
the  heart  of  the  city.  That  and  the  interior  line  are  intact. 

Your  statement  that  you  have  for  some  days  held  and  controlled  every 
avenue  by  which  the  people  and  garrison  can  be  supplied  is  incorrect.  I 
am  in  free  and  constant  communication  with  my  department. 

Your  demand  for  the  surrender  of  Savannah  and  its  dependent  forts 
is  refused. 

With  respect  to  the  threats  conveyed  in  the  closing  paragraph  of  your 
letter,  of  what  may  be  expected  in  case  your  demand  is  not  complied 
with,  I  have  to  say  that  I  have  hitherto  conducted  the  military  opera- 


THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA.  299 

tions  intrusted  to  my  direction  in  strict  accordance  with  the  rules  of 
civilized  warfare,  and  I  should  deeply  regret  the  adoption  of  any  course 
by  you  that  may  force  me  to  deviate  from  them  in  future. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully, 
Your  obedient  servant, 

W.  J.  HARDEE, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


HEADQUARTERS  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  SAVANNAH,  GA.,  December  18,  1864. 

GENERAL: — I  wrote  you  at  length  by  Colonel  Babcock  on  the  16th  instant. 
As  I  therein  explained  my  purpose,  yesterday  I  made  a  demand  on  General 
Hardee  for  the  surrender  of  the  city  of  Savannah,  and  to-day  received  his 
answer  refusing.  Copies  of  both  letters  are  herewith  inclosed.  You  will 
notice  that  I  claim  that  my  lines  are  within  easy  range  of  the  heart  of 
Savannah,  but  General  Hardee  claims  we  are  four  and  a  half  miles  dis- 
tant. But  I  myself  have  been  to  the  intersection  of  the  Charleston  and 
Georgia  railroad  and  the  three  (3)  mile  post  is  but  a  few  yards  beyond, 
within  the  line  of  our  picket.  The  enemy  has  no  pickets  outside  of  his 
fortified  line,  which  is  a  full  quarter  of  a  mile  within  the  three  (3)  mile 
post,  and  I  have  the  evidence  of  Mr.  R.  R.  Cuyler,  president  of  the 
Georgia  Central  railroad,  who  was  a  prisoner  in  our  hands,  that  the  mile- 
posts  are  measured  from  the  Exchange,  which  is  but  two  squares  from 
the  river.  .  .  .  General  Slocum  feels  confident  that  he  can  make  a 
successful  assault  at  one  or  two  points  in  front  of  the  Twentieth  Corps 
and  one  or  two  in  front  of  General  Davis'  (Fourteenth)  Corps.  But  all  of 
General  Howard's  troops,  the  right  wing  lie  behind  the  Little  Ogeechee, 
and  I  doubt  if  it  can  be  passed  by  troops  in  the  face  of  an  enemy.  Still 
we  can  make  strong  feints,  and  if  I  can  get  a  sufficient  number  of  boats, 
I  shall  make  a  co-operative  demonstration  up  Vernbn  river  or  Wassaw 
Sound.  I  should  like  very  much  to  take  Savannah  before  coming  to 
you;  but,  as  I  wrote  to  you  before,  I  will  do  nothing  rash  or  hasty,  and 
will  embark  for  the  James  river  as  soon  as  General  Easton,  who  is  gone 
to  Port  Royal  for  that  purpose,  reports  to  me  that  he  has  an  approximate 
number  of  vessels  for  the  transportation  of  the  contemplated  force.  .  . 

In  relation  to  Savannah  you  will  remark  that  General  Hardee  refers  to 
his  still  being  in  communication  with  his  war  department.  This  lan- 
guage he  thought  would  deceive  me,  but  I  am  confirmed  in  the  belief 
that  the  route  to  which  he  refers — namely,  the  Union  plank-road,  on  the 
South  Carolina  shore — is  inadequate  to  feed  his  army  and  the  people  of 
Savannah,  for  General  Foster  assures  me  that  he  has  his  force  on  that 
very  road  near  the  head  of  Broad  river,  and  that  his  guns  command  the 
railroad,  so  that  cars  no  longer  run  between  Charleston  and  Savannah. 
We  hold  this  end  of  the  Charleston  road,  and  have  destroyed  it  from  the 
three  (3)  mile  post  back  to  the  bridge,  about  twelve  (12)  miles  above.  .  . 

I  do  sincerely  believe  that  the  whole  United  States,  North  and  South, 


300  THE   MARCH   TO   THE    SEA. 

would  rejoice  to  have  this  army  turned  loose  on  South  Carolina,  to  de- 
vastate that  state  in  the  manner  we  have  done  in  Georgia,  and  it  would 
have  a  direct  and  immediate  bearing  on  your  campaign  in  Virginia. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  your  obedient  servant, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 
Lieutenant-Oeneral  U.  8.  Grant,  City  Point,  Va. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  SAVANAH,  GA.,  December  19,  1864. 

GENERAL  : — The  general-in-chief  has  gone  to  the  bay.  He  wishes  you 
to  push  the  preparations  for  attacking  Savannah  with  all  possible  speed, 
but  to  await  orders  for  the  attack.  He  will  see  General  Foster  and  the 
admiral  before  returning,  and  will  get  co-operation  from  both,  if  possible. 
Should  anything  occur  that  you  would  like  to  communicate  to  the  gen- 
eral, I  will  forward  for  you. 

I  am,  general,  with  great  respect, 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 
Major-General  O.  0.  Howard,  Commanding  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  SAVANNAH,  GA.,  December  19,  1864. 
GENERAL: — The  general-in-chief  has  gone  to  the  bay.     He  directs  me  to 
further  instruct  you  to  push  preparations  for  the  attack  on  the  defenses 
of  Savannah  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  then  await  further  directions  be- 
fore doing  more. 

He  will  endeavor  to  get  co-operation  from  Admiral  Dahlgren  and  Gen- 
eral Foster,  with  whom  he  will  confer  before  returning.  If,  in  the  mean- 
time, anything  should  occur  you  would  wish  to  communicate  to  him, 
please  to  send  to  me,  and  I  will  forward. 

I  am,  general,  with  respect, 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 
Major-General  Slocum,  Commanding  Left  Wing. 


EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  SHERMAN'S  REPORT. 

In  the  meantime,  further  reconnoissances  from  our  left  flank  had  de- 
monstrated that  it  was  impracticable  or  unwise  to  push  any  considerable 
force  across  the  Savannah  river,  for  the  enemy  held  the  river  opposite  the 
city  with  iron-clad  gunboats,  and  could  destroy  any  pontoons  laid  down  by 
us  between  Hutchinson's  Island  and  the  South  Carolina  shore,  which 
would  isolate  any  force  sent  over  from  that  flank.  I  therefore  ordered 


THE   MAECH   TO   THE    SEA.  301 

General  Slocum  to  get  into  position  the  siege-guns,  and  make  all  the 
preparations  necessary  to  assault,  and  to  report  to  me  the  earliest  moment 
when  he  could  be  ready,  whilst  I  should  proceed  rapidly  round  by  the 
right,  and  make  arrangements  to  occupy  the  Union  causeway,  from  the 
direction  of  Port  Eoyal.  General  Poster  had  already  established  a  divis- 
ion of  troops  on  the  peninsula  or  neck  between  the  Coosawhatchie  and 
Tullifinney  rivers,  at  the  head  of  Broad  river,  from  which  position  he 
could  reach  the  railroad  with  his  artillery. 

I  went  to  Port  Royal  in  person,  and  made  arrangements  to  reinforce  that 
command  by  one  or  more  divisions,  under  a  proper  officer,  to  assault  and 
carry  the  railroad,  and  thence  turn  toward  Savannah,  until  it  occupied 
the  causeway  in  question. 


EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  HOWARD'S   REPORT. 

It  having  been  intimated  that  our  future  plans  would  be  modified  by 
specific  instructions  from  the  commander-in-chief,  General  Sherman  and 
his  officers  became  anxious  to  crown  our  success  by  the  capture  of  Savan- 
nah. In  order  to  accomplish  this,  every  exertion  was  made.  Heavy  guns 
were  brought  from  Hilton  Head  and  McAllister,  and  placed  in  position  ;  the 
lines  were  worked  up  closer  to  the  enemy,  along  the  dikes  ;  good  batteries 
constructed  for  small  guns,  and  every  part  of  the  front  of  General  Oster- 
haus  and  General  Blair  thoroughly  reconnoitered  ;  light  bridges  were 
constructed,  and  fascines  made,  so  as  to  span  the  streams  and  fill  up  the 
ditches  ;  in  brief,  every  possible  preparation  was  made  to  assault  the  en- 
emy's works.  The  same  was  the  case  along  General  Slocum's  front. 

While  these  preparations  were  going  on,  the  general-in-chief,  having 
demanded  the  surrender  of  Savannah  on  the  18th  instant,  and  having 
been  refused,  had  gone  to  the  fleet,  in  order  to  secure  co-operation  from 
the  admiral  and  General  Foster,  in  the  contemplated  attack.  He  left  di- 
rections to  get  ready,  but  not  to  strike  till  his  return. 

Two  at  least  of  my  division  commanders  felt  perfectly  confident  of 
success,  in  case  the  assault  should  be  made. 


EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  SLOCUM'S  REPORT. 

Our  line  was  established  as  close  as  possible  to  that  of  the  enemy,  and 
the  time  spent  in  preparations  for  an  assault  upon  his  works.  Batteries 
were  established  on  the  river,  in  such  positions  as  prevented  any  boats 
from  passing.  The  steamer  Ida,  while  attempting  to  pass  up  from  Savan- 
nah, 011  the  10th  of  December,  was  captured  and  burned.  On  the  12th, 
two  gunboats  and  the  steamer  Resolute  attempted  to  pass  our  batteries 
from  above,  but  both  gunboats  were  driven  back  by  Winegar's  battery, 
and  the  steamer  was  so  disabled  that  she  fell  into  our  hands.  She  was 
soon  repaired,  and  has  since  been  transferred  to  the  quartermaster's  de- 
partment, 


302  THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

On  the  18th,  a  brigade  of  the  First  division,  Twentieth  Corps,  was  thrown 
across  the  river,  and  established  near  Izzard's  plantation,  on  the  South 
•Carolina  shore,  in  a  position  which  threatened  the  only  line  of  communi- 
cation still  held  by  the  enemy.  A  bridge,  in  the  meantime,  had  been 
constructed  by  the  enemy  from  the  city  to  the  South  Carolina  shore, 
and  on  the  evening  of  December  20th  he  commenced  the  evacuation 
of  the  city. 

EXTKACT  FROM  THE  REPORT  OF  GENERAL  WILLIAMS. 

During  the  day  of  the  20th,  the  fire  from  the  enemy's  works  and  gun- 
boats was  unusually-heavy  and  continuous.  Reports  from  Carman's  brig- 
ade, that  large  columns  were  crossing  to  the  Carolina  shore,  either  to  cover 
their  only  line  of  communication,  or  preparatory  to  a  final  evacuation  of 
the  city.  In  the  night,  General  Geary  reported  to  me  that  the  movements 
across  the  river  were  still  apparently  going  on. 


EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  GEARY'S  REPORT. 

I  ascertained  this  morning,  the  20th,  that  the  enemy  had  completed  a 
pontoon  bridge  across  to  the  South  Carolina  shore,  from  Savannah,  and 
notified  the  general  commanding  the  corps  of  the  discovery.  This  bridge 
was  about  two  and  a  half  miles  from  my  left.  The  usual  artillery  fire 
was  kept  up  by  the  enemy  during  the  day  and  night.  During  the  night, 
I  heard  the  movement  of  troops  and  wagons  across  the  pontoon  bridge 
before  mentioned,  and  Sent  a  report  of  the  fact  to  the  general  command- 
ing the  corps. 


EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  JEFF.  C.  DAVIS'  REPORT. 

During  the  intervening  days  between  the  12th  and  21st,  at  which  time 
the  enemy  evacuated  his  position,  my  troops  were  assiduously  engaged 
in  skirmishing  with  the  enemy,  reconnoitering  his  position,  and  making 
general  preparations  for  an  attack.  Five  (5)  points  in  my  front  had, 
several  days  before  the  evacuation,  been  reconnoitered,  and  pronounced 
accessible  to  an  attacking  party.  This  information  was  duly  forwarded 
to  the  commanding  general. 


EXTRACTS  FROM  COLONEL  CARMAN'S  REPORT. 

I  then  moved  the  remaining  regiment  of  the  brigade — One  Hundred 
and  Fiftieth  New  York  Volunteers — to  the  South  Carolina  shore,  and  es- 
tablished there  my  headquarters  at  Izzard's  mill.  The  position  occupied 
by  the  brigade  was  strong  for  defense,  but  the  nature  of  the  ground  was 
such  that  an  advance  was  difficult.  .  .  . 

During  the  night,  I  transported  the  two  pieces  of  artillery  across  the 
•river,  and  put  them  in  position  in  the  center  of  the  line.  The  line  as 


THE    MARCH    TO    THE    SEA.  303 

then  formed  and  held  by  my  brigade  was  two  and  a  quarter  miles  long, 
the  left  resting  on  the  Savannah  river,  and  the  right  on  an  inlet  near 
Clyesdale  creek.  .  .  . 

December  20.  ...  During  the  day,  a  great  number  of  vehicles  of  all 
descriptions  were  seen  passing  our  front,  moving  from  Savannah  toward 
Hardeeville,  which  was  reported  to  the  headquarters  of  the  division. 
In  the  afternoon,  a  rebel  gunboat  came  up  the  river  in  our  rear,  and 
threw  about  thirty  shells  into  my  brigade,'  killing  one  man  of  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fiftieth  New  York.  I  could  reach  it  with  my  artillery. 
At  4  P.  M.  the  enemy  was  reinforced  by  three  regiments  of  infantry  from 
Savannah. 

From  7  P.  M.  until  3  A.  M.  the  noise  of  the  retreating  enemy  could 
plainly  be  heard  as  they  crossed  the  bridges  from  Savannah  to  the  South 
Carolina  shore. 

CHARLESTON,  S.  C.,  December  8,  1864. 
Lieutenant- General  Hardee,  Savannah,  Ga,  : 

Having  no  army  of  relief  to  look  to,  and  your  forces  being  essential  to 
the  defense  of  Georgia  and  South  Carolina,  whenever  you  shall  have  to 
select  between  their  safety  and  that  of  Savannah,  sacrifice  the  latter,  and 
form  a  junction  with  General  Jones,  holding  the  left  bank  of  the  Savan- 
nah river  and  the  railroad  to  this  place  as  long  as  possible. 

G.  T.  BEAUKEGAKD. 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

WASHINGTON,  December  16,  1864. 

GENERAL  : — Lieutenant-General  Grant  informs  me  that  in  his  last  dis- 
patch sent  to  you,  he  suggested  the  transfer  of  your  infantry  to  Rich- 
mond. He  now  wishes  me  to  say  that  you  will  retain  your  entire  force, 
at  least  for  the  present,  and,  with  such  assistance  as  may  be  given  you  by 
General  Foster  and  Admiral  Dahlgren,  operate  from  such  base  as  you 
may  establish  on  the  coast.  General  Foster  will  obey  such  instructions 
as  may  be  given  by  you.  Should  you  have  captured  Savannah,  it  is 
thought  that  by  transferring  the  water-batteries  to  the  land  side,  that 
place  may  be  made  a  good  depot  and  base  for  operations  on  Augusta, 
Branchville,  or  Charleston.  If  Savannah  should  not  be  captured,  or  if 
captured  and  not  deemed  suitable  for  this  purpose,  perhaps  Beaufort 
would  serve  as  a  depot.  As  the  rebels  have  probably  removed  their  most 
valuable  property  from  Augusta,  perhaps  Branchville  would  be  the  most  im- 
portant point  at  which  to  strike  in  order  to  sever  all  connections  between 
the  Virginia  and  the  Northwestern  railroads.  General  Grant's  wishes,  how- 
ever, are  that  this  whole  matter  of  your  future  actions  should  be  left  en- 
tirely to  your  discretion. 

We  can  send  you  from  here  a  number  of  complete  batteries  of  field 
artillery,  with  or  without  horses,  as  you  may  desire.  Also,  as  soon  as 
General  Thomas  can  spare  them,  all  the  fragments,  convalescents,  and 


304  THE   MAECH   TO   THE    SEA. 

furloughed  men  of  your  army.  It  is  reported  that  Thomas  defeated 
Hood  yesterday  near  Nashville,  but  we  have  no  particulars  nor  official 
reports,  telegraphic  communications  being  interrupted  by  a  heavy  storm. 
Our  last  advices  from  you  were  in  General  Howard's  note,  announcing 
his  approach  to  Savannah. 

Yours  truly, 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 
Major-General,  Chief  of  Staff. 
Major-General  Sherman,  via  Hilton  Head. 


HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 
WASHINGTON,  December  18,  1864. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL: — Yours  of  the  13th,  by  Major  Anderson,  is  just  re- 
ceived. I  congratulate  you  on  your  splendid  success,  and  shall  very  soon 
expect  to  hear  of  the  crowning  work  of  your  new  campaign,  in  the  cap- 
ture of  Savannah.  Your  march  will  stand  out  prominently  as  the  great 
one  of  this  great  war.  When  Savannah  falls,  then  for  another  wide 
swath  through  the  center  of  the  Confederacy.  But  I  will  not  anticipate. 
General  Grant  is  expected  here  this  morning,  and  will  probably  write  you 
his  own  views. 

•*•*•**•*•*•*•*#• 

Orders  have  been  issued  for  all  officers  and  detachments,  having  three 
months  or  more  to  serve,  to  rejoin  your  army,  via  Savannah.  Those  hav- 
ing less  than  three  months  to  serve  will  be  retained  by  General  Thomas. 
Should  you  capture  Charleston,  I  hope  that  by  some  accident  the  place 
may  be  destroyed;  and  if  a  little  salt  should  be  sown  upon  its  site,  it 
may  prevent  the  growth  of  future  crops  of  nullification  and  secession. 

Yours  truly, 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 
Major-General,  Chief  of  Staff. 
Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman,  Savannah. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  SAVANNAH,  December  24,  1864. 

GENERAL: — I  had  the  pleasure  of  receiving  your  two  letters  of  the  16th 
and  18th  instant  to-day,  and  I  feel  more  than  usually  nattered  by  the 
high  encomiums  you  have  passed  on  our  recent  campaign,  which  is  now 
completed  by  the  occupation  of  Savannah. 

I  am  very  glad  that  General  Grant  has  changed  his  mind  about  em- 
barking my  troops  for  James  river,  leaving  me  free  to  make  the  broad 
swath  you  describe  through  South  and  North  Carolina,  and  am  still  more 
gratified  at  the  news  from  Thomas  in  Tennessee,  because  it  fulfills  my 
plans,  which  contemplated  his  being  fully  able  to  dispose  of  Hood  in 
case  he  ventured  north  of  the  Tennessee  river.  So  I  think,  on  the 
whole,  I  can  chuckle  over  Jeff.  Davis'  disappointment  in  not  turning  my 
Atlanta  campaign  into  a  Moscow  disaster. 


THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA.  305 

I  will  bear  in  mind  your  hint  as  to  Charleston,  and  don't  think  "  salt" 
will  be  necessary.  When  I  move,  the  Fifteenth  Corps  will  be  on  the  right 
of  the  right  wing,  and  their  position  will  naturally  bring  them  into  it  first; 
and  if  you  have  watched  the  history  of  that  corps,  you  will  have  re- 
marked that  they  do  their  work  up  pretty  well.  The  truth  is,  the  whole 
army  is  burning  with  an  insatiable  desire  to  wreak  vengeance  upon  South 
Carolina.  I  almost  tremble  at  her  fate,  but  feel  that  she  deserves  all  that 
is  in  store  for  her.  Many  and  many  a  person  in  Georgia  asked  me  why  we 
did  not  go  to  South  Carolina ;  and  when  I  answered  that  I  was  en  route  for 
that  state,  the  invariable  reply  was,  "Well,  if  you  make  those  people 
feel  the  severities  of  war,  we  will  pardon  you  for  your  desolation  of 
Georgia."  I  look  upon  Columbia  as  quite  as  bad  as  Charleston,  and  I 
doubt  if  we  shall  spare  the  public  buildings  there  as  we  did  at  Milledge- 

ville. 

********* 

I  felt  somewhat  disappointed  at  Hardee's  escape  from  me,  but  really 
am  not  to  blame.  I  moved  as  quick  as  possible  to  close  up  the  "  Union 
Causeway,"  but  intervening  obstacles  were  such,  that  before  I  could  get 
my  troops  on  the  road,  Hardee  slipped  out.  Still,  I  know  that  the  men 
that  were  in  Savannah  will  be  lost  in  a- measure  to  Jeff.  Davis;  for  the 
Georgia  troops  under  G.  W.  Smith  declared  they  would  not  fight  in  South 
Carolina,  and  they  have  gone  north  en  route  for  Augusta,  and  I  have  rea- 
son to  believe  North  Carolina  troops  have  gone  to  Wilmington — in  other 
words,  they  are  scattered. 

********* 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General 
Major-General  H.  W.  Halleck,  Chief  of  Staff,  Washington,  Z>.  O. 

VOL.  n—20 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII. 

v 

MARCH   THROUGH   THE   CAROLINAS,   FROM   SAVANNAH   TO  GOLDSBORO 
AND   RALEIGH  ;   THE  BATTLES  OP  AVERYSBORO  AND  BENTONVILLE. 

SOON  after  the  occupation  of  Savannah  by  General  Sherman, 
the  movement  of  his  army  by  sea  was  abandoned,  and  its 
march  through  the  Carolinas  was  adopted  instead.  General 
Sherman  had  indicated  to  General  Grant,  in  his  letter  of  De- 
cember 16th,  his  preference  for  the  overland  movement,  and 
in  subsequent  communications  emphasized  his  choice.  And 
in  view  of  the  apparent  advantages  of  this  approach  to  Vir- 
ginia, General  Grant  authorized  General  Sherman,  December 
27th,  to  move  his  army  northward  through  the  Carolinas  as 
soon  as  practicable.  It  was  anticipated  that  this  movement 
would  prevent,  in  great  measure,  the  union  of  the  fragments 
of  the  defeated  Confederate  armies  in  the  West  and  South, 
while  it  would  repeat  and  intensify  the  effect  produced  by  the 
march  from  Atlanta  to  Savannah.  The  plan  adopted,  com- 
passed the  permanent  occupancy  of  Savannah  by  troops  from 
a  distance,  that  General  Sherman  might  keep  his  army  intact 
to  be  able  to  resist  General  Lee  until  General  Grant  could  give 
him  help  from  Virginia,  should  that  general  abandon  the 
capital  of  the  Confederacy  to  oppose  him. 

The  river  defenses  of  Savannah,  with  slight  modifications, 
were  deemed  adequate.  Forts  Pulaski,  Thunderbolt,  and 
McAllister  were  put  in  complete  order.  The  forts  bearing 
upon  the  approaches  by  water  were  dismantled,  and  their 
heavy  guns  sent  to  Fort  Pulaski  and  Hilton  Head.  The 
obstructions,  in  eluding  torpedoes,  were  removed  from  the  ad- 
jacent waters,  and  Admiral  Dahlgren  had  the  channels  staked 
out  and  indicated  by  buoys.  Preparations  were  promptly 

(306) 


AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  307 

commenced  and  energetically  prosecuted,  that  the  army  might 
move  northward  by  the  15th  of  January. 

A  portion  of  General  Sherman's  forces  did  move  before  the 
15th  of  January ;  but  rain,  swollen  rivers,  and  flooded  low- 
lands so  delayed  co-operative  columns,  that  they  did  not  cross 
the  Savannah  river  until  the  first  week  of  February.  On  the 
14th,  General  Howard,  with  General  Blair's  corps,  crossed 
from  Beaufort  Island  to  the  main  land,  flanked  the  enemy  at 
Gordon's  Corner,  and  followed  him  to  Pocotaligo,  and  on  the 
following  morning  took  possession  of  the  vacant  fort  at  that 
place.  This  movement  was  a  feint  upon  Charleston,  to  deceive 
the  enemy  as  to  General  Sherman's  first  and  second  objectives, 
which  were  Columbia,  South  Carolina,  and  Goldsboro,  North 
Carolina. 

A  pontoon  bridge  had  been  thrown  at  Savannah  for  the 
passage  of  the  left  wing,  and  the  Union  causeway  had 
been  repaired ;  but  the  flood  in  the  river  had  borne  away  the 
bridge  and  submerged  the  causeway,  and  General  Slocum  was 
compelled  to  move  up  the  river  to  find  a  crossing.  Jackson's 
and  Ward's  divisions  of  the  Twentieth  Corps  crossed  •  at 
Purysburg,  and  on  the  19th  were  at  Hardeeville,  in  com- 
munication with  General  Howard  at  Pocotaligo.  The  Four- 
teenth Corps,  and  Geary's  division  of  the  Twentieth  Corps, 
which  had  been  relieved  from  garrison  duty  at  Savannah,  by 
General  Grover's  division  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps  from  Vir- 
ginia, did  not  leave  Savannah  until  the  26th  of  January. 
These  troops  then  moved  up  to  Sister's  Ferry,  and  succeeded 
in  crossing  the  river  during  the  first  week  of  February.  In 
the  meantime,  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  General  John  A.  Logan 
commanding,  had  crossed  the  river  and  lowlands,  and  joined 
General  Howard  at  Pocotaligo. 

General  Sherman's  forces  were  now  in  readiness  to  enter 
upon  a  campaign  which  involved  strategic  combinations  of 
widest  range.  When  the  northward  march  was  first  indicated, 
Generals  Bragg,  Beauregard,  and  Hardee  were  intent  upon 
concentrating  all  fragments  of  armies  far  and  near  to  oppose 
it.  Generals  Beauregard  and  Hardee  were  in  Charleston,  and 
General  Bragg  was  in  North  Carolina. 

North  Carolina  was  open  to  attack  from  the  coast,  and 


308  AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE. 

thither  General  Schofield's  corps  of  twenty-one  thousand  men 
from  the  "West  and  other  forces  were  to  move.  General  Sher- 
man had  an  offensive  army  of  sixty-five  thousand  men,  and 
forces  in  his  rear  to  hold  Savannah  and  garrison  such  other 
fortified  places  as  should  fall  into  his  hands.  Acting  aggres- 
sively on  a  "broad  field,  with  possible  objectives  in  front,  or 
right  or  left,  their  antagonist  could  conceal  his  purposes,  and 
strike  vital  points  uncovered  by  invitation  of  feints  in  other 
directions.  The  disposition  of  his  forces  from  Sister's  Ferry 
to  Pocotaligo  menaced  equally  Charleston,  Columbia,  and 
Augusta,  and  which  was  General  Sherman's  immediate  ob- 
jective, the  Confederate  generals  could  not  discern  with  cer- 
tainty. And  if  they  could  have  ascertained  his  aims,  he  could 
change  them  with  pleasure  with  crushing  effect.  Having 
passed  by  Augusta  in  his  march  from  Atlanta  that  he  might 
menace  that  city  with  his  left  flank  while  feigning  against 
Charleston  with  his  right,  to  concentrate  between  the  divided 
forces  of  the  enemy  upon  Columbia  as  his  first  objective,  he 
proposed  that  his  two  wings  should  shake  hands  where  seces- 
sion first  found  positive  expression  through  the  convention  of 
South  Carolina,  and  then  stride  on  to  Goldsboro  and  Rich- 
mond. 

The  inevitable  delay  at  Savannah  was  favorable  to  the 
enemy,  as  it  had  given  tiriie  for  a  sweeping  conscription  in  the 
states  immediately  threatened,  for  the  fragments  of  Hood's 
army  to  move  far  toward  the  Carolinas,  and  for  Wheeler  to 
obstruct  the  roads  before  General  Sherman's  columns,  and 
destroy  the  bridges  that  could  not  be  utilized  for  defense. 
These  obstructions,  the  depth  of  the  rivers,  and  the  breadth  of 
the  immediate  lowlands  on  their  margins,  doubtless  gave  hope 
to  the  enemy  that  the  invasion  of  the  Carolinas  would  be 
greatly  delayed,  if  .not  defeated.  But  though  the  obstacles 
were  almost  insurmountable,  General  Sherman's  victorious 
troops  did  not  hesitate  to  make  causeways  in  the  deep  cold 
waters  for  miles,  nor  to  make  roads  through  the  swamps  of 
South  Carolina  in  midwinter,  and  made  a  march  not  inferior 
to  the  celebrated  passage  of  the  Alps,  except  in  the  low  lines 
of  advance. 

The  infantry  forces  of  the  enemy  occupied  the  line  of  the 


AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  309 

Salkehatchie  river,  while  Wheeler's  cavalry  hovered  around  the 
heads  of  column  or  on  the  fianks  of  the  two  wings.  The  left 
wing,  with  Kilpatrick  on  its  left  flank,  moved  upon  Barn- 
well,  threatening  Augusta;  the  right  wing,  accompanied 
by  General  Sherman,  moved  westward  to  the  Salkehatchie, 
touching  the  river  at  Beaufort  and  Rivers'  bridges,  flanking 
Charleston,  arid  neutralizing  the  elaborate  fortifications  of  that 
city,  which  had  so  long  defied  the  heavy  guns  of  iron-clads 
and  land-batteries.  The  bridges  of  the  Salkehatchie  were  de- 
fended with  spirit,  but  in  vain;  and  General  Howard  soon 
forced  the  passages,  when  the  enemy  retired  to  Branchville, 
burning  all  bridges  behind  him.  These  movements  spread 
alarm  everywhere.  The  Confederate  forces  were  feeble  at 
best,  and  there  were  now  so  many  possibilities  to  General 
Sherman,  all  fruitful  of  ruin,  that  extreme  uncertainty  and 
foreboding  of  crushing  disasters  palsied  the  courage  of  troops 
and  citizens.  They  could  only  guess  at  General  Sherman's 
objective,  and  so  many  were  possible'  and  his  strategy  so  be- 
wildering that  no  positions  were  held  with  adequate  strength 
for  temporary  resistance,  and  Columbia  was  uncovered  almost 
entirely. 

General  Sherman  threw  the  Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth 
Corps  on  the  Orangeburg  road — the  latter  by  Binnaker's 
bridge  over  the  south  fork  of  Edisto,  and  the  former  by  Hoi- 
man's.  Having  reached  Orangeburg,  the  right  wing  moved 
on  the  direct  road  to  Columbia.  The  enemy  was  driven  from 
all  points  where  resistance  was  made,  and  on  the  16th,  the 
head  of  column  approached  the  capital  of  South  Carolina. 
The  left  wing  advanced  steadily  by  Barnwell  and  Lexington 
as  the  general  direction,  and  destroyed  the  Charleston  and 
Augusta  railroad  for  several  miles.  After  a  well-sustained 
menace  to  Augusta,  General  Slocum  gathered  his  forces  and 
touched  the  Saluda  river  above  Columbia  simultaneously  with 
the  arrival  of  General  Howard  on  the  bank  of  the  river  oppo- 
site the  city. 

General  Sherman's  maneuvers  resulted  in  marked  success. 
Throwing  his  columns  in  diverging  lines  from  Savannah,  and 
then  converging  them  upon  Columbia,  he  caused  the  evacua- 
tion of  Charleston,  and  drove  General  Cheatham,  moving 


310  AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE. 

eastward  with  the  remnant  of  Hood's  army,  to  the  north  of 
his  projected  line.  It  now  remained  to  reach  Goldsboro 
through  repetition  of  the  same  confusing  strategy;  but  the 
conditions  of  its  success  were  now  greatly  changed,  as  the  gar- 
risons of  Charleston,  Columbia,  and  Augusta  could  be  united 
with  the  "Western  troops  and  other  forces  on  the  Atlantic 
coast,  and  endanger  isolated  columns.  Besides,  a  great 
strategist,  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  had  been  appointed  to 
the  command  of  all  the  forces  available  to  resist  General  Sher- 
man, in  tacit  recognition  of  the  fact  that  his  management  of 
defensive  campaigns  promised  better  results  than  that  of  any 
other  general  who  could  be  assigned  to  command  in  the  Car- 
olinas ;  but  General  Johnston's  conduct  of  the  defensive  was 
now  to  be  subject  to  conditions  radically  different  from  those 
of  the  Atlanta  campaign.  His  army,  as  before,  was  inferior  to 
that  of  General  Sherman's,  and  was  composed  of  fragmentary 
troops,  whose  morale  was  in  harmony  with  the  condition  of 
the  cause  which  they  represented;  and,  besides,  he  was  to 
meet  his  old  antagonist,  with  an  army  whose  spirit  had  risen, 
if  possible,  with  its  successive  triumphs,  and  not  now,  as  before, 
restrained  in  maneuver  by  connection  with  a  railroad  as  its 
only  channel  of  supply.  General  Johnston  could  therefore 
have  no  hope  of  success,  unless  he  could  strike  unsupported 
columns  and  defeat  General  Sherman  in  detail ;  and  past  expe- 
rience did  not  give  promise  of  such  an  opportunity. 

In  advancing  from  Columbia,  General  Sherman,  as  before, 
covered  his  real  object  by  a  menace  in  a  different  direction. 
He  now  directed  General  Slocum  to  threaten  Charlotte,  North 
Carolina,  to  create  the  impression  that  he  would  strike  that 
point  on  his  way  to  Virginia,  while  in  reality  directing  his 
army  to  Goldsboro.  Accordingly,  General  Slocum  resumed 
motion  on  the  17th,  crossed  the  Saluda  at  Mount  Zion  Church 
on  the  19th,  and  Broad  river  at  Freshley's  mills  the  day  fol- 
lowing, and  arrived  at  Winnsboro  on  the  21st.  On  this  march 
the  left  wing  and  cavalry  destroyed  several  miles  of  railroad 
north  and  south  of  Alston.  The  right  wing,  General  Sherman 
accompanying,  left  Columbia  on  the  20th,  on  the  direct  road 
to  Winnsboro,  and  destroyed  the  railroad  between  the  two 
places.  Eighty  squares  in  Columbia  were  left  in  ashes  from  a 


AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  311 

conflagration  whose  origin  and  progress  has  been  a  matter  of 
historical  controversy. 

From  Winnsboro  the  two  wings  again  diverged.  General 
Slocum  moved  to  the  north  with  his  troops  well  spread  out 
and  then  turned  east,  crossed  the  Catawba,  and  advanced  to 
Sneedshoro.  The  cavalry  on  his  left  demonstrated  toward 
Charlotte,  and  then  followed  to  Sneedsboro.  The  right  wing, 
in  the  meantime,  advanced  to  Cheraw — the  Seventeenth  Corps 
entering  that  place  on  the  2d  of  March.  The  enemy  offered 
some  resistance,  but  did  not  retard  a  single  column.  Wheeler's 
cavalry  and  the  forces  from  Charleston  appeared  at  times 
before  the  columns.  The  other  forces,  including  Cheatham's 
from  the  West,  were  directed  to  Charlotte,  under  the  impres- 
sion that  this  was  the  objective. 

From  Pedee  river  the  two  wings  moved  toward  Fayetteville, 
crossing  near  Sneedsboro  and  at  Cheraw — the  corps  moving  on 
separate  roads,  and  the  cavalry  maintaining  position  on  the 
left  flank.  On  the  9th  of  March,  General  Hampton  surprised 
one  of  General  Kilpatrick's  brigades,  and  gained  a  temporary 
advantage  over  his  whole  force.  General  Kilpatrick  barely 
escaped  capture  on  foot.  The  enemy,  however,  stopped  to 
plunder  the  camps,  and  this  gave  time  for  the  national  cavalry 
to  rally;  and  having  done  this,  General  Kilpatrick  charged 
and  recaptured  his  camps  and  repelled'  all  subsequent  attacks. 
General  J.  G.  Mitchell,  with  his  brigade  of  infantry,  reached 
the  scene  of  conflict  just  as  the  enemy  abandoned  his  effort  to 
regain  his  lost  advantage. 

On  the  llth,  the  Fourteenth  and  Seventeenth  Corps  arrived 
at  Fayetteville  and  skirmished  with  Hampton's  cavalry,  which 
covered  General  Hardee  as  he  withdrew  from  the  town  on  the 
bridge  spanning  Cape  Fear  river,  which  he  succeeded  in  burn- 
ing. It  was  anticipated  that  General  Hardee  would  contest 
the  possession  of  this  place,  but  he  abandoned  it  without  resist- 
ing and  with  it  a  vast  amount  of  public  property,  including  an 
immense  arsenal.  At  Fayetteville,  General  Sherman  was  met 
by  the  army  tug  Davidson,  Captain  Ainsworth  commanding, 
and  the  gunboat  Eolus,  Lieutenant- Commander  Young,  with 
the  first  intelligence  of  the  fall  of  Wilmington,  and  he  then 


312  AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE. 

dispatched  orders  to  Generals  Schofield  and  Terry  to  move 
upon  Goldsboro. 

The  march  through  South  Carolina  had  left  a  track  of  deso- 
lation more  than  forty  miles  wide.  That  state's  special  guilt 
in  taking  the  initiative  in  secession,  was  assumed  "by  officers 
and  men  as  the  justification  of  its  devastation.  As  many  of 
the  Southern  people  who  were  originally  opposed  to  secession, 
blamed  South  Carolina  for  precipitating  the  movement,  and 
having  themselves  experienced  the  terrible  retributions  of  the 
war  which  resulted,  desired  that  South  Carolina  should  feel 
war's  heavy  hand  before  peace  should  come,  it  was  not  strange 
that  the  national  troops  in  marching  through  the  state  which 
originally  suggested  secession,  and  studiously  endeavored  to 
induce  the  Southern  States  to  withdraw  from  the  Union,  should 
leave  behind  them  the  fearful  evidences  of  vengeance  achieved. 
But  it  was  easier  for  the  veterans  of  the  war  to  find  justifica- 
tion for  sweeping  desolation  in  their  own  feelings  than  it  is  for 
others  to  find  grounds  for  its  historical  vindication. 

As  General  Johnston  had  now  lost  a  large  number  of  im- 
portant places  without  losing  their  garrisons,  and  had  been 
joined  by  several  thousand  troops  from  the  "West,  it  was  now 
possible  for  him  to  unite  all  to  resist  General  Sherman  between 
Fayetteville  and  Goldsboro.  Altogether  they  did  not  consti- 
tute an  army  equal  to  General  Sherman's,  yet,  when  united, 
were  formidable  against  either  wing  or  a  smaller  fraction.  Re- 
ferring to  these  forces,  General  Sherman  thus  wrote :  "  These 
made  up  an  army  superior  to  me  in  cavalry,  and  formidable 
enough  in  artillery  and  infantry  to  justify  me  in  extreme  cau- 
tion in  making  the  last  step  necessary  to  complete  the  march  I 
have  undertaken."  In  a  letter  to  General  Schofield,  of  March 
12th,  he  said  that  General  Johnston  might  concentrate  at  Ra- 
leigh from  forty  to  forty-five  thousand  men,  and  wrote:"  I  can 
.whip  that  number  with  my  present  force,  and  with  yours  and 
Terry's  added,  we  can  go  wherever  we  can  live."  To  General 
Grant,  the  same  day,  he  wrote :  "  Joe  Johnston  may  try  to  in- 
terpose between  me  and  Schofield  about  ^NTewbern ;  but  I  think 
he  will  not  try  that,  but  concentrate  his  scattered  armies  at 
Raleigh,  and  I  will  go  straight  at  him  as  soon  as  I  get  my  men 
reclothed  and  our  wagons  reloaded." 


AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  313 

General  Sherman's  maneuvers,  after  leaving  Fayetteville, 
were,  in  type,  a  repetition  of  his  former  strategy.  He  moved 
his  cavalry  toward  Raleigh,  and  followed  immediately  with 
four  divisions  of  the  left  wing,  and  more  remotely  with  four 
of  the  right,  throwing  all  his  trains  and  the  four  remaining 
divisions  farther  to  the  east.  He  commenced  these  movements 
on  the  15th.  At  3  A.  M.  General  Kilpatrick  advanced  on  the 
direct  road  to  Averyshoro  to  make  the  feint  on  Raleigh,  and 
then  strike  the  railroad  near  Smithfield.  General  Slocum  fol- 
lowed with  four  unincumbered  divisions.  General  Howard 
held  four  divisions  in  trim  to  march  to  General  Slocum's  help 
should  there  be  need.  The  trains  of  the  left  wing,  with  two 
divisions,  moved  on  the  direct  road  to  Goldshoro,  and  the  trains 
and  two  divisions  of  the  right  wing,  toward  Faisori  Station  on 
the  Wilmington  and  Goldsboro  railroad.  General  Sherman  ac- 
companied the  left  wing. 

The  heavy  rains  made  quagmires  of  the  roads,  and  it  became 
necessary  to  corduroy  them  for  the  artillery.  So  much  of  this 
work  had  been  done  in  the  swamps  of  South  Carolina,  that 
great  facility  had  been  attained,  and  the  army  moved  on  with- 
out serious  delays.  During  the  evening  of  the  15th,  General 
Kilpatrick  met  a  strong  force  of  infantry  near  Taylor's  Hole 
creek,  under  the  command  of  General  Hardee.  He  skirmished 
with  the  rear-guard  and  captured  some  prisoners,  among  whom 
was  Colonel  Rhett  of  the  heavy  artillery.  The  next  morning 
General  Slocum  advanced  his  infantry  columns  to  the  vicinity 
of  Averysboro,  and  found  General  Hardee  intrenched  on  a  nar- 
row neck  of  swampy  land  between  the  Cape  Fear  and  South 
rivers.  General  Hardee's  position  was  in  front  of  the  point 
where  the  Goldsboro  road  through  Bentonville  leaves  the  main 
road  leading  in  the  direction  of  Raleigh.  This  was  the  first 
positive  resistance  which  had  been  offered  by  infantry  in  strong 
force  north  of  Savannah,  and  was  doubtless  intended  to  retard 
General  Sherman's  advance,  until  General  Johnston  could  pre- 
pare for  still  stronger  opposition  at  some  point  farther  north 
or  east.  At  this  time  the  conjecture  was  that  he  would  con- 
centrate at  Raleigh,  Smithfield,  or  Goldsboro ;  but  his  point  of 
intended  concentration  was  much  nearer  than  either  of  these 
towns.  But  the  execution  of  General  Sherman's  plan,  wher- 


314  AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE. 

ever  General  Johnston  might  offer  battle,  required  that  Gen- 
eral Hardee  should  be  dislodged.  Without  this,  the  feint  on 
Raleigh  could  not  be  sustained  or  even  fully  initiated,  and  the 
ultimate  reunion  of  the  columns,  as  contemplated,  could  not 
be  effected,  as  General  Hardee  barred  the  diverging  road  to 
Goldsboro. 

General  Slocum  was  therefore  ordered  to  advance  against 
General  Hardee,  whose  position  was  not  strong,  except  from 
intrenchments  and  the  softness  of  the  ground  before  it,  which 
scarcely  admitted  the  deployment  and  advance  of  infantry, 
and  rendered  the  movement  of  horses  almost  impossible. 
Notwithstanding  this  obstacle,  General  Slocum  advanced, 
Williams'  corps  leading  and  Ward's  division  deployed.  Gen- 
eral Ward's  skirmishers  soon  developed  Rhett's  brigade  of 
artillery,  acting  as  infantry,  behind  slight  intrenchments, 
whose  trend  was  at  right  angles  to  the  road,  and  was  sus- 
tained by  a  battery,  which  enfiladed  the  line  of  direct  ap- 
proach. Direct  attack  being  perilous,  General  Williams 
threw  a  brigade  on  the  left  of  the  enemy's  line,  when  the 
quondam  artillerymen,  in  complete  rout,  fell  back  to  a 
stronger  position.  This  success  opened  the  way  for  a  general 
attack,  to  accomplish  which  Jackson's  division  formed  on  the 
right  of  Ward  and  General  Davis'  two  divisions  of  the  Four- 
teenth Corps  on  his  left.  General  Kilpatrick  was  directed  to 
reach  out  beyond  Jackson's  right  flank  and  grasp  the  Benton- 
ville  road.  One  brigade  of  cavalry  gained  the  road,  but  was 
attacked  furiously  by  McLaw's  division,  and  driven  back. 
After  this  repulse,  General  Slocum's  whole  line  advanced, 
pushed  General  Hardee  within  his  intrenchments,  and  pressed 
him  there  so  heavily  that  during  the  following  dark  and  stormy 
night  he  retreated.  The  next  morning,  General  Ward  fol- 
lowed through  Averysboro,  but  soon  rejoined  the  main  force, 
in  motion  on  the  Goldsboro  road,  which  the  engagement  had 
opened.  General  Slocum  lost  about  eighty  killed  and  four 
hundred  and  eighty  wounded.  The  enemy  left  one  hundred 
and  seventy-eight  dead  on  the  field,  and  lost  one  hundred  and 
seventy-five  men  and  three  guns  by  capture.  The  number 
of  his  wounded  was  not  ascertained.  General  Ward's  pursuit 


AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  315 

developed  the  fact  that  General  Hardee  had  retreated  toward 
Smithfield. 

The  night  previous,  General  Kilpatrick  crossed  South  river, 
and  on  the  17th  advanced  toward  Elevation,  on  the  east  hank. 
General  Slocum  huilt  a  hridge  over  the  swollen  stream,  and 
then  advanced  on  the  Goldshoro  road.  General  Sherman  con- 
tinued with  the  left  wing,  and  encamped  with  the  head  of 
column,  on  the  night  of  the  18th,  on  the  Goldsboro  road, 
twenty-five  miles  from  Goldsboro,  and  five  from  Bentonville, 
at  a  point  where  the  road  from  Clinton  to  Smithfield  crosses 
the  one  to  Goldshoro.  General  Howard  reached  Lee's  store, 
a  few  miles  distant,  the  same  night,  and  the  two  wings  were 
sufficiently  near  to  give  support  in  battle,  and  were  upon 
roads  which  united  a  short  distance  to  the  east. 

Up  to  this  time,  General  Sherman  had  anticipated  an  attack 
upon  his  left  flank;  but  he  was  now  led  to  believe  that  Gen- 
eral Johnston  would  not  attack,  as  it  was  supposed  that  he 
had  retreated  to  Smithfield,  and  he  gave  orders  for  the  two 
columns  to  move  upon  Goldsboro — General  Howard,  on  the 
new  Goldsboro  road,  by  Falling  Creek  Church,  to  give  the 
direct  road  to  General  Slocum.  His  object  was  to  concentrate 
his  forces  at  Goldsboro  as  soon  as  practicable,  and  he  moved 
to  General  Howard's  head  of  column,  to  open  communication 
with  Generals  Schofield  and  Terry — the  former  coming  to  meet 
him  from  IsTewbern,  and  the  latter  from  Wilmington,  having 
conjointly  from  thirty  to  thirty -five  thousand  men.  It  was 
not  known  that  General  Johnston's  whole  army  was  in  imme- 
diate proximity,  but  it  was  supposed  that  only  cavalry  would 
be  met  on  the  way  to  Goldsboro. 

Scarcely  had  General  Carlin's  division  of  the  Fourteenth 
Corps,  in  the  advance  of  the  left  wing,  wheeled  into  the  road 
to  push  on  to  Goldsboro,  when  Dibbrell's  division  of  cavalry 
was  met,  whose  stubborn  resistance  indicated  that  there  was 
support,  or  that  its  courage  had  given  a  new  type  to  the  con- 
flict of  cavalry  with  infantry.  Being  under  orders  to  press 
on,  and  supposing  that  cavalry  alone  was  in  his  front,  General 
Carlin  engaged  the  enemy  vigorously,  and  soon  the  responsive 
roar  of  artillery  announced  the  opening  of  a  battle  which 
General  Johnston  was  delivering,  in  expectation  of  crushing 


316  AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE.. 

the  Fourteenth  Corps  at  least.  But  the  magnitude  of  the 
conflict  was  not  yet  apparent.  As  the  resistance  of  the  enemy 
became  more  stubborn,  Colonels  Hobart's  and  Miles'  brigades 
were  deployed,  the  former  on  the  right,  and  Colonel  Buell  was 
sent,  by  order  of  General  Slocum,  some  distance  to  the  left  to 
develop  the  enemy's  line.  The  resistance  offered  by  the  en- 
emy was  supposed  at  first  to  be  done  by  cavalry,  and  General 
Slocum  so  reported  to  General  Sherman,  who  had  gone  to  the 
right  to  join  General  Howard,  whose  columns  were  moving 
toward  Goldsboro. 

As  resistance  increased,  General  Morgan  was  directed  to 
move  to  the  right  of  Carlin  in  support.  The  former  threw 
General  Mitchell's  brigade  to  the  right  of  Miles'  brigade  and 
the  road,  and  General  Fearing's  to  the  right  and  rear  of 
Mitchell — both  in  double  lines.  The  Seventy-eighth  Illinois 
of  the  former  was  sent  forward  to  skirmish.  Under  this 
stronger  formation,  both  division  generals  were  directed  to 
press  the  enemy  closely,  and  compel  him  to  reveal  his  position 
and  strength. 

General  Slocum  soon  became  convinced  that  he  had  before 
him  a  force  more  formidable  than  a  division  of  cavalry- 
While  still  in  doubt  as  to  the  strength  of  the  enemy,  a  deserter 
came  to  him,  who  had  been  a  national  soldier,  who  gave  in- 
formation that  General  Johnston  had,  by  forced  marches, 
massed  his  entire  army  in  his  front.  This  statement  being 
supported  by  actual  developments,  induced  General  Slocum 
to  prepare  for  defense,  and  immediately  ordered  General  Wil- 
liams to  throw  his  train  to  the  right,  gather  his  forces,  and 
hasten  to  the  support  of  General  Davis.  He  then  sent  a  mes- 
senger to  General  Sherman  to  announce  that  there  was  evi- 
dence that  an  army  was  before  him. 

The  direction  of  General  Hardee's  retreat  from  Averysboro, 
had  led  to  the  belief  that  the  way  to  Goldsboro  was  open. 
And  this  was  the  impression  that  General  Johnston  desired 
to  make  by  all  his  movements.  General  Hardee  meanwhile 
had  changed  direction  not  far  from  Averysboro,  and  by  a 
detour,  had  united  his  command  with  the  other  forces  con- 
centrated and  intrenched  near  Bentonville.  Apparently,  the 
coveted  conditions  of  the  battle  assured  the  success  of  General 


AVERYSBORO  AND  BENTONVILLE.        317 

Johnston's  strategy,  for  two  divisions  in  isolation  were  within 
his  reach ;  two  more  were  distant  a  few  miles,  and  the  four 
divisions  of  the  right  wing,  intended  for  the  support  of  the 
left,  in  the  event  of  battle,  were  in  rapid  motion  toward  Golds- 
boro,  far  to  the  right.  General  Williams'  defeat,  in  prospect, 
was  to  follow  that  of  General  Davis,  and  the  other  corps  and 
detached  divisions  were  to  be  defeated  in  turn,  and  the  trains 
destroyed.  The  plan  miscarried,  mainly,  from  two  unex- 
pected causes — the  resistance  of  two  divisions  until  the  Twen- 
tieth Corps  could  give  support,  and  the  lack  of  complete  con- 
cert of  action  in  General  Johnston's  army,  composed  of  the 
commands  of  Generals  Bragg,  Hardee,  S.  D.  Lee,  and  Cheat- 
ham. 

When  General  Slocum  first  ordered  the  Twentieth  Corps 
to  move  quickly  to  the  field,  it  was  his  intention  to  form  it  on 
the  right  of  the  Fourteenth,  but  when  he  became  fully  con- 
vinced that  General  Johnston's  army  was  in  his  front,  he  di- 
rected General  Williams  to  form  his  corps,  as  the  several  frac- 
tions should  reach  the  field,  on  the  left  of  General  Davis. 
Eobinson's  being  in  the  advance,  was  the  first  to  come  up,  and 
was  placed  in  support  of  Carlin's  division. 

Anticipating  that  Colonel  Buell  would  need  support  in  his 
movement,  General  Carlin  was  directed  by  General  Davis  to 
move  Hobart's  brigade  to  the  left,  and  place  Robinson's 
brigade  in  its  place  in  the  line,  and  support  a  battery,  located 
on  the  main  road,  which  had  been  responding  to  the  enemy's 
artillery. 

Colonel  Buell,  in  advancing  as  directed,  soon  struck  the 
enemy's  intrenchments,  which  he  assaulted  furiously.  After 
a  somewhat  protracted  struggle,  resulting  in  heavy  loss,  Col- 
onel Buell  was  forced  to  withdraw  his  brigade,  which  had 
been  badly  broken,  when  the  enemy  sallied  from  his  works 
in  strong  force  in  pursuit,  and  pressed  him  back,  until  checked 
by  Hobart's  brigade,  which  offered  most  stubborn  resistance. 

When  the  action  commenced,  the  small  train  of  the  corps, 
in  charge  of  General  Vanderveer's  brigade,  was  moved  to  the 
right,  until  this  brigade  had  reached  the  right  of  General 
Mitchell,  where  the  troops  were  formed  in  double  lines,  with 
their  right  resting  on  a  swamp.  This  was  a  timely  disposi- 


318  AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONV1LLE. 

tion,  as  the  advance  of  the  enemy  against  Colonel  Buell  was 
merely  an  incident  in  General  Johnston's  plan  of  aggression, 
which  was  to  wheel  his  whole  line  upon  its  left  to  envelop 
and  capture  General  Davis'  two  divisions.  Colonel  Hobart, 
first,  after  Colonel  Buell,  felt  the  force  of  this  general  attack, 
but  hie  was  not  entirely  encompassed,  as  Buell's  attack  had 
broken  the  continuity  of  the  enemy's  movement,  and  General 
Johnston's  troops  on  the  right  of  the  point  assaulted  by  Buell 
failed  to  move  forward  promptly.  This  failure  gave  time  for 
General  Davis  to  make  such  dispositions  as  were  essential  to 
his  safety,  and  afforded  General  Slocum  opportunity  to  bring 
up  his  reserve  artillery  and  locate  it  with  reference  to  the 
arrest  of  the  enemy  and  the  formation  of  a  new  line  to  the 
left  and  rear. 

The  front  attack  upon  Hobart  and  Robinson  on  his  right, 
was  so  vigorous  as  to  involve  them  speedily  in  the  severest 
conflict,  and  soon  after  in  retreat  upon  the  artillery,  put  in 
position  far  to  the  rear,  on  the  main  road.  The  recession  of 
these  brigades  exposed  the  artillery  on  the  right  of  Robinson, 
three  pieces  of  which  were  captured,  and  also  caused  the  re- 
tirement of  Miles'  brigade  between  Mitchell's  left  and  the 
road.  There  were  now  only  two  brigades,  Mitchell's  and 
Yanderveer's,  on  the  original  line,  and  the  flank  of  the  former 
was  in  air. 

At  this  juncture,  General  Davis  rode  to  his  right  and  or- 
dered General  Fearing's  brigade  to  move  to  the  left,  forming 
line  of  battle  as  it  advanced,  and  facing  the  Bentonville  road. 
This  brigade  moved  quickly  and  was  soon  lost  to  view  in  the 
thickly  wooded  swamp.  General  Morgan  now  directed  Gen- 
eral Mitchell  to  throw  his  second  line  on  his  left,  but  this 
movement  had  been  anticipated  by  the  brigade  commander 
in  provision  for  the  stability  of  his  left  flank.  Mitchell's  brig- 
ade was  now  in  single  line,  bent  at  right  angles  in  the  center. 

The  full  weight  of  the  enemy's  attack  was  soon  after  felt  by 
all  the  troops  on  the  field.  The  forces  that  had  driven  back 
Carlin's  division  and  Robinson's  brigade,  pursued  toward  the 
batteries  in  the  rear,  and  heavy  columns  assaulted  Mitchell 
and  Vanderveer  with  great  impetuosity.  General  Slocum 
had  been  active  in  forming  a  new  line  near  his  artillery,  which 


AVERYSBOEO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  319 

covered  the  re-formation  of  the  troopsthat  had  been  driven  back 
on  the  left.  To  this  result  General  Fearing  rendered  timely 
co-operation,  as  he  advanced  against  the  flank  of  the  columns 
in  parallelism  to  the  road,  and  brought  upon  himself  a  counter 
attack  by  overwhelming  numbers.  "Wounded  himself,  and 
his  brigade  decimated,  he  persisted  in  holding  his  position  for 
a  time,  but  was  finally  compelled  to  give  ground,  to  the  expo- 
sure of  Mitchell's  flank.  In  the  emergency,  General  Morgan 
threw  Yanderveer's  second  line  to  Mitchell's  left ;  but  his  line 
thus  extended,  was  soon  overlapped,  and  the  two  brigades,  in 
single  line,  were  exposed  to  attacks  in  front  and  rear,  as  they 
were  cut  off  from  all  support  and  from  all  communication 
with  the  corps  commander,  and  each  brigade  was  separately 
surrounded.  Repulsing  the  enemy  in  front  repeatedly,  they 
leaped  their  barricades  and  reversing  the  direction  of  their  fire 
repelled  the  enemy  from  their  rear.  In  this  state  of  affairs, 
General  Davis  put  into  the  action  his  escort  and  a  train-guard 
of  four  companies  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Topping.  Gen- 
eral Hoke  and  a  part  of  his  division  were  captured  in  the  rear 
of  Mitchell  and  Vanderveer,  but  as  a  guard  could  not  be 
spared  from  the  engagement,  the  prisoners  passed  round  Yan- 
derveer's right  flank  and  escaped. 

In  the  meantime,  the  new  line  had  been  formed  at  right  an- 
gles to  the  road,  at  the  batteries,  and  Fearing's  brigade  and 
portions  of  Carlin's  division  faced  the  road,  but  not  in  con- 
nection with  Mitchell's  left.  The  general  line  was  now  bent 
twice  at  right  angles — an  improvised  formation,  but  the  most 
effective  possible  for  defense ;  for  the  enemy's  columns  of  at- 
tack to  the  left  of  Mitchell's  salient  angle  were  taken  in  flank 
in  assaulting  either  the  line  parallel  to  the  road  or  the  one 
at  right  angles  to  it,  while  batteries  enfiladed  the  road  between 
the  two  angles  of  the  line,  and  to  some  extent  covered  the 
opening  between  Mitchell  and  the  troops  on  his  left,  and  also 
swept  a  wide  open  space  to  the  left  of  the  road.  The  firmness 
of  Mitchell  and  Yanderveer  contributed  largely  to  break  the 
offensive  force  of  General  Johnston's  army. 

Late  in  the  evening,  Cogswell's  brigade  of  the  First  division, 
Twentieth  Corps,  moved  into  the  space  between  Fearing  and 


320  AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE. 

Mitchell,  and  drove  the  enemy  back  until  nearly  all  the  lost 
ground  was  recovered. 

Viewed  in  relation  to  the  magnitude  of  the  army,  success- 
fully resisted  by  eight  brigades  of  infantry,  and  Kilpatrick's 
division  of  cavalry,  which  held  position  on  the  left  and  rear, 
the  objects  and  hopes  of  the  enemy  and  the  character  of  the 
fighting  by  Morgan's  division,  this  engagement  takes  rank 
amongst  the  great  decisive  battles  of  the  war.  The  defense, 
under  such  unequal  conditions,  was  triumphantly  successful, 
and  General  Johnston  here  failed  in  the  only  special  aggres- 
sive effort  against  General  Sherman  in  his  march  from  Atlanta 
to  Raleigh.  That  the  issue  turned  upon  the  action  of  the 
brigades  of  Mitchell,  Yanderveer,  and  Fearing,  can  not  be 
doubted.  The  two  former  did  not  give  an  inch  of  ground  to 
the  enemy,  though  thrown  into  single  lines,  cut  off  from  sup- 
port, surrounded,  and  compelled  to  fight  in  front  and  rear. 
The  action  of  Fearing's  brigade  was  not  less  important,  as  it 
disturbed  and  defeated  General  Johnston's  combination  to 
utilize  for  complete  success  his  first  advantage.  General  Fear- 
ing fought  in  complete  isolation  for  some  time,  without  de- 
fenses, and  when  his  right  flank  was  struck  by  the  enemy  with 
such  force  as  to  shatter  it,  he  changed  front  upon  his  left,  ral- 
lied his  shattered,  troops,  and  held  the  ground  essential  to  the 
stability  of  the  new  line.  The  later  dispositions  and  resistance 
by  the  whole  command  gave  a  symmetry  and  brilliancy  to  the 
conflict  which  have  seldom  found  expression  in  such  urgent 
impro  vision. 

To  the  enemy  the  issue  must  have  been  dispiriting  in  the 
extreme.  Sadly  and  hopelessly  must  the  Confederate  chief- 
tain have  witnessed  the  failure  of  his  initiative,  in  destroying 
General  Sherman's  corps  consecutively,  in  their  isolation.  He 
had  constructed  his  fortifications,  which  were  strong  and  elab- 
orate, to  accomplish  this  object.  His  intrenchments  crossed 
the  main  Goldsboro'  road  at  right  angles,  then  extended  to 
the  west  one  mile,  and  then  curved  more  than  two  miles  to 
the  west-northwest,  nearly  parallel  to  the  road,  but  concealed 
by  distance  and  forests.  He  then  resisted  strongly  on  the 
Bentonville  road  to  conceal  his  fortifications  at  that  point,  that 
he  might  throw,  his  whole  army  around  the  Fourteenth  Corps 


AVERYSBOKO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  321 

.and  interpose  between  it  and  the  Twentieth,  which,  at  the 
first,  was  nearly  ten  miles  in  the  rear,  and  restrained  from 
swift  motion  by  exceedingly  boggy  roads,  made  almost  im- 
passable by  the  wagons  and  artillery  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps. 
The  failure  of  the  initiative  of  this  elaborate  plan,  was  there- 
fore entirely  unexpected  to  General  Johnston,  and  was  doubt- 
less as  much  a  surprise  to  himself  as  was  the  presence  of  his 
army  at  Bentonville  to  General  Sherman,  who  scattered  his 
columns  the  morning  before  the  battle,  believing  that  the  Con- 
federate army  was  far  to  the  north,  having  abandoned  the 
purpose  of  offering  further  resistance  to  his  advance  to  Golds- 
boro. 

In  the  evening  the  remainder  of  the  Twentieth  Corps 
reached  the  field,  and  was  placed  on  the  left  of  the  line  of  bat- 
tle, with  Kilpatrick's  troopers  covering  that  flank. 

When  General  Sherman  was  informed  by  General  Slocum, 
through  a  messenger  late  in  the  day,  that  General  Johnston's 
army  had  been  developed,  he  directed  him  to  call  up  his 
two  divisions  guarding  the  wagon  trains,  and  also  General 
Hazen's  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  then  in  the  rear  of 
the  right  wing,  but  several  miles  distant,  and  to  act  defensively 
until  he  could  direct  the  remaining  divisions  of  the  right  wing 
to  the  enemy's  left  and  rear,  from  the  direction  of  Cox's  bridge 
over  the  Neuse  river.  At  the  time,  General  Howard's  advance 
was  near  this  bridge,  about  ten  miles  from  Goldsboro.  Gen- 
eral Sherman  did  not  give  full  credit  to  General  Slocum's  re- 
ports of  General  Johnston's  concentration  at  Bentonville,  as 
he  did  not  believe  that  he  would  accept  or  invite  battle  with 
the  Neuse  river  in  his  rear. 

On  the  morning  of  the  20th,  Generals  Baird  and  Geary, 
each  with  two  brigades,  and  General  Hazen,  with  his  entire 
division,  arrived  on  the  field.  General  Hazen,  by  direction  of 
General  Slocum,  formed  his  command  on  the  right  of  General 
Morgan,  and  General  Baird  moved  out  in  front  of  the  line  of 
battle  of  the  preceding  day.  These  three  generals  received 
orders  to  press  the  enemy,  and  General  Morgan  gained  a  por- 
tion of  his  line  on  the  right. 

At  2  A.  M.,  on  the  20th,  General  Sherman  informed  General 

VOL.  II — 21 


322  AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE. 

Slocum  that  he  would  go  to  his  support  with  his  whole  army. 
He  turned  back  the  right  wing  from  the  Neuse  river,  ordered 
General  Schofield  to  push  for  Goldsboro  and  then  move 
toward  Smithfield,  and  instructed  General  Terry  to  move  on 
Cox's  bridge  and  establish  a  crossing.  By  daylight,  General 
Howard's  columns  were  in  motion  toward  Bentonville.  Cav- 
alry was  encountered  earlier,  but  the  first  infantry  was  found 
behind  barricades  near  Bentonville,  three  miles  east  of  the 
battle-field.  General  Logan,  in  moving  forward,  ascertained 
that  General  Johnston's  left  was  refused  behind  a  parapet, 
connecting  with  the  intrenchments  before  General  Slocum, 
with  a  salient  on  the  main  Goldsboro  road  between  the  two 
wings.  His  flanks  rested  on  Mill  creek,  covering  the  road  to 
Smithfield,  which  crosses  the  stream  on  a  bridge.  General 
Sherman  directed  General  Howard  to  approach  cautiously, 
who  connected  his  left  flank  with  General  Slocum's  right  at 
4  P.  M.,  and  then  a  strong  line  was  presented  to  the  enemy. 

On  the  21st,  General  Sherman  gave  orders  to  press  the 
enemy  with  skirmishers,  use  artillery  freely,  but  not  give 
battle  unless  at  an  advantage.  The  same  day,  General 
Schofield  reached  Goldsboro,  and  General  Terry  laid  a  pon- 
toon bridge  at  Cox's  bridge,  and  then  the  three  armies,  in  the 
aggregate  nearly  one  hundred  thousand  men,  were  virtually 
united. 

During  the  day,  General  Mower's  division  of  the  Seven- 
teenth Corps  worked  round  the  enemy's  left  flank,  and  nearly 
reached  the  bridge  so  essential  to  General  Johnston.  This 
movement  and  the  approach  of  Generals  Schofield  and  Terry 
induced  General  Johnston  to  abandon  his  position  the  follow- 
ing night.  General  Johnston,  in  this  case  as  in  all  others  dur- 
ing the  war,  made  a  safe  retreat.  He  sacrificed  his  pickets 
and  left  his  wounded  in  hospitals,  but  lost  nothing  of  value 
besides. 

General  Slocum  lost  nine  officers  and  one  hundred  and 
forty-five  men  killed,  fifty-one  officers  and  eight  hundred  and 
sixteen  men  wounded,  and  two  hundred  and  twenty-three 
captured.  The  aggregate  loss  was  twelve  hundred  and  forty- 
seven.  He  buried  on  the  field  one  hundred  and  sixty-seven 
of  the  enemy,  and  captured  three  hundred  and  thirty  prisoners. 


AVERYSBORO   AND   BEISTTONVILLE.  323 

General  Howard's  total  loss  was  three  hundred  and  ninety- 
nine,  and  he  captured  twelve  hundred  and  eighty-seven.* 

General  Johnston  was  pursued  at  dawn  the  next  morning, 
but  the  troops  were  soon  recalled,  when  General  Sherman 
renewed  his  orders  for  the  concentration  at  Goldsboro. 

After  the  armies  had  been  placed  in  encampments,  General 
Sherman  visited  General  Grant  to  confer  with  regard  to  the 
final  operations  of  the  war  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  He  returned 
with  the  impression  that  General  Lee  would  unite  with  Gen- 
eral Johnston  after  abandoning  Richmond.  But  whatever  the 
specific  action  of  the  two  Confederate  generals  might  be,  he 
was  to  co-operate  with  General  Grant  by  advancing  against 
General  Johnston  and  then  moving  north. 

At  Goldsboro,  General  Sherman  proposed  a  new  organiza- 
tion for  his  combined  armies,  giving  General  Schofield  the 
command  of  the  "  center,"  and  thus  designating  his  forces, 
retaining  for  the  right  wing  its  old  designation,  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  and  styling  the  two  corps  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  the  Fourteenth  and  Twentieth,  the  "  Army  of 
Georgia."  The  left  wing  had  informally  borne  this  name 
during  the  march  through  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas,  but 
these  corps  were  only  really  detached  from  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  after  they  had  fought  their  last  battle. 

This  fact  gives  the  Fourth,  Fourteenth,  and  Twentieth  Corps 
a  community  of  fame  and  glory  achieved  at  Nashville  and 
Bentonville.  General  Sherman  had  assigned  them  separate 
fields  of  operation,  but  had  not  formally  separated  them  until 
it  was  too  late  to  give  them  new  historic  relations.  The  fame 
of  "Bentonville,"  quite  as  much  as  that  of  "Franklin"  and 
"  Nashville,"  belongs  to  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  At 
Bentonville,  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  long  under  the  personal 
command  of  General  Thomas,  and  the  Twentieth,  of  more  re- 
cent connection  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  but  of 
friendly  alliance,  achieved  a  great  victory.  Indeed,  all  the 
achievements  of  these  three  corps,  in  union  or  separation,  are 
portions  of  the  history  of  the  same  army,  as  by  hearty  consent 
each  has  an  interest  in  the  aggregate  glory.  They  have  an 

*  General  Sherman's  statement  in  official  report. 


324        AVERYSBORO  AND  BENTONVILLE. 

undivided  tenure  in  the  fame  of  the  army,  achieved  in  all  the 
battles  from  Lookout  Mountain  to  Jonesboro ;  not  less  do  they 
hold  in  common  the  glory  of  the  fields  so  widely  separated. 
The  shouts  of  the  Fourteenth  and  Twentieth  Corps  at  Savan- 
nah for  victory  at  Nashville,  in  which  the  Fourth  and  their 
own  representatives  had  a  share,  and  their  beloved  commander 
the  chief  glory,  was  answered  in  glad  response  from  every 
camp  in  Tennessee  and  Alabama  for  the  repulse  of  General 
Johnston  in  his  attempt  to  bring  defeat  and  disgrace  to  the 
oldest  corps  of  the  unequaled  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

On  the  9th  of  April,  General  Lee  surrendered  himself  and 
his  army  to  General  Grant,  and  on  the  following  morning,  Gen- 
eral Sherman's  armies  moved  from  the  vicinity  of  Goldsboro 
toward  Smithfield  and  Raleigh,  against  the  only  remaining 
Confederate  army  east  of  the  Mississippi  river.  General  John- 
ston knew  well  that  he  could  not  resist  the  hundred  thousand 
men  moving  against  him,  but  to  make  the  most  of  his  slender 
possibilities,  he  retreated  through  Raleigh  as  General  Sherman 
advanced,  and  fell  back  to  Greensboro.  His  objects  were  to 
avoid  the  crime  of  waging  a  hopeless  warfare,  to  get  the  best 
possible  terms  in  a  surrender  which  would  terminate  it,  and 
disband  his  troops  on  such  conditions  as  would  prevent  their 
plundering  their  friends  as  they  sought  their  homes.  The  last 
•campaigns  had  inflicted  upon  the  South  losses  of  a  magnitude 
transcending  approximate  estimation  and  a  desolated  country, 
wasted  resources  and  the  traditions  of  a  lost  cause  (but  a  cause 
which,  during  the  bloody  trial  of  its  existence  and  supremacy, 
had  commanded  the  persistent  efforts  and  strongest  aspirations 
of  millions)  were  now  the  sad  inheritance  of  a  proud  people. 
And  General  Johnston  sought  to  save  what  material  resources 
remained,  and  to  return  his  soldiers  to  their  homes  with  as 
little  demoralization  as  possible. 

At  Smithfield,  General  Sherman  heard  of  the  surrender  of 
General  Lee,  and  pressed  forward  with  the  conviction  that  he 
would  soon  give  the  final  blow.  At  Raleigh,  he  dropped  his 
trains,  and  directed  General  Howard  to  follow  the  line  of  re- 
treat, and  General  Slocum  to  take  a  route  to  the  south  through 
Pittsville  and  Ashboro,  in  expectation  that  General  Johnston 
would  follow  the  railroad  to  Salisbury.  On  the  14th,  he  re- 


AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  325 

ceived  a  note  which  opened  negotiations  and  resulted  in  a  con- 
vention embracing  conditions  of  peace  as  well  as  the  surrender 
of  the  remaining  Confederate  forces  and  armies,  and  declaring  a 
truce  until  after  notice  should  he  given  of  its  discontinuance, 
on  account  of  the  disapproval  of  the  government  of  the  terms 
agreed  upon.  The  government  did  disapprove,  and  the  stipu- 
lated notice  of  forty-eight  hours,  as  the  limit  of  the  truce,  was 
given  on  the  24th.  Two  days  later,  there  was  a  second  con- 
ference at  General  Johnston's  request,  which  resulted  in  the 
surrender  of  all  the  forces  of  the  Confederacy  east  of  the  Chat- 
tahoochee  river.  The  next  day  General  Sherman  announced 
in  orders  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  and  made  provision  for 
the  relief  of  the  people.  He  then  directed  Generals  Howard 
and  Slocum  to  move  their  armies  through  Richmond  to 
Washington. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  FATETTEVILLE,  N.  C.,  March  12,  1865. 
GENERAL  : — 

ft  *****,  ft  *  * 

We  must  not  lose  time  for  Joe  Johnston  to  concentrate  at  Goldsboro. 
We  can  not  prevent  his  concentrating  at  Raleigh,  but  he  shall  have  no 
rest.  I  want  General  Schofielcl  to  go  on  with  his  railroad  from  Newbern 
as  fast  as  he  can,  and  you  do  the  same  from  Wilmington.  If  we  can  get 
the  roads  to,  and  secure  Goldsboro  by  April  10th,  it  will  be  soon  enough, 
but  every  day  is  worth  a  million  of  dollars.  I  can  whip  Joe  Johnston, 
provided  he  don't  catch  one  of  my  corps  in  flank  ;  and  I  will  see  that  my 
army  marches  hence  to  Goldsboro  in  compact  form. 

»•.»»*'»»•*»» 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  * 

Major-General. 
Major-General  Terry,  Commanding  United  States  Forces,  Wilmington,  N.  C, 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  FAYETTEVILLE,  N.  C.,  March  12,  1865. 
DEAR  GENERAL: — 

•X-****-*-*** 

I  hope  you  have  not  been  uneasy  about  us  and  that  the  fruits  of  this 
march  will  be  appreciated.  It  had  to  be  made  not  only  to  secure  the  val- 
uable depots  by  the  way,  but  its  incidents,  in  the  necessary  fall  of  Charles- 
ton, Georgetown,  and  Wilmington.  If  I  can  add  Goldsboro  to  the  list 


4 

326  AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE. 

without  too  much  cost,  I  will  be  in  position  to  aid  you  materially  in  the 
spring  campaign. 

Joe  Johnston  may  try  to  interpose  between  me  here  and  Schofield 
about  Newbern ;  but  I  think  he  will  not  try  that,  but  concentrate  his  scat- 
tered armies  at  Raleigh,  and  I  will  go  straight  at  him  as  soon  as  I  get  my 
men  reclothed  and  our  wagons  reloaded. 

Keep  everybody  busy  and  let  Stoneman  push  toward  Greensboro  or 
Charlotte  from  Knoxville ;  even  a  feint  in  that  quarter  will  be  most  im- 
portant. .  .  . 

I  expect  to  make  a  junction  with  General  Schofield  in  ten  days. 

Yours  truly, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 
Lieutenant- General  U.  iS.  Grrant,  Commanding  United  States  Army,  City  Point. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  OPPOSITE  FAYETTEVILLE,  N.  C.,  TUESDAY,  March  14,  1865. 
GENERAL  : — I  am  now  across  Cape  Fear  river,  and  to-morrow  will  draw 
out  ten  miles,  and  next  day,  if  weather  is  favorable,  will  begin  to  ma- 
neuver on  Goldsboro.  I  shall  feign  on  Raleigh,  by  approaching,  and  it 
may  be  striking  the  railroad  half-way  between  Goldsboro  and  Raleigh ; 
then,  as  soon  as  the  wagons  are  well  toward  Faison's,  will  swing  rapidly  in 
front  of  Goldsboro,  but  will  not  cross  the  Neuse  till  I  hear  from  you* 
You  must  push  vigorously  toward  Kingston  and  Goldsboro,  with  the  ab- 
solute certainty  that  I  will  engage  the  attention  of  Joe  Johnston's  army 
to  the  west  and  southwest  of  Goldsboro.  .  .  . 

I  take  it  for  granted  Joe  Johnston  now  has  S.  D.  Lee's  corps,  four 
thousand  (4,000);  Cheatham's,  five  thousand  (5,000);  Hoke's,  eight  thou- 
sand (8,000) ;  Hardee's,  ten  thousand  (10,000) ;  and  detachments,  about  ten 
thousand  (10,000) ;  making  thirty-seven  thousand  (37,000),  with  near  eight 
thousand  (8.000)  cavalry.  Our  duty  is  to  effect  a  junction  south  of  the 
Neuse j  but  if  you  can  get  Kingston  whilst  Joe  Johnston  is  engaged  with 
m«,  do  so,  and  push  on  toward  Goldsboro.  I  will  attack  the  Raleigh 
road.  .  .  . 

I  am,  yours  truly, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General  Commanding. 
Major-General  Schqfield,  Commanding  at  Newbern. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  OPPOSITE  FAYETTEVILLE,  TUESDAY,  March  14,  1865. 
DEAR  GENERAL  : — I  am  now  across  Cape  Fear  river  with  nearly  all  my 
army,  save  one  division,  with  orders  to  cross  at  daylight  to-morrow.     I 
shall  then  draw  out  ten  miles,  and  begin  my  maneuvers  for  the  possession 
of  Goldsboro,  which  is  all  important  for  our  future  purposes. 


AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  327 

I  was  in  hopes  that  1  could  get  some  shoes  and  stockings  at  Wilming- 
ton, but  the  tug  Davidson  has  returned  with  Brigadier-General  Dodge, 
chief  quartermaster,  with  word  that  there  is  no  clothing  there ;  but  he 
brings  us  some  forage,  sugar,  and  coffee.  I  can  get  along  for  ten  days, 
having  forced  the  army  to  collect  plenty  of  beef  and  a  good  deal  of  corn- 
meal. 

I  shall  to-night  move  my  cavalry  (5,000)  straight  toward  Raleigh,  and 
follow  it  with  four  divisions  infantry,  without  trains,  and  keep  the  trains 
off  toward  the  right  rear.  I  will  hold  another  four  divisions  in  close  sup- 
port, and  move  toward  Smithneld,  or  to  strike  the  railroad  half  way  be- 
tween Goldsboro  and  Raleigh ;  then,  when  my  trains  are  well  across 
toward  the  Neuse,  will  move  rapidly  to  Bentonville,  and  afterward,  at 
leisure,  move  opposite  Goldsboro,  and  open  direct  communication  with 
General  Schofield,  who  is  ordered  to  push  against  Kingston  and  Golds- 
boro. I  may  cross  the  Neuse  about  Cox's  bridge,  and  move  into  Goldsboro ; 
but  will  not  attempt  it  till  within  close  communication  with  General 
Schofield.  I  have  sent  full  orders  to  Schofield.  It  will  not  do  to  build 
any  determinate  plan  until  I  am  in  full  possession  of  Goldsboro.  I  have 
ordered  Generals  Schofield  and  Terry  to  push  toward  Goldsboro  as  hard 
as  possible  from  the  east,  as  I  advance  from  the  southwest.  The  enemy 
is  superior  to  me  in  cavalry,  but  I  can  beat  his  infantry  man  for  man ; 
and  I  do  n't  think  that  he  can  bring  forty  thousand  (40,000)  men  for  battle. 
I  will  force  him  to  guard  Raleigh  until  I  have  interposed  between  it  and 
Goldsboro. 

Weather  is  good  now,  but  threatens  rain.  We  are  all  well.  Keep  all 
parts  busy,  and  I  will  give  the  enemy  no  rest. 

Yours  truly, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 

Lieutenant-General  U.  S.  Grant,  City  Point. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  OPPOSITE  FAYETTEVILLE,  N.  C.,  March  14,  1865. 

GENERAL  : — I  have  notified  General  Howard  that  to-morrow  night  your 
head  of  column  will  be  near  the  cross-roads  above  Kyle's  landing;  the 
next  day  across  Black  river,  near  Mingo,  and  third  day  near  Bentonville ; 
and  have  instructed  him  to  have  four  (4)  divisions  in  easy  support,  and  a 
little  in  advance  of  you — say,  five  or  six  miles — so  that,  on  receiving 
orders  or  hearing  battle,  he  may  come  promptly  up  on  your  right. 

I  think  Colonel  Garber  can  promise  you  another  boat,  in  which  case  it 
would  be  well  to  send  to  Wilmington  your  prisoners  of  war  You  might 
leave  them  to-morrow  where  the  gunboat  lies,  two  (2)  miles  below  Gen- 
eral Howard's  bridge,  and  the  guard,  if  unable  to  overtake  you  the  day 
after  to-morrow,  could  follow  direct  to  Bentonville.  I  want  the  first 
marches  to  be  made  with  prudence  and  deliberation.  I  am  willing  to  ac- 


328  AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE. 

cept  battle  with  Johnston's  concentrated  force,  but  would  not  attack  him 
in  position  until  I  make  a  junction  with  General  Schofield. 

I  am,  truly  yours, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General  Commanding. 
Major-General  Slocum,  Commanding  Left  Wing. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
EN  THE  FIELD,  OPPOSITE  FAYETTEVILLE,  March  14,  1865 — 7  P.  M. 

GENERAL  : — I  think  I  have  studied  the  problem  of  the  next  move,  and 
will  give  you  in  confidence  its  analysis. 

We  must  make  a  strong  feint  on  Raleigh,  and  strike  with  cavalry,  if 
possible,  the  railroad  near  Smithfield.  I  take  it  for  granted  that  the 
bridge  will  be  too  strongly  guarded  for  General  Kilpatrick  to  surprise, 
and  therefore  I  will  leave  him  to  disable  that  road,  of  course  only  par- 
tially, between  the  Neuse  and  Eureka.  To  this  end  the  cavalry  will 
move  to-night  across  the  bridge,  beginning  at  3  A.  M.,  and  will  push  up 
the  plank-road  to  about  Averysboro,  General  Slocum  following  up  with 
four  disincumbered  divisions  to  near  the  forks  of  the  road,  moving  his 
trains  by  a  cross-road  toward  Bentonville.  The  next  move  will  be  the 
cavalry  to  Elevation,  and  General  Slocum  will  cross  Black  river.  The 
next  move  will  bring  General  Slocum  to  Bentonville,  and  Kilpatrick,  sup- 
ported by  a  division  of  infantry,  will  make  a  dash  for  the  railroad.  This 
is  as  far  as  I  will  now  determine. 

I  want  you  to  be  as  near  in  support  as  possible.  I  do  think  it  is  John- 
ston's only  chance  to  meet  this  army  before  an  easyjunction  can  be  effected 
with  General  Schofield. 

I  would  like  you  to  have  four  (4)  divisions  free  to  move  rapidly  to  the 
sound  of  battle  in  the  direction  of  Mingo  creek  and  Elevation,  and,  at  any 
event,  to  make  a  junction  by  head  of  column  with  General  Slocum  at 
Bentonville.  The  weather  looks  bad,  and  I  fear  we  may  have  swamps 
about  South  river.  I  think  it  would  be  well  for  you  to  have  four  divisions 
to  get  ahead  of  General  Slocum's  trains  on  the  direct  road  from  Fayette- 
ville  to  Bentonville,  and  keeping  ahead  of  him  about  five  or  six  miles,  se- 
as, in  case  of  action,  to  come  up  on  his  right. 

*''•*''#••*.:*-••#  *."*'•••'« 

Yours  truly, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

Major-General  0.  0.  Howard,  Commanding  Right  Wine 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  18  MILES  NORTHEAST  FAYETTEVILLE,  March  17, 1865 — 7  A.  M. 
GENERAL  : — General  Slocum  found  the  enemy  covering  the  narrow  neck 
from  Taylor's  creek  to  Goldsboro  road.     He  drove  them  from  two  succes- 


AVERYSBORO  AND  BENTONVILLE.        329" 

sive  positions,  taking  three  guns,  some  prisoners,  wounded,  but  losing 
himself  pretty  severely — I  think  as  many  as  three  hundred  in  all ;  but' 
the  enemy  lost  heavily  also,  from  appearances.  .  .  . 

General  Slocum  will  feel  out  toward  Averysboro,  but  move  his  column 
on  the  Goldsboro  road,  which  is  that  which  crosses  Black  and  Min  go- 
creeks,  just  ahead  of  where  we  are.  Our  true  tactics  would  be  to  push  all 
our  columns  to  Srnithfield,  but  I  will  only  follow  Hardee  far  enough  to 
give  him  impulse,  when  we  must  resume  our  course. 

I  want  you  to-day  to  get  to  where  the  Goldsboro  road  crosses  Mingo, 
and  have  that  bridge  well  repaired.  You  need  not  come  on  to  General 
Slocum  unless  you  hear  him  engaged.  We  might  cut  his  column  at  Ele- 
vation, but  it  will  be  enough  to  think  of  that  to-night. 

General  Blair  is  getting  too  far  off;  better  draw  him  and  all  your  trains 
toward  Troublefield's  Store. 

»••",    ~  •••*/'#•-•*•'•-#•--*••  »t        ••  *         .* 

Yours,  etc., 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 
Major-General  0.  O.  Howard,  Commanding  Right  Wing. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  CAMP  BETWEEN  NORTH  RIVER  AND  MINGO  CREEK, 

March  17,  1865, 
GENERAL : — 

»....*.-•,»-.»  H,   •'*•..;».'»* 

I  have  examined  your  order,  and  it  will  do,  only  get  on  a  right-hand 
road  as  soon  as  possible,  that  you  may  not  delay  General  Slocum's  troops, 
who  will  all  be  forced  on  the  one  road.  Try  and  keep  around  the  head 
of  Falling  Water  creek,  viz.,  to  the  south.  I  will  push  General  Slocum 
to-morrow  and  next  day,  and  think  by  day  after  to-morrow  we  will  be  in 
position — viz.,  you  directly  in  front  of  Goldsboro,  and  General  Slocum  at 
Cox's  bridge. 

At  the  time  I  sent  Colonel  Ewing  to  you  yesterday,  the  enemy  had 
brought  General  Slocum  up  all  standing,  and  it  was  on  the  theory  that  he 
would  hold  General  Slocum  there,  that  I  wanted  you  at  Mingo  bridge. 
But  the  enemy  retreated  in  the  night  on  Smithfield,  and  we  are  again  on 
the  march,  feigning  to  the  left,  but  moving  trains  and  troops  as  rapidly  as 
the  roads  admit  on  Goldsboro.  You  may  do  the  same. 

•fc-*-*-****--*-* 

Yours  truly, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General 
Major-General  Howard,  Commanding  Right  Wing. 


330  AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  TWENTY-SEVEN  MILES  FROM  GOLDSBORO,  N.  C., 

March  18,  1865. 

GENERAL: — The  Fourteenth  Corps  is  here,  but  the  Twentieth  is  well 
back.  It  started  from  Averysboro  and  North  river,  with  General  Kilpat- 
rick  to  the  north  of  the  road.  We  heard  some  musketry  and  artillery  in 
that  direction,  but  Colonel  Poe  left  Mingo  creek,  which  he  bridged,  at  11 
A.  M.,  at  which  time  the  Twentieth  Corps  was  a  half  mile  behind. 

We  can  not  get  any  farther  to-day.  General  Davis  may  go  a  couple  of 
miles  farther  to  the  forks  of  the  road.  I  think  this  road,  the  Averysboro 
and  Goldsboro  road,  will  lead  to  Cox's  bridge,  though  it  is  represented  as 
passing  three  (3)  miles  south  of  Bentonville. 

Get  on  the  right-hand  road,  so  that  General  Geary  and  his  trains  may 
take  that  to  Goldsboro,  via  Cox's  bridge. 

I  think  the  enemy  is  concentrated  about  Smithfield,  and  I  can  not 
make  out  whether  Goldsboro  is  held  in  force  or  not.  I  think  it  probable 
that  Joe  Johnston  will  try  to  prevent  our  getting  to  Goldsboro. 

It  4t  •***.*  #  4t  41 

I  fear  General  Slocum  will  be  jammed  with  all  his  trains  in  a  narrow 
space;  but,  at  the  same  time,  I  don't  want  to  push  you  too  far  till  his 
flank  is  better  covered  by  the  Neuse.  General  Slocum  is  back  with  the 
Twentieth  Corps,  and  as  soon  as  I  hear  from  him  I  will  send  over  to  you. 
General  Morgan's  division  found  a  couple  of  Hampton's  regiments 
here,  but  they  cleared  out  to  the  north  as  soon  as  he  deployed  skir- 
mishers. 

I  am,  general,  very  respectfully,  etc., 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General  Commanding. 
Major-General  0.  O.  Howard,  Commanding  Right  Wing. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  March  18,  1865. 

GENERAL: — General  Slocum  is  up.  The  firing  you  heard  was  General 
Kilpatrick,  who  found  parties  picketing  the  roads  to  the  north.  He  re- 
ports Hardee  retreating  on  Smithfield,  and  Joe  Johnston  collecting  his 
old  Georgia  army  this  side  of  Raleigh.  I  know  he  will  call  in  all  minor 
posts,  which  embraces  Goldsboro.  You  may  therefore  move  straight  for 
Goldsboro,  leaving  General  Slocum  the  river  road,  and,  if  possible,  the 
one  from  Lee's  Store  toward  Falling  Waters.  Make  a  break  into  Golds- 
boro, from  the  south,  and  let  your  scouts  strike  out  for  General  Schofield, 
at  Kingston,  though  I  hope  to  moet  him  at  Goldsboro. 

Our  roads  are  very  bad,  but  I  think  the  Fourteenth  Corps  will  be  at 
Cox's  bridge  to-morrow  night,  and  will  aim  to  strike  the  railroad  to  the 
northwest  of  Goldsboro.  If  any  change  occurs,  I  will  notify  you  to-night. 

Yours, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Howard,  present.  Major-GeneraL 


AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  331 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  TEN  MILES  SOUTHWEST  or  GOLDSBORO, 

SUNDAY,  March  19,  1865—2  p.  M. 
Major-General  Schofield,  Kingston : 

To-night  my  left  wing  will  be  at  Cox's  bridge,  and  my  right  within  ten 
miles  of  Goldsboro.  To-morrow  we  will  cross  the  Neuse  river  at  Cox's 
bridge,  and  be  near  Goldsboro,  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  occupying 
Goldsboro  in  force. 

The  scout  Pike  has  arrived  with  dispatch  of  17th.  Continue  to  extend 
to  the  right  as  fast  as  possible,  and  I  expect  you  to  move  toward  Golds- 
boro, even  if  it  be  unnecessary,  as  I  do  n't  want  to  lose  men  in  direct  attack, 
when  it  can  be  avoided.  .  .  . 

We  whipped  Hardee  easily  about  Averysboro.  All  retreated  on  Smith- 
field  and  Raleigh. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  FALLING  CREEK  CHURCH,  March  19,  1865 — 2  P.  M.* 

GENERAL: — General  Howard,  with  one  division,  is  now  at  this  point, 
which  is  just  three  miles  south  from  Cox's  bridge  and  ten  from 
Goldsboro.  A  scout  is  just  in  from  General  Schofield,  who  writes  that  he 
will  leave  Kingston  for  Goldsboro  to-day  or  to-morrow.  I  have  sent  him 
a  courier  with  orders  to  march  straight  for  Goldsboro.  General  Howard's 
four  (4)  divisions  are  strung  out,  but  he  will  push  them  through  to-night. 
We  occupy  a  position  dangerous  to  the  enemy,  if  he  thinks  he  is  in  front 
of  the  whole  army.  You  may  strengthen  your  position,  but  feel  the  en- 
emy all  night.  If  he  is  there  at  daylight  we  will  move  to  Cox's  bridge, 
and  then  turn  toward  you.  I  think  you  will  find  him  gone  in  the  morn- 
ing. General  Howard  has  sent  a  regiment  to  Cox's  bridge.  It  has  not 
reported  yet.  He  has  the  bridge  across  Falling  Creek,  two  miles  east  of 
this,  toward  Goldsboro,  and  has  some  mounted  men  opposite  Goldsboro, 
where  they  find  a  tete-de-pont  occupied  by  the  enemy.  General  Blair  is 
about  five  miles  south  of  this  with  his  trains. 

I  will  order  General  Kilpatrick  to  remain  with  you.  Get  up  your 
trains  between  Lee's  Store  and  your  camp,  and  keep  the  enemy  busy 
until  we  can  get  up  the  Fourth  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps. 

If  you  hear  firing  to  your  front,  not  explained  by  your  own  acts,  you 
must  assault  or  turn  the  enemy,  for  it  will  not  do  to  let  him  fight  us  sep- 
arately. 

Yours, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 
Major-General  Slocum,  Commanding  Left  Wing. 

*The  date  of  this  dispatch  is  thus  given  in  the  "  Keport  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War,"  Supplement,  Part  I.,  Second  Session,  Thirty-eighth  Congress,  page  358.  But  this 
must  be  an  error,  for  the  P.  S.  mentions  the  reception  of  a  dispatch  of  2  p.  M.  from  General 
Slocum,  from  the  battle-field  of  Bentonville. 


332  AVERYSBOKO   AND   BENTONVILLE. 

P.  S. — Your  note  of  2  p.  M.  is  just  received.  General  Howard's  regi- 
ments drove  the  pickets  from  the  cross-roads,  one  mile  this  side  of  Cox's 
bridge.  That  will  disturb  the  force  to  your  front.  General  Howard  can 
better  help  you  from  this  quarter  than  by  returning  by  Lee's  Store. 

SHERMAN. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  FALLING  CREEK  CHURCH,  March  19,  1865 — 5  p.  M. 
GENERAL: — Your  report  of  to-day  is  received.     General  Slocum  thinks 
the  whole  rebel  army  is  in  his  front.     I  can  not  think  Johnston  would 
fight  us  with  the  Neuse  to  his  rear.     You  may  remain  with  General  Slo- 
cum until  further  orders,  or  until  the  two  wings  come  together. 

If  that  force  remain  in  General  Slocum's  front  to  morrow,  I  will  move 
straight  on  its  rear. 

Yours  truly, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 
General  Kilpatrick,  Commanding  Cavalry. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  FALLING  CREEK  CHURCH,  March  20,  1865 — 2  A.  M. 
GENERAL: — Yours  of  8  p.  M.,  19th,  is  just  received,  and  I  acknowledge 
receipt  by  the  direction  of  the  general-in  chief,  who  instructed  me  to  say 
that  the  whole  army  is  moving  to  your  assistance  as  rapidly  as  possible. 
Upon  its  approach  he  wishes  you  to  be  prepared  to  assume  the  offensive 
against  the  enemy. 

•fr-**-***--*** 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Assistant  Adjutant-GeneraL 
Major-General  Slocum,  Commanding  Left  Wing. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  BENTONVILLE,  March  20,  1 865 — 2  P.  M. 
GENERAL  SCHOFIELD  : — Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  js  received.     You  can 
march  into  Goldsboro  without  opposition.     General  Terry  is  at  Faison's, 
and  I  have  ordered  him  to  Cox's  bridge  until  the  present  action  is  over. 
I  am  now  within  two  miles  of  Slocum,  but  Johnston  is  between  us.     We 
are  now  skirmishing. 

After  occupying  Goldsboro,  if  you  hear  nothing  to  the  contrary,  join  a 
part  of  your  force  with  General  Terry's,  and  come  to  me  wherever  I 

may  be. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  Gen  era  L 


AVEKYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  333 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  BENTONVILLE,  1ST.  C.,  March  22,  1865  —  10  A.  M. 
GENERAL:  —  Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  is  just  received.  We  whipped 
all  of  Joe  Johnston's  army  yesterday,  and  he  retreated  in  disorder  in  the 
night.  We  are  in  possession  of  the  field,  and  our  skirmishers  are  after 
his  rear-guard,  two  miles  north  of  Mill  creek.  We  are  not  in  condition 
as  to  supplies,  to  follow  up,  but  will  gradually  draw  back  to  Goldsboro, 
and  refit.  .  .  . 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 
General  Schqfield,  Goldsboro. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  Cox's  BRIDGE,  NEUSE  RIVER,  N.  C.,  March  22,  1865. 

GENERAL  :  — 

•    •"•»''»»».»  •''•'•»"»-« 

We  resumed  the  march  toward  Goldsboro.  I  was  with  the  left  wing 
until  I  supposed  all  danger  passed;  but  when  General  Slocum's  head  of 
column  was  within  four  miles  of  Bentonville,  after  skirmishing  as  usual 
with  cavalry,  he  became  aware  that  there  was  infantry  at  his  front.  He 
deployed  a  couple  of  brigades,  which,  on  advancing,  sustained  a  partial 
repulse,  but  soon  rallied,  and  he  formed  a  line  of  the  two  leading  divis- 
ions, Morgan's  and  Carlin's,  of  Jeff.  C.  Davis'  corps.  The  enemy  at- 
tacked these  divisions  with  violence,  but  was  repulsed.  This  was  in  the 
forenoon  of  Sunday,  the  19th.  General  Slocum  brought  forward  the  two 
divisions  of  the  Twentieth  Corps,  and  hastily  disposed  them  for  defense 
and  General  Kilpatrick  moved  his  cavalry  on  the  left. 

General  Joe  Johnston  had,  the  night  before,  marched  his  whole  army  — 
Bragg,  Cheatham,  S.  D.  Lee,  Hardee,  and  all  the  troops  he  had  from  every 
quarter  —  determined,  as  he  told  his  men,  to  crush  one  of  our  corps,  and 
then  defeat  us  in  detail.  He  attacked  General  Slocum  in  position  from  3  p. 
M.  on  the  1  9th  till  dark,  but  was  everywhere  repulsed,  and  lost  fearfully.  At 
the  time,  I  was  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  marching  on  a  road  more  to  the 
right;  but  on  hearing  of  General  Slocum's  danger,  directed  that  corps  to- 
ward Cox's  bridge,  and  that  night  brought  Blair's  corps  over,  and  on  the 
20th  marched  rapidly  on  Johnston's  flank  and  rear.  We  struck  him 
about  noon,  and  forced  him  to  assume  the  defensive,  and  fortify.  Yester- 
day we  pushed  him  hard,  and  came  very  near  crushing  him. 

•a*-******-* 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  Genera  I. 
Lieutenant-General  U.  S.  Grant,  Commander-4nChief}  City  Point,  Va. 


334  AVERYSBOEO   AND   BENTONVILLE. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  GOLDSBORO,  N.  C.,  March  31,  1865. 

DEAR  SIR: — I  had  the  honor  and  satisfaction  to  receive  your  letter  and 
telegram  of  welcome  when  at  City  Point  and  Old  Point  Comfort. 

I  am  back  again  at  my  post,  possessed  of  the  wishes  and  plans  of  the 
general-in-chief,  and  think,  in  due  time,  I  can  play  my  part  in  the  coming 
campaign.  All  things  are  working  well,  and  I  have  troops  enough  to  ac- 
complish the  part  assigned  me,  and  only  wait  the  loading  our  wagons, 
patching  up  and  mending  made  necessary  by  the  wear  and  tear  of  the 
past  winter.  .  .  . 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 
Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  GOLDSBORO,  N.  C.,  April  5,  1865. 

DEAR  GENERAL: — I  can  hardly  help  smiling  when  I  contemplate  my 
command.  It  is  decidedly  mixed.  I  believe,  but  am  not  certain,  that 
you  are  in  my  jurisdiction,  but  I  certainly  can  not  help  you  in  the  way 
of  orders  or  men,  nor  do  I  think  you  need  either.  General  Cruft  has  just 
arrived  with  his  provisional  division,  which  will  at  once  be  broken  up, 
and  the  men  sent  to  their  proper  regiments,  as  that  of  Meagher  was  on  my 
arrival.  You  may  have  some  feeling  about  my  asking-  that  General 
Slocum  should  have  command  of  the  two  corps  that  properly  belonged 
to  you — viz.,  Fourteenth  and  Twentieth;  but  you  can  recall  that  he  was 
but  a  corps  commander,  and  could  not  legally  make  orders  of  discharge, 
transfer,  etc.,  which  was  imperatively  necessary.  I  therefore  asked  that 
General  Slocum  be  assigned  to  command  "  an  army  in  the  field."  called 
the  "Army  of  Georgia,"  composed  of  the  Fourteenth  and  Twentieth  Corps. 
The  order  is  not  yet  made  by  the  President,  though  I  have  recognized  it, 
because  both  General  Grant  and  the  President  sanctioned  it,  and  prom- 
ised to  have  the  order  made.  ... 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-  General. 

Major- General  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  Commanding  Department  of  the  Cumberland. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  GOLDSBORO,  N.  C.,  April  7,  1865. 

GENERAL  : — The  capture  of  Richmond,  and  the  retreat  of  Lee's  army  to 
the  west  (Danville  and  Lynchburg),  necessitates  a  change  in  our  plans. 
"VVo  will  hold  fast  toGoldsboro  and  its  lines,  and  move  rapidly  on  Raleigh. 
I  want  you  to  be  all  ready  to  move  early  on  Monday,  straight  on  Smith- 
field  and  Raleigh,  by  the  most  direct  road.  General  Schofield  will  sup- 
port you,  with  the  Twenty-third  Corps  following  you,  and  on  the  10th  the 
cavalry  will  move  from  Mount  Olive  and  Faison's,  by  Bentonville  and  Tur- 


AVERYSBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  335 

ner's  bridge,  the  right  wing  by  Pikesville  and  Whitely's  mill,  with  a  division 
around  by  Nahunta  and  Folk's  bridge.  If  the  enemy  declines  to  fight 
this  side  of  the  Neuse,  I  will  of  course  throw  the  right  wing  up  to  Hin- 
ton's  bridge. 

Yours, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 
Major-General  Slocum,  Commanding  Army  of  Georgia. 


[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  44.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  GOLDSBORO,  N.  C.,  April  1,  1865. 
•*#*-x--*-&-**# 

VI.  The  following  is  announced  as  the  organization  of  this  army : 
Right  wing — Army  of  the  Tennessee,  Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth  Corps, 

Major-General  0.  0.  Howard  commanding. 

Left  Wing — Army  of  Georgia,  Fourteenth  and  Twentieth  Corps,  Major- 
General  H.  W.  Slocum  commanding. 

Center — Army  of  Ohio,  Tenth  and  Twenty-third  Corps,  Major-General 
J.  M.  Schofield  commanding. 

Cavalry — Brevet  Major-General  J.  Kilpatrick  commanding. 

VII.  Each  of  these  commanders  will  exercise  the  powers  prescribed  by 
law  for  a  general  commanding  a  separate  department  or  army  in  the  field. 

•*  ******** 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T..  Sherman. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  RALEIGH,  April  14,  1865. 

GENERAL  : — The  general-in-chief  has  arranged  for  a  meeting  with  General 
J.  E.  Johnston,  near  Durham's  Station,  North  Carolina  railroad,  at  12  M., 
April  27th,  and  to  accomplish  it  will  leave  here  at  8  A.  M.  to-morrow,  by  rail- 
road. Until  further  orders  he  directs  that  all  troops  will  remain  as  they 
are  at  this  time,  the  movements  as  directed  in  Special  Field  Orders  No. 
55,  being  for  the  time  suspended. 

I  am,  general,  with  great  respect, 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 
Assistant  Adjutant- General. 
General  H.  W.  Slocum,  Commanding  Army  of  Georgia. 


HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  RALEIGH,  N.  C.,  April  ^  1865—6  A.  M. 
General  Johnston,  Commanding  Confederate  Army,  Greensboro  : 
You  will  take  notice  that  the  truce  or  suspension  of  hostilities  agreed 


336        AVERYSBORO  AND  BENTONVILLE. 

upon  between  us,  will  cease  in  forty-eight  hours  after  this  is  received  at 
your  lines,  under  first  article  of  our  agreement. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  RALEIGH,  April  3A,  1865. 
General  Johnston,  Commanding  Confederate  Armies : 

I  have  replies  from  Washington  to  my  communication  of  April  18th. 
I  am  instructed  to  limit  my  operations  to  your  immediate  command,  and 
not  to  attempt  civil  negotiations.  I  therefore  demand  the  surrender  of 
your  army  on  the  same  terms  as  were  given  General  Lee  at  Appomattox, 
of  April  9th  instant,  purely  and  simply. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX. 

GENERAL   GEORGE   STONEMAN'S    CAVALRY   OPERATIONS  IN    TENNES- 
SEE  AND  NORTH    CAROLINA. 

IN  terminating  the  pursuit  of  General  Hood's  army,  Gen- 
eral Thomas'  first  thought  was  to  put  his  forces  in  winter  can- 
tonments to  rest  after  their  severe  service  since  early  spring, 
and  to  prepare  for  such  operations  as  the  future  movements 
of  the  enemy  might  render  necessary,  or  such  as  might  promise 
the  entire  supremacy  of  the  national  government  within  the 
limits  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi  or  throughout 
the  Southern  States;  but  General  Grant  ordered  otherwise, 
and  on  the  31st  of  December  the  troops  of  the  military  division 
were  disposed  with  a  view  to  immediate  active  operations.  Gen- 
eral A.  J.  Smith's  corps,  and  four  divisions  of  cavalry  under 
General  Wilson,  were  ordered  to  Eastport,  Mississippi,  and  the 
Fourth  Corps  to  take  post  at  Huntsville,  Alabama,  according  to 
previous  arrangement,  for  a  different  purpose,  and  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps  was  left  at  Columbia,  instead  of  taking  position  at 
Dalton,  Georgia. 

General  Sherman  was  desirous  that  General  Thomas  should 
conduct  a  campaign  in  Northern  Alabama  and  Georgia,  and 
expressed  this  wish  to  General  Grant;  but  the  latter  had 
formed  other  plans  before  this  wish  had  been  expressed,  and 
had  ordered  General  Schofield's  corps,  and  the  detachments 
from  the  corps  with  General  Sherman,  to  North  Carolina,  to 
co-operate  with  him.  Subsequently,  he  directed  General 
Thomas  to  send  General  A.  J.  Smith's  forces  and  five  thousand 
cavalry,  by  river,  to  report  to  Major-General  Canby,  at  New 
Orleans,  to  take  part  in  the  operations  against  Mobile.  Ac- 
cordingly, General  Smith's  troops  started  from  Eastport  on  the 

VOL.  II—22  (337) 


338  STONEMAN'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS. 

6th  of  February,  and  General  Knipe's  division  of  cavalry  from 
Eastport  and  Nashville  on  the  12th.  These  transfers  of  forces 
reduced  the  troops  under  General  Thomas  to  the  Fourth 
Corps,  the  infantry  and  artillery  garrisons  of  the  military 
division,  the  cavalry  divisions  under  General  "Wilson,  and  the 
one  under  General  Stoneman  in  East  Tennessee. 

Early  in  February,  General  Thomas  ascertained  from  various 
sources  that  a  remnant  of  General  Hood's  army,  under  Gen- 
erals Cheatham  and  S.  D.  Lee,  were  on  their  way  from  Mis- 
sissippi to  South  Carolina,  moving  through  Selma  and  Mont- 
gomery, Alabama,  to  reinforce  the  army  opposing  General 
Sherman,  and  that  other  fragments  of  the  Confederate  Army 
of  the  Tennessee — a  skeleton  corps — under  General  Richard 
Taylor,  and  seven  thousand  cavalry,  under  General  Forrest, 
remained  in  Mississippi,  with  headquarters  at  Meridian. 

February  6th,  General  Grant  directed  that  General  Stone- 
man should  be  sent  on  an  expedition  to  penetrate  North  Car- 
olina and  well  down  toward  Columbia,  South  Carolina,  to 
destroy  the  enemy's  railroads  and  military  resources  which 
were  out  of  the  reach  of  General  Sherman ;  and  on  the  13th, 
General  Grant  directed  General  Thomas  to  prepare  a  cavalry 
expedition  to  penetrate  Northern  Alabama  and  co-operate 
with  General  Canby  in  his  movement  against  Mobile.  Prepa- 
rations for  both  expeditions  were  completed  about  the  same 
time,  and  on  the  22d  of  March  Generals  Stoneman  and  Wil- 
son moved  as  respectively  directed. 

The  cavalry  division  in  East  Tennessee,  commanded  by 
Brigadier- General  A.  C.  Gillem,  comprised  three  brigades,  under 
the  respective  command  of  Colonel  Palmer,  Brigadier- General 
Brown,  and  Colonel  Miller.  It  was  concentrated  at  Mossy  creek 
on  the  22d  of  March,  in  readiness  for  movement  into  North 
Carolina  under  the  personal  direction  of  General  Stoneman. 
It  was  known  at  this  time  that  General  Sherman  had  captured 
Columbia,  South  Carolina,  and  was  moving  into  North  Caro- 
lina. Rumors  were  current  that  General  Lee's  army  would 
evacuate  Richmond  and  Petersburg,  and  might  force  a  pas- 
sage through  Lynchburg  to  Knoxville.  To  guard  against 
such  a  contingency,  General  Stoneman  was  directed  to  move 
toward  Lynchburg,  to  destroy  the  railroad  and  resources  of 


STOISTEMAN'S  CAVALKY  OPERATIONS.  339 

that  region,  and  then  sweep  through  Western  North  Carolina 
with  the  same  destructive  intent ;  and  the  Fourth  Corps  was 
ordered  by  General  Thomas  to  advance  from  Huntsville  as  far 
into  East  Tennessee  as  it  could  supply  itself,  to  repair  the 
railroad  as  it  advanced,  and  form  at  last  with  General  Tillson's 
division  of  infantry,  a  strong  support  to  General  Stoneman, 
should  he  meet  the  enemy  in  such  force  as  to  drive  him  back. 

On  the  24th,  General  Stoneman  moved  to  Morristown,  and 
there  detached  the  Third  brigade,  Colonel  Miller  commanding, 
to  make  a  detour  from  Bull's  Gap,  to  reach  the  railroad  between 
Jonesboro  and  Carter's  Station,  in  the  rear  of  a  force  reported 
to  be  in  the  vicinity  of  the  former  place.  The  other  two  bri- 
gades advanced  directly  forward,  and  encamped  on  the  night 
of  the  25th  ten  miles  west  of  Jonesboro.  Here  all  incum- 
brances  were  left,  save  one  ambulance,  one  wagon,  and  four 
guns  with  their  caissons. 

At  noon  on  the  26th,  the  division  was  reunited  at  Jones- 
boro. Colonel  Miller  had  complied  with  his  instructions,  but 
the  Confederate  general,  Jackson,  had  fled  in  haste  the  night 
previous.  General  Stoneman  then  moved  forward,  and  reached 
the  "Watauga  river  on  the  27th,  and  the  town  of  Boone,  North 
Carolina,  on  the  28th.  At  the  latter  place,  Major  Keogh,  of 
General  Stoneman's  staff,  with  a  detachment  of  the  Twelfth 
Kentucky,  routed  a  company  of  home  guards,  capturing 
sixty.  Here  the  brigades  again  separated — General  Stoneman, 
with  Palmer's  brigade,  moving  on  Wilkesboro,  by  Deep  Gap, 
and  General  Gillem,  with  the  other  two  brigades  and  the  ar- 
tillery, to  the  same  point,  by  the  Flat  Gap  road.  From  Wilkes- 
boro,  the  whole  command  moved  through  Mount  Airy,  and 
over  the  Blue  Ridge,  to  Hillsville,  Virginia,  with  no  incidents, 
save  the  capture  of  a  small  forage  train.  At  Hillsville,  Col- 
onel Miller,  with  five  hundred  picked  men,  moved  on  "Wythe- 
ville,  destroyed  a  depot  of  supplies  there,  and  a  bridge  over 
Reedy  creek,  and  another  at  Max  Meadows.  The  command 
then  advanced  to  Jacksonville,  where  Major  Wagner,  of  the 
Fifteenth  Tennessee,  with  two  hundred  and  fifty  select  men, 
dashed  on  to  Salem,  Virginia,  and  destroyed  bridges  and  the 
railroad  track  extensively.  On  the  6th  of  April,  two  brigades 
ivere  at  Christianburg,  and  had  possession  of  ninety  miles  of 


340  STONEMAN'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS. 

the  Virginia  and  Tennessee  railroad,  from  "Wytheville  to  Sa- 
lem. From  Christianburg,  after  destroying  twenty  miles  of 
railroad,  and  several  bridges  over  Roanoke  river,  and  disabling 
the  bridge  over  New  river,  Colonel  Palmer  moved  to  Martins- 
ville,  and  General  Brown  to  Taylorsville,  and  at  10  A.  M.  on 
the  8th,  Palmer  and  Brown  united  at  that  place,  and  then  the 
whole  command  converged  upon  Danbury,  North  Carolina, 
arriving  there  on  the  9th.  At  Germantown,  beyond,  Colonel 
Palmer  was  detached,  and  ordered  to  Salem,  North  Carolina, 
to  destroy  the  large  factories,  which  were  supplying  the  Con- 
federate armies  with  clothing,  and  then  to  send  parties  to 
destroy  the  railroad  south  of  Greensboro,  and  between  that 
place  and  Danville,  the  main  column  turned  south  from  Ger- 
mantown toward  Salisbury,  bivouacking  at  night  on  the  llth, 
twelve  miles  north  of  Salisbury.  A  little  after  midnight,  the 
South  Yadkin  river  was  crossed,  without  opposition,  as  had 
not  been  expected.  From  the  river,  the  main  force  advanced 
on  a  new  road  on  the  left,  while  a  battalion  of  the  Twelfth 
Kentucky  was  sent  on  the  road  to  the  right,  to  demonstrate 
strongly  at  the  crossing  of  Grant  creek,  and,  if  successful  in 
passing  that  stream,  to  attack  in  rear  the  forces  defending  the 
upper  bridge.  At  daylight,  the  head  of  the  main  column 
met  the  enemy's  pickets,  who  were  driven  back  to  the  bridge 
over  Grant  creek,  and  his  artillery  and  musketry  opened 
from  the  other  side.  A  reconnoissance  developed  the  fact 
that  a  portion  of  the  floor  of  the  bridge  had  been  taken 
up  from  two  spans  of  the  bridge,  and  trains  could  be  heard 
leaving  the  town  on  the  South  Carolina  and  Morgantown 
railroads.  General  Gillem  now  ordered  Colonel  Miller  and 
General  Brown  to  close  up  their  brigades,  and  a  section  of 
Reagan's  battery  to  move  forward.  At  this  juncture,  Gen- 
eral Stoneman  directed  that  a  detachment  should  cross  the 
creek  two  and  a  half  miles  above,  cut  the  railroad,  and,  if 
practicable,  capture  the  train,  and  then  get  in  the  rear  of  the 
town,  and  annoy  the  enemy  as  much  as  possible.  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Slater,  of  the  Eleventh  Kentucky,  was  designated  with 
his  regiment  for  this  service,  and  Captain  Morrow,  of  General 
Stoneman's  staff,  joined  the  detachment.  At  the  same  time, 
Major  Donnelly,  of  the  Thirteenth  Tennessee,  with  one  hun- 


STONEMAN'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS.  341 

dred  men,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Smith,  with  a  party  of 
dismounted  men,  were  ordered  to  cross  at  lower  points.  As 
soon  as  these  parties  engaged  the  enemy  across  the  stream, 
and  the  rattling  fire  of  the  Spencer  rifles  of  the  Eleventh  Ken- 
tucky announced  that  the  enemy's  left  had  been  turned,  Col- 
onel Miller's  brigade  was  ordered  to  advance  on  the  main 
road.  A  detachment  of  the  Eighth  and  Thirteenth  Tennessee 
regiments  restored  the  floor  of  the  bridge,  and  Miller  charged 
across.  By  this  time  the  enemy  was  falling  back  along  his 
entire  line.  Brown  was  thrown  forward  to  support  Miller, 
who  continued  to  press  the  enemy  back.  The  retreat  soon 
terminated  in  rout.  Major  Keogh,  who  had  led  the  charge  of 
the  Eleventh  Kentucky  on  the  right,  having  been,  joined  by 
Major  Sawyer's  battalion  of  the  Eighth  Tennessee,  charged 
the  enemy  again  at  the  intersection  of  the  Statesville  road 
with  the  one  upon  which  Colonel  Miller  was  advancing,  and 
captured  all  the  artillery  which  had  been  used  on  the  enemy's 
left  flank.  The  pursuit  was  continued  until  the  enemy's 
troops  lost  even  the  semblance  of  organization,  and  all  who 
escaped  capture,  hid  themselves  in  the  woods.  Three  thousand 
men,  under  command  of  Major-General  "W.  M.  Gardener,  with 
eighteen  pieces  of  artillery,  in  charge  of  Colonel  J.  C.  Pem- 
berton,  recently  a  lieutenant-general,  were  thus  routed. 
Nearly  thirteen  hundred  prisoners  were  captured,  eighteen 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  public  property  of  immense  value, 
most  of  which  was  destroyed.  At  2  p.  M.  Major  Barnes,  to 
whom  the  destruction  of  public  property  had  been  committed, 
reported  having  destroyed  ten  thousand  stand  of  small  arms, 
one  million  pounds  of  (small)  ammunition,  ten  thousand 
pounds  of  artillery  ammunition,  six  thousand  pounds  of 
powder t  three  magazines,  six  depots,  ten  thousand  bushels  of 
corn,  seventy-five  thousand  suits  of  uniform  clothing,  two 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  blankets  (English  manufacture), 
twenty  thousand  pounds  of  leather,  six  thousand  pounds  of 
bacon,  one  hundred  thousand  pounds  of  salt,  twenty-seven 
thousand  pounds  of  rice,  ten  thousand  pounds  of  saltpetre, 
fifty  thousand  bushels  of  wheat,  eighty  barrels  of  turpentine, 
fifteen  million  of  Confederate  money,  and  medical  stores 
worth  over  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  in  gold.  Besides 


342  STONEMAN'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS. 

the  detachments  which  had  been  sent  to  Virginia,  destroyed 
the  railroad  nearly  to  Lynchburg,  seven  thousand  bales  of 
cotton  and  two  large  factories,  and  captured  four  hundred 
prisoners.  The  railroad  south  of  Salisbury  having  been  de- 
stroyed for  some  distance,  and  it  having  been  determined  to 
send  the  prisoners,  and  captured  artillery,  not  destroyed,  to 
East  Tennessee,  the  forces  withdrew  on  the  13th,  and  reached 
Lenoir  on  the  15th. 

Here  General  Stoneman  turned  over  the  command  to  Gen- 
eral Gillem,  with  instructions  as  to  the  disposition  and  service 
of  the  troops.  Colonel  Palmer  was  to  take  post  at  Lincoln- 
ton,  and  scout  down  the  Catawba ;  General  Brown,  at  Morgan- 
town,  to  connect  with  Colonel  Palmer  on  the  Catawba,  and 
Colonel  Miller,  at  Asheville,  to  open  communications  through 
to  Greenville,  Tennessee.  The  objects  in  leaving  the  cavalry 
on  this  side  of  the  mountains,  were  to  obstruct,  intercept,  or 
disperse  any  troops  moving  south,  and  to  capture  trains. 

When  General  Gillem,  with  Brown's  and  Miller's  brigades, 
reached  the  Catawba,  two  and  a  half  miles  from  Morgantown, 
he  found  the  bridge  torn  up,  the  ford  blockaded,  and  his  pass- 
age of  the  stream  disputed  by  Major-General  McCown,  with 
about  three  hundred  men  and  one  piece  of  artillery.  He  then 
sent  Major  Kenner,  of  the  Eighth  Tennessee,  to  cross  up  the 
river  and  reach  the  enemy's  rear,  and  threw  forward  another 
battalion  of  the  same  regiment  as  directly  toward  the  bridge  as- 
shelter  could  be  found.  Opening  with  his  artillery,  he  disabled 
the  enemy's  gun  and  drove  him  from  his  defenses,  and  the 
dismounted  men  charging  over  the  sleepers  of  the  bridge, 
drove  him  from  the  ford,  and  captured  his  gun  and  fifty  men. 

On  the  19th,  General  Gillem  moved  toward  Asheville,  byway 
of  Swananoa  Gap.  He  found  the  gap  the  nex  day,  to  be  held  by 
about  five  hundred  men,  with  four  pieces  of  artillery.  Leaving 
Colonel  Miller  to  make  feints,  he  moved  rapidly  to  Rutherford, 
forty  miles  distant,  and  at  sundown  on  the  22cl,  he  passed  the 
Blue  Ridge,  at  Hammond's  Gap,  and  was  in  the  rear  of  the  en- 
emy, who  retreated  through  Andersonville,  pursued  by  Slater, 
who,  in  a  charge,"  captured  the  four  guns  and  seventy  men 
At  this  time  he  learned  that  Colonel  Palmer  had  not  moved 
as  he  had  been  ordered,  in  consequence  of  information  through 


STONEMAN'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS.  343 

General  Echols,  that  a  truce  had  been  proclaimed.  Deeming 
it  essential  to  the  safety  of  his  command  that  he  should  hold 
one  of  the  gaps  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  General  Gillem  ordered 
Palmer  to  move  as  previously  directed,  and  advanced  with  his 
own  column  to  attack  Asheville.  At  3  P.  M.  on  the  23d,  he  re- 
ceived a  flag  of  truce  from  Asheville,  covering  a  communication 
from  General  Martin,  which  stated  that  he  had  received  official 
notification  of  a  truce.  Later,  General  Martin  proposed  a  meet- 
ing for  the  next  day.  That  night  at  11  o'clock,  the  fact  of  the 
existence  of  a  truce  was  established  by  an  official  announce- 
ment, coming  from  General  Sherman,  and  at  11  p.  M.  he  received 
an  order  from  him,  directed  to  General  Stoneman,  requiring 
the  command  to  move  to  Durham  Station  or  Hillsboro.  Being 
convinced  that  this  order  had  been  issued  by  General  Sherman, 
under  the  conviction  that  this  cavalry  division  was  at  or  near 
Salisbury,  he  decided  to  draw  back  to  his  base  at  Greenville, 
Tennessee,  rather  than  advance  two  hundred  miles  to  Durham's 
{Station.  At  the  meeting  with  General  Martin,  he  announced 
this  decision,  and  requested  three  days'  rations  for  his  men,  to 
save  the  people  on  his  route  from  supplying  his  wants  by  con- 
straint. General  Martin  furnished  supplies,  but  demanded  the 
rendition  of  the  artillery  which  had  been  captured  the  day  be- 
fore ;  but  General  Gillem  positively  refused  to  do  this,  as  the 
capture  had  been  made  prior  to  his  reception  of  any  authentic 
announcement  of  a  truce. 

This  expedition  was  ably  conducted  and  eminently  success- 
ful. General  Stoneman's  strategy  put  the  enemy  under  positive 
disadvantage,  at  each  objective,  in  receiving  the  intended  blow. 
When  the  Blue  Ridge  was  first  passed,  the  enemy  supposed 
that  Salisbury  was  menaced.  This  supposition  placed  the  Ten- 
nessee and  Virginia  railroad  at  General  Stoneman's  mercy,  and 
the  advance  for  its  destruction  was  a  surprise,  and  cost  the  enemy 
three  trains,  and  the  loss  of  more  than  two  hundred  wagons, 
and  twenty-one  pieces  of  artillery,  spiked  and  abandoned,  while 
the  troops  that  were  separated  from  the  main  body  by  this  move- 
ment, returned  to  Kentucky.  Again,  when  the  column  turned 
south, Colonel  Palmer's  divergence  to  ward  Danville  and  Greens- 
boro, by  Martinsville,  caused  the  enemy  to  withdraw  troops 
from  Salisbury ,which  fell  more  easily  in  consequence  when  it  was 


344  STONEMAN'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS. 

attacked,  as  the  paramount  object  of  the  advance  southward. 
The  enemy  discovered  his  mistake,  and  made  effort  to  reinforce 
Salisbury  when  the  danger  was  apparent,  but  the  railroad  being 
cut  in  five  places  south  of  Danville,  the  effort  miscarried,  as 
the  reinforcing  division  of  infantry  and  brigade  of  cavalry  did 
not  reach  the  vicinity  of  the  town  until  after  the  destruction 
of  the  depots,  magazines,  and  stores.  And  at  last  a  brigade 
held  the  enemy  at  Swananoa  Gap,  until  another  passed  to  the 
rear  and  surprised  and  captured  a  large  portion  of  his  force. 
The  captures  were  twenty-five  guns  taken  in  action,  twenty- 
one  abandoned  in  Southwest  Virginia,  and  over  six  thousand 
prisoners  and  seventeen  battle-flags. 


WASHINGTON,  December  31,  1864—11.30  A.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas : 

Lieutenant-General  U.  S.  Grant  directs  all  of  your  available  force  not  es- 
sential to  hold  your  communications,  be  collected  on  the  Tennessee  river 
— say,  at  Eastport  and  Tuscumbia — and  be  made  ready  for  such  move- 
ments as  may  be  ordered.  It  is  supposed  that  a  portion  of  the  troops  in 
Louisville,  and  other  parts  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  can  now  be  avail- 
able for  active  operations  elsewhere.  They  should  be  made  ready  for 
that  purpose.  General  Dodge  wishes  you  to  return  to  St.  Louis  the 
Thirty-ninth  Missouri  Infantry,  now  at  Louisville,  so  that  he  may  com- 
plete its  organization.  Please  give  us  the  earliest  possible  notice  of 
Hood's  line  of  retreat,  so  that  orders  may  be  given  for  the  continuance 
of  the  campaign.  Lieutenant-General  Grant  does  not  intend  that  your 
army  should  go  into  winter-quarters.  It  must  be  ready  for  active  opera- 
tions in  the  field. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Major-  General. 


EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  THOMAS'  REPORT. 

On  the  6th  of  February,  a  communication  was  received  from  Lieuten- 
ant-General Grant,  directing  ah  expedition,  commanded  by  General  Stone- 
man,  to  be  sent  from  East  Tennessee  to  penetrate  North  Carolina  and 
well  down  toward  Columbia,  South  Carolina,  to  destroy  the  enemy's  rail- 
roads and  military  resources  in  that  section,  and  visit  a  portion  of  the 
state  beyond  the  control  or  reach  of  General  Sherman's  column.  As  the 
movement  was  to  be  merely  for  the  purpose  of  destruction,  directions 
were  given  General  Stoneman  to  evade  any  heavy  engagements  with  the 
enemy's  forces. 


STONEMAN'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS.  345 

Again,  on  the  13th  of  February,  General  Grant  telegraphed  me  to  pre- 
pare a  cavalry  expedition  of  about  ten  thousand  strong,  to  penetrate 
Northern  Alabama,  acting  as  a  co-operative  force  to  the  movement  on 
Mobile  by  General  Canby.  Before  leaving  Eastport,  Mississippi,  I  had 
directed  General  Wilson  to  get  his  command  in  readiness  for  just  such  a 
campaign,  of  which  the  above  was  simply  an  outline — my  instructions 
being  for  him  to  move  on  Selma,  Montgomery,  and  Tuscaloosa,  Alabama, 
and  to  capture  those  places  if  possible,  after  accomplishing  which  he  was 
to  operate  against  any  of  the  enemy's  forces  in  the  direction  of  Missis- 
sippi, Mobile,  or  Macon,  as  circumstances  might  demand. 


CLIFTON,  TENN.,  January  14,  1865. 
H.  W.  HallecJc,  Major-General,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

I  arrived  here  this  morning,  and  from  all  I  can  learn,  Hood  has  gone 
south  of  Corinth.  Accordingly,  Schofield's  corps,  in  obedience  to  your 
orders,  has  been  ordered  to  Annapolis,  and  will  commence  embarking  to- 
morrow. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major- General  Commanding. 


EASTPORT,  Miss.,  February  2,  1865. 
H.  W.  Halleck,  Major-General,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

A  telegram  just  received  from  Louisville,  from  General  Allen,  states 
that  your  order  to  me  of  the  26th  January,  means  five  thousand  cavalry 
instead  of  five  divisions,  as  I  have  informed  him.  Which  is  correct — five 
thousand  or  five  divisions  ?  Are  they  and  General  Smith  to  take  their 
wagon  transportation  with  them  ? 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  iS.  A. 

NASHYILLE,  TENX.,  February  16,  1865. 
U.  iS.  Grant,  Lieutenant-General,  City  Point,  Va.  : 

It  seems  to  be  now  pretty  certain  that  Cheatham's  and  Lee's  corps  of 
Hood's  army  have  left  Mississippi,  and  gone  eastward.  They  left  Colum- 
bus and  Tupelo  about  the  17th  of  January  last,  and  I  have  traced  them 
through  different  persons  so  regularly,  that  I  can  no  longer  doubt  their 
having  gone.  The  last  person  reported  their  having  passed  Opelika  on 
the  27th  of  January,  and  all  agree  in  reporting  that  they  were  going  to 
South  Carolina.  I  have  also  received  two  or  three  reports  during  the 
past  week,  that  Forrest  is  about  to  remove  his  troops  to  Georgia,  if  he 
has  not  already  started.  I  think  my  cavalry  expedition  from  Eastport 
will  overtake  him.  It  will  be  ready  about  the  20th  inst.  1  have  taken 
measures  to  equip  General  Stoneman  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  have 
substituted  another  regiment  for  the  Fourth  Missouri  Cavalry,  but  would 
like  to  get  that  regiment  as  soon  as  possible,  as  I  could  make  it  very  use- 
ful south  of  Chattanooga,  as  there  are  a  number  of  scouting  parties  of 


346  STONEMAN'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS. 

the  enemy  about  Rome,  Resaca,  Lafayette,  and  other  towns  in  that  re- 
gion. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  A.  Commanding. 


NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  February  27,  1865. 
U.  iS.  Grant,  Lieutenant-General,  City  Point ,  Fa.  : 

Your  telegram  of  the  26th  inst.  is  just  received.  General  Stoneman 
has  not  yet  started,  but  informed  my  chief  of  staff  a  few  days  since  at 
Louisville,  that  he  would  be  ready  to  start  about  the  1st  of  March.  I 
will  notify  you  as  soon  as  he  gets  off.  He  has  been  delayed  for  want  of 
horses.  I  have  just  returned  from  Eastport,  having  completed  the  ar- 
rangements for  the  cavalry  expedition  from  that  point.  Owing  to  the 
recent  stormy  and  rainy  weather,  General  Wilson  will  be  delayed  a  few 
days  for  the  roads  to  dry  up.  He  will  be  able  to  start  in  a  few  days  with 
at  least  ten  thousand  men. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  A.  Commanding. 


CHAPTER  XL. 


GEORGIA. 

GENERAL  WILSON'S  column  of  cavalry,  comprising  Generals 
McCook's,  Long's,  and  Upton's  divisions,  having  crossed  the 
Tennessee  river  on  the  18th  of  March,  was  put  in  motion 
southward  on  the  23d.  General  Hatch's  division  not  having 
a  full  remount,  was  deprived  of  all  horses  for  the  other  divis- 
ions, and  left  at  Eastport,  to  join  the  column  subsequently, 
should  horses  be  obtained  in  time.  General  Wilson's  wagon 
and  pontoon  trains,  including  about  two  hundred  and  fifty 
teams,  were  put  under  the  direction  of  Captain  Brown,  pro- 
tected by  fifteen  hundred  dismounted  men,  under  Major 
Archer.  The  destitution  of  forage,  in  the  region  immedi- 
ately south  of  the  Tennessee  river,  imposed  the  necessity  of 
starting  the  troops  in  detachments  to  glean  over  a  broad  belt 
of  country,  what  little  produce  might  be  left,  where  war  had. 
so  long  and  so  heavily  laid  its  hand.  This  diffusion,  however, 
involved  no  hazard,  as  General  Forrest's  command  was  at 
"West  Point,  Mississippi,  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  south  of 
Eastport,  and  General  Roddy's  forces  were  holding  Monte- 
vail  o,  on  the  Alabama  and  Tennessee  railroad,  as  remote,  to 
the  southeast.  There  was,  besides,  an  important  advantage 
in  this  divergence  in  the  beginning  of  the  enterprise,  as 
thereby  the  enemy  was  put  in  doubt  as  to  the  first  objectives, 
and  was  compelled  to  watch  equally  the  roads  to  Selma,  Tus- 
caloosa,  and  Columbus. 

General  Grant's  orders  required  the  movement  of  a  force  of 
five  or  six  thousand  men,  to  demonstrate  against  Tuscaloosa 
and  Selma,  to  co-operate  with  General  Canby.  General 

(347) 


348  WILSON'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS. 

Wilson  expressed  the  conviction  that  he  could  capture  these 
places  and  conduct  other  decisive  operations,  and  General 
Thomas  gave  him  permission  to  take  with  him  all  his  availa- 
ble force,  giving  him  such  freedom  of  action  as  the  nature  and 
proposed  objects  of  the  expedition,  positive  and  contingent, 
demanded.  Thus,  by  General  Grant's  instructions,  the  license 
given  by  General  Thomas,  and  the  conditions  of  his  enterprise, 
General  "Wilson  became  an  independent  commander,  at  least 
as  far  as  all  special  combinations  and  minor  objectives  were 
concerned.  He  was  subject  still  to  General  Thomas,  as  actual 
commander  of  all  the  forces  within  the  geographical  limits  of 
the  military  division ;  bu+,  he  had  discretion  within  exceed- 
ingly extended  limits. 

General  Upton's  division,  followed  by  his  train,  moved 
rapidly  on  the  most  easterly  route,  passing  Barton's  Station, 
Throgmorton's  Mills,  Russellville,  Mount  Hope,  and  Jasper, 
to  Sanders'  Ferry,  on  the  west  fork  of  the  Black  Warrior 
river.  General  Long's  division  marched  through  Cherokee 
Station,  Frankfort,  and  Russellville,  and  then  followed  the 
Tuscaloosa  road  to  the  Black  Water  creek,  twenty -five  miles 
from  Jasper.  General  McCook's  division  followed  Long's  to 
the  Upper  Bear  treek,  then  moved  on  the  Tuscaloosa  road  to 
Eldridge,  afterward  turning  east  to  Jasper.  The  crossing  of 
the  Black  Warrior  river  was  beset  with  difficulties,  but  the 
knowledge  that  General  Chalmers  was  moving  to  Tuscaloosa, 
and  the  danger  of  a  full  river,  permitted  no  delay,  and  the 
corps  was  hurried  across,  with  the  loss  of  a  few  horses,  and 
then,  with  pack-mules  bearing  supplies,  wagons  and  artillery 
being  far  in  the  rear,  the  command  moved  rapidly  through 
Ely  ton  to  Montevallo.  At  Ely  ton,  General  Croxton  was  de- 
tached with  his  brigade  to  advance  to  Tuscaloosa,  to  burn  the 
public  stores,  military  school,  bridges,  foundries,  and  factories 
at  that  place,  and  then  join  the  main  column  at  Selma,  if 
practicable.  The  direction  of  Croxton's  movement  somewhat 
covered  the  trains  arid  artillery  in  the  rear,  and  was  intended 
to  develop  any  movement  of  the  enemy  in  that  quarter.  On 
the  march,  General  Upton  destroyed  the  Red  Mountain,  Cen- 
tral, Bibb,  and  Columbian  a  iron-works,  Cahawba  rolling-mills, 
and  much  valuable  property.  The  other  divisions  followed, 


WILSON'S   CAVALRY   OPERATIONS.  349 

and  when  General  Wilson  reached  Montevallo,  on  the  31st  of 
March,  General  Upton  was  ready  to  move  forward.  And  for 
this  there  was  need,  as  the  enemy  had  appeared  on  the  Selma 
road,  and  General  Upton,  with  General  Alexander's  brigade 
leading,  was  sent  against  him.  Alexander  soon  provoked  a 
sharp  conflict,  which  he  terminated  by  a  charge,  driving  the 
enemy,  a  portion  of  Roddy's  division  and  Crossland's  Ken- 
tucky brigade,  in  confusion  toward  Randolph.  General 
Roddy  attempted  to  make  a  stand  five  miles  south  of  Monte- 
vallo,  when  General  Upton  threw  "Winslow's  brigade  to  the 
front,  and  opened  Rodney's  battery,  Fourth  United  States 
Artillery,  causing  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  and  loss  of  fifty 
prisoners  in  the  pursuit  by  "Winslow.  This  action  gave  the 
type  of  the  campaign. 

At  night,  General  Upton  bivouacked  fourteen  miles  from 
Montevallo,  and  the  next  day  advanced  to  Randolph.  Here 
he  turned  to  the  east  by  Maplesville  to  the  old  Selma  road, 
while  General  Long  pushed  forward  on  the  new  road.  A 
message  from  General  Croxton  to  the  effect  that  he  was  in  the 
rear  of  General  Jackson's  division,  near  Trion,  and  dispatches 
captured  from  the  enemy  revealing  his  plans  and  the  disposi- 
tions of  his  forces,  called  for  new  combinations  and  their 
prompt  execution.  General  Forrest,  with  a  portion  of  his 
command,  was  in  the  front  of  the  main  column ;  Jackson's 
division  was  involved  with  Croxton. 

General  Chalmers  was  under  orders  to  cross  from  Union,  to 
join  Forrest,  either  in  Wilson's  front  or  in  the  works  at  Selma, 
and  the  enemy's  dismounted  men  were  holding  an  important 
bridge  over  the  Cahawba,  at  Centreville.  To  secure  this  bridge 
and  prevent  the  junction  of  Jackson's  division  with  Forrest, 
General  Wilson  directed  General  McCook  to  strengthen  the 
battalion  en  route  to  Centreville,  by  a  regiment,  and  to  follow 
with  La  Grange's  brigade  with  all  speed,  leaving  even  his  pack 
trains,  to  seize  the  bridge,  and  then  hasten  to  support  Croxton 
against  Jackson.  Having  provided  for  his  right  flank,  he  next 
looked  to  the  protection  of  his  rear,  against  the  traditional 
strategy  of  Forrest,  by  ordering  Upton  and  Long  to  push  him 
without  rest  toward  Selma.  These  officers  moved  forward 
rapidly,  without  changing  roads,  and  brushing  back  small  par- 


350  WILSON'S  CAVALKY  OPERATIONS. 

ties,  developed  Forrest  in  position  for  battle,  on  the  north 
bank  of  Bigler's  creek,  his  right  resting  on  Mulberry  creek, 
and  left  on  a  high  wooded  ridge,  covered  by  a  battery  of  artil- 
lery. A  portion  of  his  front  was  covered  by  slashed  timber 
and  rail  barricades.  His  force  comprised  Crossland's  brigade, 
Armstrong's  brigade  of  Chalmers'  division,  Roddy's  division, 
and  a  battalion  just  arrived  from  Selma,  in  all  about  five  thou- 
sand men.  Perceiving  the  enemy  in  strength  in  his  imme- 
diate front,  General  Long  reinforced  his  vanguard  by  a  bat- 
talion of  the  Seventy-second  Indiana  Mounted  Infantry,  with 
the  remainder  of  the  regiment  dismounted,  and  formed  on  the 
left  of  the  road.  This  regiment  drove  back  the  enemy  in 
broken  ranks.  '  At  this  juncture  General  Long  ordered  forward 
four  companies  of  the  Seventeenth  Indiana,  Lieutenant- Col- 
onel Frank  White  commanding,  with  drawn  sabers.  These 
companies  drove  the  enemy  to  his  works,  dashed  against  his 
main  line,  broke  through  it,  rode  over  his  guns,  and  finally 
turning  to  the  left  cut  their  way  out,  but  leaving  one  officer 
and  sixteen  men  with  the  enemy.  In  this  charge  Captain 
Taylor  lost  his  life,  having  led  his  men  into  the  midst  of  the 
enemy,  and  engaged  in  a  running  fight  for  two  hundred  yards 
with  General  Forrest  himself. 

Hearing  the  noise  of  this  preliminary  fighting,  Alexander's 
brigade  of  Upton's  division  hurried  up  on  the  trot,  and  formed 
on  the  left  of  General  Long,  and  as  soon  as  everything  was  in 
readiness,  the  brigade  advanced,  dismounted.  In  less  than  an 
hour,  although  Forrest  resisted  stubbornly,  his  forces  were 
completely  routed.  Alexander  captured  two  guns  and  about 
two  hundred  prisoners.  Long's  division  took  one  gun.  "Wins- 
low's  brigade  pressed  forward  in  pursuit,  but  could  not  bring 
the  enemy  to  a  stand.  At  sundown  the  corps  bivouacked 
near  Plantersville,  in  sharp  conflict  with  the  enemy,  who  had 
been  driven  twenty-four  miles  during  the  day. 

At  daylight  the  next  day,  the  columns  were  in  motion  to- 
ward Selma.  General  Long  advanced  to  the  town  and  crossed 
to  the  Summerville  road.  General  Upton  moved  on  the  Eange 
Line  road,  sending  a  squadron  on  the  Burnsville  road.  Lieu- 
tenant Eundlebrook,  with  a  battalion  of  the  Fourth  United 
.States  Cavalry,  followed  the  railroad,  burning  stations  and 


WILSON'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS.  351 

bridges  to  Burnsville.  By  4  P.  M.  the  troops  were  in  position 
:and  ready  to  assault.  General  Wilson  had  previously  ob- 
tained a  complete  description  of  the  defenses,  and  having  cor- 
roborated its  correctness  by  observation  and  formal  recon- 
noissance,  he  gave  orders  for  the  assault.  General  Long  was 
instructed  to  move  across  the  road,  upon  which  his  troops 
were  posted,  and  General  Upton  was  permitted,  as  he  had  re- 
quested, with  three  hundred  picked  men,  to  penetrate  a  swamp 
on  his  left,  and  break  the  line  covering  it,  thus  to  turn  For- 
rest's right,  while  the  remainder  of  his  division  should  conform 
to  his  movements. 

A  single  gun  from  Rodney's  battery  was  to  be  the  signal 
for  a  general  advance,  and  this  was  to  be  given  as  soon  as 
Upton's  success  was  revealed.  Before  this  signal  gun  could 
be  fired,  General  Long  was  informed  that  a  heavy  force  of 
cavalry  was  skirmishing  with  his  rear-guard,  and  threatening 
an  attack  from  that  quarter.  He  left  six  companies  well 
posted  at  the  creek,  in  anticipation  of  the  movement  which 
General  Chalmers  was  now  making  in  obedience  to  orders 
from  General  Forrest.  This  force  was  known  to  have  been 
the  day  before  at  Marion,  and  fearing  that  its  appearance  on 
the  road,  as  had  been  expected,  might  compromise  the  assault 
upon  the  town,  General  Long  determined  not  to  wait  for  the 
development  of  General  Upton's  turning  movement.  He 
simply  strengthened  his  rear  with  a  regiment,  and  then  dis- 
mounting four  regiments  from  the  brigades  of  Miller  and 
Minty,  he,  with  these  officers,  led  them  in  charging  over  an 
open  space  for  six  hundred  yards,  over  a  stockade,  a  deep 
ditch,  and  the  parapet,  and  drove  the  enemy  in  confusion  to 
the  city.  At  the  moment  of  victory,  General  Wilson  reached 
that  part  of  the  field,  and  directed  Colonel  Minty,  who  had 
assumed  command  of  the  division  in  consequence  of  a  severe 
wound  to  General  Long,  to  advance  toward  the  town.  He 
ordered  Colonel  Yail  to  place  his  own  regiment,  the  Seven- 
teenth Indiana,  and  the  Fourth  Ohio,  in  line  inside  the  works, 
and  the  Fourth  United  States  Cavalry  and  the  Board  of  Trade 
battery  to  participate  in  the  attack.  When  the  division  again 
advanced,  the  enemy  was  occupying  unfinished  defenses  near 
the  town.  The  Fourth  Cavalry,  Lieutenant  O'Connell  com- 


352  WILSON'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS. 

manding,  was  repulsed,  but  formed  again  on  the  left.  In  the 
meantime,  General  Upton  had  succeeded  in  his  movement, 
and  was  now  advancing  on  the  left  of  Minty.  A  charge  was 
again  made  by  the  Fourth  Ohio,  Seventeenth  Indiana,  and 
Fourth  Cavalry  dismounted,  and  the  whole  line  participating 
with  wildest  enthusiasm,  the  enemy  was  hurled  from  position, 
and  the  city  was  penetrated  in  all  directions. 

The  charge  of  General  Long,  his  brigade  commanders  leading 
with  him,  and  fifteen  hundred  and  fifty  men  following,  was 
brilliant  in  the  extreme.  A  single  line  without  support 
advanced  in  utmost  exposure  for  five  or  six  hundred  yards, 
leaped  a  stockade  five  feet  high,  a  ditch  five  feet  deep  and 
fifteen  wide,  and  a  parapet  six  to  eight  feet  high,  and  drove 
Armstrong's  brigade,  the  best  of  Forrest's  command,  over 
fifteen  hundred  strong,  in  rout  from  works  of  great  strength 
and  advantages  of  wonderful  superiority,  and  this  was 
done  while  sixteen  field-guns  were  playing  upon  them.  In 
the  charge,  Colonel  Dobbs,  of  the  Fourth  Ohio,  was  killed. 
General  Long,  and  Colonels  Miller,  McCormick,  and  Biggs 
were  wounded.  The  general  loss  of  the  division  was  forty 
killed,  two  hundred  and  sixty  wounded,  and  seven  missing. 

The  fruits  of  the  victory  were  in  correspondence  with  the 
gallantry  of  the  troops  that  won  it.  Thirty-one  field-guns 
and  one  thirty-pounder  Parrott,  two  thousand  seven  hundred 
prisoners,  including  one  hundred  and  fifty  officers,  and  public 
property  of  great  value.  Lieutenant-General  Taylor  sought 
safety  in  flight  early  in  the  afternoon,  and  under  cover  of  the 
darkness,  Generals  Forrest,  Roddy,  Armstrong,  and  Adams 
escaped  with  a  number  of  men.  A  portion  of  Upton's  division 
pursued  on  the  Burnsville  road  till  late  in  the  night,  capturing 
four  guns  and  many  prisoners.  The  enemy  destroyed  twenty- 
five  thousand  bales  of  cotton,  but  left  the  foundries,  machine- 
shops,  arsenals,  and  warehouses  of  this  immense  depot  of  war 
material,  for  the  torch. 

General  Wilson  placed  Brevet  Brigadier-General  Winslow 
in  command  of  the  city,  and  instructed  Lieutenant  Haywood, 
engineer  officer,  to  press  the  construction  of  pontoons  for  a 
bridge  over  the  Alabama  river.  The  next  day  at  daylight, 
General  Upton  marched  to  draw  General  Chalmers*  to  the 


WILSON'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS.  353 

west  side  of  the  Cahawba  river  and  open  coramnnications  with 
General  McCook,  who  was  expected  with  the  train  from 
Centerville.  This  movement  looked  to  an  advance  of  the 
whole  command  toward  Montgomery  as  soon  as  it  could  be 
gathered  together  and  other  conditions  were  favorable.  The 
capture  of  Selma  and  so  large  a  portion  of  Forrest's  force  gave 
General  Wilson  the  assurance  of  successful  movements  what- 
ever objectives  he  might  choose. 

Generals  McCook  and  Upton  arrived  at  Selma,  April  5th, 
with  the  train.  The  former  had  been  successful  against  Cen- 
treville,  but  on  reaching  Scottsboro  had  found  General  Jackson 
so  strongly  posted  that  he  did  not  attack  him,  but  burning 
the  cotton  factories  and  the  bridge,  turned  toward  Selma. 
General  Croxton  had  not  been  found  nor  even  heard  from ; 
but  his  protracted  separation  from  the  corps  did  not  cause  un- 
easiness, as  it  was  confidently  believed  that  he  had  taken  care 
of  himself  and  gone  in  a  new  direction. 

On  the  6th,  General  Forrest  requested  a  conference  with 
General  Wilson,  with  reference  to  an  exchange  of  prisoners. 
His  arrogance  and  manifest  hope  that  he  could  recapture  his 
men  made  the  interview  brief,  but  through  it,  General  Wilson 
learned  that  General  Croxton  had  had  an  engagement  two 
days  before  with  General  Adams  at  Bridgeville,  forty  miles 
southwest  of  Tuscaloosa.  His  safety  being  assured,  as  also 
General  Canby's  ability  to  take  Mobile  without  support,  there 
was  no  barrier  to  the  movement  to  Montgomery  but  the  Ala- 
bama river,  whose  deep,  swift  current  gave  an  unsteady  resting 
to  a  pontoon  bridge  eight  hundred  and  seventy  feet  long. 
Three  times  the  bridge  was  broken,  but  Major  Hubbard,  aided 
by  Generals  Upton  and  Alexander  and  the  staff  of  General 
Wilson,  succeeded  in  connecting  the  banks  by  the  floating 
bridge,  and  the  command  passed  safely  over  by  daylight  on 
the  10th  of  April  Selma  had  been  so  far  destroyed  as  to  be 
of  no  use  to  the  enemy  for  military  purposes ;  and  Forrest's 
force  had  been  so  greatly  diminished  and  so  thoroughly  de- 
moralized that  General  Wilson  moved  fearlessly  forward 
toward  Montgomery,  intending  to  destroy  railroads  and  army 
supplies  and  material,  and  then  sweep  on  to  the  theater  of  op- 
VOL.  H — 23 


354  WILSON'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS. 

erations  in  North  Carolina.  His  mounted  force  was  now 
stronger  than  at  starting,  as  he  had  captured  horses  for  all  his 
dismounted  men,  and  he  now  disin cumbered  himself  of  all 
wagons  and  pontoons  which  could  be  spared,  to  give  him 
facility  for  quick  movement.  The  able-hodied  negroes  who 
had  joined  his  column  were  organized  into  regiments  under 
efficient  officers.  These  men,  in  the  first  flush  of  freedom,  be- 
came soldiers,  keeping  pace  with  the  troopers,  gathering 
supplies  from  the  country,  and  marching  thirty-five  miles 
per  day. 

The  march  from  Sei'ma  to  Montgomery  was  retarded  by  bad 
roads  and  bridgeless  streams ;  but  at  7  A.  M.  on  the  12th,  Col- 
onel La  Grange,  whose  brigade  was  in  advance,  received  the 
surrender  of  the  capital  of  the  State  of  Alabama,  and  the  first 
capital  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  But  how  great  had 
been  the  changes  of  four  years  of  civil  war !  On  the  4th  of 
March,  1861,  the  insurgent  Congress  had  asserted,  with  the 
pomp  and  circumstance  befitting  a  nation's  birth,  the  inde- 
pendence of  seven  slaveholding  states.  The  national  govern- 
ment was  boldly  defied,  and  blindly  ignoring  the  contin- 
gencies of  their  venture,  the  members  of  this  Congress  boldly 
assumed  the  independence  of  the  South  as  an  actuality,  and 
talked  of  war  as  if  its  invocation  involved  no  guilt,  and  its 
progress  compassed  naught  but  victories  and  speedy  triumph. 
The  outlying  crowds  of  men  drawn  to  Montgomery  by  the 
culmination  of  Southern  frenzy  in  the  assumption  of  a  new 
nationality,  echoed  the  bold  utterances  of  the  provisional  Pres- 
ident and  Congress  in  jubilant  ecstasy  through  the  streets. 
The  illuminated  city  was  a  blazing  type  of  the  fire  that  was 
burning  in'  the  Southern  heart,  and  all  the  assumptions  of 
prospective  empire,  in  the  frenzy  of  the  moment,  were  removed 
beyond  the  sphere  of  doubt.  Now,  the  mayor  of  the  city — the 
dispirited  representative  of  a  conquered  people — comes  meekly 
forth  from  the  provisional  capital  of  the  war-broken  Confed- 
eracy and  tenders  its  surrender  to  a  commander  of  brigade. 
How  different  the  beginning  and  end  of  Montgomery  in  the 
"  great  conflict !  "  The  burning  of  ninety  thousand  bales  of 
cotton,  the  ideal  king  of  commerce,  is  now  the.  illumination 
which  betokens  the  loss  of  his  crown  and  the  loyalty  of  his 


WILSON'S   CAVALRY   OPERATIONS.  355 

subjects,  for  it  is  they  who,  in  their  desperation,  set  fire  to  this 
immense  mass  of  royalty.  The  quiet  streets  and  silent  halls, 
the  fleeing  troopers  and  hiding  citizens,  are  in  striking  an- 
tithesis to  the  pomp,  the  boast,  and  the  maddened  multitude 
of  a  former  day. 

Having  destroyed  five  steamboats,  several  locomotives,  one 
armory,  and  several  foundries,  General  Wilson  resumed  motion 
on  the  14th.  General  Upton  moved  through  Mount  Meigs  and 
Tuskegee,  toward  Columbus,  Georgia,  and  Colonel  La  Grange 
followed  the  railroad  through  Opelika,  to  West  Point.  Two 
days  later,  General  Upton,  with  three  hundred  dismounted 
men,  assaulted  and  carried  the  breastworks  at  Columbus,  sav- 
ing by  the  impetuosity  of  his  attack  the  bridges  over  the 
Chattahoochee,  and  capturing  fifty-two  guns  in  position,  and 
twelve  hundred  prisoners.  The  ram  Jackson,  nearly  ready 
for  the  sea,  and  carrying  six  seven-inch  guns,  was  destroyed ; 
also  the  navy-yard,  foundries,  arsenal,  armory,  sword  and 
pistol  factory,  accouterment-shops,  paper-mills,  four  cotton 
factories,  fifteen  locomotives,  two  hundred  cars,  and  one  hun- 
dred and  fifteen  thousand  bales  of  cotton.  The  assault  was 
made  at  night,  by  men  from  the  Third  Iowa,  Colonel  Noble 
commanding,  the  Fourth  Iowa  and  Tenth  Missouri  being  held 
in  support.  Generals  Upton  and  Winslow  directed  the  move- 
ment in  person.  The  enemy  opened  a  heavy  artillery  arid 
musketry  fire  as  the  troops  advanced,  but  their  Spencer  rifles 
gave  response  as  they  rushed  through  the  abatis  and  over  the 
parapet.  When  this  had  been  accomplished,  General  Upton 
sent  Captain  Glassen,  with  two  companies  of  the  Tenth  Mis- 
souri, to  get  possession  of  the  bridge  over  the  Chattahoochee. 
The  captain  passed  through  the  inner  line  of  defenses,  under 
cover  of  the  darkness,  and  seized  the  bridge  before  the  enemy 
was  aware  of  his  movement.  Then  General  Upton  made  a  gen- 
eral charge,  swept  away  all  opposition,  seized  the  bridges,  and 
stationed  his  troops  thoughout  the  city.  The  fortifications 
were  held  by  three  thousand  men,  and  yet  three  hundred 
penetrated  the  main  line,  and  this  primal  success  was  followed 
by  overwhelming  victory,  with  a  loss  in  all  of  twenty  men 
killed  and  wounded. 

Colonel  La  Grange  had  spirited  skirmishing  on  the  way  to 


356  WILSON'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS. 

West  Point,  but  reached  the  vicinity  with  his  advance  at  10 
A.  M.,  April  16th.  Beck's  Indiana  battery  and  the  Second 
and  Fourth  Indiana  held  the  attention  of  the  enemy  until  the 
arrival  of  the  remainder  of  the  brigade.  Then  after  a  recon- 
noissance,  preparations  were  made  for  an  assault.  Detach- 
ments from  the  First  Wisconsin,  Second  Indiana,  and  Seventh 
Kentucky  regiments  were  dismounted  to  make  the  charge. 
At  1  p.  M.  the  signal  was  given,  and  these  troops  moved  for- 
ward, drove  into  the  fort  the  skirmishers,  and  reached  the 
ditch,  which  was  LOO  wide  to  leap  and  too  deep  to  pass. 
Sharpshooters  kept  the  enemy  down  until  materials  for 
bridges  were  gathered,  when  the  charge  was  sounded  again, 
and  the  detachments  rushed  over  the  parapets,  on  three  sides 
of  the  square  fort  and  captured  the  entire  ^garrison  of  two  hun- 
dred and  sixty-five  men,  General  Tyler  commanding,  and 
eighteen  officers  and  men  were  killed  and  twenty-eight 
wounded.  Colonel  La  Grange  lost  seven  killed  and  twenty- 
nine  wounded.  He  captured  three  guns  and  five  hundred 
stand  of  small  arms.  Simultaneously  with  the  storming  of  the 
fort,  the  Fourth  Indiana  dashed  through  the  town,  scattered 
a  superior  cavalry  force  which  had  just  arrived,  and  burned 
five  locomotives  and  trains ;  also  securing  the  bridges  over 
the  Chattahoochee.  Colonel  La  Grange  here  destroyed  two 
bridges,  nineteen  locomotives,  and  two  hundred  and  forty-five 
cars  loaded  with  quartermaster,  commissary,  and  ordnance 
stores.  Before  departure,  he  established  a  hospital  for  the 
wounded  of  both  sides,  and  left  for  them  ample  supplies  with 
the  mayor.  He  then  moved  toward  Macon,  through  La 
Grange,  Griffin,  and  Forsyth,  breaking  the  railroad  at  these 
points. 

April  17th,  General  Wilson  commenced  his  movement  on 
Macon,  giving  Minty's  division  the  advance,  and  instructing 
that  commander  to  send  forward  a  detachment  to  seize  the 
double  bridges  over  Flint  river.  Captain  Hudson,  of  the  Fourth 
Michigan,  was  put  upon  this  service,  and,  at  7  A.  M.  the  next 
day,  gained  the  bridges,  scattering  the  guards,  and  capturing 
forty  prisoners.  The  whole  command  followed  the  detach- 
ment on  the  18th.  Two  days  later,  Colonel  White,  of  the 
Seventeenth  Indiana  in  the  advance,  encountered  two  hundred 


WILSON'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS.  357 

cavalrymen,  and  driving  them  rapidly  toward  Macon,  saved 
the  Echconnee  and  Tohesofke  bridges.  When  within  thir- 
teen miles  of  Macon,  he  met  a  flag  of  truce  in  charge  of  Gen- 
eral Robinson,  bearing  a  written  communication  addressed  to 
the  commanding  officer  United  States  forces.  Colonel  White 
halted  and  sent  the  communication  to  Colonel  Minty,  his 
division  commander,  who,  having  read  it,  sent  it  to  General 
Wilson,  but  instructed  Colonel  Whit©  to  resume  his  advance, 
and  so  informed  General  Robinson.  The  communication  was 
from  General  Cobb,  inclosing  a  dispatch  from  General  Beau- 
regard,  advising  that  a  truce  was  existing,  which  was  applica- 
ble to  all  the  forces  under  Generals  Sherman  and  Joseph 
E.  Johnston,  and  declaring  that  he  was  ready  to  comply  with 
the  terms  of  the  armistice,  and  proposing  a  meeting  with  the 
commander  of  the  United  States  forces,  to  make  arrangements 
for  a  more  perfect  enforcement  of  the  armistice. 

Without  giving  entire  credence  to  the  communication,  Gen- 
eral Wilson  rode  rapidly  forward  to  halt  his  troops  at  the  de- 
fenses of  Macon,  and  by  seeing  General  Cobb  to  convince 
himself  with  regard  to  the  questions  at  issue,  before  acknowl- 
edging the  armistice.  But  Colonel  White  had  been  too  quick, 
and  had  dashed  into  the  city  and  received  its  surrender  before 
General  Wilson  overtook  him.  The  garrison  made  a  show  of 
resistance,  but  promptly  laid  down  their  arms  at  the  demand 
of  Colonel  White.  When,  however,  General  Wilson  arrived, 
General  Cobb  protested  against  what  he  termed  a  violation  of 
the  armistice,  overlooking  the  fact  that  he  could  not  claim  to 
be  an  authoritative  channel  of  communication  for  a  message 
of  such  importance,  and  demanded  that  he  should  withdraw 
his  forces  to  the  point  where  General  Robinson  had  met  hie 
advance.  General  Wilson  had  no  reason  to  doubt  the  existence 
of  the  truce,  but  he  was  unwilling  to  give  it  recognition,  until 
he  had  received  notice  and  instructions  from  proper  authority 
authentically  transmitted,  especially  as  his  subordinate  officers 
had  captured  the  city  before  he  could  respond  to  the  message 
which  had  been  sent  under  the  flag  of  truce.  His  force,  though 
known  as  the  cavalry  corps  of  the  Military  Division  of  the 
Mississippi,  and  organized  under  General  Sherman's  order, 
had  not  yet  served  under  his  personal  command,  but  had,  by 


358  WILSON'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS. 

his  direction,  reported  to  General  Thomas,  as  commander  of 
all  the  forces  of  the  military  division  not  present  with  the 
commanding  general,  and  all  his  orders  subsequently  had  either 
originated  with  General  Thomas  or  had  been  transmitted  by 
him  from  General  Grant.  Without  authentic  instructions  from 
either  General  Grant,  General  Sherman,  or  General  Thomas, 
he  hesitated  to  recognize  the  application  of  the  armistice  to 
his  command.  He  therefore  determined  to  hold  Generals  Cobb, 
Smith,  Mackall,  Robinson,  and  Mercer,  and  the  garrison  of 
Macon,  as  prisoners  of  war,  until  his  conduct  was  disapproved 
by  competent  authority,  after  full  investigation.  However,  to 
relieve  himself  from  suspense,  at  the  earliest  possible  moment, 
he  sent  a  dispatch  in  cipher  to  General  Sherman,  the  evening 
of  the  20th  of  April,  and  the  next  clay  received  an  official  no- 
tification from  him  of  the  existence  of  the  armistice.  Upon 
receiving  it,  he  suspended  all  operations  until  he  should  receive 
orders  to  renew  them,  or  until  circumstances  should  justify  in- 
dependent action. 

On  the  1st  of  May,  General  Croxton,  who  during  his  sepa- 
ration from  the  main  column,  had  made  a  tortuous  ride  of  six 
hundred  and  fifty  miles,  arrived  at  Macon.  He  skirmished  with 
General  Jackson  near  Trion,  on  the  2d  of  April,  and  finding 
that  his  force  was  double  his  own,  he  declined  battle  and  moved 
rapidly  in  simulated  flight  to  the  Black  Warrior  river,  crossed 
to  the  west  side,  and  reached  Northport,  April  4th.  Fearing 
that  his  presence  might  be  known,  he  moved  at  midnight,  sur- 
prised the  force  at  the  bridge,  crossed  into  Tuscaloosa,  captured 
three  guns  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  prisoners,  scattered  the 
state  militia  and  cadets,  and  destroyed  the  military  school  edi- 
fice, and  the  public  works  and  stores.  Here  he  tried  to  com- 
municate with  General  McCook,  but  failed.  He  then  abandoned 
Tuscaloosa,  and  moved  to 'the  southeast  to  avoid  Jackson  and 
Chalmers.  When  near  Eutaw,  he  heard  of  the  arrival  of  Adams' 
division,  and  fearing  to  risk  an  engagement  with  a  force  of  cav- 
alry more  than  double  his  own  strength,  supported  by  militia, 
he  countermarched  toward  Tuscaloosa ;  then  diverging  to  the 
left,  moved  through  Jasper,  crossed  the  Coosa,  and  marched  to 
Talladega.  Near  this  place  he  defeated  General  Hill,  capturing 
one  gun  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  prisoners,  and  then  marched 


WILSON'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS.  359 

through  Carrollton,  Newnan,  and  Forsyth,  to  Macon.  During 
the  period  of  his  isolation,  he  had  no  knowledge  of  the  move- 
ments of  the  main  column,  but  having  faith  in  the  success  of 
the  general  plan,  he  sought  General  Wilson  at  Macon. 


NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  March  6,  1865. 
J.  H.  Wilson,  Major-General,  Eastport,  Miss,  : 

Your  note  of  the  26th  February  received.  You  remember  the  plan  of 
operations  you  propose  in  your  note  is  essentially  what  I  mentioned  to 
you  last  winter  I  should  adopt  if  permitted.  But  General  Grant  wants 
all  my  infantry  held  in  readiness  for  operations  in  East  Tennessee,  and 
has  given  directions  accordingly. 

He  expects  Canby  to  take  Montgomery  and  Seima,  and  hold  them  after- 
ward, and  has  directed  your  expedition  as  a  co-operative  one,  which  is 
also  expected  to  seize  either  Montgomery  or  Selma,  or  both,  if  you  find 
it  can  be  done  when  the  enemy  is  opposing  the  progress  of  Canby. 
After  Canby  gets  to  Montgomery,  your  command  will  then  be  relieved 
from  further  operations  in  that  quarter. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  A.  Commanding. 


NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  March  9,  1865. 
U.  S.  Grant,  Lieutenant-General,  City  Point : 

General  Canby  telegraphs  me,  March  1st,  from  New  Orleans,  that,  in 
consequence  of  the  continued  rains  during  the  month  of  February,  that 
he  can  not  start  the  cavalry  expedition  from  Vicksburg,  as  he  intended, 
and  has  ordered  Knipe  to  New  Orleans.  These  heavy  rains  having  ex- 
tended as  far  north  as  this  state,  have  also  swollen  the  streams  to  an  im- 
passable condition,  and  General  Wilson  will  be  somewhat  delayed  thereby, 
but  will  be  able  to  move  in  time  to  co-operate  with  General  Canby  against 
Mobile,  Selma,  and  Montgomery.  .  .  . 

"   GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major- General  U.  S.  A.  Commanding. 


CHATTANOOGA,  TENN.,  March  14,  1865. 
J.  H.  Wilson,  Major-General,  Eastport,  Miss.  : 

Your  telegram  of  9  A.  M.  12th  inst.  received.  If  the  report  made  to  you 
by  the  railroad  man  be  true,  then  your  expedition  should  be  successful. 
Canby  will  march  against  Selma  the  moment  he  gets  to  Mobile.  He  will 
have  over  forty  thousand  infantry.  General  Hatch  will  get  his  horses  in 
time  to  have  enough  to  do  this  summer.  I  am  now  on  my  way  to  Knox- 
ville  to  get  Stoneman  off,  and  concentrate  all  my  available  infantry  at 
Bull's  Gap,  after  which  I  may  move  on  Lynchburg. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  A.  Commanding. 


360  WILSON'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS. 

CHATTANOOGA,  TENN.,  March  19,  1865. 
Geo.  Stoneman,  Major-General,  Knaxville,  Tenn.  : 

Your  telegram  of  8.10  P.  M.  yesterday  received.  From  our  present 
knowledge  of  the  situation  of  affairs  in  Southwestern  Virginia,  I  believe 
the  route  agreed  upon  by  us  for  your  forces  to  take  will  be  the  most  ef- 
fective that  can  be  adopted — viz.,  to  go  down  the  New  River  valley,  strike 
the  railroad  beyond  Christian sburg,  unless  you  learn  that  Sheridan  has 
possession  of  Lynchburg;  then,  should  you  learn  the  force  at  Danville  is 
weak,  attack  that  place,  and  destroy  the  railroad  as  far  as  you  can  with 
safety  toward  Richmond,  and  then  withdraw  toward  Tennessee,  and  ob- 
serve and  report  all  movements  of  the  enemy  to  me  promptly. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  8.  A. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  TENNESSEE  AND  GEORGIA, 

MACON,  April  20,  1865. 

GENERAL  : — I  have  just  received  from  General  G.  T.  Beauregard,  my 
immediate  commander,  a  telegraphic  dispatch,  of  which  the  following  is 
a  copy : 

"  GREENSBORO,  April  19,  1865,  VIA  COLUMBIA,  19;  VIA  AUGUSTA,  20. 
"Major-General  H.  Cobb: 

"  Inform  general  commanding  enemy's  forces  in  your  front  that  a  truce 
for  the  purpose  of  a  final  settlement  was  agreed  upon  yesterday  between 
Generals  Johnston  and  Sherman,  applicable  to  all  forces  under  their  com- 
mand. A  message  to  that  effect  from  General  Sherman  will  be  sent  to 
him  as  soon  as  practicable.  The  contending  forces  are  to  occupy  their 
present  position,  forty-eight  hours'  notice  being  given  in  the  event  of  the 
resumption  of  hostilities. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD, 
"  General,  Second  in  Command. 

My  force  being  a  portion  of  General  Johnston's  command,  I  proceed 
at  once  to  execute  the  terms  of  the  armistice,  and  have  accordingly  issued 
orders  for  the  carrying  out  of  the  same.  I  will  meet  you  at  any  inter- 
mediate point  between  our  respective  lines  for  the  purpose  of  making  the 
necessary  arrangements  for  a  more  perfect  enforcement  of  the  armistice. 
This  communication  will  be  handed  to  you  by  Brigadier  F.  H.  Robinson. 
I  am,  general,  very  respectfully  yours, 

HOWELL  COBB, 
Major- General  Commanding,  etc. 
The  Commanding  General  of  the  United  States  Forces. 


WILSON'S   CAVALRY   OPERATIONS.  361 

HEADQUARTERS  CAVALRY  CORPS  MILITARY  DIVISION  MISSISSIPPI, 

MACON,  GA.,  April  20,  1865—9.  p.  M. 

Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman,  through  headquarters  General  Beauregard,  Greens- 
boro, N.  C.  : 

My  advance  received  the  surrender  of  this  city  this  evening.  General 
Cobb  had  previously  sent  me,  under  flag  of  truce,  a  copy  of  a  telegram 
from  General  Beauregard,  declaring  the  existence  of  an  armistice  between 
all  troops  under  your  command  and  those  under  Johnston.  Without 
questioning  the  authenticity  of  this  dispatch,  or  its  application  to  my 
command,  I  could  not  communicate  orders  to  my  advance  in  time  to  prer 
vent  the  capture  of  the  place.  I  shall  therefore  hold  its  garrison,  in- 
cluding Major-Generals  G«  W.  Smith  and  Cobb,  and  Brigadier-General 
Mackall,  prisoners  of  war.  Please  send  me  orders.  I  shall  remain  here 

a  reasonable  length  of  time  to  hear  from  you. 

J.  H.  WILSON, 

Major-General  Commanding  Cavalry  Corps. 


HEADQUARTERS,  GREENSBORO,  N.  C.,  April  21,  1865 — 2  p.  M. 
Major-General  Wilson,  Commanding  Cavalry  Army  United  States,  through  Major- 
General  H.  Cobb  : 

The  following  is  a  copy  of  a  communication  just  received,  which  will 
be  sent  to  you  to-day  by  an  officer : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

"  RALEIGH,  April  20,  1865. 
"  Major-General  Wilson,  Commanding  Cavalry  United  States  Army  in  Georgia: 

"  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  has  agreed  with  me  for  a  universal  suspen- 
sion of  hostilities,  looking  to  a  peace  over  the  whole  surface  of  our  coun- 
try. I  feel  assured  that  it  will  be  made  perfect  in  a  few  days.  You  will 
therefore  desist  from  acts  of  war  and  devastation  until  you  hear  that  hos- 
tilities are  resumed.  For  the  convenience  of  supplying  your  command, 
you  may  either  contract  for  supplies  down  about  Fort  Valley  or  the  old 
Chattahoochee  arsenal ;  or,  if  you  are  south  of  West  Point,  Georgia,  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Rome  or  Kingston,  opening  up  communication  and  a 
route  of  supplies  into  Chattanooga  and  Cleveland.  Report  to  me  your 
position  through  General  Johnston,  as  also  round  by  sea.  You  may  also 
advise  General  Canby  of  your  position,  and  the  substance  of  this,  which 
I  have  sent  round  by  sea. 

"  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
' ' Major-  General  .Commanding. ' ' 
Please  communicate  above  to  the  Federal  commander. 

J.  E.  JOHNSTON. 


CHAPTER  XLI. 

CAPTUBE   OF   THE   CONFEDERATE   PRESIDENT. 

THE  two  cavalry -columns  were  arrested  about  the  same  time, 
by  the  armistice  established  by  Generals  Sherman  and  John- 
ston, under  circumstances  of  embarrassment  to  the  generals 
commanding  them,  though  fortunately  there  were  no  condi- 
tions of  great  hazard,  in  suspending  their  operations,  as  each 
had  swept  through  the  enemy's  country  in  ceaseless  success 
and  triumph.  Their  orders  were  so  positive  as  to  allow  no 
discretion,  even  had  the  suspension  of  their  operations  given 
advantage  to  the  enemy,  through  whom  the  knowledge  of  the 
truce  was  communicated.  Neither  did  the  embarrassments 
produced  by  the  truce  stop  with  the  commanders  in  the  field, 
but  reached  General  Thomas,  who  was  charged  with  the  man- 
agement of  the  affairs  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, and  who  had  organized  these  expeditions  under  orders 
from  Lieutenant-General  Grant.  For,  although  telegraphic 
communications  did  not  reach  either  General  "Wilson  or  Gen- 
eral Stoneman,  General  Thomas  heard  of  the  armistice  through 
each  of  these  generals  before  he  received  official  information 
of  its  existence  from  the  lieutenant-general.  Referring  to  the 
time  of  receiving  information  from  his  subordinates,  he  thus, 
in  his  official  report,  mentioned  his  own  embarrassments  in 
relation  to  the  armistice  and  the  manner  of  its  announcement: 
"  Up  to  that  period  I  had  not  been  officially  notified  of  the 
existence  of  any  armistice  between  the  forces  of  Generals 
Sherman  and  Johnston,  and  the  information  only  reached  me 
through  my  sub- commanders,  Generals  Wilson  and  Stoneman, 
from  Macon,  Georgia,  and  Greenville,  East  Tennessee,  almost 
simultaneously.  The  question  naturally  arose  in  my  mind, 

(362) 


CAPTUKE  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  PRESIDENT.       363 

whether  the  troops  acting  under  my  direction,  by  virtue  of 
General  Sherman's  Special  Field  Order  No.  105,  series  of  1864, 
directing  me  to  assume  control  of  all  the  forces  of  the  Military 
Division  of  the  Mississippi,  4  not  absolutely  in  the  presence  of 
the  genera] -in-chief/  were  to  he  hound  by  an  armistice  or 
agreement  made  at  a  distance  of  several  hundred  miles  from 
where  those  troops  were  operating  and  of  which  they  were 
advised  through  an  enemy,  then  in  such  straitened  circum- 
stances that  any  ruse,  honorable  at  least  in  war,  was  likely 
to  be  practiced  by  him  to  relieve  himself  from  his  difficult 
position.  Then,  again,  General  Sherman  was  operating  with 
a  movable  column f  beyond  the  limits  of  his  territorial  com- 
mand, viz.,  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  and  far 
away  from  all  direct  communication  with  it ;  whereas  <  the 
troops  not  absolutely  in  the  presence  of  the  general-in-chief,' 
were  operating  under  special  instructions  and  not  even  in  co- 
operation with  General  Sherman  against  Johnston,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  General  Stoneman  was  dismantling  the  country  to 
obstruct  Lee's  retreat  and  General  "Wilson  was  moving  inde- 
pendently in  Georgia  or  co-operating  with  General  Canby. 
Before  I  could  come  to  any  conclusion  how  I  should  act  under 
the  circumstances,  and  without  disrespect  to  my  superior 
officer,  General  Sherman,  Secretary  Stanton  telegraphed  to  me 
from  Washington,  on  the  27th  of  April,  and  through  me  to 
my  sub-commanders,  to  disregard  all  orders  except  those  com- 
ing from  General  Grant  or  myself,  and  to  resume  hostilities 
at  once,  sparing  no  pains  to  press  the  enemy  firmly,  at  the 
same  time  notifying  me  that  General  Sherman's  negotiations 
with  Johnston  had  been  disapproved." 

Having  now  full  authority  for  independent  action,  and  hav- 
ing learned  that  President  Davis  with  a  party  had  started 
south  from  Charlotte,  IsTorth  Carolina,  on  the  cessation  of  the 
armistice,  General  Thomas  at  once  made  dispositions  to  cap- 
ture the  fugitive  President,  and  those  who  still  clung  to  him 
and  his  fortunes.  He  directed  General  Stoneman  to  send  the 
brigades  of  Miller,  Brown,  and  Palmer,  to  concentrate  at  An- 
derson, South  Carolina,  and  scout  down  the  Savannah  river 
to  Augusta,  Georgia,  in  search  of  the  fugitives.  General 
Gillem  was  absent  from  the  command  at  the  time,  and  Colonel 


364       CAPTURE  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  PRESIDENT. 

"W.  F.  Palmer,  of  the  Fifteenth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  assumed 
direction  of  the  expedition.  By  rapid  marching,  he  reached 
and  crossed  the  Savannah  river  in  advance  of  Mr.  Davis,  and 
so  disposed  his  troops  as  to  change  the  direction  of  the  flight, 
from  the  west  toward  the  Mississippi  river,  to  the  Atlantic 
coast.  General  Thomas  also  notified  General  Wilson,  at  Ma- 
con,  Georgia,  of  the  issue  of  the  negotiations  in  North  Caro- 
lina, and  ordered  him  to  resume  hostilities  at  once,  with 
special  reference  to  the  capture  of  Mr.  Davis. 

These  orders  had  scarcely  been  issued  before  the  surrender 
of  the  Confederate  forces  east  of  the  Chattahoochee  river,  to 
General  Sherman,  by  General  Johnston,  was  officially  an- 
nounced to  both  General  Thomas  and  General  Wilson,  and 
the  latter  at  once  adopted  measures  looking  to  the  surrender 
of  the  enemy's  military  establishments  at  Atlanta,  Georgia, 
and  Tallahassee,  Florida,  and  to  throw  a  cordon  of  cavalry 
across  the  State  of  Georgia  to  intercept  and  capture  Mr.  Davis 
and  his  party.  He  sent  General  Upton  to  Augusta ;  General 
Winslow,  with  the  Fourth  division,  to  march  to  Atlanta  "  for 
the  purpose  of  carrying  into  effect  the  terms  of  the  conven- 
tion, as  well  as  to  make  such  a  disposition  of  his  forces,  cover- 
ing the  country  northward,  from  Forsyth  to  Marietta,  so  as 
to  secure  the  arrest  of  Jefferson  Davis  and  party ;"  General 
McCook,  with  five  hundred  men  of  his  division,  to  move  to 
Tallahassee,  Florida,  "  to  receive  the  surrender  of  the  enemy 
in  that  state ;"  Colonel  Minty,  "  to  extend  his  troops  along 
the  line  of  the  Ocmulgee  and  Altamaha  rivers,  as  far  as  Jack- 
sonville ;  and  General  Croxton,  commanding  a  division  (the 
First),  "  to  distribute  it  along  the  line  of  the  Ocmulgee,"  con- 
necting with  Winslow,  and  reaching  to  Macon.  Besides, 
General  Wilson  directed  that  detachments  should  watch  the 
crossings  of  Flint  river,  and  the  stations  on  the  railroad  from 
Atlanta  to  Eufala,  as  well  as  Columbus,  West  Point,  and  Tal- 
ladega.  These  general  and  special  dispositions,  with  thorough 
scouting,  promised  the  interception  of  all  large  parties  and 
the  arrest  of  prominent  persons. 

Evading  the  terms  of  General  Johnston's  surrender,  Mr. 
Davis  moved  south  from  Charlotte,  North  Carolina,  through 
Yorkville,  toward  Unionville  and  Abbeville,  South  Carolina, 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  PRESIDENT.       365 

with  evident  purpose  of  passing  through  to  the  trans-Missis- 
sippi Department,  with  a  vague  hope  that  he  could  there  con- 
tinue the  war.  He  was,  at  first,  accompanied  by  his  staff  and 
cabinet,  under  escort  of  cavalry,  from  the  commands  of  Fer- 
guson, Duke,  Harris,  and  Butler.  Finding,  upon  reaching  the 
Savannah  river  from  Abbeville,  where  his  last  council  of  war 
was  held,  which  expressed  the  utter  despair  of  all  but  himself, 
that  he  was  enveloped  by  the  national  cavalry,  Mr.  Davis 
dismissed  his  retinue,  and  with  a  few  friends  pushed  on  to 
Washington,  reaching  that  place  on  the  morning  of  the  3d 
of  May.  In  dismissing  his  escort,  he  abandoned  the  idea  of 
fighting  his  way  to  the  west,  and  attempted  to  accomplish  the 
passage  by  the  most  secret  means.  During  the  day,  he  left 
Washington,  by  rail,  for  Atlanta,  but  abandoned  his  car  at 
Union  Point,  and  started  southwest  on  horseback.  Colonel 
Palmer  having  ascertained  this  fact,  scattered  his  forces  to  in- 
tercept him,  and  at  the  same  time  gather  up  the  fragments  of 
the  Confederate  forces  roaming  over  the  country.  •  But,  not- 
withstanding great  vigilance  and  activity,  Mr.  Davis  slipped 
through  Palmer's  detachments,  to  be  caught  by  Wilson's 
troopers,  farther  west  and  south.  On  the  7th  of  May,  Colonel 
Harnden,  of  the  First  Wisconsin,  with  one  hundred  and  fifty 
men,  having  advanced  from  Macon,  ascertained  that  Mr. 
Davis  had  crossed  the  Oconee  at  Dublin,  fifty-five  miles  south- 
east of  Macon,  and  had  fled  on  the  Jacksonville  road.  He 
pursued  rapidly,  marching  forty  miles  on  the  8th  on  the  foot- 
steps of  the  fugitive.  On  the  9th  he  crossed  the  Ocmulgee,  at 
Brown's  ferry,  and  at  Abbeville  learned  that  Mr.  Davis  had 
left  that  point  at  1  A.  M.  on  the  road  to  Irwinsville.  Hasten- 
ing forward,  he  reached  the  vicinity  of  Irwinsville  at  nightfall, 
and  awaited  daylight  to  make  the  capture. 

Having  learned  at  Abbeville  of  the  approach  of  Colonel 
Pritchard  of  the  Fourth  Michigan,  Colonel  Harnden  went,  after 
halting,  to  meet  him  and  inform  him  of  his  success  in  tracing 
the  steps  of  Mr.  Davis.  The  former  stated  that  he  had  been 
sent  to  Abbeville  to  watch  for  Mr.  Davis,  but  that  he  would 
go  no  farther  that  night.  However,  after  making  this  stipula- 
tion, he  moved  into  Irwinsville  during  the  night,  and  at  dawn 
captured  Mr.  Davis  in  disguise,  and  the  small  party  with  him. 


366       CAPTURE  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  PRESIDENT. 

Soon  after  this  accomplishment,  Colonel  Harnden  approached, 
and  having  heen  hailed  hy  Colonel  Pritchard's  detachment, 
answered  "  friends,"  and  fell  back.  In  the  mutual  uncertainty 
as  to  the  identity  of  the  two  commands,  several  shots  were 
fired,  killing  several  men — a  sad  issue  of  a  misunderstanding 
that  should  not  have  existed.  The  pursuit  had  been  con- 
ducted with  great  vigor  by  all  the  parties  from  the  two  general 
commands.  A  reward  had  been  offered  of  which  they  were 
ignorant,  from  a  conjecture  that  Mr.  Davis  was  remotely  con- 
nected with  the  assassination  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  President  of  the 
United  States. 

Mr.  Davis  would  have  made  a  better  appearance  in  history, 
had  he  met  the  final  issue  with  General  Johnston  in  preference 
to  seeking,  by  stealthy  flighi!,  the  preservation  of  the  life  which 
he  had  often  declared  should  not  survive  the  fall  of  his 
country.  This  termination  of  his  vaunted  presidency,  and 
the  disgrace  of  his  flight,  were  foreign  to  his  grand  promises 
and  lofty  aspirations.  His  humiliation  and  helplessness  were, 
however,  the  fitting  symbols  of  the  cause  and  the  government, 
of  which  in  the  days  of  his  glory  and  power  he  was  the  most 
prominent  representative.  His  descent  from  power  was  as 
sudden  and  as  marked  as  the  oft-repeated  transfer  of  kings 
and  emperors  from  thrones  to  dungeons,  but  history  furnishes 
noparallel  to  such  emphatic  loss  of  a  cause  which  commanded  the 
real  and  nominal  allegiance  of  so  many  millions  of  men.  And 
the  philosophical  historian  must  ask  the  question,  could  it 
have  collapsed  so  suddenly,  had  its  foundation  been  laid  at 
the  beginning  in  the  hearts  of  the  Southern  people  ? 

The  overthrow  of  the  rebellion  was  doubtless  due  to  a 
variety  of  causes,  which  were  strictly  subjective.  The  mal- 
administration of  the  Confederate  government  was  a  promi- 
nent cause,  but  could  not  have  been  the  most  potential  one. 
It  has  been  claimed,  however,  by  Southern  historians,  that  it 
had  this  rank,  as  it  demoralized  the  people  and  divorced  them 
from  the  cause  which  they  at  first  so  earnestly  espoused. 

The  palpable  immediate  cause  of  the  collapse  of  the  rebellion 
was  the  lack  of  soldiers  to  fight  for  it,  not  of  supplies  or  strict 
war  material.  And  this  need  of  soldiers  did  not  result  from 
the  failure  of  the  conscription  more  than  from  the  desertion 


CAPTUKE  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  PRESIDENT,       367 

of  both  volunteers  and  conscripts ;  for,  at  the  last,  nearly  a 
moiety  of  those  who  had  borne  arms  were  deserters.  The 
first  armies  had  been  formed  from  volunteers,  but  soon  mere 
enlistment  was  abandoned,  and  then  soldiers  and  supplies 
could  only  be  secured  by  despotic  constraint.  And  it  has 
been  assumed  that  the  final  despotic  measures  of  the  govern- 
ment produced  a  fatal  disaffection, 'which  did  not  originally 
exist.  But  it  should  be  considered,  in  estimating  the  force 
and  exact  influence  of  the  severe  measures  of  the  government — 
the  conscription  which  enrolled  for  military  service  all  able- 
bodied  male  persons  between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  fifty- 
five  years,  and  the  sweeping  impressment  of  supplies — that 
there  was  need  of  these  expedients,  or  the  government  would 
never  have  adopted  them,  and  that  consequently  the  potential 
cause  of  failure  produced  the  state  of  things  from  which 
originated  the  objectionable  demands  of  the  government.  Mr. 
Davis  and  the  Confederate  Congress  would  never  have  ignored 
the  rights  of  the  states,  for  the  maintenance  of  which  they 
invoked  the  war,  had  it  been  possible  to  maintain  the  conflict 
without  trenching  upon  the  sovereignty  of  the  individual 
states  composing  the  Confederacy.  It  was  a  pleasant  doctrine 
for  days  of  harmony  and  peace,  but  un suited  to  those  of  war. 
The  despotism  of  the  government,  then,  was  only  a  secondary 
cause  of  the  failure  of  the  rebellion. 

The  ruling  cause  was  that  the  war  on  the  part  of  the  South 
was  the  expression  of  an  insurrection  and  not  a  true  revolu- 
tion ;  and  the  inherent  vices  of  a  false  revolution  may  be 
traced  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  despotic  measures  of 
the  government.  All  true  revolutions  of  popular  expression 
have  their  foundation  and  force  in  the  sentiments  of  the  masses 
engaged  in  them,  and  will  be  maintained  to  the  direst  extrem- 
ity. No  insurrection  that  is  impressed  upon  a  people  by  a 
few  leaders  or  by  an  influential  or  powerful  minority,  can  com- 
mand the  perpetual  support  of  the  masses.  The  people  may 
be  deceived  for  a  time  by  false  issues  and  delusive  hopes,  and 
the  enthusiasm  which  may  thus  be  called  forth  may  take  on 
the  appearance  of  genuine  revolutionary  sentiment,  but  it  will 
not  survive  the  revelation  of  the  real  issues  or  the  disappoint- 
ments that  follow  groundless  hopes.  To  say  that  the  South- 


368       CAPTURE  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  PRESIDENT. 

ern  people  were  deprived  of  their  moral  force  and  patriotism 
by  their  government,  through  mere  errors  in  the  conduct  of 
the  war  or  absolute  despotism,  is  to  attribute  to  them  character 
too  weak  to  warrant  any  movement  which  would  involve  a 
protracted  war  of  immense  proportions ;  and  the  only  suppo- 
sition that  gives  room  for  the  existence  of  manhood  and  strong 
character  in  the  Southern  people  is,  that  the  masses  were 
beguiled  into  insurrection  against  a  good  government  by  a  few 
men  of  great  influence,  and  that  they  abandoned  it  when  they 
discovered  the  deception. 

The  original  opposition  to  secession  by  a  party  of  great 
numerical  strength,  but  of  feeble  and  incomplete  organization, 
may  be  cited  as  evidence  that  the  movement  toward  disunion 
was  not  supported  by  the  people  generally  with  such  hearti- 
ness and  spontaneous  purpose  as  indicated  a  true  revolution. 
A  fallacy,  glaring  in  absurdity  when  strictly  analyzed,  yet  sub- 
tle, imposing,  and  of  momentous  force,  when  accepted,  swept 
a  multitude  of  originally  sincere  Union  men  into  the  rebellion, 
inducing  their  allegiance  to  the  several  seceding  states  and  to 
the  Confederate  government  formed  by  them.  The  fallacy 
was  that  a  formal  act  of  secession,  though  unconstitutionally 
enacted  and  pronounced,  bound  all  citizens  of  a  state  to  serve 
the  state  in  the  extreme  consequences  of  the  act.  Its  force 
prevented  all  organization  in  opposition  to  the  resulting  war 
in  any  stage  of  its  progress,  and  long  enforced  its  support ;  but 
it  did  not  and  could  not  create  the  foundations  of  a  true  revo- 
lution, and  when  the  awakening  to  the  grand  mistake  did 
occur,  the  seeming  revolution  failed  in  default  of  the  general 
support  of  the  Southern  people. 

The  want  of  sympathy  between  the  leaders  and  the  masses 
was  never  so  apparent  as  during  the  later  campaigns  of  the 
war,  especially  during  the  last  operations  of  the  national  cav- 
alry, when  perhaps  hundreds  of  millions  of  property  might 
have  been  saved  from  destruction  if  the  leaders  of  the  rebel- 
lion had  recognized  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  the  Southern 
people  had  abandoned  it. 


CHAPTER  XLIL 

THE   DISSOLUTION  OP  THE  ARMY — SUMMARY  OF  ITS  ACHIEVEMENTS. 

THE  surrender  of  the  remaining  Confederate  armies  and 
forces  east  and  west  of  the  Mississippi  river  soon  followed  the 
capitulation  of  General  Johnston  and  the  capture  of  Mr. 
Davis.  Preparations  were  then  promptly  made  to  disband  the 
national  armies,  with  the  retention  of  such  forces  only  as  were 
necessary  to  prevent  political  and  social  chaos  in  the  Southern 
States. 

The  formal  unity  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  re- 
stored before  its  dissolution  by  the  return  of  the  Fourteenth 
and  Twentieth  Corps  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  De- 
partment of  the  Cumberland.  This  reunion  of  the  grand 
units  under  their  revered  commander  was  eminently  appro- 
priate as  well  as  historically  imperative.  Their  dismember- 
ment at  Goldsboro,  North  Carolina,  occurring  after  their  last 
battle  had  been  fought,  did  not  really  impair  the  historical 
unity  of  this  great  army.  Still,  there  would  have  been  a 
painful  lack  of  complete  roundness  in  its  mere  organic  unity, 
had  two  corps  been  disbanded  outside  the  territorial  limits  of 
the  department. 

During  the  summer  of  1865,  the  Fourth  Corps  was  also  tem- 
porarily detached,  and  sent  upon  a  mission  to  Texas  under 
General  Sheridan.  But  it,  too,  was  soon  remanded  to  the  De- 
partment of  the  Cumberland,  to  be  disbanded,  as  were  the 
Fourteenth  and  Twentieth,  by  General  Thomas. 

From  the  1st  of  June,  1865,  to  February  1, 1866,  there  were 
mustered  out  of  the  service  of  the  United  States,  from  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  five  thousand  and  eighty -three  com- 
missioned officers  and  one  hundred  and  thirty-seven  thousand 

VOL.  II— 24  (369) 


370  DISSOLUTION   OF   THE   AEMY. 

five  hundred  and  thirty-three  enlisted  men,  exclusive  of  six- 
teen regiments  of  cavalry,  whose  strength  was  not  definitely 
reported.  Ahout  twenty  thousand  volunteer  troops  were  re- 
tained within  the  Military  Division  of  the  Tennessee,  under 
the  command  ©f  Major-General  George  H.  Thomas,  until  a 
later  period.  From  the  data  given,  the  strength  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumherland,  at  the  close  of  the  war,  may  be  placed, 
with  approximate  correctness,  at  one  hundred  and  seventy-five 
thousand  men.  And  when  these  heroic  citizen  soldiers  were 
remanded  to  the  duties  of  civil  life,  the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land passed  from  organic  existence  to  live  in  history  as  an 
army  unsurpassed,  if  equaled,  by  any  of  the  great  armies  which 
participated  in  our  gigantic  civil  war — as  one  of  the  grandest 
that  ever  battled  for  country  or  freedom. 

This  army  fought,  unaided,  the  battles  of  "  Mill  Springs," 
"  Perryville,"  "  Stone  River,"  "  Chickamauga,"  "  Wauhatchee," 
and  a  Bentonville ;"  gave  essential  aid  to  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  at  "  Fort  Donelson  "  and  "  Pittsburg  Landing ;"•  in 
combination  with  that  army,  but  in  twofold  strength,  gained  the 
decisive  victories  on  Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary  Ridge ; 
furnished  more  than  half  the  forces  for  the  Atlanta  campaign, 
placing  upon  its  banners  the  historic  fields  of  "Buzzard's 
Roost,"  "  Resaca,"  "  Rome,"  "  New  Hope  Church,"  "  Kenesaw 
Mountain,"  «  Peachtree  Creek,"  «  Atlanta,"  and  "  Jonesboro  ;" 
at  Jonesboro,  represented  by  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  made  the 
only  successful  assault,  in  force,  during  the  Atlanta  campaign, 
carrying  intrenchments  held  by  Hardee's  corps ;  formed  the 
left  wing  of  the  army  which  marched  from  Atlanta  to  Savan- 
nah, and  then  swept  through  the  Carolinas  to  Richmond  and 
Washington ;  divided  the  glory  of  "  Franklin  "  with  the  Army 
of  the  Ohio,  and  that  of  "  Nashville  "  with  the  Armies  of  the 
Tennessee  and  Ohio ;  and,  represented  by  the  troopers  of  Gen- 
erals "Wilson  and  Stoneman,  rushed  through  Alabama,  Geor- 
gia, Tennessee,  and  North  Carolina,  in  swift  and  brilliant 
sequence  to  the  great  central  battles  of  the  war.  This  army, 
in  its  unity,  never  gave  but  one  field  to  the  enemy.  But  when 
it  yielded  the  bloody  ground  of  Chickamauga,  it  had  revealed, 
under  conditions  of  battle  greatly  unequal,  its  invincibility 
within  fair  terms  of  conflict.  But  even  here  it  gained  the 


DISSOLUTION   OF   THE  AEMY.  371 

fruits  of  victory,  under  the  semblance  of  defeat,  as  it  held 
Chattanooga,  the  objective  of  the  campaign. 


[GENEEAL  ORDERS,  NO.  108.] 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  June  2,  1865. 
Soldiers  of  the  Armies  of  the  United  States  : 

By  your  patriotic  devotion  to  your  country  in  the  hour  of  danger  and 
alarm,  your  magnificent  fighting,  bravery,  and  endurance,  you  have 
maintained  the  supremacy  of  the  Union  and  the  constitution,  over- 
thrown all  armed  opposition  to  the  enforcement  of  the  laws,  and  of  the 
proclamation  forever  abolishing  slavery — the  cause  and  pretext  of  the 
rebellion — and  opened  the  way  to  the  rightful  authorities  to  restore 
order  and  inaugurate  peace  on  a  permanent  and  enduring  basis,  on  every 
foot  of  American  soil. 

Your  march*-*:,,  sieges,  and  battles,  in  distance,  duration,  resolution,  and 
brilliancy  of  result,  dim  the  luster  of  the  world's  past  military  achieve- 
ments, and  will  be  the  patriot's  precedent  in  defense  of  liberty  and  right 
in  all  time  to  come. 

In  obedience  to  your  country's  call,  you  left  your  homes  and  families, 
and  volunteered  in  its  defense.  Victory  has  crowned  your  valor,  and 
secured  the  purpose  of  your  patriot  hearts;  and  with  the  gratitude  of 
your  countrymen,  and  the  highest  honors  a  great  and  free  nation  can 
accord,  you  will  soon  be  permitted  to  return  to  your  homes  and  families, 
conscious  of  having  discharged  the  highest  duty  of  American  citizens. 
To  achieve  these  glorious  triumphs,  and  secure  to  yourselves,  your  fellow- 
countrymen,  and  posterity,  the  blessings  of  free  institutions,  tens  of 
thousands  of  your  gallant  comrades  have  fallen,  and  sealed  the  price- 
less legacy  with  their  lives.  The  graves  of  these  a  grateful  nation  be- 
dews with  tears,  honors  their  memories,  and  will  ever  cherish  and  sup- 
port their  stricken  families. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-  General. 

[SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  NO.  76.] 
HEADUQARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

IN  THE  FIELD,  WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  May  30,  1865. 

The  general  commanding  announces  to  the  Armies  of  the  Tennessee 
and  Georgia  that  the  time  has  come  for  us  to  part.  Our  work  is  done, 
and  armed  enemies  no  longer  defy  us.  Some  of  you  will  go  to  your 
homes,  and  others  will  be  retained  in  military  service  until  further 
orders. 

And  now  that  we  are  all  about  to  separate,  to  mingle  with  the  civil 


372  DISSOLUTION   OF   THE   ARMY. 

world,  it  becomes  a  pleasing  duty  to  call  to  mind  the  situation  of  na- 
tional affairs  when,  but  little  more  than  a  year  ago,  we  .were  gathered 
about  the  cliffs  of  Lookout  Mountain,  and  all  the  future  was  wrapped  in 
•doubt  and  uncertainty. 

Three  armies  had  come  together  from  distant  fields,  with  separate  his- 
tories, yet  bound  by  one  common  cause — the  union  of  our  country  and 
the  perpetuation  of  the  government  of  our  inheritance.  There  is  no 
need  to  recall  to  your  memories  Tunnel  Hill,  with  Rocky  Face  Mountain 
and  Buzzard  Roost  Gap,  and  the  ugly  forts  of  Dalton  behind. 

We  were  in  earnest,  and  paused  not  for  danger  and  difficulty,  but 
dashed  through  Snake-Creek  Gap  and  fell  on  Resaca;  then  on  to  the 
Etowah,  to  Dallas,  Kenesaw,  and  the  heats  of  summer  found  us  on  the 
banks  of  the  Chattahoochee,  far  from  home,  and  dependent  on  a  single 
road  for  supplies. 

Again  we  were  not  to  be  held  back  by  any  obstacle,  and  crossed  and 
fought  four  hard  battles  for  the  possession  of  the  citadel  of  Atlanta. 
That  was  the  crisis  of  our  history.  A  doubt  still  clouded  our  future,  but 
we  solved  the  problem,  destroyed  Atlanta,  struck  boldly  across  the  State 
of  Georgia,  severed  all  the  main  arteries  of  life  to  our  enemy,  and 
Christmas  found  us  at  Savannah. 

Waiting  there  only  long  enough  to  fill  our  wagons,  we  again  began  a 
march,  which,  for  peril,  labor,  and  result,  will  compare  with  any  ever 
made  by  an  organized  army.  The  floods  of  the  Savannah,  the  swamps 
of  the  Combahee  and  Edisto,  the  high  hills  and  rocks  of  the  Santee,  the 
flat  quagmires  of  the  Pedee  and  Cape  Fear  rivers,  were  all  passed  in  mid- 
winter, with  its  floods  and  rains,  in  the  face  of  an  accumulating  enemy  ; 
and  after  the  battles  of  Averysboro  and  Bentonville,  we  once  more  came 
out  of  the  wilderness  to  meet  our  friends  at  Goldsboro.  Even  then  we 
paused  only  long  enough  to  get  new  clothing,  to  reload  our  wagons, 
Again  pushed  on  to  Raleigh  and  beyond,  until  we  met  our  enemy,  suing 
for  peace  instead  of  war,  and  offering  to  submit  to  the  injured  laws  of 
his  and  our  country.  As  long  as  that  enemy  was  defiant,  nor  mountains, 
nor  rivers,  nor  swamps,  nor  hunger,  nor  cold  had  checked  us ;  but  when 
he  who  had  fought  us  hard  and  persistently  offered  submission,  your 
general  thought  it  wrong  to  pursue  him  farther,  and  negotiations  fol- 
lowed, which  resulted,  as  you  all  know,  in  his  surrender. 

How  far  the  operations  of  this  army  contributed  to  the  final  overthrow 
of  the  Confederacy,  and  the  peace  which  now  dawns  upon  us,  must  be 
judged  by  others,  not  by  us ;  but  that  you  have  done  all  that  men  could 
do,  has  been  admitted  by  those  in  authority,  and  we  have  a  right  to  join 
in  the  universal  joy  that  fills  our  land  because  the  war  is  over,  and  our 
government  stands  vindicated  before  the  world,  by  the  joint  action  of  the 
volunteer  armies  and  navy  of  the  United  States. 

To  such  as  remain  in  the  service,  your  general  need  only  remind  you 
that  success  in  the  past  was  due  to  hard  work  and  discipline,  and  that 
the  same  work  and  discipline  are  equally  important  in  the  future.  To 
such  as  go  home,  he  will  only  say  that  our  favored  country  is  so  grand, 


DISSOLUTION   OF   THE   ARMY.  373 

so  extensive,  so  diversified  in  climate,  soil,  and  productions,  that  every 
man  may  find  a  home  and  occupation  suited  to  his  tastes ;  none  should 
yield  to  the  natural  impatience  sure  to  result  from  our  past  life  of  ex- 
citement and  adventure.  You  will  be  invited  to  seek  new  adventures 
abroad ;  do  not  yield  to  the  temptation,  for  it  will  lead  only  to  death  and 
disappointment. 

Your  general  now  bids  you  farewell,  with  the  full  belief  that,  as  in. 
war  you  have  been  good  soldiers,  so  in  peace  you  will  make  good  citi- 
zens; and  if,  unfortunately,  new  war  should  arise  in  our  country,  "  Sher- 
man's army"  will  be  the  first  to  buckle  on  its  old  armor,  and  come  forth 
to  defend  and  maintain  the  government  of  our  inheritance. 

BY  ORDER  OP  MAJOR-GENERAL  Wv  T.  SHERMAN. 

L.  M.  DAYTON, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General. 


[GENERAL  ORDERS,  NO.  30.] 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 
NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  May  10,  1865. 

The  general  commanding  the  department  takes  pride  in  conveying  to 
the  Fourth  Army  Corps  the  expression  of  his  admiration,  excited  by 
their  brilliant  and  martial  display  at  the  review  of  yesterday. 

As  the  battalions  of  your  magnificent  corps  swept  successively  before 
the  eye,  the  coldest  heart  must  have  warmed  with  interest  in  contempla- 
tion of  those  men  who  had  passed  through  the  varied  and  shifting  scenes 
of  this  great  modern  tragedy,  who  had  stemmed  with  unyielding  breasts 
the  rebel  tide  threatening  to  engulf  the  landmarks  of  freedom,  and 
who,  bearing  on  their  bronzed  and  furrowed  brows  the  ennobling  marks 
of  the  years  of  hardship,  suffering,  and  privation,  undergone  in  defense 
of  freedom  and  the  integrity  of  the  Union,  could  still  preserve  the  light 
step  and  wear  the  cheerful  expression  of  youth. 

Though  your  gay  and  broidered  banners,  wrought  by  dear  hands  far 
away,  were  all  shred  and  war-worn,  were  they  not  blazoned  on  every 
stripe  with  words  of  glory — Shiloh,  Spring  Hill,  Stone  River,  Chicka- 
mauga,  Atlanta,  Franklin,  Nashville,  and  many  other  glorious  names,  too 
numerous  to  mention  in  an  order  like  this?  By  your  prowess  and  forti- 
tude you  have  ably  done  your  part  in  restoring  the  golden  boon  of 
peace  and  order  to  your  once  distracted  but  now  grateful  country, 
and  your  commander  is  at  length  enabled  to  give  you  a  season  of  well- 
earned  rest. 

But,  soldiers,  while  we  exult  at  our  victories,  let  us  not  be  forgetful 
of  those  brave,  devoted  hearts,  which,  pressing  in  advance,  throbbed 
their  last  amid  the  smoke  and  din  of  battle,  nor  withhold  our  sym- 
pathy for  the  afflicted  wife,  child,  and  mother,  consigned,  far  off  at 
home,  to  lasting,  cruel  grief. 

BY   COMMAND   OF    MAJOR-GEXERAL   THOMAS. 

WM.  D.  WHIPPLE, 

Assistant  Adjutant- General. 


374  DISSOLUTION   OF   THE   ARMY. 

[GENERAL  ORDERS,  NO.  15.] 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  GEORGIA, 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  June  6,  1865. 

With  the  separation  of  the  troops  composing  this  army,  in  compliance 
with  recent  orders,  the  organization  known  as  "  the  Army  of  Geoi^ia  " 
will  virtually  cease  to  exist.  Many  of  you  will  at  once  return  to  your 
homes.  No  one  now  serving  as  a  volunteer  will  probably  be  retained  in 
service  against  his  will  but  a  short  time  longer.  All  will  soon  be  per- 
mitted to  return  and  receive  the  rewards  due  them  as  the  gallant  de- 
fenders of  their  country. 

White  I  can  not  repress  a  feeling  of  sadness  at  parting  with  you,  I  con- 
gratulate you  upon  the  grand  results  achieved  by  your  valor,  fidelity,  and 
patriotism. 

No  generation  has  ever  done  more  for  the  permanent  establishment  of 
a  just  and  liberal  form  of  gevernment — more  for  the  honor  of  their 
nation — than  has  been  done  during  the  past  four  years  by  the  armies  of 
the  United  States,  and  the  patriotic  people  at  home,  who  have  poured 
out  their  wealth  in  support  of  these  armies  with  a  liberality  never  before 
witnessed  in  any  country. 

Do  not  forget  the  parting  advice  of  that  great  chieftain  who  led  you 
through  your  recent  brilliant  campaigns.  "  As  in  war  you  have  been 
good  soldiers,  so  in  peace  be  good  citizens." 

Should  you  ever  desire  to  resume  the  honorable  profession  you  are 
now  about  to  leave,  do  not  forget  that  this  profession  is  honorable  only 
when  followed  in  obedience  to  the  orders  of  the  constituted  authority  of 
your  government. 

With  feelings  of  deep  gratitude  to  each  and  all  of  you  for  your  uniform 
soldierly  conduct,  for  the  patience  and  fortitude  with  which  you  have 
borne  all  the  hardships  it  has  been  necessary  to  impose  upon  you,  and 
for  the  unflinching  resolution  with  which  you  have  sustained  the  holy 
cause  in  which  we  have  been  engaged,  I  bid  you  farewell. 

H.  W.  SLOCUM,  Major-General  Commanding. 

[GENERAL  ORDERS,  NO.  17.] 

HEADQUARTERS  FOURTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS, 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  June  15,  1865. 
Soldiers  of  the  Fourteenth  Army  Corps  : 

Since  he  assumed  command  of  the  corps,  your  general  has  seen  many 
occasions  when  he  was  proud  of  your  endurance,  your  courage,  and  your 
achievements.  If  he  did  not  praise  you  then,  it  was  because  your  labors 
and  triumphs  were  incomplete.  Whilst  the  enemies  of  your  country  still 
defied  you,  whilst  hardships  and  dangers  were  yet  to  be  encountered  and 
overcome,  it  seemed  to  him  premature  to  indulge  in  unnecessary  praise 
of  deeds  being  enacted,  or  to  rest  upon  laurels  already  won.  But  now, 
when  the  battle  and  the  march  are  ended  and  the  victory  yours;  when 
many  of  you  are  about  to  return  to  your  homes,  where  the  sound  of  the 
hostile  cannon — now  silenced,  let  us  trust,  forever  in  our  land — will  soon  be 


DISSOLUTION   OF    THE   ARMY.  375 

forgotten  amidst  the  welcoming  plaudits  of  friends ;  when  the  heavy  armor 
of  the  soldier  is  being  exchanged  for  the  civic  wreaths  of  peace,  he  deems 
it  a  happy  occasion  to  congratulate  you  upon  the  part  which  you  have 
borne,  in  common  with  your  comrades  of  the  armies  of  the  Union,  in 
the  mighty  struggle  for  the  maintenance  of  the  unity  and  integrity  of  your 
country.  You  will  join  heartily  in  the  generel  rejoicing  over  the  grand 
result  and  the  termination  of  the  nation's  peril.  While  the  country  is 
welcoming  her  defenders  home,  and  their  noble  deeds  are  being  com- 
memorated, you  will  ever  remember  with  proud  satisfaction  that  at 
Chickamauga  yours  were  the  invincible  battalions  with  which  the  un- 
yielding Thomas  hurled  back  the  overwhelming  foe  and  saved  the  day ,' 
that  at  Mission  Kidge  you  helped,  with  your  brothers  of  the  Armies  of  the 
Cumberland  and  of  the  Tennessee,  to  plant  the  banners  of  your  country 
once  more  on  the  cloud-clad  heights  of  Chattanooga ;  that  at  Jonesboro 
your  resistless  charge  decreed  the  final  fate  of  proud  Atlanta ;  that  at 
Bentonville  you  for  hours  defied  the  frenzied  and  determined  efforts  of 
the  rebel  hosts  to  crush  seriatim  the  columns  of  the  victorious  Sherman. 
Years  hence,  in  the  happy  enjoyment  of  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  your 
country,  whose  preservation  your  valor  on  many  hard-fought  fields  se- 
cured, it  will  be  among  your  proudest  boasts  that  you  fought  with  Thomas 
and  marched  with  Sherman  from  the  mountains  to  the  sea ;  that  you 
toiled  and  skirmished  in  midwinter  through  the  swamps  of  Georgia  and 
the  Carolinas ;  that  after  years  of  bloody  contest  you  witnessed  the  sur- 
render of  one  of  the  enemy's  proudest  armies,  no  longer  able  to  with- 
stand your  irresistible  pursuit.  Now  the  danger  past,  and  the  victory 
won,  many  of  you  turn  homeward.  Let  the  same  generous  spirit,  the 
same  pure  patriotism  that  prompted  your  entry  into  your  country's  serv- 
ice, be  cherished  by  you,  never  forgetting  that  the  true  soldier  is  always  a 
good  citizen  and  Christian. 

Some  remain  yet  for  a  time  as  soldiers.  The  same  country  that  first 
called  you  needs  your  further  services  and*  retains  you.  Let  your  future 
record  be  a  continuation  of  the  glorious  past,  and  such  that  as  long  as  a 
soldier  remains  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  it  shall  continue  bright  and  un- 
tarnished. 

Many  of  the  noblest,  bravest,  and  best  who  came  out  with  us  will  not 
return.  We  left  them  on  the  hills  and  by  the  streams  of  the  South,  where 
no  voice  of  mother,  sister,  or  wife  will  ever  wake  them — where  no  kind 
hand  will  strew  flowers  upon  their  graves.  But,  soldiers,  by  us  they  will 
never  be  forgotten.  Their  heroic  deeds  and  last  resting-places  will  often 
be  brought  to  mind  in  fond  remembrance.  Though  dead,  they  will  live 
in  the  affections  of  their  countrymen  and  their  country's  history.  Whilst 
passing  events  are  fast  changing  our  past  associations  and  requiring  us  to 
form  new  ones,  let  us  seek  to  extend  a  warm  greeting  and  the  hearty 
hand  of  congratulation  to  all  who  rejoice  in  our  country's  preservation 
and  return  to  peace. 

By  command  of  Brevet  Major-General  Jeff.  C.  Davis. 

A.  C.  McCLURG, 
Brevet  Colonel  A.  A.  G.  and  Chief  of  Staff. 


376  DISSOLUTION   OF   THE   ARMY. 

[GENERAL  ORDERS,  NO.  39.] 

HEADQUARTERS  CAVALRY  CORPS,  M*.  D.  M.f 

MACON,  GA.,  July  2,  1865. 

To  the  Officers  and  Men  of  the  Cavalry  Corps,  Military  Division  of  the  Missis- 
sippi : 

Your  corps  has  ceased  to  exist !  The  rebellion  has  terminated  in  the 
re-establishment  of  your  country  upon  the  basis  of  nationality  and 
perpetual  unity.  Your  deeds  have  contributed  a  noble  part  to  the 
glorious  result;  they  have  passed  into  history  and  need  no  recital  from 
me.  In  the  nine  months  during  which  I  have  commanded  you,  I  have 
heard  no  reproach  upon  your  conduct — have  had  no  disaster  to  chronicle  I 

The. glowing  memories  of  Franklin,  Nashville,  West  Harpeth,  Eben- 
ezer  Church,  Selma,  Montgomery,  Columbus,  West  Point,  and  Macon 
may  well  fill  your  hearts  and  mine  with  pride. 

You  have  learned  to  believe  yourselves  invincible,  and,  contemplating 
your  honorable  deeds,  may  justly  cherish  that  belief.  You  may  be  proud 
of  your  splendid  discipline  no  less  than  your  courage,  zeal,  and  endur- 
ance. The  noble  impulses  which  have  inspired  you  in  the  past,  will  be  a 
source  of  enduring  honor  in  the  future.  "  Peace  has  her  victories  no 
less  renowned  than  war."  Do  not  forget  that  clear  heads,  honest  hearts, 
and  stout  arms,  guided  by  pure  patriotism,  are  the  surest  defense  of 
your  country  in  every  peril.  Upon  them  depend  the  substantial  progress 
of  your  race  and  order  of  civilization,  as  well  as  the  liberty  of  all  man- 
kind. 

Let  your  example  in  civil  life  be  an  incitement  to  industry,  good  order, 
and  enlightenment,  while  your  deeds  in  war  shall  live  in  the  grateful  re- 
membrance of  your  countrymen. 

Having  discharged  every  military  duty  honestly  and  faithfully,  return 
to  your  homes  with  the  noble  sentiment  of  your  martyr  President  deeply 
impressed  upon  every  heart :  "  With  malice  against  none  and  charity  for 
all,  strive  to  do  the  right  as  God  gives  you  to  see  the  right." 

Js.  H.  WILSON, 

Brevet  Major- General. 


CHAPTER  XLIII. 

THE   DEAD  AND   THEIR  DISPOSITION. 

THE  history  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  would  not  be 
complete  was  the  disposition  of  its  heroic  dead  omitted ;  for 
never,  in  the  history  of  war,  have  the  slain  of  any  other  army 
been  so  honored  in  burial. 

The  first  permanent  National  Cemetery  for  soldiers  estab- 
lished by  military  order,  was  the  one  founded  by  General 
George  H.  Thomas,  near  Chattanooga,  Tennessee.  The  cir- 
cumstances under  which  this  site  was  selected,  have  historic 
interest  far  transcending  the  mere  fact  of  priority  of  estab- 
lishment. 

During  the  battle,  which  resulted  in  the  dislodgment  of 
General  Bragg' s  army  from  Missionary  Ridge,  a  reserve  force, 
in  line  over  a  hill  near  the  field  position  of  General  Thomas,, 
revealed  its  beautiful  contour  and  suggested  its  use  as  a  Na- 
tional Cemetery.  This  hill,  conical  in  general  outline,  but 
fruitful  in  lateral  hillocks  and  varied  in  expression  from  every 
point  of  view,  is  located  equidistant  from  Cameron  hill,  which 
rises  abruptly  from  the  Tennessee  river,  where  it  turns  toward 
Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary  Ridge  on  the  east,  and  is 
central  between  General  Hooker's  point  of  attack  on  Lookout 
Mountain,  and  General  Sherman's,  on  the  northern  summit  of 
Missionary  Ridge.  Thus  it  is  the  center  of  this  complex 
battle-field. 

Soon  after  the  battle,  General  'Thomas  issued  the  following 

order : 

[GENERAL  ORDERS,  NO.  296.] 

CHATTANOOGA,  TENN.,  December  25,  1863. 

It  is  ordered  that  a  National  Cemetery  be  founded  at  this  place,  in  com- 
memoration of  the  battles  at  Chattanooga,  fought  November  23d,  24th, 

(377) 


378  THE   DEAD   AND   THEIR  DISPOSITION. 

25th,  26th,  and  27th,  and  to  provide  a  proper  resting-place  for  the  remains 
of  the  brave  men  who  fell  upon  the  fields  fought  over  upon  those  days, 
and  for  the  remains  of  such  as  may  hereafter  give  up  their  lives  in  this 
region  in  defending  their  country  against  treason  and  rebellion. 

The  ground  selected  for  the  cemetery  is  the  hill  lying  beyond  the 
Western  and  Atlantic  railroad,  in  a  southeasterly  direction  from  the 
town. 

It  is  proposed  to  erect  a  monument  upon  the  summit  of  the  hill, 
of  such  materials  as  are  to  be  obtained  in  this  vicinity,  which,  like  all 
the  work  upon. the  cemetery,  shall  be  exclusively  done  by  the  troops  of 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

Plans  for  the  monument  are  invited  to  be  sent  in  to  these  headquarters. 
When  the  ground  is  prepared,  notice  will  be  given,  and  all  interments  of 
soldiers  will  thereafter  be  made  in  the  cemetery,  and  all  now  buried  in 
and  around  the  town  removed  to  that  place. 

By  command  of  Major-General  George  H.  Thomas. 

(Signed,)  WM.  D.  WHIPPLE, 

Assistant  Adjutant- General. 

The  exigencies  of  war  prevented  the  execution  of  all  the 
work  upon  this  cemetery  hy  the  troops  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  and  the  monument  contemplated  has  never  been 
erected.  Neither  was  it  subsequently  practicable  to  obtain  a 
brief  history  of  the  many  thousands  interred  in  this  classic 
ground,  as  at  first  contemplated.  However,  while  the  war 
lasted,  troops  from  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  continued  the 
work  of  burial  and  embellishment.  When  the  volunteers  were 
mustered  out  of  the  service,  employes  of  the  quartermaster's 
department  completed  the  enterprise  as  far  as  practicable. 

The  establishment  of  the  Chattanooga  National  Cemetery 
was  followed,  first,  by  one  upon  the  battle-field  of  Stone  River, 
and  later,  by  one  at  Nashville,  Tennessee,  and  another  at  Mari- 
etta, Georgia.  Chaplain  William  Earnshaw  was  charged  with 
the  burial  of  the  dead  and  the  ornamentation  of  the  grounds 
at  Stone  Eiver  and  Nashville,  and  another  chaplain  sustained 
a  similar  relation  to  the  cemeteries  at  Chattanooga  and  Mari- 
etta. In  these  four  cemeteries  were  finally  interred  the  remains 
of  more  than  forty  thousand  soldiers.  Many  smaller  ceme- 
teries were  established  within  the  limits  of  the  Department  of 
the  Cumberland,  within  the  States  of  Kentucky,  Tennessee, 
Mississippi,  Alabama,  and  Georgia,  and  more  than  one  hundred 
thousand  soldiers  were  interred  in  cemeteries  commemorative, 


THE   DEAD  AND   THEIR   DISPOSITION.  379 

often,  of  great  battles,  and  always  of  the  nation's  gratitude  to 
those  who  gave  their  lives  to  maintain  the  nation's  life. 

In  expression  of  the  value  of  each  citizen  who  fell  in  the 
war,  the  body  of  each  was  placed  in  a  separate  grave.  And 
so  thorough  was  the  search  for  the  dead  upon  every  battle- 
field and  over  the  whole  country,  that  their  friends  may  be  as- 
sured that,  whether  identified  or  not,  all  rest  in  grounds  conse- 
crated for  their  abode  forever. 


[EXTEACT  FROM  GENERAL  ORDERS,  NO.  8.] 

HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

CHATTANOOGA,  TENN.,  January  8,  1864. 

Commanding  officers  of  regiments  in  this  department  will  furnish,  on 
the  application  of  Chaplain  Thomas  B.  Van  Home,  13th  0.  V.  I.,  in 
charge  of  the  Mortuary  Record  of  the  National  Cemetery  at  this  place, 
full  information  in  regard  to  the  full  name,  rank,  company,  native  state, 
date,  age,  marital  state,  date  of  enlistment,  address  of  nearest  friends, 
number  of  engagements  participated  in,  soldierly  character,  special  cir- 
cumstances of  death,  if  killed  in  action,  and  whatever  else  is  worthy  of 
their  history  of  record,  of  all  soldiers  who  may  be  interred  in  the  National 
Cemetery  at  Chattanooga. 

BY  COMMAND  OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS: 

WM".  D.  WHIPPLE,  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 
Official:  WM.  McMiCHAEL,  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 


APPENDIX. 


OEGANIZATION  DEPAETMENT  OF  THE  CUMBEELAND. 

[OFFICIAL.] 

Organized  August  15,  1861  (G.  O.  No.  57,  W.  D.),  embracing 
states  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  Brigadier-General  EGBERT  AN- 
DERSON, U.  S.  A.,  to  command.  Discontinued  November  9, 1861  (G. 
O.  No.  97,  W.  D.),  and  the  states  embraced  therein  assigned  as  fol- 
lows :  Kentucky,  west  of  Cumberland  river,  to  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE 
MISSOURI;  Kentucky,  east  of  Cumberland  river,  to  DEPARTMENT 
OF  THE  OHIO  ;  Tennessee,  to  the  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OHIO. 

Eeorganized  October  24,  1862  (G.  O.  No.  168,  W.  D.),  embracing 
State  of  Tennessee,  east  of  the  Tennessee  river,  and  such  parts  of 
Northern  Georgia  and  Alabama  as  are  taken  possession  of  by 
United  States  forces. 


OEGANIZATION  DEPAETMENT  OF  THE  CUMBEELAND, 
MILITAEY  DIVISION,  AND  DEPAETMENT  OF  THE 
TENNESSEE,  ETC. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND. 

Organized,  and  Major-General  W.  S.  EOSECRANS  assigned  to  the 
command,  October  30,  1862  (G.  O.  No.  168,  W.  D.,  October  24, 
1862),  consisted  of  the  Fourteenth  Army  Corps,  the  troops  of 
which  were  subsequently  divided  into  three  (3)  army  corps — the 
Fourteenth,  Twentieth,  and  Twenty -first — as  follows :  The  "  Cen- 
ter," under  command  of  Major-General  G.  H.  THOMAS,  to  con- 
stitute the  Fourteenth  Army  Corps ;  "  Eight  Wing,"  under  Major- 
General  A.  McD.  McCooK,  the  Twentieth;  and  the  "Left  Wing," 

(381) 


382  APPENDIX. 

Tinder  Major- General  T.  L.  CRITTENDEN,  the  Twenty-first  Army 
Corps.  (See  G.  O.  No.  9,  W.  D.,  February  2,  1863.) 

The  Twentieth  and  Twenty-first  Army  Corps  were  consolidated 
October  9,  1863,  to  constitute  one  corps,  to  be  known  as  the  Fourth 
Army  Corps.  Major-General  GORDON  GRANGER  to  command  (G. 
O.  No.  228,  D.  C.,  1863). 

Major-General  EOSECRANS  relieved  from  command  of  the  De- 
partment, October  19,  1863;  General  G.  H.  THOMAS  assumed  com- 
mand October  20,  1863.  General  J.  M.  PALMER  to  command 
Fourteenth  Army  Corps,  vice  THOMAS,  assigned  to  command  DE- 
PARTMENT OF  THE  CUMBERLAND,  October  28,  1863  (G.  O.  No.  350, 
W.  D.,  1863). 

The  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Corps,  consolidated,  to  constitute 
the  Twentieth  Corps,  April  4,  1864.  Major-General  JOSEPH 
HOOKER  assigned  to  the  command  (G.  O.  No.  144,  W.  D.,  Series 
of  1864). 

By  same  order,  General  GORDON  GRANGER  relieved  from  com- 
mand of  the  Fourth  Army  Corps,  and  General  O.  O.  HOWARD  as- 
signed in  his  stead. 

Major-General  J.  HOOKER  relieved  from,  and  Major-General 
SLOCUM  assigned  to,  command  Twentieth  Army  Corps ;  and  Gen- 
eral HOWARD  transferred  from,  and  General  STANLEY  assigned  to, 
command  Fourth  Army  Corps  (G.  O.  No.  238,  W.  D.,  July  30, 
1864). 

Brevet  Major-General  JEFF.  C.  DAVIS  assigned  to  command  the 
Fourteenth  Army  Corps  (G.  O.  No.  241,  W.  D.,  August,  1864). 

The  Twentieth  and  Fourteenth  Army  Corps  accompanied  Gen- 
eral SHERMAN  on  his  march  to  the  sea. 

By  direction  of  the  President  (contained  in  telegram  from  \V. 
A.  NICHOLS,  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  January  17, 1865),  the  DE- 
PARTMENT OF  THE  OHIO  was  united  to  the  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE 
CUMBERLAND,  to  embrace  such  parts  of  Mississippi,  Georgia,  and 
Alabama  as  were  occupied  by  troops  of  General  THOMAS'  com- 
mand. On  the  12th  of  February,  the  Department  was  divided 
into  the  following  Districts  and  Subdistricts,  viz  : 

DISTRICT  OF  WEST  TENNESSEE,  headquarters  at  Memphis,  Ten- 
nessee, Major-General  C.  C.  WASHBURNE  to  command. 

DISTRICT  OF  MIDDLE  TENNESSEE,  headquarters  at  Nashville, 
Major-General  L.  H.  BOUSSEAU. 

DISTRICT  OF  NORTHERN  ALABAMA,  headquarters  at  Decatur, 
Brigadier-General  K.  S.  GRANGER. 


APPENDIX.  383 

FIRST  SUBDISTRICT  OF  MIDDLE  TENNESSEE,  headquarters  at 
Tullahoma,  Major-General  E.  £L  MILROY. 

SECOND  SUBDISTRICT  OF  MIDDLE  TENNESSEE,  headquarters  at 
Pulaski,  Brigadier-General  E.  W.  JOHNSON. 

THIRD  SUBDISTRICT  OF  MIDDLE  TENNESSEE,  headquarters  at 
Kingston  Springs,  Colonel  C.  E.  THOMPSON. 

FOURTH  SUBDISTRICT  OF  MIDDLE  TENNESSEE,  Colonel  JAMES 
GILFELLAN,  Eleventh  Minnesota  Volunteers. 

FIFTH  SUBDISTRICT  OF  MIDDLE  TENNESSEE,  headquarters  at 
Clarksville,  Colonel  A.  A.  SMITH,  Eighty-third  Illinois  Volunteers. 

DISTRICT  OF  ETOWAH,  Major-General  J.  B.  STEEDMAN  ;  and 

DISTRICT  OF  EAST  TENNESSEE,  Major-General  GEORGE  STONEMAN. 

By  order  of  the  Lieutenant-General  commanding  Armies  of  the 
United  States,  dated  May  27,  1865,  Northern  Mississippi  was  em- 
bodied in  DISTRICT  OF  WEST  TENNESSEE,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUM- 
BERLAND discontinued,  and  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  TENNESSEE 
organized,  June  20,  1865. 

THE  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  TENNESSEE 

Consisted  at  its  organization  of  five  (5)  Departments,  viz : 

DEPARTMENT  OF  KENTUCKY,  Major-General  J.  M.  PALMER  to 
command,  headquarters  at  Louisville,  Kentucky. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  TENNESSEE,  Major-General  GEORGE  STONEMAN 
to  command,  headquarters  at  Knoxville,  Tennessee. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  GEORGIA,  Major-General  J.  B.  STEEDMAN  to 
command,  headquarters  at  Augusta,  Georgia. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  ALABAMA,  Major-General  C.  E.  WOODS  to  com- 
mand, headquarters  at  Mobile,  Alabama. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  FLORIDA  and  DISTRICT  OF  KEY  WEST,  Major- 
General  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS  to  command,  Tallahasse,  Florida. 

The  DEPARTMENT  OF  MISSISSIPPI,  Major-General  H.  W.  SLOCUM 
commanding,  added  to  the  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  TENNES- 
SEE, by  direction  of  the  President  (G.  O.  No.  2,  M.  D.  T.,  1865). 

By  direction  of  the  President,  the  orders  annexing  the  Depart- 
ments of  Florida  and  Mississippi  were  revoked,  in  Genera]  Orders 
No.  4,  M.  D.  T.,  1865. 


384  APPENDIX. 

DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  TENNESSEE. 

Organized  August  13,  1866,  consisting  of  the  following  Districts 
and  Subdistricts,  viz : 

DISTRICT  OP  THE  CUMBERLAND,  Major-G-eneral  STONEMAN,  head- 
quarters at  Memphis,  to  embrace  Kentucky  and  Tennessee. 

SUBDISTRICT  OP  KENTUCKY,  Brevet  Major- General  J.  C.  DAVIS. 

SUBDISTRICT  of  TENNESSEE,  Brevet  Major-General  C.  B.  FISK. 

DISTRICT  OP  MISSISSIPPI,  Major-General  THOMAS  J.  WOOD. 

DISTRICT  OP  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE,  Brevet  Major-General  C.  E. 
WOODS,  to  embrace  Subdistricts  of  Georgia  and  Alabama. 

SUBDISTRICT  OF  ALABAMA,  Major-General  W.  SWAYNE. 

SUBDISTRICT  OP  GEORGIA,  Brevet  Major-General  DAVIS  TILLSON. 

MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  TENNESSEE  was  divided  into  DEPARTMENT 
OF  THE  CUMBERLAND,  consisting  of  the  Districts  (late  Departments) 
of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  Major-General  GEORGE  STONEMAN  to 
command,  Memphis  (organized  by  G.  O.  No.  36,  W.  D.,  June  5, 1866) ; 
DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  SOUTH,  consisting  of  the  Districts  (late  De- 
partments) of  Georgia  and  Alabama,  Major-General  C.  E. 
WOODS  to  command,  Macon,  Georgia  (organized  by  G.  O.  No.  32, 
W.  D.,  May  19,  1866)  ;  DEPARTMENT  OP  MISSISSIPPI  annexed  to 
Department  by  G.  O.  No.  142,  W.  D.,  October  7,  1865,  Major- 
General  H.  W.  SLOCUM  to  command. 

General  T.  J.  WOOD  assigned  to  command  of  the  Department 
November  3,  1865  (G.  O.  No.  159,  W.  D.) 


APPENDIX.  385 


ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  DEPAETMENT  OF  THE  OHIO. 

[OFFICIAL.] 

Organized  May  3,  1861  (G.  O.  No.  14,  W.  D.),  embracing  States 
of  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois.  Major-General  GEO.  B.  McC/LELLAN 
to  command.  Headquarters,  Cincinnati,  Ohio. 

Extended  May  9,  1861  (G.  O.  No.  19,  W.  D.),  to  embrace  por- 
tions of  West  Virginia  and  Pennsylvania. 

Extended  June  6,  1861  (G.  O.  No.  30,  W.  D.),  to  embrace  State 
of  Missouri. 

Eeorganized  September  9,  1861  (G.  O.  No.  80,  W.  D.),  embracing 
States  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  so  much  of  Kentucky  as  lies  within 
fifteen  miles  of  Cincinnati,  Ohio.  Brigadier-General  MITCHELL  to 
command. 

Eeorganized  November  9,  1861  (G.  O.  No.  97,  W.  D.),  embracing 
States  of  Ohio,  Michigan,  Indiana,  Kentucky,  east  of  the  Cumber- 
land river,  and  Tennessee.  Brigadier-General  D.  C.  BUELL  to  com- 
mand. Headquarters,  Louisville.  % 

Extended  August  19,  1862  (G.  O.  No.  112,  W.  D.),  to  embrace 
Ohio,  Michigan,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Wisconsin,  and  Kentucky,  east 
of  the  Tennessee  river.  Major-General  H.  G.  WRIGHT  to  command. 

Extended  September  19,  1862  (G.  O.  No.  135,  W.  D.),  to  embrace 
West  Virginia. 

Major-General  BURNSIDE  assumed  command  of  the  Department 
March  25,  1863. 

Major-General  J.  G.  FOSTER  relieved  General  BURNSIDE  from 
command  December  — ,  1863. 

Department  to  embrace  Kentucky,  north  of  the  Tennessee  river, 
and  such  portions  of  Tennessee  as  may  be  occupied  by  troops  of 
the  Department. 

Major-General  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD  assumed  command  February  9r 
1864. 

Department  annexed  to  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland  by 
direction  of  the  President,  contained  in  telegram  from  W.  A. 
NICHOLS,  dated  January  17,  1865. 


386  APPENDIX. 


LIST  OF  OFFICEES  OF  AEMY  OF  THE  CUMBEELAND 
WHO  WEEE  KILLED  INACTION  OE  DIED  OF  WOUNDS 
OE  DISEASE  DUEING  THE  WAE,  MAINLY  COMPILED 
FEOM  THE  "AEMY  EEGISTEE." 


CONNECTICUT. 

Fifth  Connecticut  Infantry. 
First  Lieut.  James  P.  Henderson.     Killed  March  16,  1865. 

Twentieth  Connecticut  Infantry. 
Captain   Oliver  R.   Post.     Died,  July  21,  1864,  of  wounds  in  action  before 

Atlanta,  Ga. 

First  Lieut.  Edward  A.  Doolittle.     Died  of  disease,  December  20,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Henry  Lewis.     Died  December  26, 1864. 
First  Lieut.  Wellington  Barry.     Died  March  17,  1865. 

ILLINOIS. 

Brigadier-General  E.  N.  Kirk.     Died ,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Stone 

River,  December  31,  1862. 

Battery  B,  Second  Illinois  Light  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  William  Bishop.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Franklin  Seeborn.    Died,  November  11, 1864,  of  wounds  received 
in  action. 

Battery  C,  Second  Illinois  Artillery. 

First  Lieut.  Elijah  V.  Moore.     Died,  February  5,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 
Fort  Donelson. 

Battery  I. 

First  Lieut  Alonzo  W.  Coe.     Killed  near  Savannah,  Ga.,  December  9,  1864. 

Tenth  Illinois  Infantry. 
First  Lieut.  William  W.  Rice,  Adjutant.     Died  at  Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  June 

16,  1864,  of  wounds. 

Sixteenth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Major  Samuel  M.  Hayes.     Died,  August  6,  1862,  at  Monticello,  111. 
Captain  David  Wells.     Died  of  disease,  at  Macomb,  111.,  April  7,  1862. 
Captain  Calvin  H.  Wilson.     Died  at  Quincy,  111.,  June  16,  1864. 
Captain  Eben  White.     Died,  May  18,  1865,  of  wounds  received  at  Averys- 

boro,  N.  C. 
First  Lieut.  James  Donaldson.     Died,  July  17,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 

Vining's  Station,  Ga. 


APPENDIX.  387 

Nineteenth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Colonel  Joseph  Scott.  Died,  July  8,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Stone  River. 
Captain  Bushrod  B.  Howard.  Killed  by  railroad  accident,  September  17,  1871. 
Captain  Charles  H.  Shepley.  Died,  March  23,  1862,  from  accident  with  his 

revolver. 

Captain  Knowlton  H.  Chandler.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  January  2,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Wellington  Wood.     Died,  January  5,  1863,  of  wounds  received   at 

Stone  River. 

Second  Lieut.  Thomas  L.  Job.     Killed  accidentally  July  18, 1861. 
Second  Lieut.  John  H.  Hunter.     Died,  January  9,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Stone  River. 
Chaplain  Augustus  H.  Conant.     Died  February  8,  1863. 

Twenty-first  Illinois  Infantry. 

Colonel  John  W.  S.  Alexander.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 

Captain  Benjamin  F.  Reed.  Died,  September  23,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 
Chickamauga. 

Captain  Andrew  George.  Died,  January  15, 1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Chicka- 
mauga. 

First  Lieut.  Charles  L.  Smedel.  Died  at  Nashville,  Tenn.,  April  27,  1863,  of 
disease. 

Second  Lieut.  Emanuel  M.  Weigle.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31, 1862. 

Second  Lieut.  John  F.  Weitzel.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

Assistant  Surgeon  Carl  Muntz.     Died,  January  31,  1862,  at  Ironton,  Mo. 

Twenty-second  Illinois  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Harrison  E.  Hart.    Died  of  disease  at  Alton,  111.,  July  25,  1862. 

Captain  Milton  French.  Died,  September  27,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 
Chickamauga. 

Second  Lieut.  Cyrus  M.  Galloway.  Died,  January  24,  1863,  of  wounds  received 
at  Stone  River. 

Twenty-fourth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Colonel  Geza  Mihalotzy.  Died,  March  11,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Buz- 
zard's Roost,  Ga. 

Captain  Ernst  F.  Pletschke.     Died,  October  9,  1861,  at  Louisville,  Ky. 

Captain  Fred.  Hartman.  Died,  November  9,  1862,  of  wounds  received  in 
action. 

Captain  George  Heinricks.    Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Ami  Smith.     Died,  October  15,  1862,  at  Bowling  Green,  Ky. 

Twenty-fifth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Colonel  Thomas  D.  Williams.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Captain  Charles  A.  Clark.     Killed  in  quelling  mutiny,  November  25,  1863. 
Seconcl  Lieut.  David   M.    Richards.      Died,  December    10,    1863,   of  wounds 

received  in  action. 
Second  Lieut.  James  K.  Weir.     Died,  June  21,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 


388  APPENDIX. 


Twenty-seventh  Illinois  Infantry. 
Colonel  Fazelo  A.  Harrington.     Died,  January  1,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Stone  River. 

Captain  William  S.  Bryan.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  William  Shipley.     Killed  at  Belmont,  Mo.,  November  7,  1861. 
First  Lieut.  Joseph  Voellinger.  Died,  October  18,  1863,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

First  Lieut.  Hugh  M.  Love.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25,  1863. 
first  Lieut.  Andrew  J.  Slides.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Alexander  M.  Boggs.      Killed   accidentally,    near   Atlanta,    Ga., 

July  23,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Herbert  Weyman.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 

1863. 

Thirty-fourth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Amos  Bosworth.     Died,  April  23,  1862,  of  disease. 
Major  Charles  H.  Levanway.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April  7,  1862. 
Captain  Mabry  G.  Greenwood.     Died  of  wounds  received  December  31,  1862, 

at  Stone  River. 

Captain  John' A.  Parrott.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  14,  1864. 
Captain  Amos  W.  Hostetter.      Died,  July  26,   1864,   of  wounds  received   at 

Atlanta. 

First  Lieut.  Daniel  Riley.     Died  at  Nashville,  January  20,  1863,  of  wounds. 
First  Lieut.  Henry  D.  Wood,  Adjutant.     Died,  October  12,  1864,  at  Atlanta,  of 

disease. 

First  Lieut.  Edward  B.  Hamer.     Killed  near  Hay  wood,  N.  C.,  April  15,  1865. 
Second  Lieut.  Henry  Miller.     Died  of  wounds,  May  1,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  John  M.  Smith.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Thirty-fifth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Major  John  Mcllvain.     Killed  near  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  22,  1864. 

Captain  Collins  P.  Jones.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Joseph  Moore.  Died,  April  7,  1862,  of  wounds  received  at  Pea 
Ridge. 

First  Lieut.  Humphrey  M.  McConnell.  Died,  January  3,  1863,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived in  action. 

First  Lieut.  Moses  C.  Snook.     Died,  March  9, 1863,  of  disease. 

First  Lieut.  George  F.  Dietz.     Died,  July  8,  1863,  of  disease. 

First  Lieut.  John  W.  Snyder.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Daniel  H.  Kagay.     Died,  February  10,  1864,  of  disease. 

Second  Lieut.  Joseph  F.  Clise.     Died,  October  7,  1861,  of  disease. 

Second  Lieut.  James  P.  Butler.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Benjamin  F.  Smith.     Died,  November  9,  1864,  of  disease. 

Thirty-sixth  Illinois  Infantry. 
Colonel  Silas  Miller.     Died,  July  27,  1864,  of  wounds   received   at  Kenesaw 

Mountain. 
Lieut.  Colonel  Porter  C.  Olson.     Died,  November  30,  1864,  of  wounds  received 

at  Franklin. 


APPENDIX.  389 

Captain  Theodore  G.  Griffin.     Died,  November  24,  1862,  of  wounds  received  at 

Perryville. 
Captain  Aaron   C.  Holden.     Died,  December  1,  1862,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 
Captain  San  ford  H.  "Wakeman.     Died,  September  20,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Chickamauga. 
Captain  James  B.  McNeal.     Died,  September  4,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

First  Lieut.  Edward  S.  Chappell.  Died,  October  16,  1861,  at  Rolla,  Mo. 
First  Lieut.  Orison  Smith.  Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Charles  F.  Chase.  Died,  December  18,  1864,  of  wounds  received 

at  Franklin. 

Second  Lieut.  Soren  L.  Olson.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31, 1862. 
Second  Lieut.  Myron  A.  Smith.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Sidney  M.  Abbott.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 

1863. 

Thirty-eighth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Daniel  H.  Gilmer.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20, 1863. 
Lieut.  Colonel  William  T.  Chapman.      Died,  November  23,  1864,  at  Pulaski, 

Tenn.,  of  disease. 

Captain  James  P.  Mead.  Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Captain  Thomas  Cole.  Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
Captain  William  C.  Harris.  Died,  July  13,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Kene- 

saw  Mountain. 

First  Lieut,  Arthur  Lee  Bailhache,  Adjutant.    Died  of  disease,  January  2, 1862. 
First  Lieut.  John  L.  Dillon.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  Benjamin  G.  Humes.     Died,  January  6,  1865,  of  wounds  received 

in  action. 
Second  Lieut.  Peter  N.  Scott.     Died,  January  8,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Stone  River. 
Chaplain  William  M.  Brown.     Died  at  Springfield,  111.,  November  23,  1863,  of 

disease. 

Forty-second  Illinios  Infantry. 

Colonel  William  A.  Webb.     Died,  December  24,  1861,  at  Smithton,  Mo. 
Colonel  G.  W.  Roberts.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Major  James  Leighton.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
Major  D.  Woodman  Norton.     Killed  at  New  Hope  Church,  June  3,  1864. 
Captain  George  Varden.     Died,  September  19,  1862,  at  Nashville,  Tenn.,  of 

disease. 
Captain  Levi  Preston.     Died,  at  Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  December  31,  1863,  of 

disease. 

Captain  Charles  A.  Seaver,  Killed  before  Atlanta,  Ga.,  August  3,  1864. 
Captain  Gilbert  A.  Parshall.  Died,  December  3,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 

Spring  Hill,  Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  Ezra  A.  Montgomery.    Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20, 1863. 
First  Lieut.  Edward  H.  Brown,  Adjutant.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September 

20,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  George  C.  Smith.     Died,  December  7,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Missionary  Ridge. 


390  APPENDIX. 

First  Lieut.  Alfred  0.  Johnson.     Died,  December  8,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Missionary  Ridge. 
First  Lieut.   Edward   Hurson.     Died,  May  18,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 

Resaca. 

Second  Lieut.  Gilbert  L.  Barnes.     Died,  October  24,  1861,  of  disease: 
Second  Lieut,  Julius  Lettman.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  Jacob  Y.  Elliott.     Died,  December  7,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Missionary  Ridge. 

Forty-fourth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Captain  Andrew  I.  Hosmer.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Captain  Ernst  Moldenhauser.     Died,  February  27,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

in  action. 
Captain  Carl  R.  Harmsch.     Killed,  at  Chattanooga,  in  attion,  November  25, 

1863. 
Captain  Benjamin  F.  Knappen.     Died,  July  4,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

First  Lieut.  Martin  Reminger.     Died,  August  20,  1862,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut.  Peter  Weyhrich.     Died,  July  6,  1864,  of  wounds. 
Second  Lieut.  Silas  L.  Parker.     Died,  January  19, 1863,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

Fifty-first  Illinois  Infantry. 

Captain  John  T.  Whitson.     Died,  July  15,  1862,  at  Chicago,  111. 

Captain  George  L.  Bellows.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Otis  Moody.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Thomas  T.  Lester.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  14,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Henry  W.  Hall,  Adjutant.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27, 

1864. 
First  Lieut.  Archibald  L.  McCormick.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27, 

1864. 

First  Lieut.  Calvin  H.  Thomas.     Killed  at  Franklin,  November  30,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Albert  G.  Simmons.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19, 

1863. 

Fifty-ninth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Captain  David  M.  Bailey.     Died,  October  10,  1864,  of  disease. 

First  Lieut.  Albert  H.  Stookey.     Died,  March  14,  1862,  of  disease. 

First  Lieut.  John  Kelley.  Died,  September ,  1862,  at  luka,  Miss.,  of  dis- 
ease. 

First  Lieut.  Charles  F.  Adams.  Died,  October  16,  1862,  of  wounds  received  at 
Perryville. 

First  Lieut.  Robert  Gooding.     Killed  at  Nashville,  December  16,  1864. 

Second  Lieut.  Andrew  R.  Johnson.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 

Surgeon  J.  D.  S.  Haslett.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862.     . 

Assistant  Surgeon,  James  W.  Gaston.     Died,  September  13,  1864,  of  disease. 

Sixtieth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Captain  John  Coleman.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Amzi  Kniffen.     Died,  May  17,  1864,  of  wounds  received  before 
Dalton,  Ga. 


APPENDIX.  391 

Seventy-third  Illinois  Infantry. 

Major  William  E.  Smith.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 

Major  Thomas  W.  Motherspaw.     Died,  December  18,  1864,  of  wounds  received 
in  action. 

Captain  Edwin  Alsop.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

First  Lieut.  Julian  R.  Winget,  Adjutant.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September 
20,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  William  R.  Wilmer,  Adjutant,     Killed  at  Franklin,  November  30 
1864. 

Seventy-fourth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  James  B.  Kerr.     Died,  July  3,  1864,  of  wounds,  when  prisoner. 

Captain  Henry  C.  Barker.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27,  1864. 

Captain  Frederick  W.  Stegner.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27,  1864 

Captain  David  0.  Buttolp.     Died,  June  29,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Kene- 
saw Mountain. 

Captain  Bowman  W.  Bacon.     Died,  July  21,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Kene- 
saw Mountain. 

First  Lieut.  Lewis  Williams,  R»  Q.  M.     Died  November  25,  18,62. 

First  Lieut.  Cyrenius  N.  Woods.     Died,  August  12,  1863,  at  Winchester,  Tenn. 

Assistant  Surgeon  Sherman  C.  Ferson.     Killed,  October  7,  1864,  by  railroad 

accident. 

Seventy-fifth  lllinios  Infantry. 

Captain  Robert  Hale.     Killed  in  action,  July  4,  1864. 
Captain  Addison  S.  Vorrey.     Died,  August  13,  1864,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut.  Franklin  H.  Eels.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  William  H.  Thompson.     Died,  February  25,  1864,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  James  Blean.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  Ezekiel  J.  Killgour.     Died,  December  26,  1862,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  Thomas  G.  Bryant.     Died,  April  1.2,  1863,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  Alfred  K.  Buckaloo.     Died,  March  14,  1864,  of  disease. 

Seventy-eighth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Colonel  Carter  Van  Vleck.     Died  of  wounds,  August  23,  1864. 
Major  William  L.  Broaddus.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1864. 
Captain  Robert  M.  Black.     Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1,  1864. 
First  Lieut,  Tobias  E.  Butler.     Died,  May  29,  1864,  of  wounds. 
First  Lieut.  George  A.  Brown.     Died,  June  30,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

First  Lieut.  Daniel  W.  Long.     Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  George  T.  Beers.     Killed  at  Bentonville,  March  19,  1865. 
First  Lieut.  William  E.  Summers.     Killed  at  Bentonville,  March  21,  1865. 

Seventy-ninth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Sheridan  P.  Read.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Captain  John  H.  Patton.     Killed  at  Liberty  Gap,  June  25,  1863. 
Captain  Hezekiah  D.  Martin.     Died,  July  3,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Lib- 
erty Gap. 
First  Lieut.  Martin  L.  Linninger.     Killed  by  fall  of  tree,  November  19,  1862. 


392  APPENDIX. 

Eightieth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Captain  Edmund  R.  Jones.     Killed  at  Sand  Mountain,  Ala.,  April  30,  1868. 
First  Lieut.  James  C.  Jones.     Killed  at  Sand  Mountain,  Ala.,  April  30,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Alex.  Van  Kendle.     Killed  in  action,  October  8,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  Samuel  G.  Andrews.     Died.  November  22,  1862,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived in  action. 
Second  Lieut.  John  A.  Armour.     Died,  June  11,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 

•  action. 

Second  Lieut.  Harvey  Clendenin.  Died,  July  17,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 
action. 

Eighty-second  Illinois  Infantry. 
First  Lieut.  Frederick  Bechstein.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20,  1864. 

Eighty-third  Illinois  Infantry. 

Captain  Philo.  E.  Reed.     Killed  in  action  at  Fort  Donelson,  February  3,  1863. 

Captain  John  McClanahan.  Died,  February  23,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 
Fort  Donelson. 

Captain  William  W.  Turnbull.  Killed  at  Pine*  Bluff,  Ark.,  in  action,  August 
20,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  H.  D.  Bissell,  R.  Q.  M.  Killed  in  action,  Fort  Donelson,  Febru- 
ary 3,  1862. 

Second  Lieut.  John  Morton.     Died,  June  19,1864,  at  Fort  Donelson. 

Eighty-fourth  Illinois  Infantry. 
Captain  Moses  W.  Davis.     Died,  January  20, 1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Stone 

River. 
Captain  Thomas  D.  Adams.     Died,  September  21,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Chickamauga. 

First  Lieut.  Luther  T.  Ball.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  Thomas  F.  Kendrick.     Died,  November  17,  1862,  at  Bowling 

Green,  Ky.,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  Henry  E.  Abrocombie.  Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31, 1862. 

Eighty-fifth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Captain  Charles  H.  Chatfield.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27,  1864. 

Captain  John  Kennedy.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  19,  1864. 

Captain  Samuel  Young.     Died,  November  22,  1864,  of  disease. 

First  Lieut.  Clark  N.  Andrews,  Adjutant.  Died,  July  23,  1864,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived in  action. 

Eighty-six  Illinois  Infantry. 

Colonel  David  D.  Irons.     Died,  August  11,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 

Captain  Edward  Vanantwerp.  Died,  July  15,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 
action. 

Captain  John  F.  French.     Killed  at  Averysboro,  N.  C.,  March  16,  1865. 

Captain  William  B.  Bogardus.  Died,  April  13,  1865,  of  wounds  received  at 
Bentonville. 


APPENDIX.  393 

Eighty-eighth  Illinois  Infantry. 
Lieut.  Colonel  George  W.  Chandler.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27, 

1864. 

First  Lieut.  Thomas  F.  W.  Gullich.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31, 1862. 
First  Lieut.  Joshua  S.  Ballard,  Adjutant.     Died,  April  9,  1863,  of  disease,  at 

Murfreesboro,  Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  Charles  H.  Lane.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 1863. 
First  Lieut.  John  P.  D.  Gibson.     Killed  accidentally  a(t  Loudon,  Tenn.,  April 

17,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  Noah  W.  Rae.     Died,  June  2,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Adairs- 

ville,  Ga. 

Second  Lieut.  Henry  W.  Meacham.     Died,  April  1,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Mur- 
freesboro, Tenn. 
Second  Lieut.  Henry  L.  Bingham.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 

1863. 
Surgeon  George  Coatsworth.     Died,  June  9,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Murfreesboro, 

Tenn. 

Eighty-ninth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Duncan  J.  Hall.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
Captain  Henry  S.  Willett.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Captain  Herbert  M.  Blake.     Killed  at  Liberty  Gap,  June  25,  1863. 
Captain  William  H.  Rice.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
Captain  Thomas  Whiting.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
Captain  John  W.  Spink.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
Captain  Henry  L.  Rowell.     Died,  December  3,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Missionary  Ridge. 
First  Lieut.  Nathan  Street.     Died,  August  6,  1964  (?),  of  wounds  received  in 

action  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  Peter  G.  Tait.     Killed  at  Nashville,  December  16,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Amory  P.  Ellis.     Died,  October  4,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Chickamauga. 
Second  Lieut.  Erastus  0.  Young.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 

1863. 
Second  Lieut.  William  Harkness.     Killed  in  action  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  Ga., 

June  21,  1864. 
Captain  James  D.  Hill.     Died,  January  14,  1863,  of  disease. 

Ninety-second  Illinois  Infantry. 

Captain  William  Stauffer.     Died  of  disease,  January  21,  1863,  at  Danville,  Ky. 
First  Lieut.  David  B.  Colehour.     Died,  March  17, 1863,  of  disease,  at  Nashville, 

Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  James  Daubon.     Died,  September  21,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 
Jonesboro. 

Ninety-sixth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Isaac  L.  Clack.     Died,  September  22,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Chickinauga. 

Captain  Evangelist  J.  Gillmore.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  23,  1864. 
Captain  David  James.     Died,  July  20,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Kenesaw 

Mountain. 


I 


394  APPENDIX. 

First  Lieut.  Caleb  A.  Montgomery.     Died,  January  28,  1863,  of  disease,  at 

Danville,  y. 
First  Lieut.  Nelson  R.  Sims.     Died,  September  29,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Chickamauga. 
Captain  George  F.  Barnes.     Died,  October  3,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Chickamauga. 

Ninety-eighth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Captain  Orville  L.  Kelley.     Killed  September  8,  1862,  by  railroad  accident,  at 

Bridgeport,  111. 

First  Lieut.  Lindsay  D.  Law.     Died,  January  26,  1863,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut.  William  Tarrant.     Died,  April  19,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Murfrees- 

boro,  Tenn. 
First  Lieut.  Silas  Jones.     Died,  April  19,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Murfreesboro, 

Tenn. 
Second  Lieut.  George  W.  Boggess.     Died,  March  3,  1864,  at  Charleston,  Tenn. 

One  Hundreth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Colonel  Frederick  A.  Bartleson.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  23,  1864. 
Major  Rodney  S.  Bowen.     Died,  December  3,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 

Franklin. 

Captain  John  A.  Bunell.     Killed  near  Dallas,  Ga.,  in  action,  May  30,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  George  W.  Rouse,  Adjutant.     Died,  August  3,  1864,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived before  Aslanta,  Ga. 
First  Lieut.  George  C.  Shoonmaker.     Killed  before  Atlanta,  in  action,  August 

5,  1864. 

Second  Lieut.  Morris  Worthington.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  Charles  F.  Mitchell.     Died,  January  4,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Stone  River. 

One  Hundred  and  First  Illinois  Infantry. 
Captain  Thomas  B.  Woof.     Killed  before  Atlanta,  July  20,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  William  S.  Wright.     Died,  October  6,  1862,  at  Franklin,  111. 
First  Lieut.  Ferdinand  A.  Dimm.     Killed  skirmishing  near  Kenesaw,  June  27, 

1864. 
First  Lieut.  Josiah  H.  Belt.     Died,  June  29,  1864,  of  wounds  received  near 

Dallas,  Ga. 

One  Hundred  and  Fourth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Captain  John  S.  H.  Doty.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20,  1864. 
Captain  David  C.  Rynearson.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20,  1864. 
Captain  Joseph  P.  Fitzsimmons.     Killed  in  action  before  Atlanta,  August  7, 

1864. 
First  Lieut.  Moses  M.  Randolp.     Died,  December  9,  1862,  of  wounds  received 

at  Heartsville,  Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  William  E.  Brush.     Died,  April  13,  1863,  at  Chicago,  111. 
First  Lieut.  Orrin  S.  Davidson.     Died,  December  5,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Missionary  Ridge. 
Assistant  Surgeon  Thomas  B.  Hamilton.     Died,  March  17,  1865,  at  Nashville, 

Tenn. 


APPENDIX.  395 

One  Hundred  and  Fifth  Illinois  Infantry. 
Second  Lieut.  August  H.  Fischer.     Killed  on  picket  line,  before  Atlanta, 

August  13,  1864. 
Surgeon  Horace  S.  Potter.     Killed  near  Acworth,  Ga.,  June  2,  1864. 

One  Hundred  and  Tenth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Captain  John  F.  Day.  Died,  January  27,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 
Captain  James  L.  Parks.  Died,  March  8,  1863,  of  disease,  Readyville,  Tenn. 
Second  Lieut.  Jesse  G.  Payne.  Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

One  Hundred  and  Fifteenth  Illinois  Infant?^/. 

Lieut.  Colonel  William  Kinman.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
Captain  S.  Barlow  Espy.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
Captain  Stephen  M.  Huckstep.     Died,  December  9,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

in  action. 

First  Lieut.  John  Beauchamp.     Died,  March  26,  1863,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut.  Jacob' Porter.     Died,  May  14,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in  action. 
Second  Lieut.  Mathew  Freeman.     Died,  March  30,  1863,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  David  Reed.     Died,  September  27,  1863,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 
Assistant  Surgeon  James  A.  Jones.     Killed  by  Guerrillas,  July  9,  1864. 

One  Hundred  and  Twenty-third  Illinois  Infantry. 
Colonel  James  Monroe.     Killed  at  Farmington,  October  7,  1863. 
Captain  Samuel  Coblentz.     Died  November  30,  1862. 
Captain  Abram  C.  Van  Buskirk.     Killed  in  action,  March  20,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Otho  J.  McManus.     Killed  at  Selma,  April  9,  1865. 

One  Hundred  and  Twenty-fifth  Illinois  Infantry. 

Colonel  Oscar  F.  Harmon.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27,  1864. 

Captain  William  W.  Fellows.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27,  1864. 

Captain  Marion  Lee.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27,  1864. 

Captain  Edward  B.  Kingsbury.  Died,  August  19,  1864,  of  wounds  received 
before  Atlanta,  Ga. 

Captain  Jackson  Charles.     Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  2,  1864. 

Captain  Andrew  W.  Ingraham.  Died,  February  15,  1865,  of  disease,  at  Savan- 
nah, Ga. 

Second  Lieut.  William  Hart.     Died,  April  2,  1863,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 

Second  Lieut,  James  A.  McLean.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27, 1864. 

Second  Lieut.  John  L.  Jones.     Killed  in  action  before  Atlanta,  July  19,  1864. 

Second  Lieut.  John  J.  White.     Killed  in  action  before  Atlanta,  August  7, 1864. 

Chaplain  Levi  W.  Sanders.  Killed  in  action  at  Caldwell's  Ford,  Tenn.,  No- 
vember 17,  1863. 

Chaplain  George  K.  Buesing.     Died,  October  13,  1864,  at  Atlanta,  Ga. 

One  Hundred  and  Twenty-ninth  Illinois  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  John  Haldeman.  Died,  November  15,  1864,  prisoner,  at  Colum- 
bia, S.  C. 

Second  Lieut.  Stephen  K.  Kyle.  Died,  December  1,  1862,  at  Bowling  Green, 
Ky. 


396  APPENDIX. 

INDIANA. 

Second  Indiana  Cavalry. 

Major  Samuel  Hill.     Died,  April  6,  1863,  of  disease. 

Captain  Levi  Ross.     Died,  March  8,  1863,  at  Louisville,  Ky. 

First  Lieut  Henry  H.  Dunlap.     Died,  May  25,  1863,  of  disease. 

First  Lieut.  William  D.  Stover.  Killed  in  action  at  Indian  Creek,  Tenn.,  July 
28,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Asa  S.  Smith.     Killed  near  Scottville,  Ala.,  April  2,  1865. 

Second  Lieut.  John  G.  Myers.  Killed  in  action  at  Vinegar  Hill,  Ky.,  Septem- 
ber 22,  1862. 

Second  Lieut.  William  C.  Elaine.     Killed  in  action,  June  11,  1863. 

Third  Indiana  Calvary. 
Second  Lieut.  Thomas  G.  Sheaffer.     Killed  at  Resaca,  Ga.,  August  25,  1864. 

Fourth  Indiana  Cavalry. 

Major  Joseph  P.  Leslie.  Killed  in  action,  at  Fair  Garden,  Tenn.,  January  27, 
1864. 

Captain  Jesse  Keethley.     Died  at  Madisonville,  Ky.,  March  3,  1863. 

Captain  Christopher  C.  Mason.  Killed  in  action  at  Fayetteville,  Tenn.,  No- 
vember 1,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  George  Lydick.  Died,  February  3,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Munfords- 
ville,  Ky. 

First  Lieut.  John  Jackson.  Died,  in  prison,  at  Columbia,  S.  C.,  November  20, 
1864. 

Second  Lieut.  Edmund  J.  Davis.  Died,  September  24,  1862,  of  disease,  at 
Louisville,  Ky. 

Second  Lieut.  Johnson  M.  Webb.  Killed  in  action  at  Madisonville,  Ky.,  Octo- 
ber 5,  1862. 

Second  Lieut.  Enoch  S.  Boston.  Died,  November  7,  1862,  of  disease,  at  Bowl- 
ing Green,  Ky. 

Eighth  Indiana  Cavalry. 

Captain  Joseph  C.  Potts.     Died,  October  5,  1863,  of  wounds  received  in  action. 
First  Lieut.  John  A.  Stockdell.     Died,  April  1,  1862,  of  disease,  at  Columbia, 

Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  William  R.  Phillips,     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April  7,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  William  H.  Garboden.     Died,  October  28, 1863,  of  wounds  received 

in  action. 
First  Lieut.  Wiley  Baker.     Killed  in  action  at  Puluski,  Tenn.,  September  27, 

1864. 
First  Lieut.  James  A.  Gray.     Died  of  wounds,  October  2,  1864,  at  Nashville, 

Tenn. 
First  Lieut.  Clinton  Lennen.     Killed  in  action  at  Black  River,  N.  C.,  March 

16,  1865. 
Second  Lieut.  Gabriel  Woodmansee.    Died,  January  9, 1863,  of  wounds  received 

in  action. 
Second  Lieut.  Moses  M.  Neal.     Died,  January  8  1863,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 


4PPENDIX.  397 

Fifth  Indiana  Battery. 
Captain  Peter  Simonson.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  16,  1864. 

Seventh  Indiana  Battery. 
Second  Lieut.  Frank  W.  Backmar.     Died,  January  16, 1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Stone  River. 

Eleventh  Indiana  Battery. 

Second  Lieut.  Charles  R.  Scott.     Died  January  5,  1864. 

Twelfth  Indiana  Battery. 

First  Lieut.  Moody  C.  Dustin.     Died  March  16,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Benjamin  F.  Lutz.     Died  April  18,  1862. 

Eighteenth  Indiana  Battery. 
First  Lieut.  Martin  J.  Miller.     Killed  in  action,  near  Selma,  Ala.,  April  2, 1865, 

Nineteenth  Indiana  Battery. 

First  Lieut.  Samuel  W.  Webb.  Died,  May  20,  1865,  of  wounds  received  in 
action. 

Sixth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Colonel  Philomen  G.  Baldwin.     Killed  at  Chickamanga,  September  19,  1863. 
Captain  Samuel  Russell.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
Captain  Frank  P.  Strader.     Died,  December  15,  1863,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

Captain  Andrew  F.  Connor.     Killed  in  action  near  Dallas,  Ga.,  May  27,  1864. 
Captain  Andrew  J.  Newland.     Killed  in  action  near  Dallas,  Ga.,  May  27, 1864. 
Captain  Samuel  F.  McKeehan.     Died  of  wounds,  July  15,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Alanson  Solomon.     Died,  May  11,  1862,  of  disease,  at  Washington, 

Ind. 

First  Lieut.  George  B.  Green.     Died,  October  28,  1863,  of  wounds. 
First  Lieut.  William  A.  Cummings.     Killed  at  Allatoona  Ridge,  Ga.,  May  27, 

1864. 

Second  Lieut.  Jerome  P.  Holcomb.     Died,  June  12, 1863,  of  accidental  wounds. 
Second  Lieut.  Charles  Neal.     Died  June  22,  1864. 

Ninth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Captain  James  Houghton.     Died,  April  8,  1862,  of  wounds  received  at  Shiloh. 

Captain  Isaac  M.  Pettit.  Died,  March  19,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Stone 
River. 

Captain  De  Witt  C.  Hodsden.  Died,  July  27,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 
action. 

First  Lieut.  Thomas  J.  Patton,  Adjutant.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April  7,  1862. 

First  Lieut.  Joseph  S.  Turner.  Died,  April  16,  1862,  of  wounds  received  at 
Shiloh. 

First  Lieut.  James  J.  Drum,  R.  Q.  M.     Died  May  31,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Lewis  S.  Nickerson.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19, 1863. 

First  Lieut.  William  H.  Criswell.  Died,  September  23,  1863,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived in  action. 

Second  Lieut.  Henry  Kessler.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Second  Lieut.  Seth  B.  Parks.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 


398  APPENDIX. 

Second  Lieut.  Benjamin  Franklin.     Died,  October  17, 1863,  of  wounds  received 
in  action. 

Second  Lieut.  Leander  C.  Shipherd.     Died,  October  20,  1863,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived in  action. 

Assistant  Surgeon  Alexander  W.  Gilmore.     Died,  May  13,  1863,  of  disease,  at 
Nashville,  Tenn. 

Tenth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Colonel  William  B.  Carroll.     Died,  September  20,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Chickamauga. 
Captain  Samuel  H.  Shortle.     Died,  October  13,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Frankfort, 

Ind. 
Captain  John  W.  Perkins.     Died,  November  16,  1863,  of  accidental  wounds  at 

Chickamauga. 

First  Lieut.  James  H.  McAdams.  Killed  at  Mill  Springs,  January  19,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  Martin  T.  Jones.  Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Israel  H.  Miller.  Died,  March  7,  1862,  of  disease,  at  Nashville, 

Tenn. 
Second  Lieut.  Jeremiah  Batterton.     Died,  September  27,  1862,  of  disease,  at 

Bowling  Green,  Ky. 

Fifteenth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Captain  Robert  J.  Templeton.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862 

Captain  Joel  W.  Foster.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Captain  John  F.  Monroe.     Died,  November  26,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Missionary  Ridge. 
Second  Lieut.  William  D.  Sering.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 

1863. 

Seventeenth  Indiana  Infantry.     (Mounted.'] 

Captain  James  D.  Taylor.     Killed  near  Plantersville,  Ala.,  April  1,  1865. 
First  Lieut.  James  T.  Mooreland.     Died,  July  12,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Stone  River. 

First  Lieut.  George  B.  Covington,  Adjutant.     Died,  June  1,  1864,  of  wounds. 
Chaplain  John  L.  Craig.     Died,  July  11,  1865,  of  disease. 

Twenty-second  Indiana  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Squire  Isham  Keeth.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
Captain  Robert  K.  Smith.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October,  8,  1862. 
Captain  Alonzo  J.  Moss.     Died,  June  29,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in  action. 
First  Lieut,  Lewis  W.  Daily.     Died,  March  2,  1862,  of  wounds. 
First  Lieut.  Samuel  H.  McBride.     Died,  December  9, 1862,  of  wounds  received 

at  Perryville. 

Second  Lieut.  Tyrus  Tolbert.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  Francis  L.  M.  Sibbitt.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  George  R.  Ridlen.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  David  G.  Linson.     Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  David  R.  Runzan.     Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Nicholas  Moser.     Killed  at  Bentonville,  March  19,  1865. 


APPENDIX.  399 

Twenty-seventh  Indiana  Infantry. 
First  Lieut.  George  T.  Chapin.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  15,  1864. 

Twenty-ninth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Major  Joseph  P.  Collins.     Died,  October  5,  1864,  of  disease,  at  Chattanooga, 
Term. 

Captain  Frank  A.  Hardman.     Died  March  5,  1862. 

Captain  Frank  Stebbins.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Captain  Thomas  J.  Henderson.     Died,  July  6,  1863,  at  Murfreesboro,  Term. 

Captain  N.  Palmer  Dunn.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Asa  H.  Mathews,  R.  Q.  M.     Died  April  21,  1862. 

First  Lieut.  John  Cutler.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Elijah  A.  Macomber.     Died,  September  19,  1864,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived in  action. 

Thirtieth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Colonel  Sion  S.  Bass.     Died,  April  7,  1862,  of  wounds  received  at  Shiloh. 
First  Lieut.  Edwin  B.  Scribley.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  Douglas  L.  Phelps.     Died,  September  19,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

in  action. 
First  Lieut.  Joshua  Eberly.     Died,  September  20,  1863,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 
Assistant  Surgeon  Delos  W.  Rupert.     Died,  October  2,  1862,  of  disease. 

Thirty-first  Indiana  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Francis  L.  Neff.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  25,  1864. 
Major  Frederick  Arn.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April  6,  1862. 
Captain  John  S.  Welch.     Died  December  26,  1861. 
Captain  George  Harvey.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April  6,  1862. 
Captain  William  1.  Leas.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
Captain  Jeremiah  Mewhinney.     Died,  June  24,  1864,  of  disease,  at  Chicago,  111. 
Captain  Richard  M.  Waterman.     Died,  August  23,  1864,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  James  W.  Peckins.     Died,  January  7,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Stone  River. 

Second  Lieut.  John  N.  Pike.     Died,  April  16,  1863,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  Lucien  Ray.     Died,  April  11,  1864,  of  disease. 

Thirty-second  Indiana  Infantry. 

Colonel  Henry  Von  Trebra.     Died,  August  6,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Arcola,  111. 
Major  Jacob  Glass.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25,  1863. 
Captain  Fred.  A.  Mueller.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April  7,  1862. 
Captain  Frank  Kodalle.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April  7,  1862. 
Captain  John  D.  Ritter.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
Captain  Henry  Seyffert.     Killed  at  Allatoona,  Ga.,  May  27,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Max  Sachs.     Killed  in  action,  at  Rowlett's  Bridge,  Ky.,  December 

17,  1861. 
First  Lieut.  Max  Hupfauf.     Killed  at  Allatoona  Ga.,  May  27,  1864. 


400  APPENDIX. 

Thirty-third  Indiana  Infantry. 
Captain  Israel  C.  Dille.     Killed  by  Guerrillas,  at  Fosterville,  Term.,  July  17, 

1863. 
Captain  James  L.  Banks.     Died,  June  22,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Dallas, 

Ga. 

Captain  George  L.  Scott.     Killed  on  picket,  before  Atlanta,  July  23,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Estees  Wallingford,  Adjutant.     Died,  April  21,  1864,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut.  Charles  H.  Porter,  Adjutant.     Killed  near  Kenesaw  Mountain, 

June  22,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Eli  M.  Adams.     Died,  December  8,  1861,  of  disease. 

Thirty-fifth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Major  John  P.  Dufficy.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  20,  1864. 
Captain  Frank  Baggot.     Died,  January  5,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Stone 

River. 
Captain  Henry  Prosser.     Died,  January  9,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Stone 

River. 
First  Lieut.  Bemald  R.  Mullin,  Adjutant.     Killed  near  Nashville,  in  action, 

December  9,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  William  Kilroy.     Died,  January  10,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Stone  River. 

Thirty-sixth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Captain  Abram  D.  Shultz.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Captain  James  H.  King.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Captain  George  M.  Graves.     Died,  September  28,  1863,  of  wounds. 

First  Lieut.  Addison  M.  Davis.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April  7,  1862. 

First  Lieut.  Joseph  W.  Connell,  R.  Q.  M.     Died,  May  26, 1862,  of  disease,  near 

Corinth,  Miss. 

First  Lieut.  William  H.  Fentress.     Killed  at  Dallas,  Ga.,  May  31,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  George  W.  Bowman;     Killed  before  Atlanta,  Ga.,  July  19,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Mahlon  Hendricks.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  23,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  George  0.  Williard.     Killed  before  Atlanta,  Ga.,  August  5, 1864. 
Second  Lieut.  William  Butler.     Died,  September  24,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Chickamauga. 
Second  Lieut.  James  Patterson.     Died,  September  24, 1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Chickamauga. 
Second  Lieut.  Salathiel  D.  Colvin.     Died,  October  9,  of  wounds. 

Thirty-seventh  Indiana  Infantry. 

Captain  James  H.  Burk.     Died,  July  9,  1864,  of  wounds,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 
Captain  Frank  Hughes.     Died,  July  28,  1864,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 
First  Lieut.  Isaac  N.  Abernethy.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  Jesse  B.  Holman.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  James  M.  Hartley.     Died,  April  26,  1862,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  William  Speer.     Killed  in  action,  at  Dallas,  Ga.,  May  27,  1864. 


APPENDIX.  401 

Thirty-eighth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Captain  John  Sexton.     Died,  November  10,  1862,  of  wounds  received  at  Perry- 
ville. 

Captain  James  E.  Fouts.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Captain  Joshua  B.  Jenkins.     Died,  November  13,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 
Jonesboro. 

Captain  James  H.  Low.     Died,  March  20,  1865,  of  wounds  received  at  Benton- 
ville. 

First  Lieut.  Rufus  H.  Peck.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  John  B.  Southern.     Died,  October  13,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 
Chickamauga. 

First  Lieut.  Joseph  H.  Reeves.     Died,  March  15,  1864,  of  disease. 

First  Lieut.  Adam  Osborn.     Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Charles  S.  Deweese.     Killed  at  Bentonville,  March  19,  1865. 

Second  Lieut.  Thomas  S.  W.  Hawkins.     Died,  January  23,  1863,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived at  Stone  River. 

Fortieth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  James  N.  Kirkpatrick.    Drowned  near  luka,  Miss.,  June  8,  1862. 

Captain  James  K.  Kiser.     Died,  May  17,  1862,  of  disease,  near  Corinth,  Miss. 

Captain  Charles  T.  Elliott.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27,  ]864. 

Captain  Absalom  Kirkpatrick.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27,  1864. 

Captain  William  L.  Coleman.     Killed  April  27,  1865,  by  explosion  of  steamer 
"Sultana." 

Captain  Henry  L.  Hazelrigg.     Killed  April  27,  1865,  by  explosion  of  Steamer 
"Sultana." 

First  Lieut.  Jeremiah  C.  Brower.     Killed  at   Franklin,  November  30,  1864. 

Second  Lieut.  John  H.  Holmes.     Died,  June  24,  1864,  of  wounds,  at  Chat- 
tanooga, Tenn. 

Chaplain  Allen  D.  Beaseley.     Died,  June  30,  1864,  of  disease,  at  Murfreesboro, 
Tenn. 

Forty-second  Indiana  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  James  M.  Shanklin.     Died,  May  23,  1863,  at  Evansville,  Ind. 
Captain  Charles  G.  Olmsted.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 

First  Lieut.  Edmund  M.  Knowles.     Killed,  January ,  1864,  when  prisoner 

of  war,  at  Augusta,  Ga. 

First  Lieut.  John  D.  A.  Steel.     Killed  at  Bentonville,  March  19,  1865. 
First  Lieut.  Ephraim  Rutledge.    Died,  March  22,  1865,  of  wounds. 
Second  Lieut.  Emory  Johnson.     Killed,  before  Atlanta,  July  22,  1864. 

Forty-fourth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Baldwin  J.  Crosswait.     Died,  February  18, 1862,  at  Angola,  Ind. 
Lieut.  Colonel  Simeon  C.  Aldrich.     Died,  August  15,  1864,  of  disease. 
Lieut.  Colonel  Joseph  C.  Hodges.     Died,  September  28,  1864,  of  injury  by 

railroad. 

Captain  John  Murray.     Died,  April  9,  1862,  of  wounds  received  at  Shiloh. 
Captain  William  H.  Cuppy.     Died  July  15,  1862. 

Captain  John  Gunsenhouser.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Marcus  W.  Bayless,  R.  Q.  M.     Died  June  9,  1862. 


402  APPENDIX. 

First  Lieut.  Sedgwick  Livingston.     Died,  January  25, 1864,  at  Nashville,  Term. 
Second  Lieut.  J.  Delta  Kerr.     Died,  March  25,  1862,  at  Evansville,  Ind. 
Second  Lieut.  Charles  M.  Hinman.     Died  April  27,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  David  K.  Stopher.     Died,  January  18,  1864,  of  disease,  Knox- 

ville,  Tenn. 
Assistant  Surgeon  Edward  B.  Speed.     Died,  September  14,  1864,  of  disease. 

Fifty-first  Indiana  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  James  W.  Sheets.     Died,  June  30,  1863,  of  wounds. 
Captain  Samuel  Lingeman.     Died,  March  18,  1864,  at  Danville,  Ind. 
Captain  Adolphus  H.  Wonder.     Died,  September  24,  1862,  at  Charleston,  S.  C. 
First  Lieut.  Albert  Light.     Died,  February  24,  1862,  at  Lebanon,  Ky. 
Second  Lieut.  Harvey  Slavens.     Died,  March  21,  1862,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 
Second  Lieut.  Samuel  C.  Owen.     Died,  February  26,  1863,  at  Murfreesboro 

Tenn. 
Second  Lieut.  Jeremiah  Sailor.     Died,  March  19,  1863,  near  Murfreesboro, 

Tenn, 

Fifty-seventh  Indiana  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  George  W.  Lennard.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  14,  1864. 

Captain  William  S.  Bradford.     Died  May  16, 1862, 

Captain  Joseph  S.  Stidham.     Killed  in  action,  June  23,  1864. 

Captain  Addison  M.  Dunn.     Killed  at  Franklin,  November  30,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Benjamin  F.  Beitzell.     Killed  in  action,  June  18,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Robert  F.  Callaway.     Died,  July  4,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 

in  action. 
First  Lieut.  Charles  W.  T.  Minesinger.     Died,  September  13,  1864,  of  wounds 

received  in  action. 
Surgeon  Issac  S.  Collings.     Died,  September  10,  1865,  of  disease. 

Fifty-eighth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Captain  Charles  H.  Bruce.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  William  Overlin.     Died,  March  19,  1862,  of  disease,  at  Nashville, 

Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  James  D.  Foster.     Killed  at'Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
First  Lieut..  George  Raffari,  R.  Q.  M.     Died,  May  13, 1864,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 
Second  Lieut.  Francis  B.  Blackford.    Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31, 

1862, 
Second  Lieut.  Hugh  J.  Barnett.     Died,  September  24, 1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Chickamauga. 

Sixty-eighth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Colonel  Edward  A.  King.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
Captain  Charles  C.  Wheeler.     Died,  August  22, 1864,  of  wounds,  at  Dalton,  Ga. 
First  Lieut.  Robert  J.  Price.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  John  Reese.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25,  1863. 

Seventieth  Indiana  Infantry. 
First  Lieut.  Edward  B.  Colestock.     Died,  May  30,  1864,  of  wounds,  at  Resaca, 

Ga. 
Second  Lieut.  Jeptha  F.  Bunta.    Died,  May  14,  1863,  at  Gallatin,  Tenn. 


APPENDIX.  403 

-Second  Lieut.  Josiah  E.  Lewes.     Killed  before  Atlanta,  July  20,  1864. 
Assistant  Surgeon  John  M.  White.     Died,  August  31,  1863,  of  disease. 

Seventy-second  Indiana  Infantry. 

Captain  William  H.  McMurtry.     Killed  at  Rock  Spring,  September  12, 1863. 
First  Lieut.  Liews  C.  Priest.    Died  June  24,  1864. 
Second  Lieut,  John  W.  Gaskill.     Killed  at  Hoover's  Gap,  in  action,  June  24, 

1863. 
Chaplain  John  R.  Eddy.     Killed  in  action,  at  Hoover's  Gap,  June  24,  1863. 

Seventy-third  Indiana  Infantry. 

Colonel  Gilbert  Hathaway.     Killed  at  Blount's  farm,  Ala.,  May  2,  1863. 
Captain  Miles  H.  Tibbitts.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31, 1862. 
Captain  Peter  Doyle.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Seventy-fourth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Myron  Baker.     Killed  before  Atlanta,  August  5,  1864. 
Captain  Philip  F.  Davis.     Died,  February  6,  1863,  of  disease. 
Captain  Everett  F.  Abbott.     Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Stephen  Hamlin.     Died,  December  27,  1862,  of  disease,  at  Galla- 

tin,  Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  Thomas  Bodley.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Ananias  Davis.     Died,  October  11,  1863,  at  Chattanooga,  Tenn. 
Second  Lieut.  Richard  H.  Hall.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

Seventy-fifth  Indiana  Infantry. 
Captain  Francis  M.  Bryant.     Died,  December  2,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Missionary  Ridge. 

Captain  William  McGinness.     Died,  August  31,  1864,  at  Savannah,  Ga. 
First  Lieut.  John  B.  Frazer.     Died,  July  4,  1863,  near  Tullahoma,  Tenn. 

Seventy-ninth  Indiana  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  Thompson  Dunn,  Adjutant.  Killed  at  Lovejoy's  Station,  Septem- 
ber 2,  1864. 

Second  Lieut.  John  S.  McDaniels.  Died,  December  2,  1862,  of  disease,  at 
Nashville,  Tenn. 

Second  Lieut.  Benjamin  T.  Poynter.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  January  2,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  George  W.  Clark.  Died,  September  28, 1863,  of  wounds  received 
at  Chattanooga,  Tenn. 

Chaplain  Perry  T.  Hall.  Died,  October  26,  1862,  of  disease,  at  Indianapolis, 
Ind. 

Eightieth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Captain  Thomas  J.  Brooks,  Jun.  Died,  February  26, 1863,  of  wounds  received 
at  Perryville. 

Captain  Russell  J.  Showers.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  14,  1864. 

Captain  William  S.  Emery.     Died,  May  28, 1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Resaca. 

First  Lieut.  William  Archer.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  14,  1864. 

Second  Lieut.  Alexander  Anderson.  Died,  October  13,  1862,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived at  Perryville. 


404  APPENDIX. 

Second  Lieut.  James  F.  Ruark.     Died,  October  24,  1862,  of  wounds  received 

at  Perryville. 
Second  Lieut.  Lewis   C.  Turbett.     Died,  December  31,  1862,  of  accidental 

wounds. 

Eighty-first  Indiana  Infantry. 

Captain  Elijah  R.  Mitchell.     Died,  September  20,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Chickamauga. 

Captain  Eugene  M.  Schell.     Killed  at  Nashville,  December  15,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  William  M.  Morgan.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31, 1862. 
Second  Lieut.  Samuel  Wilde.     Died,  January  1,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Stone  River. 
Second  Lieut.  John  Felkner.     Died  March  13,  1663. 

Eighty-second  Indiana  Infantry. 
Lieut.  Colonel  Paul  P.  Slocum.     Died,  May  3,   1864,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

Captain  George  W.  Kendrick.     Died,  January  23, 1863,  at  Murfreesboro,  Tenn. 
Captain  Harrison  McCallister.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  John  W.  Walker.     Killed  at  Rasaca,  May  14,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Jackson  Woods.     Died,  May  27,  1864,  of  disease,  at  Macon,  Ga. 
First  Lieut.  Joseph  Fraker.     Died,  September  30,  1864,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  Samuel  Guy.     Died,  May  22,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Triune,  Tenn. 
Second  Lieut,  Thomas  V.  Webb.     Died,  March  3,  1864,  at  Madison,  Ind. 
Assistant  Surgeon  Mathew  Kelley.     Died,  August  23,  1864,  of  disease. 

• 

Eighty-fourth  Indiana  Infantry. 
Major  William  A.  Boyd.     Died,  July  11,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Rocky 

Face  Ridge. 

Captain  John  H.  Ellis.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  George  C.  Hatfield.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Noble  B.  Gregory.     Killed  at  Nashville,  December  16, 1864. 
First  Lieut.  Frank  M.  Flickenger.     Killed  accidentally,  March  13,  1865. 
Second  Lieut.  William  L.  Steele.     Died  at  Franklin,  Tenn.,  May  16,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Jerome  B.  Mason.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20, 1864. 

Eighty-fifth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Major  Robert  E.  Craig.     Died,  April  2,  1862,  at  Murfreesboro,  Tenn. 
Captain  Abner  Floyd.     Killed  at  Thompson's  Station,  Tenn.,  March  5,  1865. 
Captain  Wilson  T.  Stark.     Died,  March  28,  1863,  at  Franklin,  Tenn. 
Captain  Caleb  Nash.     Died,  May  20,  1863,  at  Annapolis,  Md. 
First  Lieut.  Mortimer  Denny.     Died,  August  19,  1864,  of  wounds. 

Eighty-sixth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Captain  William  M.  Southard.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 1864. 
First  Lieut.  George  W.  Smith.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  James  T.  Doster.     Died,  December  10,  1863,  of  disease. 


APPENDIX.  405 

Eighty-seventh  Indiana  Infantry. 

Captain  James  M.  Holliday.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19, 1863. 

Captain  George  W.  Baker.     Killed  at  Chickaraauga,  September  20,  1863. 

Captain  Lewis  Hughs.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Sloan  D.  Martin.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Fredus  Ryland,  Adjutant.     Killed  at  Chickaraauga,  September  20, 
1863. 

First  Lieut.  Burr  Russell.     Died,  November  29,  1863,  of  wounds   received  at 
Missionary  Ridge. 

First  Lieut.  John  Demuth.     Killed  at  Atlanta,  August  22,  1864. 

Second  Lieut.  Franklin  H.  Bennett.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19, 
1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Abram  C.  Andrew.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20, 1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Elisha  Brown.     Died,  September  24,  1863,  of  wounds  received 
at  Chickamauga. 

Surgeon  Samuel  Higinbotham.     Died, 29,  1863,  at  Triune,  Tenn. 

Chaplain  Joseph  K.  Albright.     Died,  December  5,  1862,  at  Gallatin,  Tenn.,  of 
disease. 

Eighty-eighth  Indiana  Infantry. 

Major  George  W.  Stough.     Died,  October  28, 1863,  of  wounds  at  Richmond,  Va. 

Captain  Isaac  H.  LeFevre.     Died,  September  21,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 
Chickamauga. 

Captain  James  H.  Steele.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Samuel  L.  Stough.     Died,  April  20,  1863,  at  Waterloo,  Ind. 

First  Lieut.  William  Forrest.     Died,  September  20,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Nash- 
ville, Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  David  Caston.     Killed  in  action  at  Resaca,  May  15,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Walter  E.  Boley.     Killed  in  action  at  Resaca,  May  15,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Thomas  E.  Kimball.    Died,  October  1, 1864,  in  Libby  Prison,  Rich- 
mond, Vai 

First  Lieut.  George  W.  Seelye.     Died,  March  23,  1865,  of  wounds  received  at 
Bentonville. 

First  Lieut.  Isaac  A.  Slater.     Died,  April  26,  1865,  of  wounds  received  at  Ben. 
tonville. 

Second  Lieut.  John  G.  Goheen.     Died,  January  24,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 
Stone  River. 

Second  Lieut.  Daniel  Little.     Died,  December  15,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 
Chickamauga. 

One  Hundred  and  First  Indiana  Infantry. 
Fi'-d;  Lieut.  John  H.  Ellis.     Died,  October  20,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Chattanooga, 

Tenii. 
First  Lieut  Andrew  J.  Barlow.     Died,  September  16,  1864,  of  wounds  received 

in  action,  at  Chattanooga,  Tenn. 
Second  Lieut.  Richard  H.  Busick.     Died,  October  16,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Chickamuaga. 
Second  Lieut.  Henry  W.  Waterman.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November 

25,  1863. 


406  APPENDIX. 

IOWA. 

Fifth  Iowa  Cavalry. 

Major  William  Kelsay.    Died,  February  28, 1862,  of  disease,  at  Ft.  Heiman,  Ky. 

Major  Shaeffer  DeBoernstein.     Died,  May  7,  1862,  of  wounds. 

Captain  William  Curl.     Killed  in  skirmish  at  Coosa  River,  July  13,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Milton  S.  Summers.  Died,  August  28,  1862,  of  wounds  received  in 
action. 

First  Lieut.  Michael  Gallagher.  Killed  in  action  at  Garrettsburg,  Ky.,  Novem- 
ber 6,  1862. 

First  Lieut.  Andrew  Guler.  Killed  in  action  near  Chattahoochee  River,  August 
3,  1864. 

Second  Lieut.  John  W.  Watson.     Killed  at  Nashville,  December  15,  1864. 

Eighth  Iowa  Cavalry. 

Colonel  Joseph  B.  Dorr.     Died,  May  28,  1865,  of  disease,  at  Macon,  Ga. 
Major  H.  Isett,     Died,  April  6,  1865,  of  disease,  at  South  Bend,  Ind. 
First  Lieut.  James  Horton.     Killed  at  Lovejoy's  Station,  Ga.,  July  29,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  John  B.  Loomis.     Killed  at  Newnan,  Ga.,  July  30,  1864. 

KANSAS. 

Eighth  Kansas  Infantry. 

Captain  Edgar  P.  Trego.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  John  L.  Graham.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Zacharias  Burckhardt.    Died,  October  28,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

in  action. 

Second  Lieut.  William  Becker.     Died  of  disease,  November  21,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Seth  Foot.     Died  of  disease,  at  Famesburg,  Iowa,  May  14,  1864.- 
Assistant  Surgeon  Samuel  E.   Beach.     Died  of  disease,  at  Nashville,  Tenn.,. 

November  4,  1863. 

KENTUCKY. 

First  Kentucky  Cavalry. 

Brigadier-General  James  S.  Jackson.  Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862,. 
commanding  division. 

Captain  Jarrett  W.  Jenkins.  Killed  in  action,  at  Perryville,  Ky.,  October  8,. 
1862. 

Captain  Jesse  M.  Carter.     Killed  at  Columbus,  Ky.,  July  3,  1863. 

Captain  Francis  M.  Wolford.  Killed  in  action  near  Hillsboro,  Ga.,  July  31,. 
1864. 

First  Lieut.  Jonathan  P.  Miller.  Killed  in  action  at  Mill  Springs,  Ky.,  Jan- 
uary 19,  1862. 

First  Lieut.  James  Humphrey.     Died,  September ,  of  wounds. 

Second  Lieut.  Alexander  Thompson.     Died,  October  30,  1861,  of  disease. 

Second  Kentucky  Cavalry. 

Major  William  H.  Eifert.     Killed  in  action,  September  3,  1864. 
Captain  Miller  R.  McCullock.     Killed  in  action  at  Stone  River,  Tenu.,  Decem- 
ber 30,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  William  G.  Jenkins.     Killed  in  action,  June  29, 1863. 


APPENDIX.  407 

First  Lieut.  George  A.  Hosmer.     Died  October  6,  1863. 

First  Lieut  G.  W.  L.  Batman.     Died  of  disease,  April  23,  1864. 

First.  Lieut.  William  Bradney.     Killed  in  action,  July  30,  1864. 

Fourth  Kentucky  Cavalry. 
Captain  Basil  N.  Hobbs.     Died  April  30,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Frank  N.  Sheets.  Killed  in  action  at  Chickamauga,  September 
20,  1863. 

Fifth  Kentucky   Cavalry. 

Colonel  William  P.  Sanders.  Died  of  wounds  received  in  action,  November  20, 
1863. 

Captain  John  W.  Forrester.     Died  of  wounds,  November  29,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  W.  D.  Mitchell,  Adjutant.     Killed  in  action,  March  10,  1865. 

First  Lieut.  Amos  M.  Griffin.     Killed  in  action,  March ,  1865. 

Second  Lieut.  Edward  Hughes.     Died  July  17,  1862. 

Second  Lieut.  James  Funk.     Died,  December  4,  1862,  of  disease. 

Second  Lieut.  Francis  B.  McAllister.  Died  of  disease,  at  Huntsville,  Ala., 
July  28,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Joseph  G.  Hardin.  Died  of  disease,  at  Nashville,  Tenn.,  Sep- 
tember 29,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  George  M.  Vandover.     Died  July  9,  1864. 

Sixth  Kentucky  Cavalry. 
Colonel  D.  I.  Halisey.     Killed  in  action  near  New  Market,  Ky.,  December  31, 

1862. 
Major  William  H.  Fidler.     Died,  April  28,  1865,  from  injuries  by  explosion  of 

steamer  "  Sultana." 
Captain  Edmund  H.  Parish.     Died,  April  28,  1865,  from  injuries  by  explosion 

of  steamer  "  Sultana." 
First  Lieut.  James  I.  Surber.     Died,  April  28,  1865,  from  injuries  by  explosion 

of  steamer  "Sultana." 

First  Lieut.  William  Murphy.     Killed  in  action,  July  4,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  William  C.  Hunter.     Died  at  Louisville,  Ky.,  December  7,  1864. 

Seventh  Kentucky  Covalry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Thomas  T.  Vincent.     Died  at  Dandridge,  Tenn.,  June  16,  1864. 
Captain  Jesse  H.  Berry.     Died  of  disease,  at  Carlisle,  Ky.,  September  18, 1863. 
Captain  Seneca  P.  Goulding.     Drowned  at  Benton,  Ala.,  April  10,  1865. 
First  Lieut.  John  S.  Stodgill.     Died  of  disease,  at  Nashville,  Tenn.,  March  2, 

1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Samuel  H.  Royce.     Killed  in  action,  at  Big  Hill,  Ky.,  August 

23,  1862. 

Second  Lieut.  Alfred  Mitchell.     Died  at  Maysville,  Ky.,  September  29,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.    Lewis  B.  Vimont.     Died  of  disease,  at  Chattanooga,  Tenn., 

October  28,  1864. 

Twelfth  Kentucky  Cavalry. 

First  Lieut.  Elza  C.  Smith.     Killed  by  guerrillas  while  sick  at  Saltville,  Va., 

October  7,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Joseph  W.  Cartwright.     Drowned  at  Burksville,  June  22, 1864. 


408  APPENDIX. 

Battery  A. 
Second  Lieut.  William  K.  Irwin.     Died  at  Nashville,  Tenn.,  August  15,  1864. 

First  Kentucky  Infantry. 
First  Lieut.  Courtland  W.  King.     Drowned  in  Bear  Creek,  Ala.,  June  15, 1562. 

Second  Kentucky  Infantry. 

Captain  John  H.  Spellmeyer.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  Tenn.,  April  7,  1862.. 

Captain  James  M.  Bodine.  Killed  in  action  at  Chickamauga,  Tenn.,  Septem- 
ber 21,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Daniel  W.  Finch.  Died  of  disease,  at  Camp  Lookout,  Va.,  Sep- 
tember 26,  1861. 

Second  Lieut.  James  A.  Miller.     Killed  in  action,  at  Shiloh,  April  7,  1862. 

Third  Kentucky  Infantry. 

Colonel  Samuel  McKee.     Killed  in  action,  at  Stone  River,  December  31, 1862. 

Captain  Henry  S.  Taylor.  Killed  in  action,  at  Chickamauga,  Ga.,  September 
20,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Daniel  Severance.  Died  of  wounds  received  at  Stone  River,  Janu- 
ary 10,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Alban  D.  Bradshaw.  Died  of  wounds  received  at  Chickamauga, 
Ga.,  October  8,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  G.  D.  Hunt,  Adjutant.  Died  of  wounds  received  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  November  30,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Matthew  Cullen.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Fourth  Kentucky  Infantry.     (Mounted.) 

Captain  John  L.  Williams.     Died  of  disease,  at  Paris,  Ky.,  April  28,  1864. 
Captain  E.  R.  Harrington.     Died  of  disease,  at  Atlanta,  Ga.,  October  3,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  N.  M.  Kelley.     Died  of  disease,  at  Lebanon,  Ky.,  January  12, 

1862. 
Second  Lieut.  James  M.  Kelley.     Killed  in  action  near  Logan's  Cross  Roads, 

January  19,  1862. 
Chaplain  John  W.  Jacobs.     Died  at  Lebanon,  K3T.,  January  20,  1862. 

Fifth  Kentucky  Infantry. 

Major  Charles  L.  Thomasson.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

Captain  Alexander  B.  Ferguson.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Captain  Upton  Wilson.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25,  1863. 

Captain  John  P.  Hurley.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25,  1863. 

Captain  Joseph  E.  Miller.     Killed  at  Resaca,  Ga.,  May  15,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Richard  Jones.     Died  of  disease,  near  Corinth,  Miss.,  June  9, 1862. 

First  Lieut.  John  W.  Huston.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Frank  Dissell.  Died  of  wounds  received  at  Stone  River,  May  12, 
1863, 

Second  Lieut.  Milton  W.  Curray.     Died  November  20,  1861. 

Second  Lieut.  John  Ryan.  Died  of  wounds  received  at  Chickamauga,  Sep- 
tember 25,  1863. 


APPENDIX.  409 

Sixth  Kentucky  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  George  T.  Cotton.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Captain  Peter  Enge-    Died  of  disease,  at  Louisville,  Ky.,  May  17,  1862. 
Captain  Charles  S.  Todd.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Captain  Peter  Marker.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
Captain  John  McGraw.    Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
Captain  Frederick  Nierdoff.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  Ga.,  June  23,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Sundsford  D.  Carrington.     Died  of  disease,  January  4,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  William  H.  Middletown.     Died  of  disease,  March  1,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Richard  Rockingham.     Killed  at   Chickamauga,  September    20 

1863. 

Second  Lieut.  William  B.  Dunlap.     Died  of  disease,  March  10,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  Anton  Hund.     Died  of  wounds  received   at  Shiloh,  May  23, 

1862. 

Second  Lieut.  Thomas  Eubanks.      Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19, 1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Frederick  V.  Lochman.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19, 

1863. 

Second  Lieut.  William  W.  Furr.     Killed  near  Dallas,  May  27,  1864. 
Assistant  Surgeon  Abner  B.  Coone.     Died  of  disease,  March  4,  1862. 

Eighth  Kentucky  Infantry. 

Captain  Robert  B.  Hickman.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  January  2,  1863. 

Captain  John  H.  Benton.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  January  2,  1863. 

Captain  Landon  C.  Minton.     Died  of  wounds  received  at  Stone  River,  Febru- 
ary 15,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Wade  B.  Cox.     Died  of  wounds  received  at  Stone  River,  January 
12,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Newton  J.  Hughes.     Died  of  disease,  Murfreesboro,  Tenn.,  Febru- 
ary 9,  1863. 

Ninth  Kentucky  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Allen  J.  Roark.     Died  of  disease,  April  10,  1862. 

Captain  William  T.  Bryan.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  January  2,  1863. 

Captain  Demetrius  B.  Coyle.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  January  2,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Moses  L.  Norvell.     Died  March  31,  1862. 

First  Lieut.  Charles  R.  Tate.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April  7,  1862. 

First  Lieut.  Henry  W.  Jenkins.     Died  of  disease,  July  9,  1862. 

First  Lieut.  Algernon  S.  Leggett.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  January  2,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Turner  Hestand.     Killed  at  Lovejoy's  Station,  Ga.,  September  2, 
1864. 

First  Lieut.  Fred.  F.  Carpenter.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  January  2,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  William  S.  Barton.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 
1863. 

Tenth  Kentucky  Infantry. 

Major  Henry  G.  Davidson.     Died  of  disease,  at  Louisville,  Ky.,  November  21, 
1864. 

Captain  Seth  P.  Bevill.      Died  of  wounds  received  at  Chickamauga,  September 
21,  1863. 

Captain  Henry  Waller.     Died  March  13, 1864. 


410  APPENDIX. 

Second  Lieut.  John  H.  Myers.     Killed  at  Chick  am  auga,  September  20,  1863. 

Surgeon  Will.  Atkinson.     Died  April  9,  1862. 

Assistant  Surgeon  Thomas  M.  Knott.     Died  April  5,  1862. 

Assistant  Surgeon  Charles  Hardesty.     Died  July  7,  1863. 

Eleventh  Kentucky  Infantry. 

Captain  Elijah  C.  Phelps.     Died  at  Columbus,  Tenn.,  March  29,  1862. 
Captain  Isaac  W.  Sketoe.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April  7,  1862. 
Captain  Joseph  S.  Willis.     Died  February  10,  1863. 
Captain  Columbus  H.  Martin.    Died  of  wounds  received  at  Philadelphia,  Tenn.r 

December  18,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Vincent  S.  Hay,  R.  Q.  M.     Died  in  prison  at  Atlanta,  Ga.,  March 

— — ,  1863. 

Thirteenth  Kentucky  Infantry. 
Captain  Wallace  Victor.     Died,  July  13,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Chicka- 

mauga. 

Fifteenth  Kentucky  Infantry. 
Colonel  Curran  Pope.     Died,  November  5.  1862,  of  wounds  received  at  Perry- 

ville. 

Colonel  James  B.  Foreman.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Lieut.  Colonel  George  P.  Jouett.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
Major  William  P.  Campbell.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
Captain  William  T.  McCure.     Died  of  disease,  July  12,  1862. 
Captain  Aaron  S.  Bayne.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Captain  E.  Irvine  McDowell.     Killed  at  Resaca,  Ga.,  May  14,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  James  A.  T.  McGrath.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  L.  Frank  Todd.     Died,  of  wounds  received  in  action,  January  20, 

1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Joseph  L.  McClure.     Died,  of  wounds  received  in  action,  Octo- 
ber 18,  1862. 

Seventeenth  Kentucky  Infantry. 
Captain  Henry  S.  Barnett.     Died  March  22,  1862. 
Captain  Preston  Morton.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April  6, 1862. 
Captain  John  V.  Boyd.     Died  at  Murfreesboro,  Tenn.,  March  22,  1863. 
Captain  James  W.  Anthony.     Died,  October  10,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Chickamauga. 

Captain  Robert  L.  Beckham.     Died  April  13,  1864. 
Captain  William  J.  Landrum.     Killed  at  Cassville,  Ga.,  in   action,  May  19, 

1864. 
Captain  Robert  C.    Sturgis.      Died,  August  9,   1864,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 
First   Lieut.  John   M.   Williams.      Killed    at    Chickamauga,   September   19, 

1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Isaac  S.  Condit.     Died  December  18,  1861. 
Second  Lieut.  Albert  E.  Brown.     Died,  May  18,  1862,  of  wounds  received  at 

Shiloh. 


APPENDIX.  411 

Eighteenth  Kentucky  Infantry. 
Major  Abram  G.  Wileman.      Killed  at  Pendleton,  Ky.,  by  guerrillas,  October 

5,  1865. 

Captain  Orin  M.  Lewis.     Killed  in  action  at  Richmond,  Ky.,  August  30,  1862. 
Captain  W.  W.  Culbertson.     Died,  September  22,  1862,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

Captain  Charles  S.  Williams.     Died  of  disease,  January  14,  1865. 
Eirst  Lieut.  James  Dunlap.     Killed  in  action  at  Richmond,  Ky.,  August  30, 

1862. 
Second  Lieut.  John  W.  Washburn.     Killed  in  action  at  Richmond,  Ky.,  August 

30,  1862. 

Nineteenth  Kentucky  Infantry. 

Captain  Aaron  Blakeman.     Died,  July  11,  1861,  at  Cumberland  Gap,  Tenn. 

Twenty-first  Kentucky  Infantry. 
Colonel  Ethelbert  Dudley.    Died  of  disease,  February  20,  1862,  at  Columbus, 

Ky. 

Captain  Williamson  Irvin.     Died  of  disease,  January  21,  1862. 
Captain  William  C.  Edwards.     Died  of  disease,  January  27,  1862,  at  Campbell- 

ville,  Ky. 

Captain  Zachariah  Taylor.     Died  of  disease,  February  7,  1862. 
Captain  G.  W.  Twyman.     Died  at  Lexington,  Ky.,  February  16,  1865. 
First  Lieut.  Sebastian  Stone.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  January  2,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Hugh  A.  Hedger.     Killed  at  Nashville,  December  15,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  James  I.  Bolton.     Died  at  Indianola,  Texas,  July  17,  1865. 
Second  Lieut.  John  H.  Bevill.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  January  2,  1863. 

Twenty-third  Kentucky  Infantry. 
Lieut.  Colonel  James  C.  Foy.     Died  of  wounds  received  at  Vining's"  Station, 

July  24,  1864. 
Captain  Ephraim  P.  MaVfay.     Died  at  Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  September  17,  1864, 

of  wounds  received  in  action. 
First  Lieut.  John  B.  Konnan.    Died,  July  26, 1864,  of  wounds  received  in  action, 

at  Chattanooga,  Tenn. 
First  Lieut.  Joseph  C.  Hoffman.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

Twenty-eighth  Kentucky  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  Granville  J.  Sinkham.     Killed  at  Franklin,  Tenn.,  in  action,  No- 
vember 30,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Isaac  Everet.     Died,  January  8,  1863,  at  Louisville,  Ky. 

MARYLAND. 

Third  Maryland  Infantry. 
First  Lieut.  Frederick  Pringey.     Died  January  3,  1863. 

MASSACHUSETTS. 

Thirty-third  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  William  P.  Mudge,  Adjutant.     Killed  in  action,  Lookout  Valley, 
October  29,  1863. 


412  APPENDIX. 

First  Lieut.  Edgar  L.  Bumpers.     Killed  in  action  at  Resaca,  May  15, 1864. 
First  Lieut.  Henry  J.  Parker.     Killed  in  action  at  Resaca,  May  15,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Joseph  P..  Burrage.     Killed  in  action,  Lookout  Valley,  October 

29,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  James  Hill.     Killed  in  action,  Lookout  Valley,  October  29, 1863. 
Second  Lieut  Oswego  Jones.     Died,  November  12, 1863,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

MICHIGAN. 

First  Michigan  Mechanics  and  Engineers. 
Captain  James  W.  Sligh.     Died  by  railroad  accident,  November  15,  1863. 

Second  Michigan  Cavalry. 

Captain  Philo.  W.  Rodgers.     Died,  May1 17,  1862,  at  Evansville,  Ind. 

Captain  James  Hawley.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Russel  T.  Dawon.  Killed  in  action,  at  Florence,  Ala.,  October  7, 
1864. 

First  Lieut.  James.  P.  Scott,  R.  Q.  M.  Shot  himself  accidentally,  at  Cleve- 
land, Tenn.,  May  15,  1865. 

Fourth  Michigan  Cavalry. 
First  Lieut.  Edward  L.  Tucker.     Died,  October  7,  1863,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 
First  Lieut.  Theodore  W.  Sutton.     Killed  in  action,  at  Noonday  Church,  June 

20,  1864. 

Second  Lieut.  Charles  F.  McKenzie.     Died  November  18,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Aaron  F.  Ismon.     Died,  December  21,  1863,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  Smith  Randolp.     Died,  May  30,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 

Kingston,  Ga. 

Battery  "-4,"  Michigan  Light  Artillery. 
First  Lieut.  George  W.  Van  Pelt.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19, 1863. 

Ninth  Michigan  Infantry. 

Captain  Albert  Nye.    Died,  June  23,  1862,  at  Murfreesboro,  Tenn. 
First  Lieut.  Joseph  H.  Jott.     Died,  March  16,  1862,  at  Elizabethtown,  Ky.,  of 

disease. 
First  Lieut.  Charles  T.  Fox.     Died,  September  22,  1862,  of  wounds  received 

in  action. 
Second  Lieut.  Lambert  Bafshite.     Died,  February  19,  1862,  of  disease,  at 

Elizabethtown,  Ky. 
Second  Lieut.  Alpheus  Chase.     Killed  at  Murfreesboro,  Tenn.,  in  action,  July 

13,  1862. 

Tenth  Michigan  Infantry. 

Major  James  J.  Scarritt.     Died,  November  16,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Nashville, 

Tenn. 

Major  Henry  S.  Burnett.     Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1,  1864. 
Captain  Bradford  Cook.     Died,  June  29,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in  action. 
Captain  Hannibal  H.  Ninus.     Died,  September  3,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 

Jonesboro. 
First  Lieut.  Sylvester  D.  Cowles,  Adjutant.     Died  May  26,  1862. 


APPENDIX.  413 

First  Lieut.  Daniel  Leach.     Died,  July  7,  1862,  of  disease. 

First  Lieut.  Frank  M.  Vanderburgh.     Died,  April  18,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

in  action. 

Second  Lieut.  Richard  Teal.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  John  Knox.     Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1,  1864. 

Eleventh  Michigan  Infantry. 

Major  Benjamin  G.  Bennet.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25,  1863. 

Captain  David  Oakes,  Jun.     Died,  January  30,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Murfrees- 
boro,  Tenn. 

Captain  Charles  W.  Newbury.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Christopher  C.  Haight.     Died,  February  5,  1862,  of  disease,  at 
Bardstown,  Ky. 

First  Lieut.  Joseph  Wilson.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  30,  1862. 

First  Lieut.  Thomas  Flynn.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

First  Lieut.  Edward  U.  Catlin.     Died,  August  7,  1864,  of  wounds  received  be- 
fore Atlanta,  Ga. 

Thirteenth  Michigan  Infantry. 

Major  Williard  G.  Eaton.     Killed  at  Bentonville,  March  19,  1865. 

Captain  Clement  C.  Webb.     Died,  February  4,  1863,  of  wounds  received  in 
action. 

Captain  Clark  D.  Fox.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

Captain  Daniel  B.  Hosmer.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Jerome  S.  Bigelow.     Died,  May  28,  1862,  of  disease. 

Fourteenth  Michigan  Infantry. 

Captain  John  C.  Lind.     Died,  August  8,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Saginaw,  Mich. 
Captain  James  J.  Jeffres.     Died,  July  10,  1864,  at  Chattanooga,  Tenn. 
First  Lieut.  Joseph  Kirk.     Killed  before  Atlanta,  Ga.,  August  8,  1864. 

Nineteenth  Michigan  Infantry. 

Colonel  Henry  C.  Gilbert.     Died,  May  24, 1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Resaca 

Major  Eli  A.  Griffin.     Died,  June  16,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Golgotha 
Church,  Ga. 

Captain  Charles  H.  Calmer.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  15,  1864. 

Captain  Charles  W.  Bigelow.     Died,  May  29,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  New 
Hope  Church. 

Captain  Leonard  Gibbon.     Killed  at  Averysboro,  March  16,  1865. 

First  Lieut.  Charles  G.  Parsel.     Killed  at  Averysboro,  March  16,  1865. 

Second  Lieut.  Charles  Mandeville.     Killed  at  New  Hope  Church,  May  25, 
1864. 

Twenty-first  Michigan  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  William  L.  Whipple.     Died  November  16,  1862. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Morris  B.  Wells.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 

Captain  Leonard  0.  Fitzgerald.     Died,  January  8,  1863,  of  wounds. 

Captain  Edgar  W.  Smith.     Died,  October  16, 1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Chick- 
amauga. 

First  Lieut.  Herman  Hunt.     Died,  December  16,  1862,  of  disease. 


414  APPENDIX. 

Twenty-second  Michigan  Infantry. 

€olonel  Moses  Wisner.     Died,  January  5,  1863,  at  Lexington,  Ky. 
Captain  Henry  Carlton.     Killed  on  railroad,  June  6,  1863. 
Captain  Elijah  Snell.     Died,  September  25,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Chick- 

amauga. 
Captain  William  Augustus  Smith.     Died,  October  11,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

in  action. 

Captain  Alexander  G.  Golbraith.     Died,  April  1,  1865,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  John  Sackett.     Died,  January  1,  1863,  at  Cincinnati,  Ohio. 
Second  Lieut,  Joseph  R.  Nute.     Died,  October  8,  1864,  in  prison,  at  Millen, 

Ga. 

MINNESOTA. 

Second  Minnesota  Battery. 

First  Lieut.  Albert  Woodbury.  Died,  October  29,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 
Chickamauga. 

Second  Minnesota  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  Henry  C.  Simpson.     Died  December  1,  1861. 

First  Lieut.  Charles  Haven.     Died,  March  4,  1862,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  Samuel  G.  Trimble.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 

1863, 
Second  Lieut.  John  C.  Jones.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  18,  1864. 

MISSOURI. 

Battery  "  G,"  Missouri  Light  Artillery 
First  Lieut.  R.  C.  M.  Taliaferro.    Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1865. 

Second  Missouri  Infantry. 

Colonel  Frederick  Schaefer.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Captain  Walter  Hoppe.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
Captain  Charles  Deyhle.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
Captain  Herman  Hartmann.     Died,  December  7,  1863,  of  wounds. 
First  Lieut.  William  Aulbach.     Killed  accidentally,  at  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  Decem- 
ber 31,  1863. 

Fifteenth  Missouri  Infantry. 

Captain  M.  Zimmermann.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Captain  John  V.  Krebs.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 

Captain  John  G.  Rees.  Died,  December  19,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Mis- 
sionary Ridge. 

Captain  William  Hark.     Killed  at  Franklin,  November  30,  1864. 

Captain  Joseph  B.  Vourdon.     Killed  accidentally,  June  12,  1865. 

First  Lieut.  Martin  Schroeder,  Adjutant.  Died,  January  19,  1863,  of  wounds 
received  at  Stone  River. 

First  Lieut.  Hermann  C.  Koerner.    Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20, 1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Christian  Guinzius.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Second  Lieut.  Charles  Kellner.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 


APPENDIX.  415 

Twenty-third  Missouri  Infantry. 

Major  John  McCullougli.     Died,  October  7,  1863,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut.  William  P.  Harlbut.     Died,  November  24,  1862,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut.  William  0.  Seaman.     Died,  July  31,  1864,  of  wounds. 
First  Lieut.  N.  Judson  Camp.     Killed  accidentally,  August  4,  1864. 
Chaplain  James  M.  Oyler.     Died,  December  30,  1862,  of  disease. 

NEW   JERSEY. 

Thirteenth  New  Jersey  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  Peter  M.  Eyerson.      Died,  July  1,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 
action. 

Thirty-third  New  Jersey  Infantry. 

Captain  Samuel  F.  Waldron.     Killed  in  action,  November  23,  1863. 

Captain  William  G.  Boggs.     Died,  December  19,  1863,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

Captain  Henry  C.  Bartlett.     Killed,  May  8,  1864,  at  Rocky  Face  Ridge,  Ga. 
Captain  Charles  J.  Field.     Died,  June  5,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in  action. 
First  Lieut.  Joseph  L.  Miller.     Killed  May  8,  1864,  at  Rocky  Face  Ridge,  Ga. 
First  Lieut.  William   H.   Cochrane.      Killed,  June  25,  1864,  before   Kenesaw 

Mountain. 

Battery  "  //'  New  Jersey  Light  Artillery. 

Captain  Nicholas  Sohm.     Died,  May  1,  1864,  of  disease. 

Second  Lieut.  Francis  Henchew.     Killed  before  Atlanta,  July  27,  1864. 

Thirteenth  New  Jersey  Battery. 
Captain  William  Wheeler.     Killed  at  Culp's  Farm,  June  22,  1864. 

NEW   YORK. 

Fifty-eighth  New  York  Infantry. 
Captain  Albert  Von  Rosenburg.     Died  May  3,  1864. 
Chaplain  Anthony  Zyla.     Died,  April  5,  1865,  of  disease,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 

Sixtieth  New  York  Infantry. 
First  Lieut.  John  E.  Wilson.     Killed  near  Golgotha,  Ga.,  June  18,  1864. 

One  Hundred  and  Second  New  York  Infantry. 

Major  Gilbert  M.  Elliott.     Killed  in  action  at  Lookout  Mountain,  November  24, 
1863. 

One  Hundred  and  Seventh  New  York  Infantry. 

Major  Lathrop  Baldwin.     Died  July  30,  1864. 

Captain  John  F.  Knox.     Died,  May  29,  1864,  of  wounds  received  near  Dallas, 

Ga. 
Second  Lieut.  John  D.  Hill.     Killed,  near  Dallas,  Ga.  (New  Hope  Church) 

May  25,  1864. 

One  Hundred  and  Nineteenth  New  York  Infantry. 
Lieut.  Colonel  Edward  F.  Lloyd.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  15,  1864. 


416  APPENDIX. 

One  Hundred  and  Twenty-third  New  York  Infantry. 
Colonel  Archibald  L.  McDougall.     Died,  June  23,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 

New  Hope  Church. 

Captain  Henry  O'Wily.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  John  H.  Daicy.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20,  1864. 

One  Hundred  and  Thirty-fourth  New  York  Infantry. 
Captain  Edwin  Forrest.      Died,  May  20,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Rocky 

Face  Ridge. 
First  Lieut.  C.  P.  Hunter.     Accidentally  drowned  in  North  River,  March  llf 

1864. 
First  Lieut.  Charles  A.  Ahreetz.     Killed  at  Savannah,  Ga.,  December  13,  1864, 

One  Hundred  and  Thirty-sixth  New  York  Infantry. 
First  Lieut.  Charles  F.  Tresser.     Died,  December  16,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

in  action  at  Chattanooga. 
First  Lieut.  William  C.  Hall.     Died,  May  27,  1864,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 

One  Hundred  and  Thirty-seventh  New  York  Infantry. 

Colonel  David  Ireland.  Died,  September  10,  1864,  of  disease,  at  Atlanta,  Ga. 
First  Lieut.  George  C.  Owen.  Killed  at  Lookout  Mountain,  November  24, 1864. 
Assistant  Surgeon  Taylor  Elmore.  Died,  May  25,  1864,  at  Chattanooga,  Tenn. 

One  Hundred  and  Forty-first  New  York  Infantry. 
Colonel  William  K.  Logic.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Alfred  E.  Barber.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  15,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Theodore  M.  Warren.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Eugene  Egbert.    Died,  December  18,  1864,  of  disease. 

One  Hundred  and  Forty-third  New  York  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Joseph  B.  Taft,  Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 1863. 
First  Lieut.  William  M.  Ratcliff,  Adjutant.  Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July 

20,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Peter  L.  Waterbury.     Died,  July  24,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 

Peach  Tree  Creek. 
First  Lieut.  R.  M.  J.  Hordenbough.     Died,  March  15,  1865,  of  wounds  received 

in  action. 
Second  Lieut.  Edward  Carrington.      Killed  in  action  at  Natural  Bridge,  Fla., 

March  6,  1865. 

One  Hundred  and  Forty-ninth  New  York  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Charles  B.  Randall.  Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20, 1864. 
Captain  David  J.  Lindsay.  Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20,  1864. 

One  Hundred  and  Fiftieth  New  York  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  Edgar  P.  Welling.     Died,  October  21,  1863,  at  Tallahoma,  Tenn. 
First  Lieut.  Henry  Gridley.     Killed  in  action  at  Gulp's  Farm,  June  22,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  David  B.  Sleight.     Killed  at  Averysboro,  March  16,  1865. 
Second  Lieut.  John  Sweet.     Died  August  13,  1864. 


APPENDIX.  417 

One  Hundred  and  Fifty-fourth  New  York  Infantry. 
Captain  Alanson  Crosby.     Died,  July  9,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in  action. 

l  ,  OHIO. 

Brigadier  General  Robert  L.  McCook.     Killed  in  ambulance,  April  1,  1862, 

near  New  Market,  Term. 

Brigadier  General  J.  W.  Sill.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Brigadier  General  W.  H.  Lytle.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
Brigadier  General  C.  G.  Harker.     Killed  at  Kenesaw,  June  27,  1864. 

First  Ohio  Cavalry. 

Colonel  Minor  Millikin.      Killed  in  action  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Lieut.  Colonel  Valentine  Cupp.     Died,  September  20, 1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Chickamauga. 

Major  David  A.  B.  Moore.     Killed  in  action,  December  31, 1862,  at  Stone  River. 
Captain  Andrew  B.  Emery.     Died,  July  15, 1862,  of  wounds  received  in  action. 
Captain  John  H.  Robinson.     Died  October  31,  J862. 
Captain  William  H.  Scott.     Died,  September  22,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

Second  Lieut.  John  M.  Renick.     Died,  May  28,  1862,  at  Corinth,  Miss. 
Second  Lieut.  Ira  Stevens.     Died,  October  31,  1862,  at  Danville,  Ky. 
Second  Lieut.  Timothy  L.  Condit.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Third  Ohio  Cavalry. 

Captain  Daniel  Gotshall.    Died,  June  17,  1862,  of  disease. 
Captain  William  B.  Amsden.     Died,  June  19,  1862,  at  Fremont,  Ohio. 
Captain  Richard  B.  Wood.     Killed,  February  23,  1864,  in  action,  at  Dalton, 

Ga. 
Captain  J.  Samuel  Clock.     Died,  July  2,  1865,  of  wounds  received  at  Macon, 

Ga. 

Second  Lieut.  William  G.  Goodnow.     Died,  May  27, 1862,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  Ralf  Devereaux.     Died,  June  21,  1862,  of  disease. 

Fourth  Ohio  Cavalry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  George  W.  Dobb.     Killed,  April  2,  1865,  at  Selma,  Ala. 
Captain  Jesse  P.  Wilson.     Killed,  February  20, 1862,  on  picket,  near  Nashville, 

Tenn. 

Captain  John  C.  Stewart.     Died,  November  18,  1864,  at  Cincinnati,  Ohio. 
Captain  Frank  Robie.     Killed,  April  2,  1865,  in  action,  at  Selma. 
First  Lieut.  Richard  W.  Neff.     Killed,  September  20,  1863,  at  Chickamauga. 

Tenth  Ohio  Cavalry. 

Captain  Samuel  E.  Norton.     Died,  December  5,  1864,  at  Waynesboro,  Ga. 
First  Lieut.  Henry  H.  Crooks.     Killed  in  action,  August  30,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  James  S.  Morgan.     Killed  in  action,  at  Bear  Creek,  Ga.,  Novem- 
ber 16,  1864. 
Surgeon  James  W.  Thompson.    Died,  November  25,  1864,  at  Wrightsville,  Pa. 


; 

418  APPENDIX. 

First  Ohio  Light  Artillery. 

Lieut.  Colonel  W.  E.  Lawrence.     Died,  November  26,  1864,  of  disease,  at  Mur- 
freesboro,  Term. 

Battery  "  B." 

Second  Lieut.  George  D.  Eldridge.     Died,  March  24,  1863,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 

Battery  "F." 
Second  Lieut.  John  Lynch.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

Battery  "/." 

Second  Lieut.  Charles  Kotzebue!     Died,  July  16,  1864.  of  wounds  received  at 
Kenesaw  Mountain. 

Sixth  Ohio  Battery. 

First  Lieut.  Oliver  H.  P.  Ayres.     Died,  July  8,  1864,  of  wounds. 

Twentieth  Ohio  Battery. 
First  Lieut.  Charles  F.  Nitschelm.     Died,  August  15,  1864,  at  Chattanooga, 

Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  John  S.  Burdick.     Killed  in  action,  at  Franklin,  Tenn.,  November 
30,  1864. 

First  Ohio  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  John  W.  Jackson.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Sylvanus  S.  Dixon.     Killed  in  action,  near  Dallas,  Ga.,  May  27, 
1864. 

First  Lieut.  George  J.  Grove.     Killed  in  action,  near  Dallas,  Ga.,  May  27, 1864. 

First  Lieut.  Alexander  Varian.     Died,  June  2,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 
Resaca. 

Second  Lieut.  Christopher  Wollenhaupt.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  Novem- 
ber 25,  1863. 

Second  Ohio  Infantry. 

Colonel  John  Kell.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Captain  Alexander  S.  Berryhill.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 

Captain  John  Herrel.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 

Captain  John  C.  Hazlett.     Died,  June  7,  1863,  at  Murfreesboro,  Tenn. 

Captain  Jacob  Fotrel.     Killed  in  action,  at  Resaca,  May  14,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Richard  S.  Chambers.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

First  Lieut.  Lafayette  Van  Horn.     Died,  January  14,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Stone  River. 

First  Lieut.  George  W.  Landrum.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20, 1863. 
First  Lieut.  John  W.  Thomas,  Adjutant.     Killed  in  action  before  Atlanta,  Ga., 

July  20,  1864. 

Third  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  Leonidas  McDougal.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
Captain  Henry  E.  Cunard.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  C.  L.  Starr.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  James  St.  John.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
Surgeon  R.  R.  McMeens.    ,  1862. 


APPENDIX.  419 

Fifth  Ohio  Infantry 

Colonel  John  H.  Patrick.     Killed  at  New  Hope  Church,  Ga.,  May  25,  1864. 
Major  Henry  E.  Symmes.     Died  July  9,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Henry  A.  Fortman,  Adjutant.     Died,  September  28,  1864,  of  dis- 
ease. 

Sixth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Major  Samuel  C.  Erwin.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25,  1863. 
Captain  Ezekiel  H.  Tatem.     Killed  by  railroad  accident,  July  19,  1862. 
Captain  Henry  McAlpin.     Died,  December  31,  1862,  of  wounds  received  at 

Stone  River. 
First  Lieut.  Albert  G.  Williams,  Adjutant.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December 

31,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  Charles  H.  Foster.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Seventh  Ohio  Infantry. 

Colonel  William  R.  Creighton.     Killed  at  Ringgold,  Ga.,  November  27,  1863. 
Lieut.  Colonel  Orrin  J.  Crane.     Killed  at  Ringgold,  Ga.,  November  27,  1863. 

Ninth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  Gustav  Richter.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
Captain  Ferdinand  Mueller.     Died,  September  25,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Chickamauga. 

Captain  John  Gansen.     Died,  October  28, 1863,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut.  Henry  Liedke.     Died,  September  22,  1863,  of  wounds  received  in 

action  at  Chickamauga. 
First  Lieut.  Theodore  Lammers.     Died,  October  7, 1863,  of  wounds  received  in 

action  at  Chickamauga. 
Second  Lieut.  Raymond  Hermann.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19, 

1863. 
Assistant  Surgeon  James  Davenport.     Died  March  29,  1863. 

Tenth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  Charles  F.  Nickel.     Died,  November  3,  1862,  of  wounds. 
Captain  James  M.  Fitzgerald.     Died,  November  17,  1863,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut.  John  S.  Mulroy.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  Sebastian  Eustachio.     Died,  August  1,  1861,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  William  Porter.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 

Eleventh  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  David  K.  Curtis.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  George  E.  Peck.     Died,  November  26,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 
Missionary  Ridge. 

Thirteenth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Colonel  Joseph  G.  Hawkins.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Lieut.  Colonel  Elhanon  M.  Mart.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
Captain  Isaac  R.  Gardner.      Died,  May  31,  1862,  of  wounds  received  at  Shiloh. 
Captain  Thomas  F.  Murdock.     Killed,  September  20,  1863,  at  Chickamauga. 
Captain  Thomas  J,  Loudon.      Drowned,  September  29,  1863,  in  Mississippi 
River. 


420  APPENDIX. 

Captain  Samuel  McCulloch.     Died,  May  28,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in  action. 
First  Lieut.  James  A.  Leisure,  E.  Q.  M.     Died,  October  17,  1861,  at  Gallipolis, 

Ohio. 
First  Lieut.  John  Murphy.      Died,  January  10,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Stone  River. 

Second  Lieut.  James  C.  Whittaker.     Killed  at  Stone  Eiver,  December  31, 1862. 
Second  Lieut.  John  Fox.      Died,  January  1,  1863,  of  wounds  receivedat  Stone 

Eiver. 

Fourteenth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Major  John  W.  Wilson.'    Died  October  3,  1864. 

Captain  Wilbur  F.  Spofford.     Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Walter  B.  Kirk.     Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Ebenezer  C.  Tillotson.     Died,  September  24,  1864,  on  Lookout 

Mountain,  Tenn. 

Second  Lieut.  Charles  B.  Mitchell.     Died  September  28,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Nathaniel  0.  Cobb.     Died,  October  3,  1864,  of  wounds  received 

at  Jonesboro. 

Fifteenth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  James  C.  Cummins.     Died,  February  19,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 
First  Lieut.  Thomas  N.   Hanson.      Killed  at  Nashville,  Tenn.,  December  16, 

1864. 

Fist  Lieut.  Charles  J.  Eodig.     Killed  at  Nashville,  Tenn.,  December  16,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Andrew  E.  Smiley.     Killed  in  action,  June  24,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Nicholas  M.  Fowler.      Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20, 

1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Frank  W.  Sanders.     Died  November  26,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Andrew  L.  Hadden.     Killed  in  action,  June  14,  1864. 
Surgeon  Henry  Spellman.     Died,  June  9,  1862,  of  disease. 

Sixteenth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  William  Spangler.     Died,  January  19,  1862,  of  disease. 
Captain  Joseph  Edgar.     Killed  near  Tazewell,  Tenn.,  August  6,  1862. 

Seventeenth  Ohio  Infantry. 
Major  Benjamin  F.  Butterfield.     Died,  December  16,  1863,  of  wounds  received 

at  Missionary  Eidge. 

Captain  Ezra  Eicketts.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Jacob  Humphreys.     Died,  December  21,  1861,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut.  Theodore  C.  Stewart.     Killed  at  Eesaca,  May  14,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Lyman  W.  Barnes.     Killed  in  action,  August  5, 1864. 
First  Lieut.  Jacob  M.  Euffner,  Adjutant.    Killed  before  Atlanta,  August  9, 1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Eichard  T.  Foster.     Died  June  15,  1864. 

Eighteenth  Ohio  Infantry. 
Captain  George  Stivers.     Died,  January  4,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Stone 

Eiver. 
Captain  Philip  E.  Taylor.     Died,  January  5,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Stone 

Eiver. 


APPENDIX.  421 

Captain  Ashbel  Fenton.      Died,  April  14,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Stone 

River. 

Captain  George  W.  Dunkle.   ,  Died,  June  9,  1863,  of  disease. 
Captain  Ebenezer  Grosvenor.     Killed  at  Nashville,  Tenn.,  December  15,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  William  W.  Blacker.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31, 1862. 
Second  Lieut.  Samuel  W.  Thomas.     Killed  at  Nashville,  Tenn.,  December  15, 

1864. 

Nineteenth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Major  Timothy  D.  Edwards.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April  7,  1862. 

Captain  W.  Rakestraw.     Died,  December  17,  1861,  at  Columbus,  Ky. 

Captain  Franklin  E.  Stowe.    Died,  April  30, 1862,  at  Pittsburgh  Landing,  Tenn. 

Captain  Urwin  Bean.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  January  2,  1863. 

Captain  Uriah  W.  Irwin.    Died,  December  6, 1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Chick- 

amauga. 

Captain  Charles  Brewer.     Killed  in  action  at  Picket  Mills,  May  27,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Samuel  F.  Lentz.     Died,  February  16,  1862,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut.  Daniel  Donovan.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  Job  D.  Bell.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  William  F.  McHenry.     Killed  before  Atlanta,  August  24,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  D.  W.  Heldenbrand.     Died,  July  21,  1862,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 
Second  Lieut.  J.  Stanley  Cochran.     Died,  May  6,  1865,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 
Assistant  Surgeon  James   H.  Biteman.      Died,  September  25,  1865,  near  San 

Antonia,  Texas. 

Twenty-first  Ohio  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Dwella  M.  Stoughton.  Died,  November  19,  1863,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived at  Chickamauga. 

Captain  Daniel  Lewis.     Killed  before  Atlanta,  July  21,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Amos  E.  Wood.     Died.  June  14,  1863,  at  Murfreesboro,  Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  Robert  S.  Dilworth.     Killed  June  27,  1864. 

Second  Lieut.  Enoch  B.  Wiley.  Died,  June  5,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 
Stone  River. 

Second  Lieut.  Asa  C.  Spafford.     Died,  October  14,  1864,  at  Columbia,  S.  C. 

Twenty-fourth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Colonel  Frederick  C.  Jones.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Major  Henry  Terry.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Captain  Enoch  Weller.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  January  2,  1863. 

Captain  Dewitt  C.  Wadsworth.  Died,  September  21,  1863,  of  wounds  received 
at  Chickamauga. 

Captain  Isaac  N.  Dryden.  Died,  October  1,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Chick- 
amauga. 

First  Lieut.  Charles  R.  Harman.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Twenty-sixth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  William  H.  Ross.  Died,  September  20,  of  wounds  received  at  Chick- 
amauga. 

First  Lieut.  David  McClelland.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  Francis  M.  Williams.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  James  W.  Burbridge.    Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19, 1863. 


422  APPENDIX. 

Second  Lieut.  John  W.  Ruley.     Killed  at  Chickamaoga,  September  19,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Samuel  G.  Platt.     Killed  near  Dallas,  Ga.,  June  4,  1864. 

Twenty-ninth  Ohio  Infantry- 
Major  Myron  T.  Wright.      Died,  January  7,  1865,  of  wounds  received  before 

Savannah,  Ga. 

First  Lieut.  Winthrop  H.  Grant.     Killed  at  Rocky  Face  Ridge,  May  8,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  John  W.  Dice.     Died,  June  17,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Kene- 
saw  Mountain. 

Thirty-first  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  David  C.  Rose.     Died,  December  26,  1861,  of  disease. 

Captain  James  A.  Cahill.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  23,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  James  K.  Rochester.      Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25r 

1863. 

Thirty-third  Ohio  Infantry. 

Major  Joshua  V.  Robinson.     Died,.  March  23,  1862,  at  Portsmouth,  Ohio. 
Major  Ephraim  J.  Ellis.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
Captain  Samuel  A.  Currie.     Died,  April  16,  1862,' at  Shelbyville,  Tenn. 
Captain  William  McKain.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  14,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Charles  R.  Pomeroy,  Jun.     Killed,  before  Atlanta,  August  13, 1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Enos  A.  Holmes.  •  Died,  December  24,  1861,  at  Elizabethtownr 

Ky. 

Second  Lieut.  Joseph  H.  Cole.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Edgar  J.  Higby.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  14,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Francis  M.  Campbell.     Died,  July  22,  1864,  of  wounds. 
Second  Lieut.  John  E.  Sykes.     Killed  in  action,  September  6,  1864. 

Thirty-fifth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  John  S.  Earhart.     Died,  August  10,  1863,  at  Winchester,  Tenn. 
Captain  Oliver  H.  Parshall.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19, 1863. 
Captain  Joel  K.  Deardorf.     Died,  October  8, 1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Chick 

amauga. 

Captain  David  M.  Gans.     Died,  November  25,  1863,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut.  Thomas  M.  Harlan.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  James  Sabin.     Died,  June  16,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in  action. 

Thirty-sixth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Colonel  William  G.  Jones.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
Captain  James  C.  Selby.     Died,  September  14,  1864,  of  wounds. 
Second  Lieut.  William  A.  Rhodes.     Died,  October  11, 1863,  of  wounds  received 

in  action. 

Thirty-eighth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Colonel  Edward  H.  Phelps.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25,  1863, 

Colonel  William  A.  Choate.     Died,  September  12,  1864,  of  wounds. 

Captain  John  H.  Adams.     Died,  December  10,  1862,  of  disease. 

Captain  Edgar  M.  Denchar.     Died,  September  4,  1864,  of  wounds. 

Captain  John  Crosson.     Died,  September  10,  1864,  of  wounds. 

First  Lieut.  James  C.  Betts.     Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1,  1864. 

Second  Lieut.  Alphonso  L.  Braucher.     Died,  January  29,  1862,  of  disease. 


APPENDIX.  423 

Second  Lieut.  John  Lewis.     Killed  at  Missionary  Eidge,  November  25,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Joseph  Newman.     Died,  December  12,  1863,  of  wounds. 
Second  Lieut.  James  McQuillen.     Died,  October  2,  1864,  of  wounds. 

Fortieth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Major  Thomas  Acton.     Killed  at  Lookout  Mountain,  November  24,  1864. 
Captain  Clements  F.  Snodgrass.     Killed  before  Atlanta,  July  1,  1864. 
Captain  John  C.  Meagher.     Died,  August  15,  1864,  at  Liberty,  Ohio. 
First  Lieut.  Cyrenius  Van  Mater.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20, 1863. 
First  Lieut.  Daniel  Collett.     Died,  May  30,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Look- 
out Mountain. 
First  Lieut.  Charles  Converse.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  30,  1864. 

Forty-first  Ohio  Infantry. 
Captain  William  W.  Munn.     Died,  December  2,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Missionary  Ridge. 

Captain  William  Hansard.     Died,  January  9,  1865,  of  wounds. 
First  Lieut.  Franklin  E.  Pancoast.     Died,  May  16,  1862,  of  wounds  received  at 

Shiloh. 

First  Lieut.  Calvin  C.  Hart.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  Lester  T.  Patchin.     Died,  January  18,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Stone  River. 

First  Lieut.  Samuel  B.  Asdel,  Adjutant.     Died,  November  17,  1863,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut  Henry  S.  Dirlam.     Died,  December  18, 1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Missionary  Ridge. 

Second  Lieut.  Chauncey  H.  Talcott.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April  7,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  William  W.  Watson.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 

1863. 

Forty-ninth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Levi  Drake.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Captain  Amos  Keller.     Died,  January  1,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Stone 

River. 

Captain  Hiram  Chance.     Killed  at  Liberty  Gap,  June  24,  1863. 
Captain  Shepherd  Green.     Died,  November  27,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 
First  Lieut.  Aaron  H.  Keller.     Died,  January  27,  1863,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

First  Lieut.  Jacob  C.  Miller.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Silas  W.  Simons.      Killed  in  action,  at  Pickett's  Mills,  May  27, 

1864, 
First  Lieut.  John  C.  Ramsey.     Killed  in  action,  at  Pickett's  Mills,  May  27, 

1864. 

First  Lieut.  Theodore  A.  Pesso.     Killed,  August  25,  1864,  at  Vining's  Station. 
First  Lieut.  John  K.  Gibson.     Died,  January  25,  1865,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 
Second  Lieut.  Henry  F.  Arndt.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 

1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Issac  H.  White.     Killed  at   Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 

1863. 


424  APPENDIX. 

Second  Lieut.  Jacob  Wolf.     Died,  December  16,  1863,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

Second  Lieut.  William  F.  Gibbs.     Killed  at  Pickett's  Mills,  May  27,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Charles  Wallace.     Died,  June  23,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

Fifty-first  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  Willium  Patton.     Died,  April  14,  1862,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 

Captain  Benjamin  F.  Heskett.     Died,  January  4,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Stone  River. 

Captain  Samuel  Stephens.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  20,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Frank  Shriver.     Died,  July  9,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in  action. 
Second  Lieut.  Willis  C.  Workman.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  22, 

1864. 

Fifty-second  Ohio  Infantry. 

Colonel  Daniel  McCook.     Died,  July  17,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Keuesaw 

Mountain. 

Captain  Salathiel  M.  Neighbor.     Died,  July  7,  1864,  of  wounds. 
Captain  Peter  C.  Schneider.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  19,  1864. 
Captain  James  M.  Summers.     Died,  April  16,  1865,  of  wounds. 
First  Lieut.  Ira  H.  Pool.     Died,  July  30,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Kenesaw 

Mountain. 
Second  Lieut,  James  H.  Donaldson.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  19, 

1864. 
Second  Lieut.  David  F.  Miser.     Died,  August  2,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 

Kenesaw  Mountain. 
Assistant  Surgeon  Arthur  J.  Rosa.     Died  February  20,  1864. 

Fifty-fifth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Colonel  Charles  B.  Gambee.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  15,  1864. 
Major  Rodolphus  Robbins.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  15,  1864. 
Captain  Albert  E.  Peck.     Killed  at  Averysboro,  March  16,  1865. 
Second  Lieut.  Edward  Bromley.     Killed  in  action,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  No- 
vember 24,  1863. 

Fifty-ninth  Ohio  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  Frank  H.  Woods.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  John  W.  Shinn.     Died,  June  17,  1863,  at  Stone  River  Ford, 

Tenn. 
Second  Lieut.  Jesse  Ellis.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

Sixty-first  Ohio  Infantry. 
Lieut.  Colonel  William  H.  H.  Brown.     Died,  September  5,  1864,  of  wounds,  at 

Chattanooga,  Tenu. 

Major  David  C.  Beckett.     Killed  in  action,  June  22,  1864. 
Captain  William  H.  McGroarty.     Killed  in  Lookout  Valley,  October  28,  1863. 
Captain  Edward  H.  Newcomb.     Killed  July  21,  1864. 


APPENDIX.  425 

Sixty-fourth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Colonel  Alexander  Mcllvaipe.     Killed  at  Rocky  Face  Ridge,  May  9,  1864 
Captain  Joseph  B.  Sweet.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Captain  John  K.  Ziegler.     Died,  September  20,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Chickamauga. 

Captain  Henry  H.  Kling.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Thomas  H.  Ehlers.     Killed  at  Rocky  Face  Ridge,  May  9,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  George  C.  Marshall.     Killed  neaj  Dallas,  Ga.,  May  27,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Thomas  McGill.     Died,  March  30,  1862,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 

Sixty-fifth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Major  Samuel  C.  Brown.     Died,  September  22,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 
Chickamauga. 

Captain  Jacob  Christophel.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Captain  Nahan  L.  Williams.      Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  July  27,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Horace  H.  Justice,  Adjutant.     Died,  February  14,  1862,  of  disease. 

First  Lieut.  Clark  S.  Gregg.     Died,  May  11,  1862,  of  disease,  at  St.  Louis,  Mo. 

First  Lieut.  William  H.  Massey,  Adjutant.     Died,  April  7,  1863,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived at  Stone  River. 

First  Lieut.  Nelson  Smith.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Jonas  Smith.     Died,  June  10,  1865,  from  accidental  injury. 

First  Lieut.  John  T.  Hyatt..    Died,  December  16,  1861,  of  disease. 

Second  Lieut.  George  N.  Huckins.     Died,  April  2,  1862,  of  disease. 

Second  Lieut.  John  R.  Parish.     Died  July  31,  1862. 

Second  Lieut.  Dolsen  Van  Kirk.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Second  Lieut.  Samuel  C.  Henwood.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19, 
1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Eben  Bingham.     Killed  at  Big  Shanty,  Ga.,  in  action,  June  18, 
1864. 

Sixty-sixth  Ohio  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  Harrison  Davis.     Killed  at  Ringgold,  Ga.,  November  27,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Joseph  W.  Hitt.     Killed  at  Dallas,  Ga.,  May  25,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  John  R.  Organ.     Killed  before  Atlanta,  July  20,  1864. 

Sixty-ninth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  Leonard  Counseller.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  January  2,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Joseph  W.  Boynton.     Died,  June  5,  1863,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

First  Lieut.  Jacob  S.  Pierson.  Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Martin  V.  Bailey.  Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  John  S.  Scott.  Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25,  1863t 

Seventy-first  Ohio  Infantry. 

Major  James  W.  Carlin.     Perished  on  Steamer  Sultana,  April  24,  1865. 
First  Lieut.  Nicholas  Eidemiller.     Died,  May  16;  1862,  at  Cincinnati,  Ohio. 
First  Lieut.  Eliah  A.  Widener.     Killed  at  Nashville,  Tenn.,  December  16, 1864. 
Second  Lieut.  William  S.  Hamilton.    Drowned  August  19,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  John  M.  Simmons.     Died,  August  24,  1863,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  Everah  C.  Le  Blond.     Killed  at  Nashville,  December  16,  1864. 


426  APPENDIX. 

Seventy-third  Ohio  Infantry. 
Captain  Luther  M.  Buchwalter.     Killed  in  Lookout  Valley,  October  29,  1863. 

Seventy-fourth  Ohio  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  W.  H.  H.  Moody.     Died,  September  28,  1864,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut.  Geosge  W.  Bricker.     Died,  September  15, 1864,  of  wounds  received 

in  action. 

Second  Lieut.  John  A.  McKee.     Drowned,  February  1,  1864,  at  Cincinnati,  0. 
Second  Lieut.  John  Scott.     Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1,  1864. 

Seventy-ninth  Ohio  Infantry. 
First  Lieut.  Isreal  D.  Compton.     Died,  December  31, 1862,  of  disease. 

Eighty-second  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  William  J.  Dick-son.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  15,  1864. 
Captain  William  Ballentine.      Died,  March  19,  1865,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 
Second  Lieut.  Asa  H.  Gary.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20, 1864. 

Eighty-ninth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  George  H.  DeBolt.     Died,  February  3,  1865,  at  Savannah,  Ga. 
First  Lieut.  J.  Riley  Dixon.     Died,  December  18,  1862,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut.  George  W.  Penn.      Died,  January  21,  1863,  at  Moscow,  0. 
First  Lieut.  Granville  Jackson.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Stephen  V.  Walker.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Dudly  King.       Died,   August   13,   1864,  of  wounds   received   ia 

action. 
First  Lieut.  Otho  P.  Fairfield.     Died,  October  8,  1864,  at  Columbia,  S.  C.,  a 

prisoner  of  war. 
Second  Lieut.  Clement  Thomas.     Died,  February  20,  1863,  of  disease. 

Ninetieth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Major  George  Angle.     Killed  near  Marietta,  Ga.,  July  2,  1864. 

Captain  Robert  D.  Caddy.     Killed^at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 

Captain  Thomas  Rains.     Killed  before  Atlanta,  August  19,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Daniel  N.  Kingery,  Adjutant.  Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September 
20,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Nelson  A.  Patterson.  Died,  October  10,  1863,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived at  Chickamauga, 

Ninety-second  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  John  Brown.  Died,  October  7,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Chicka- 
mauga, 

Captain  William  B.  Whittlesey.  Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 
1863. 

Captain  Edward  Grosvenor.     Died,  November  27,  1864,  of  disease. 

First  Lieut.  George  B.  Turner,  Adjutant.  Died,  December  1,  1863,  of  wounds 
received  at  Missionary  Ridge. 

Second  Lieut.  Hugh  Townsend.  Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 
1863. 


APPENDIX.  427 

Ninety-third  Ohio  Infantry. 

Colonel  Hiram.  Strong.  Died,  October  7,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Chicka- 
muaga. 

Major  William  Birch.  Died,  November  25,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Mis- 
sionary Ridge. 

Captain  John  Eastman.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  23,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  John  M.  Patterson.     Killed  at  Nashville,  December  16,  1864. 

Ninety-fourth  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  John  C.  Drury.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
Captain  David  Steel.     Died,  January  5,  1863,  of  wounds  received  in  action. 
First  Lieut.  John  A.  Beall.     Died,  January  2,  1863,  of  disease. 

Ninety-seventh  Ohio  Infantry. 

Captain  William  Berkshire.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  William  P.  Gardner.     Died,  November  30,  1862,  at  Scottsville,. 

Ky. 

Ninety-eighth   Ohio  Infantry. 

Colonel  George  Webster.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 

Lieut.  Colonel  James  M.  Shane.     Killed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27,  1864. 

Captain  William  C.  Lochary.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 

Captain  Armstrong  J.  Thomas.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 

Captaid  Robert  F.  Williams.  Died,  August  10,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 
Vining's  Station,  Ga. 

First  Lieut.  Samuel  A.  Rank.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 

First  Lieut.  William  McMillen.  Died,  October  27,  1862,  of  wounds  received  at 
Perryville. 

First  Lieut.  John  H.  Reeves,  Adjutant.  Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1, 
1864. 

First  Lieut.  John  M.  Banum.     Killed  at  Bentonville,  March  19,  1865. 

Second  Lieut.  Richard  B.  McGuire.  Died,  October  15,  1863,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived at  Chickamauga. 

Surgeon  F.  W.  Marseilles.     Died  April  23,  1864. 

PENNSYLVANIA. 

Seventh  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
Captain  James  Bryson.     Died  April  1,  1862. 
Captain  David   G.  May.      Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  Tenn.,  September  21, 

1863. 
Captain  James  G.  Taylor.     Killed  in  action  at  Lovejoy's  Station,  August  20, 

1864. 

Captain  Robert  McCormick.     Died,  December  29,  1864,  at  Bardstown,  Ky. 
First  Lieut.  Joseph  Castles.     Died,  March  13,  1862,  at  Munfordsville,  Ky. 
First  Lieut.  Amos  B.  Rhoads.     Killed  at  Shelby ville,  Tenn.,  June  27,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Chauncy  C.   Hermans.      Killed  in   action   at  Lovejoy's   Station, 

August  21,  1864.    ' 

First  Lieut.  Jacob  Sigman.     Killed  in  action  at  Selma,  April  2,  1865. 
Second  Lieut.  Harvey  H.  Best.     Died,  March  5, 1862,  of  disease,  at  Bardstown, 


428  APPENDIX. 

Second  Lieut.  Nicholas  Wynkoop.     Killed  in  action  at  Gallatin,  Tenn.,  August 

21,  1862. 

Second  Lieut.  Henry  W.  Lutz.     Died,  November  29,  1862,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 
Second  Lieut.  James  Henderson.    Died,  April  17,  1863,  at  Murfreesboro,  Tenn. 
Second  Lieut.  Henry  D.  Calkins.     Died  October  7,  1864. 
Surgeon  John  L.  Sherk.      Killed  by  guerrillas  at  Bardstown,  Ky.,  December 

29,  1864. 

Ninth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Thomas  C.  James.     Died,  January  13, 1863,  at  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
Captain  Hugh  W.  McCullough.      Killed  in   action   near  Tompkinsville,  Ky., 

June  6,  1862. 

Captain  Gilbert  Waters.     Killed  in  action  at  Shelby ville,  Tenn.,  June  28,  1863. 
Captain  John  Boal.     Killed  in  action,  March  16,  1865. 
First  Lieut.  Theophilus  J.  Mountz.     Killed  at  Dandridge,  Tenn.,  December  24, 

1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Isaac  B.  Kauffman.     Died  June  7,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  David  Nissley.     Died,  July  5,  1862,  at  Bowling  Green,  Ky. 
Second  Lieut.  Aaron  Sullivan.      Killed  in  action  at  Tompkinsville,  Ky.,  July 

9,  1862. 

Fifteenth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

Major  Adolph  B.  Rosengarten.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  29,  1862. 
Major  Frank  B.  Ward.     Died,  January  11,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Stone 

River. 
First  Lieut.  Harvey  S.  Lingle.     Killed  in  action  at  Mossy  Creek,  December  29, 

1863. 

Battery  "  B"  Independent  Pennsylvania  Artillery. 

Captain  Alanson  J.  Stevens.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863. 
Captain  Samuel  M.  McDowell.     Killed  in  action,  May  27,  1864. 

Battery  "  E,"  Independent  Pennsylvania  Artillery. 
Captain  Charles  A.  Atwell.     Died,  November  2,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Wauhatchie. 
First  Lieut.  Edward  R.  Geary,     Killed  at  Wauhatchie,  October  29,  1863. 

Twenty-seventh  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 

Major  Peter  A.  McAloon.     Died,  December  7,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Mis- 
sionary Ridge. 

Twenty-eighth  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  Peter  Kaylor.      Died,  December  5,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Ringgold,  Ga. 
Second  Lieut.  Isaiah  B.  Robison.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20, 1864. 

Twenty-ninth  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 

Second  Lieut.  William  Harrington.    Killed  by  railroad  accident,  March  4,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Ethan   0.  Fulce.      Killed  in  action,  near  Fayetteville,  N.  C., 
March  14,  1865. 


APPENDIX.  429 

Forty-sixth  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 

Captain  Dennis  H.  Cheesbro.     Killed  at  New  Hope  Church,  May  25,  1864. 

Captain  Sefrer  T.  Kettrer.  Died,  July  21,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Peach 
Tree  Creek. 

First  Lieut.  John  H.  Knipe.  Died,  May  15,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 
Resaca. 

First  Lieut.  Luther  R.  Witman,  Adjutant.  Died,  July  20,  1864,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived at  Peach  Tree  Creek. 

First  Lieut.  David  C.  Selheimer.  Died,  September  21, 1864,  of  wounds  received 
at  Peach  Tree  Creek. 

Second  Lieut.  John  W.  Phillips.     Killed  at  New  Hope  Church,  May  25,  1864. 

Second  Lieut.  Samuel  Wolf.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20,  1864. 

Second  Lieut,  Howell  J.  Davis.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20,  1864. 

Seventy-third  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 
Captain   Henry  Hess.       Died,  June   19,  1864,    of  wounds  received   at  Pine 

Knob,  Ga. 

Seventy-seventh  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 
Lieut.  Colonel  Peter  B.  Housuin.    Died,  December  31, 1862,  of  wounds  received 

at  Stone  River, 

Captain  John  E.  Walker.     Killed  before  Atlanta,  Ga.,  August  5, 1864. 
First  Lieut.  William  H.  Thomas.      Killed  in  action  at  Liberty  Gap,  June  25, 

1863. 
First  Lieut.  Henry  B.  Thompson.     Killed  at  Lovejoy's  Station,  September  3, 

1864. 
First  Lieut.  Alexander  T.  Baldwin.     Killed  at  Nashville,  December  16,  1864. 

Seventy-eight  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 
Captain  William  S.  Jack.     Died,  February  5,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Stone 

River. 

First  Lieut.  Adam  Lowry,  R.  Q.  M.     Died,  September  28,  1863,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut,  Matthew  J.  Halstead.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  January  2,  1863. 
Assistant  Surgeon  William  Morrow  Knox.     Killed  accidentally,  at  Louisville, 

Ky.,  April  27,  1862. 

Assistant  Surgeon  T.  P.  Tomlinson.     Died  September  7,  1865. 
/ 

Seventy-ninth  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 

Captain  John  H.  Dysart.    Died,  February  8,  1862,  of  disease,  at  Louisville,  Ky. 
Captain  Samuel  J.  Boone.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
Captain  Lewis  Heidegger.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Henry  J.  Test.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
Second  Lieut.  Frederick  Strasbaugh.     Died,  September  20,  1863,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived at  Chickamauga. 

One  Hundred  and  Ninth  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 
First  Lieut.  James  Glendening.     Killed  at  Wauhatchie,  October  29,  1863. 


430  APPENDIX. 

One  Hundred  and  Eleventh  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 

Colonel  George  A.  Cobham,  Jun.      Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20,  1864. 
Major  John  A.  Boyle.     Killed  at  Wauhatchie,  October  29,  1863. 
Captain  Charles  Woeltge.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  15,  1864. 
Captain  Martellus  H.  Todd.     Killed  at  New  Hope  Church,  May  25,  1864. 
Captain  Hiram  L.  Blodget.     Died,  August  5,  1864,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  Marvin  D.  Pettit.     Killed  at  Wauhatchie,  October  29,  1863. 

One  Hundred  and  Forty-seventh  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 
€aptain  Charles  S.  Davis.      Died,  November  28,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Taylor's  Ridge. 
€aptain  Samuel  F.  McKee.    Died,  June  25,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in,action. 

TENNESSEE. 

First  Tennessee  Cavalry. 

Captain  Alfred  J.  Lane.     Killed  in  action,  July  1,  1863. 
Captain  Elbert  J.  Canon.     Died,  January  3,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Mossy 

Creek. 
Captain  Nelson  Bowman.     Died,  October  22,  1864,  of  wounds,  at  Bull's  Gap, 

Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  Adam  L.  Whitehead.     Died, ,  1862. 

First  Lieut.  George  W.  Cox.     Died,  December  30,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Mossy  Creek. 
Second  Lieut.  John  Roberts.     Died,  July  29,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 
Second  Lieut.  Thomas  T.  Hull.     Died,  February  9,  1865,  at  Memphis,  Tenn. 

Second  Tennessee  Cavalry. 

Captain  James  H.  Morris.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  January  1,  1863. 
Captain  Aaron  G.  McReynolds.     Died,  October  27,  1864,  of  wounds  received 
in  action. 

Third  Tennessee  Cavalry. 

Major  Albert  C.  Catlett.     Died,  March  24,  1864,  of  disease,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 

Captain  Gid.  R.  Griffith.     Died,  July  11,  1863,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  John  W.  White.     Died,  March  16,  1863,  at  Murfreesboro,  Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  George  E.  Curton.     Killed  in  action,  September  25,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  Robert  B.  Eanter.     Died,  December  22,  1864,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 

Assistant  Surgeon  Frederick  Wagner.     Killed  in  action,  September  25,  1864. 

Fourth  Tennessee  Cavalry. 
{Japtain  Daniel  Meader.     Drowned  bathing,  August  8,  1863. 

Captain  Henry  C.  Kerner.     Died,  October  ,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

Captain  Robert  W.  Ragon.     Died,  June  4,  1865,  of  disease. 
Second  Lieut.  John  P.  Harper.     Died  April  14,  1865. 

Fifth  Tennessee  Cavalry. 

Captain  A.  T.  Julian.     Killed  in  action,  March  18,  1863. 
Surgeon  Joseph  B.  Moore.    Killed  by  guerrillas,  September  5,  1864. 


APPENDIX.  431 

Eighth  Tennessee  Cavalry. 

Captain  Willey  Galyou.     Died,  at  Nashville,  Tenn.,  March  25, 1864. 
First  Lieut.  Pryor  L.  Mason.     Killed  in  action,  July  29,  1863. 

Ninth  Tennessee  Cavalry. 
Captain  William  J.  Trotter.     Died  June  28,  1854. 

Tenth  Tennessee  Cavalry. 
Major  William  P.  Story.     Died,  December  27,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 
First  Lieut.  Judson  Wise.     Died,  June  3,  1864,  of  disease. 

Twelfth  Tennessee  Cavalry. 

Major  Sater  Boland.     Died,  December  HI,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in  action 
at  Franklin. 

Captain  Andrew  J.  Sullivan.     Killed 'by  guerrillas,  April  20,  1864. 

Captain  John  C.  Rodgers.     Killed  in  action,  June  14,  1864. 

Captain  John  C.  Penoyer.     Died,  July  14,  1864,  at  Pulaski,  Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  Chauncey  Cunningham.    Killed  in  action,  at  Florence,  Ala.,  August 
10,  1864. 

First  Lieut.  William  T.  Ford.     Killed  near  Shoal  Creek,  Ala.,  November  8, 
1864. 

Second  Lieut.  William  J.  Rankin.     Died,  December  18,  1864,  of  wounds  re- 
ceived in  action. 

Thirteenth  Tennessee  Cavalry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  William  H.  Ingerton.     Died,  December  8,  1864,  of  wounds. 
Captain  Richard  H.  Luttrell.     Died,  January  20,  1864,  at  Camp  Nelson,  Ky. 
Captain  James  B.  Wyatt.     Killed  in  action,  December  12,  1864. 
Captain  William  M.  Gourley.     Killed  in  action,  in  Marion;  Va.,  December  13, 
1864. 

First  Tennessee  Infantry. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Milton  L.  Phillips.     Died  December  25,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Thomas  Pierce.     Died,  January  17, 1863,  at  Murfreesboro,  Tenn. 

Second  Tennessee  Infantri 

Captain  William  H.  Cowan.     Died  April  12,  1862. 
Captain  Elihu  E.  Jones.     Died,  May  21,  1862,  of  disease. 
Captain  John  L.  Sneed.     Died,  February  14, 1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Stone 

River. 

Captain  Francis  M.  Skaggs.     Died,  May  19,  1863,  of  disease. 
First  Lieut  Abraham  Meyrs.     Died,  March  25,  1862,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

Second  Lieut.  John  Brown.     Died  February  13,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Charles  0.  McBee.     Killed  in  action,  October  14,  1863. 

Tenth  Tennessee  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  William  C.  Shelbey.     Killed  accidentally,  August  26,  1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Patrick  Sullivan.     Died,  September  16,  1862,  of  wounds. 
Assistant  Surgeon  Charles  Johnson.     Killed  by  a  fall  from  his  horse,  April  5. 
1863. 


f 
432  APPENDIX. 

WISCONSIN. 

First  Wisconsin  Cavalry. 

Second  Lieut.  Charles  Clinton.     Died,  March  29,  1864,  at  Murfreesboro,  Tenn. 
Second  Lieut.  Sheldon  E.  Vosburg.     Died,  April  16,  1865,  of  wounds  received 
in  action. 

Fifth  Wisconsin  Battery. 

Captain  Oscar  F.  Pinney.     Died,  February  17,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Stone  River. 
Second  Lieut.  Almon  Smith.     Died,  August  23,  1862,  of  disease. 

Eighth  Wisconsin  Battery. 
Captain  Stephen  J.  Carpenter.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

First  Wisconsin  Infantry. 

Captain  WiHiam  S.  Mitchell.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
Captain  Abner  0.  Heald.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Robert  J.  Nickles.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19, 1863. 
First  Lieut.  Charles  A.  Searles.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19, 1863. 
Second  Lieut.  Jarius  S.  Richardson.     Died,  October  5, 1863,  of  wounds  received    ' 

at  Chickamauga. 
Second  Lieut.  Collins  C.  McVean.     Died,  June  22,  1864,  of  wounds  received 

in  action. 
Assistant  Surgeon  Egbert  Jamieson.     Died,  June  17,  1863,  of  disease. 

Third  Wisconsin  Infantry. 

Captain  James  W.  Hunter.     Died,  June  8,  1864,  of  wounds  received  in  action. 
Captain  Thomas  E.  Orton.     Died,  July  25,  1864,  of  wounds  received  before  At- 
lanta, Ga. 

First  Lieut.  John  H.  Meigs.     Died  May  7,  1865. 
Chaplain  John  M.  Springer.     Died,  May  29, 1864,  of  wounds  received  at  Resaca. 

Tenth  Wisconsin  Infantry. 
Lieut.  Colonel  John  H.  Ely.     Died,  October  4,  1863,  of  wounds  received  in 

action. 

Major  Henry  0.  Johnson.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 
Captain  William  Moore.     Killed  by  guerrillas,  July  4,  1862. 
Captain  George  M.  West.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Robert  Rennie.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Chester  A.  Burdick.     Died,  September  17,  1864,  of  disease,  at 

Charleston,  S.  C. 

Thirteenth  Wisconsin  Infantry. 

Colonel  David  E.  Wood.     Died,  June  17, 1862,  of  disease. 
Captain  George  E.  Waldo.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April  7,  1862. 
Captain  Levi  W.  Vaughn.     Killed  at  Corinth,  Miss.,  October  3,  1862. 
Captain  Samuel  Harrison.     Died  of  wounds  received  at  Corinth,  Miss. 


APPENDIX.  433 

Fifteenth  Wisconsin  Infantry. 

Colonel  Hans  C.  Heg.  Died  of  wounds  received  at  Chickamauga,  September 
20,  1863. 

Lieut.  Colonel  David  McKee.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 

Captain  John  Ingmandson.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  30,  1862. 

Captain  John  M.  Johnson.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

Captain  Hans  Hansen.  Died,  October  13,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Chick- 
amauga. 

Captain  Henry  Hauff.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Andrew  Clement.  Died,  September  23, 1864,  of  disease,  at  Briggs- 
ville,  Wis. 

Second  Lieut.  Oliver  Thompson.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  September  20, 1863. 

Twenty-first  Wisconsin  Infantry. 

Major  Frederick  Schumacher.     Killed  at  Perry ville,  October  8,  1862. 

€aptain  George  Bently.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 

Captain  Hiram  M.  Gibbs.  Died,  October  15,  1862,  of  wounds  received  at  Per- 
ryville. 

Captain  John  Jewett,  Jun.  Died,  November  21,  1862,  of  disease,  at  Mitchells- 
ville,  Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  Edward  T.  Midgley.     Killed  at  Bentonville,  March  19,  1865. 

Second  Lieut.  David  Mitchell.     Killed  at  Perryville,  October  8,  1862. 

"Second  Lieut.  Henry  C.  Taylor.  Died,  December  12, 1864,  at  Charleston,  S.  C., 
a  prisoner. 

Surgeon  Samuel  J  Carolin.     Died,  November  4,  1862,  at  Bowling  Green,  Ky. 

Twenty-second  Wisconsin  Infantry. 

Captain  Gustavus  Goodrich.     Died,  March  17,  1863,  at  Racine,  Wis. 
Captain  Marshall  W.   Patton.     Died,  May  19,   1864,   of  wounds  received  at 

Resaca. 

First  Lieut.  John  E.  Holmes,  R.  Q.  M.     Died,  May  8,  1863,  at  Annapolis,  Md. 
Second  Lieut.  Ephraim  K.  Newman.     Died,  December  25,  1862,  as  Nicholas- 

ville,  Ky. 
Second  Lieut.  David  Flint.     Died,  May  27,  1864,  at  Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  of 

wounds. 

Twenty-fourth  Wisconsin  Infantry. 

Captain  Gustavus  Goldsmith.     Died,  October  3,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Chickarrmuga. 

Captain  Howard  Greene.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25,  1863. 
Captain  Frederick  A.  Root.     Died,  December  2,  1863,  at  Chattanooga,  Tenn. 
Captain  Alvah  Philbrook.     Killed  at  Franklin,  November  30,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Robert  J.  Chivas.     Killed  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25, 1863. 
First  Lieut.  Thomas  T.  Keith.     Killed  in  action  at  Adairs ville,  Ga.,  May  17, 

1864. 

First  Lieut.  Frederick  Schlenstedt.     Killed  at  Jonesboro,  September  1, 1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Christian  Nix.     Died,  January  1,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Stone  River. 
Second  Lieut.  George  Bleyer.     Died,  January  25,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at 

Stone  River. 


434  APPENDIX. 

I  Twenty-sixth  Wisconsin  Infantry. 

Captain  John  P.  Seeman.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20,  1864. 
Captain  Robert  Mueller.     Killed  at  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  20,  1864. 
Captain  Carl  Schmidt.     Killed  at  Averysboro,  March  16,  1865. 
First  Lieut.  Christian  Phillip.     Killed  at  Resaca,  May  15,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Nicholas  Wolmer.     Died,  August  21,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 

Peach  Tree  Creek. 
First  Lieut.  Francis  Rudolph  Klein.     Killed  at  Averysboro,  March  16,  1865. 

Thirty-first  Wisconsin  Infantry. 
Major  William  J.  Gibson.     Died,  September  9,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Columbus, 

Ky. 
Captain  James  B.  Mason.     Died,  October  17,  1863,  of  disease,  at  Nashville, 

Tenn. 
Second  Lieut.  Gilbert  N.  Rodgers.     Died,  August  12,  1864,  of  disease. 


Twelfth  Colored  Infantry. 
Captain  Robert  Headin.     Died,  January  1,  1865,  of  wounds  received  at  Nash 

ville,  Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  William  L.  Clark.     Killed,  November  21,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  David  G.  Cook.     Killed  near  Murfreesboro,  Tenn.,  December  24, 

1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Dennis  Dease.     Died,  December  25,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 

Nashville. 

Thirteenth  Colored  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  George  Taylor.     Killed  at  Nashville,  December  16,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  J.  W.  Woodruff.     Killed  at  Nashville,  December  16,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  James  A.  Trom.     Killed  at  Nashville,  December  16,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Luther  L.  Parks.     Killed  at  Nashville,  December  16,  1864 

Fourteenth  Colored  Infantry. 
First  Lieut.  George  W.  Apthorp.     Died,  October  28,  1864,  of  wounds  received 

at  Decatur. 
Second  Lieut.  Frank  Gillett.     Died,  October  28,  1864,  of  wounds  received  at 

Decatur. 
Second  Lieut.  Charles  Woodworth.     Ktlled  in  action  at  Decatur. 

Fifteenth  Colored  Infantry. 
Assistant  Surgeon  Eli  M.  Hewitt.     Killed  by  guerrillas,  near  Springfield,  Tenn., 

July  24,  1864. 
Second  Lieut.  Edward  Long.     Died,  March  15,  1866,  of  disease,  at  Nashville, 

Tenn. 

Seventeenth  Colored  Infantry. 

Captain  Gideon  V.  Ayres.     Killed  in  action  at  Nashville,  December  15,  1864. 
Captain  Job  H.  Aldrich.     Killed  in  action  at  Nashville,  December  15,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  George  L.  Clark.     Died  of  wounds  received  at  Nashville,  January 

7, 1865. 


APPENDIX.  435 

Eighteenth  Colored  Infantry. 

First  Lieut.  Leander  Martin.     Killed  in  action  at  Sand  Mountain,  Ala.,  Janu- 
ary 27,  1865. 

Forty-fourth  Colored  Infantry. 

Captain  Charles  G.  Penfield.     Murdered,  after  capture,  by  Forrest's  Command, 
December  22,  1864. 

One  Hundredth  Colored  Infantry. 

Assistant  Surgeon  Edward  M.  Wash.     Died,  September  20,  1865,  of  disease,  at 
Columbus,  Tenn. 

One  Hundred  and  First  Colored  Infantry. 

Captain  Stephen  H.  Eno.     Died,  December  16,  1865,  of  disease,  at  Nashville, 
Tenn. 

One  Hundred  and  Eleventh  Colored  Infantry. 

Colonel  Wm.  H.  Lathrop.     Killed  in  action  at  Sulphur  Branch  Trestle,  Ala., 
September  25,  1864. 


NAMES  OF  OFFICEES  APPOINTED  BY  THE  PEESIDENT, 
IN  THE  VOLUNTEEE  SEEYICE,  WHO  FELL  IN  THE 
WAE,  OE  DIED  FEOM  WOUNDS  OE  SICKNESS. 

Major-General  William  Nelson,  U.  S.  N.    Died  at  Louisville,  Ky.,  September 

29,  1862. 

Brigadier-General  Wm.  E.  Terrill,  Captain  U.  S.  A.     Killed  at  Perry ville,  Oc- 
tober 8,  1862. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  George  E.   Flint,  A.  A.  G.,  Chief  of  Staff,   Fourteenth 

Corps.     Died,  1864. 

Surgeon  Abraham  L.  Cox.     Died  on  Lookout  Mountain,  Tenn.,  July  28,  1864. 
Surgeon  R.  W.  S.  Jackson.     Died  on  Lookout  Mountain,  Tenn.,  January  18, 

1865. 

Captain  Henry  Clay,  A.  A.  G.     Died,  June  6,  1862,  at  Louisville,  Ky. 
Captain  Richard  Stevenson,  A.  Q.  M.    Died,  October  5,  1862,  at  Louisville, 

Ky. 
Captain  William  C.  Russell,  A.  A.  G.     Killed  at  Chickamaugua,  September  20, 

1863. 
Captain  Edward  D.  Saunders,  A.  A.  G.     Killed  in  action  at  Allatoona  Creek, 

June  2,  1864. 

Captain  R.  J.  Waggener,  A.  A.  G.     Killed  at  Dallas,  Ga.,  May  28,  1864. 
Captain  Oscar  0.  Muller,  A.  A.  G.     Killed  at  Jonesboro,  Ga.,  September  2, 

1864. 

Captain  John  A.  Irvine,  C.  S.     Died,  March  1,  1865,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 
Captain  Samuel  A.  Bonsall,  A.  Q.  M.     Died  at  Gallatin  Tenn.,  July  19,  1865. 
Captain  S.  H.  Sunt,  A.  Q.  M.     Died,  July  28,  1865,  at  Mobile,  Ala. 


436  APPENDIX. 

NAMES  OF  OFFICEES  OF  THE  EEGULAE  AEMY,  SEEY- 
ING  ACCOEDING  TO  AEMY  EANK,  WHO  FELL  IN 
BAtTLE  OE  DIED  FEOM  WOUNDS  OE  DISEASE 
DUEING  THE  WAE. 

Colonel  Edward  A.  King,  6th  U.  S.  Infanty.     Killed  at  Chickamauga,  Septem- 
ber 20,  1863. 
Colonel  Julius  P.  Garesche,  Chief-of-Staff  to  General  Rosecrans.      Killed  at 

Stone  River,  December  31,  1862. 
Major  S.  D.  Carpenter,  19th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December 

31,  1862. 
Major  Sidney  Coolidge,  16th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December 

31,  1862. 

Captain  Wm.  H.  Acker.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April  7,  1862. 
Captain  Patrick  T.  Kayes,  16th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Died,  May  3, 1862,  of  wounds 

received  at  Shiloh. 
Captain  J.  B.  Bell,  15th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December  31, 

1862. 
Captain  Charles  L.  Kneass,  18th  Infantry.     Killed  at  Stone  River,  December 

31,  1862. 
Captain  Wm.  W.  Wise,  15th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Died,  January  3, 1863,  of  wounds 

received  at  Stone  River. 
Captain  Charles  E.  Dennison,  18tK  U.  S.  Infantry.     Died,  June  15,  1863,  of 

wounds  received  at  Stone  River. 
Captain  John  A.  Thompson,  18th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Killed  at  Hoover's  Gap, 

June,  1863. 
Captain  David  Ireland,  15th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Died  at  Atlanta,  Ga.,  September 

10,  1864. 
Captain  Wm.  H.  Ingerton,  16th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Died  at  Knoxville,  Tenn., 

December  8,  1864. 
First  Lieut.  Irwin  W.  Wallace,  18th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Died  at  Pittsburgh,  Pa., 

February  19,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  William  W.  Stevenson,  16th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Died,  February  27, 

1862,  at  Louisville,  Ky. 
First  Lieut.  Edward  L.  Mitchell,  16th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Killed  at  Shiloh,  April 

7,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  James  W.  Bingham,  16th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Died  at  Bardstown  Ky.f 

November  9,  1862. 
First  Lieut,  Herman  G.  Radcliffe,  18th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Killed  at  Stone  River, 

December  18,  1862. 
First  Lieut.  James  L.  Simonds,  18th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Died,  June  14,  1863,  of 

wounds  received  at  Stone  River. 
First  Lieut.  Joseph  McConnell,  18th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Died,  January  14,  1863, 

of  wounds  received  at  Stone  River. 
First  Lieut.  Howard  M.  Burnham,  Battery  H,  5th  U.  S.  Artillery.     Killed  at 

Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863. 
First  Lieut.  Charles  L.  Truman,  18th  U.  S.  Infantry.     Killed  at  Chickamauga, 

September  20,  1863. 


APPENDIX.  437 

First  Lieut.  Michael  B.  Fogarty,  19th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Killed  at  Chickamauga, 
September  20,  1863. 

First  Lieut.  Lucius  F.  Brown,  18th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Died  at  Chattanooga,  Oc- 
tober 10,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Chickamauga. 

First  Lieut.  Homer  H.  Clarke,  16th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Died  at  Nashville,  Octo- 
ber 21,  1863,  of  wounds  received  at  Chickamauga. 

First  Lieut.  Tillinghast  L'Hommedieu,  4th  U.  S.  Cavalry.  Died  at  Pulaski, 
Tenn.,  December  31,  1863,  of  disease. 

First  Lieut.  William  H.  Leamy,  19th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Died,  July  11,  1864,  of 
disease,  at  Chattanooga,  Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  Samuel  J.  Dick,  18th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Died,  December  28,  1864, 
of  disease,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  Edward  Fitzgerald,  4th  U.  S.  Cavalry.  Died,  February  16,  1865, 
of  disease,  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 

First  Lieut.  Elbridge  G.  Eoys,  4th  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Killed  at  Selma,  Ala.,  April 
2,  1865. 

First  Lieut.  Arthur  N.  Thompson,  16th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Died  July  13,  1865,  at 
New  Orleans,  La. 

First  Lieut.  George  H.  Burns,  15th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Died,  October  15,  1865,  of 
disease,  at  Mobile,  Ala. 

First  Lieut.  William  A.  Garland,  19th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Died,  December  1, 
1865,  of  disease,  at  Augusta,  Ga. 

First  Lieut.  Charles  M.  Reed,  19th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Died,  December  8,  1865, 
of  disease,  at  Augusta,  Ga. 

First  Lieut.  Douglas  Edwards,  19th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Died,  December  24,  1865, 
of  disease,  at  Augusta,  Ga. 

Second  Lieut.  John  F.  Hitchcock,  18th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Killed  at  Stone  River, 
December  31,  1862. 

Second  Lieut.  Thomas  Healey,  4th  U.  S.  Cavalry.  Died  of  wounds,  at  Frank- 
lin, Tenn.,  April  23,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Francis  C.  Wood,  4th  U.  S.  Cavalry.  Died,  May  23,  1863,  of 
wounds  received  at  Middleton,  Tenn. 

Second  Lieut.  Charles  F.  Miller,  19th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Died  of  wounds  re- 
ceived at  Chiekamauga,  September  22,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  John  Lane,  18th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Died,  October  15,  1863,  of 
wounds  received  at  Chickamauga. 

Second  Lieut.  Robert  Floyd,  3d  U.  S.  Artillery.  Died,  September  23,  1863,  of 
wounds  received  at  Chickamauga. 

Second  Lieut.  Henry  C.  Pohlman,  18th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Died,  October  15, 1863, 
at  Richmond,  Va. 

Second  Lieut.  Peter  J.  Covenzler,  16th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Killed  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  November  25,  1863. 

Second  Lieut.  Joseph  C.  Forbes,  15th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Killed  at,  New  Hope 
Church,  Ga.,  May  31,  1864. 


BLOCK-HOUSES,  ETC. 


THE  ENGINEEE  SEEYICE  IN  THE  AEMY  OP  THE  CUM- 

BEELAND. 

{By  Brevet-Colonel  W.  E.  Merrill,  Major  Engineers,  late  Chief  Engineer  Army 

Cumberland.) 

The  peculiarities  of  the  country  in  which  the  Army  of  the 
•Cumberland  campaigned,  developed  novel  modifications  of 
many  of  the  engineering  appliances  in  general  use  by  all  fully 
equipped  armies,  and  some  of  these  are  deserving  of  record, 
especially  in  a  work  that  aims  to  be  a  complete  history  of  the 
gallant  army  by  whom  they  were  used  and  for  whom  they 
were  devised.  In  the  present  article,  I  will  briefly  call  at- 
tention to  three  points  of  military  engineering  in  which  the 
experience  of  this  army  may  be  valuable  to  others  that  in  the 
future  may  have  to  tread  in  similar  paths  of  difficulty  and 
danger.  The  three  subjects  to  which  I  would  invite  attention 
are  block-houses  for  railroad  defense,  canvas  pontons,  and 
military  maps. 

BLOCK-HOUSES  FOR  RAILROAD   DEFENSE. 

Among  all  the  American  armies  that  fought  in  the  long 
civil  war,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  exceptional  in 
being  the  only  one  that  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  its 
-career  fought  exclusively  along  lines  of  railroad,  was  supplied 
wholly  by  railroad,  had  its  depots  at  prominent  railroad  cen- 
ters, fought  for  the  possession  of  the  railroad  centers  of  the 
-enemy,  and  in  general  was  compelled  to  adapt  its  strategy  and 
its  tactics  to  the  novel  conditions  imposed  by  the  invention  of 
railroads,  and  the  total  change  in  methods  of  transportation 
that  had  occurred  since  the  great  Napoleonic  wars,  from 
whose  records  students  of  the  military  art  had  hitherto  derived 

(439) 


440  APPENDIX. 

their  knowledge.  "No  other  American  army  acquired  so  great 
an  experience  in  the  art  of  defending  railroads  through  hos- 
tile territory,  and  therefore  it  is  believed  that  a  brief  state- 
ment should  be  made  of  the  means  by  which  these  results 
were  attained. 

Supplies  for  the  depot  at  Nashville  were  mainly  received 
by  rail  from  Louisville  (one  hundred  and  eighty -five  miles)  r 
but  whenever  the  stage  of  water  permitted,  the  Cumberland 
and  Tennessee  rivers  (the  latter  with  the  aid  of  the  railroad 
from  Johnsonville  to  Nashville — seventy-eight  miles)  were 
used  as  auxiliaries.  South  of  Nashville,  the  only  communi- 
cation was  by  railroad.  When  the  army  was  at  Chattanooga, 
its  only  line  of  supply  was  the  single-track  railroad  to  Nash- 
ville (one  hundred  and  fifty-one  miles),  and  when,  with  the 
sister  armies  of  the  Tennessee  and  the  Ohio,  it  pressed 
southward  to  Atlanta,  the  narrow  iron  band  that  connected 
them  with  their  main  depot  at  Louisville  was  lengthened  out 
to  four  hundred  and  seventy-three  miles,  the  whole  distance 
being  in  territory  either  wholly  or  partly  hostile.  The  success 
of  the  Southern  campaigns  depended  entirely  on  holding  this 
line  with  such  tenacity  that  no  serious  break  in  it  could  be 
made  by  cavalry  raids,  or  by  the  disaffected  population  of  the 
district  through  which  it  passed.  The  destruction  of  a  single 
important  bridge  would  have  made  matters  in  front  look  very 
serious.  The  destruction  of  a  number  would  have  compelled 
the  army  to  retrace  its  steps.  It  was  therefore  a  vital  matter 
to  hold  the  railroads  at  all  hazards,  and  it  was  almost  equally 
important  to  arrange  a  system  of  railroad  defenses  that  would 
require  but  few  men  at  any  one  place,  otherwise  the  invading 
army  would  soon  become  too  much  reduced  to  continue  the 
offensive. 

When,  in  January,  1864, 1  was  appointed  chief  engineer  of 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  which  position  I  held  from  that 
time  until  the  close  of  the  war,  the  headquarters  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  was  in  Chattanooga,  that  of  the  Army  of 
the  Ohio  in  Knoxville,  and  that  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
in  Huntsville — General  Sherman  being  in  chief  command  at 
Nashville.  As  Middle  Tennessee,  Northern  Alabama,  and 
Georgia,  and  the  southern  part  of  East  Tennessee  composed 


APPENDIX.  441 

the  Department  of  the  Cumberland,  the  defenses  of  the  rail- 
roads and  fortified  towns  in  this  territory  properly  fell  to  my 
charge.  A  very  interesting  report  could  be  made  on  the  de- 
fenses of  the  three  chief  towns  of  Nashville,  Murfreesboro, 
and  Chattanooga ;  but  though  the  works  at  the  first  two  were 
very  elaborate  and  highly  creditable  to  the  professional  skill 
of  General  St.  Clair  Morton,  Captain  of  Engineers,  who  de- 
signed them,  there  were  no  marked  novelties  in  construction, 
and  the  influence  of  the  works  themselves  on  the  campaigns 
was  only  indirect.  Lack  of  space  unfortunately  prevents 
more  than  this  passing  mention.  During  the  long  halt  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  at  Murfreesboro,  the  seven  bridges 
on  the  thirty  miles  of  railroad  between  it  and  Nashville  were 
defended  by  heavy  stockades  built  in  the  form  of  a  Greek 
cross.  These  stockades  were  block-houses  in  all  respects,  ex- 
cept the  possession  of  a  roof.  During  the  campaigns  that  cul- 
minated in  the  capture  of  Tullahoma  and  Chattanooga,  de- 
tachments were  left  at  various  points  on  the  railroad,  but  no 
systematic  effort  was  made  to  erect  engineering  structures  for 
railroad  defense.  The  army  was  so  busily  occupied  in  endeav- 
oring to  maintain  itself  east  of  the  Cumberland  mountains, 
that  it  had  no  time  to  pay  much  attention  to  perfecting  its 
conquests  by  permanently  holding  the  country  gained.  Be- 
sides the  main  line  of  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  railroad, 
the  course  of  events  had  given  us  possession  of  the  line  from 
Nashville  to  Decatur  (along  which  the  Army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee was  supplied),  the  portion  of  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  railroad  between  Decatur  and  Stevenson,  the  North- 
western railroad  to  Johnsonville,  the  railroad  to  Clarksville, 
and  portions  of  the  railroads  extending  northeast  to  Knox- 
ville  and  southeast  toward  Atlanta.  There  was  thus  suddenly 
thrown  on  my  hands  for  defense  about  six  hundred  miles  of 
railroad,  every  foot  of  which  lay  in  hostile  territory,  and  was 
exposed  to  injury,  not  only  from  raids  of  regularly  organized 
commands,  but  was  also  in  danger  from  guerilla  bands  and 
from  nominally  peaceful  citizens. 

A  similar  problem  had  fallen  to  my  lot,  when,  in  the  fall  of 
1862,  the  Army  of  Kentucky,  commanded  by  General  Gordon 
Granger,  advanced  from  Cincinnati  to  Lexington,  and  had  to 


442 


APPENDIX. 


rebuild  all  the  bridges  on  the  Kentucky  Central  railroad,  ex- 
cept the  trestle-work  at  Paris.  General  Granger  ordered  me 
to  plan  such  fortifications  as  would  prevent  a  recurrence  of 
such  a  disaster.  A  brief  examination  showed  me  that  the 
bridges  as  a  rule  were  located  at  points  where  the  land  rose 
gradually  on  both  sides  for  long  distances,  thus  making  it 
very  difficult  to  place  a  fort  near  enough  to  protect  the  bridge, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  secure  its  occupants  from  plunging  or 
reverse  fires.  Safety  from  this  kind  of  attack  necessitated 
cover  over  head,  and  as  the  requirements  of  the  service  called 
for  the  minimum  garrisons  at  bridges  which  would  be  con- 
sistent with  their  adequate  protection,  I  was  naturally  led  to 
select  the  block-house  as  the  only  available  means  of  defense. 
It  did  not  seem  at  all  probable  that  any  cavalry  command 
that  would  be  likely  to  get  over  the  mountains  into  Central 
Kentucky  would  be  accompanied  by  artillery,  and  therefore 
the  block-houses  were  only  planned  to  resist  attack  by  mus- 
ketry. I  believe  that  some  of  them  were  captured  in  1864  by 
a  cavalry  command,  but  I  have  the  impression  that  the  garri- 
sons either  evacuated  the  block -houses,  or  else  surrendered 
them  without  a  fight.  I  was  with  the  army  in  Georgia  at  the 
time,  and  news  from  Central  Kentucky  was  very  meager. 
The  plans  of  these  Kentucky  block-houses  are  shown  in  fig- 
ures 1,  2,  and  3,  with  the  exception  that  the  walls  were  of  one 
thickness  of  timber,  and  there  were  no  towers. 


FIG.  1.     PLAN  OP  RECTANGULAR  BLOCK-HOUSE. 


APPENDIX. 


443 


FIG.  2.     ELEVATION  OP  KECTANGULAR  BLOCK-HOUSE. 


FIG.  3.     SECTION  ON  A.  B.  (FiG.  1.) 

When  General  Buell  was  campaigning  in  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee  his  engineers  constructed  stockades  for  defending 
railroad  bridges — a  favorite  form  being  that  of  a  square  re- 
doubt with  four  circular  bastions,  the  diameter  of  the  latter 
being  made  the  same  as  that  of  a  Sibley  tent,  so  that  the  bas- 
tions could  be  covered  by  these  tents  and  used  as  men's  quar- 
ters. These  stockades  answered  a  good  purpose  against 
infantry,  but  were  worse  than  nothing  against  artillery,  be- 
coming at  such  times  mere  slaughter-pens.  With  this  expe- 
rience before  me,  I  determined  to  endeavor  to  make  my  block- 
houses proof  against  such  light  artillery  as  cavalry  might  be 
expected  to  take  with  them.  The  Michigan  Engineers  (Colonel 
Innes)  were  assigned  by  General  Thomas  to  the  work  of  build- 
ing the  necessary  block-houses,  and  accordingly  I  started  out 
writh  Lieutenant-Colonel  Huntoon  (then  commanding  the  reg- 
iment) on  a  tour  of  location,  stopping  at  every  bridge  and 
selecting  the  most  favorable  sites  for  block-houses.  While  at 
Lavergne,  I  decided  to  change  the  location  of  the  heavy 
stockade  which  had  been  built  there  while  the  army  was  at 
Murfreesboro,  and  therefore  took  advantage  of  the  opportu- 


444  APPENDIX. 

nity  to  try  some  experiments  on  its  power  to  resist  artillery. 
After  hitting  it  a  number  of  times  with  solid  shot  from  a  six- 
pounder,  it  became  apparent  that  even  the  heavy  timbers 
(from  twenty  to  twenty-four  inches  in  diameter)  of  which  it 
was  built,  would  not  answer  the  purpose.  I  then  decided  to 
double  the  walls,  so  as  to  secure  at  least  forty  inches  of  timber. 

The  tower,  or  second  story  of  the  block-house,  was  valua- 
ble as  giving  a  more  elevated  point  from  which  to  see  the 
enemy,  and,  if  necessary,  to  look  over  the  railroad  bank.  It 
was  set  diagonally  to  the  lower  story  so  as  to  cover  more 
thoroughly  all  the  country  around.  To  avoid  excessive  weight 
it  was  made  log-house  fashion  of  one  thickness  of  logs,  the 
expectation  being  that  it  would  be  vacated  in  case  of  artillery 
attack.  Owing  to  the  amount  of  work  to  be  done,  the  con- 
struction of  towers  was  left  to  the  garrisons  after  the  engineer 
troops  had  finished.  As  a  matter  of  fact  but  few  were  built. 
The  usual  course  was  to  employ  engineer  troops  to  build  the 
block-houses  of  a  single  thickness  of  timber,  without  cellar 
or  tower,  and  to  employ  the  garrisons  to  finish  the  work 
under  the  direction  of  the  inspectors  of  railroad  defenses. 

To  resist  plunging  fire,  the  roof  of  the  block-house  was 
made  of  a  layer  of  logs  laid  side  by  side  and  covered  with 
earth.  On  top  of  all  was  a  roof  of  shingles  (when  they  could 
be  procured),  or  of  boards  and  battens — it  being  very  impor- 
tant to  keep  the  block-house  dry,  so  that  the  garrison  might 
always  live  in  it.  With  the  same  view  the  block-houses  were 
supplied  with  ventilators,  cellars,  water-tanks,  and  bunks. 

It  was  foreseen  from  the  first  that  a  rectangular  plan  was 
not  the  best  for  a  block-house,  but  the  extra  cost  and  difficulty 
of  making  the  best  form,  the  octagonal,  and  the  great  num- 
ber that  had  to  be  built  immediately,  made  it  necessary  to  use 
the  simplest  plan  that  could  be  made  to  answer.  Late  in  the 
war  the  octagonal  plan,  shown  in  Figs.  4  and  5,  was  adopted, 
and  the  result  of  my  experience  is,  that  this  form  is  the  best  for 
an  independent  block-house.  In  the  rectangular  block-house 
each  corner  has  but  one  loop-hole,  and  therefore  the  block- 
houses are  of  little  offensive  power  along  the  diagonals  through 
the  corners.  In  the  octagonal  these  corners  are*cut  off,  and 
the  angles  of  the  loop-holes  are  such  that  the  fire  of  two  faces 


APPENDIX. 


445 


FIG.  4.     ELEVATION  OP  OCTAGONAL   BLOCK-HOUSE.     BANK  REMOVED  FROM 
FRONT  OF  ENTRANCE. 


FIG.  5.     PLAN  OF  OCTAGONAL  BLOCK-HOUSE  WITH  TOWER. 

can  always  be  concentrated  on  the  diagonal  through  their  in- 
tersection ;  the  former  weak  points  are  thus  made  the  strong- 
est. I  would  therefore  earnestly  advise  the  use  of  octagonal 


446  APPENDIX. 

"block-houses  for  railroad  defense.  So  much  time  was  con- 
sumed in  making  mortises  and  tenons,  that  I  would  advise  for 
future  block-houses  a  greater  simplicity  of  joints  and  the  lib- 
eral use  of  spikes,  abolishing,  as  far  as  possible,  all  work  re- 
quiring skilled  labor.  Spikes  answered  admirably  on  the 
Kentucky  Central  block-houses,  but  I  was  induced  to  try 
tenons  in  Tennessee,  on  account  of  having  skilled  labor  avail- 
able. I  am  now  satisfied  that  the  first  method  of  construc- 
tion was  greatly  preferable. 

As  a  rule,  the  small  railroad  bridges  had  one  block-house, 
and  the  larger  ones  two,  on  opposite  sides  of  the  track.  At 
the  very  high  and  long  trestle-work  across  the  Running  Water 
gorge  at  Whiteside,  four  small  block-houses  were  built.  For 
the  protection  of  the  east  bridge  over  the  Tennessee,  at  Bridge- 
port, I  thought  it  best  to  establish  two  block-houses  for  artil- 
lery. The  design  of  these  works  are  given  in  Figs.  6  and  7. 


FIG.  6.     ELEVATION  OF  ARTILLERY  BLOCK-HOUSE. 

An  upper  story  (not  shown  in  the  figure),  resting  diagonally  on 
the  corners  of  the  inner  square,  was  added  to  the  west  block- 
house as  quarters  for  the  garrison.  To  avoid  an  excess  of 
weight,  this  story  was  only  made  musketry-proof.  On  top  of 
all  was  a  small  lookout.  The  construction  of  these  block- 
houses reflected  great  credit  upon  the  Michigan  Engineers  by 
whom  they  were  built.  An  artillery  block-house  was  also 
commenced  in  1865,  at  Larkinsville,  Alabama,  but  it  was  never 
completed.  It  was  intended  to  answer  as  a  fort  for  the  gar- 
rison at  this  important  point,  which  was  much  exposed  to 
attack  from  the  south  side  of  the  Tennessee.  It  is  proper  to 
add  that  my  first  idea  of  building  a  block-house  for  artillery 
came  from  seeing  a  rude,  half-finished  work  of  this  kind, 
which  was  begun  by  the  Confederates  in  1863,  at  Strawberry 
Plains,  above  Knoxville. 

An  artillery  block-house  is  difficult  and  costly  to  build,  and 
is  only  justifiable  in  very  exceptionable  localities.     I  think 


APPENDIX. 


447 


FIG.  7.     PLAN  OF  ARTILLERY  BLOCK-HOUSE. 

that  Bridgeport  was  such  a  locality,  as  the  vital  importance 
to  the  army  of  the  two  long  bridges  over  the  Tennessee  called 
for  defense  by  artillery,  as  well  on  the  island  as  on  the  main 
land,  and  the  latter  so  thoroughly  commanded  the  island  that 
artillery  could  only  remain  on  it  while  thoroughly  under  cover. 
It  may  he  well  to  mention  that  an  artillery  block-house  after 
my  designs  was  built  in  1864,  near  Alexandria,  Virginia,  to 
protect  from  cavalry  raids  down  the  valley  of  Hunting  creek. 
The  enemy  soon  found  that  our  block -houses  were  proof 
against  any  ordinary  attack,  and  small  bodies  never  molested 
them.  Injury  to  the  track  of  the  railroad  was  repaired  almost 
as  soon  as  made,  and  after  a  while  such  annoyances  ceased. 
The  only  serious  assaults  received  by  our  block -houses  were 
as  follows : 


448  APPENDIX. 

In  August,  1864,  General  Wheeler,  with  a  division  of 
cavalry,  left  Atlanta,  traveled  north  to  near  Knoxville, 
thence  west  to  near  Nashville,  thence  southwest  to  Northern 
Alabama.  During  this  raid  he  swept  along  a  large  portion  of 
the  railroad  from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta,  and  tore  it  up  in 
some  places,  but  destroyed  no  bridge  and  attacked  no  block- 
house. He  struck  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  railroad 
between  Nashville  and  Murfreesboro,  and  attacked  block, 
house  No.  5,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  John  S.  Orr,  One 
Hundred  and  Fifteenth  Ohio.  Tbe  artillery  fire  killed  or 
wounded  one-third  of  the  garrison  (the  garrison  was  probably 
thirty  men  in  all),  but  the  gallant  lieutenant  did  not  surren- 
der, and  his  bridge  was  not  injured.  One  of  the  neighboring 
block-houses  was  commanded  by  a  sergeant,  who  got  demor- 
alized and  surrendered  after  a  slight  show  of  resistance.  His 
bridge  was  burned,  but  I  believe  no  other  was  damaged  on 
this  railroad,  and  no  bridge  at  all  on  the  railroad  to  Decatur. 

In  October,  1864,  General  Hood  started  north  from  Atlanta 
with  his  army,  and  General  Sherman  after  him.  All  the  block- 
houses south  of  Dalton  (except  the  one  at  Allatoona  creek, 
which  was  captured)  were  evacuated  by  order  and  burned  by 
his  forces.  After  the  capture  of  Dalton  he  wished  to  go  west 
through  Buzzard  Roost  Gap.  In  this  gap,  and  at  the  bridge 
over  Mill  creek,  was  a  block-house  containing  about  thirty 
men.  This  block-house  commanded  the  wagon-road  through 
the  gap,  and  no  wagons  or  artillery  could  get  through  until  it 
was  captured.  Bate's  division  of  infantry,  with  three  bat- 
teries of  artillery,  were  detailed  to  capture  the  block-house. 
The  infantry  kept  up  an  ineffectual  musketry  fire,  and  the 
artillery,  after  being  driven  from  many  positions,  finally  got  on 
the  diagonal  through  one  corner  and  concentrated  their  shot 
on  this  corner.  The  weight  of  metal  thrown  soon  made  a 
breach  in  the  block-house,  but  the  garrison  did  not  surrender, 
and  at  the  close  of  the  day  they  still  held  their  position. 
During  the  night  it  was  decided  to  organize  a  storming  party, 
part  of  whom  should  stop  the  loop-holes  with  fence  rails,  while 
the  other  portion  were  to  leap  on  the  roof  of  the  block-house 
and  dig  down  to  the  garrison  below.  At  daylight  the  storm- 
ing party  crept  as  near  the  block-house  as  possible  j  but  before 


APPENDIX.  449 

giving  the  command  to  charge,  the  colonel,  desirous  to  save 
further  bloodshed,  in  a  loud  voice  summoned  the  garrison  to 
surrender.  A  white  handkerchief  was  waved  in  reply,  and 
the  block-house  surrendered.  Fully  one-half  of  the  small 
garrison  were  killed  or  wounded,  and  it  seems  that  during  the 
latter  part  of  the  preceding  day,  after  many  lives  had  been 
lost  and  the  block-house  had  become  entirely  untenable,  they 
had  tried  to  surrender,  but  their  signals  were  not  seen  and 
they  had  concluded  that  the  Confederates  were  enraged  at 
their  obstinacy  and  were  determined  to  kill  them  all.  I  re- 
gret that  I  can  not  give  the  names  of  this  heroic  garrison,  as 
they  were  of  course  sent  south  with  other  prisoners,  and  I 
never  had  the  fortune  to  meet  any  of  them  afterward.  The 
details  given  above  were  obtained  long  after  the  war,  from 
Confederate  sources. 

In  a  series  of  articles  published  in  the  New  Orleans  Times 
in  the  spring  of  1874,  General  Hood  reviews  "  Johnson's 
Narrative,"  and  speaks  as  follows  of  the  block-house  in 
Buzzard  Roost  Gap : 

"  When  en  route  to  Tennessee,  during  the  campaign  in 
the  fall  of  1864,  our  army,  having  captured  the  troops 
stationed  in  Dalton,  attempted  to  march  through  Mill- 
creek  Gap,  but  was  prevented  from  so  doing  by  a  squad  of 
men  posted  within  a  little  fort,  covered  with  railroad  iron 
and  constructed  of  logs  of  large  size,  around  which  was  thrown 
up  an  embankment  of  earth  to  protect  the  troops  against  field 
artillery  ;  port-holes  were  cut  so  as  to  allow  the  men  to  fire  in 
all  directions,  and  especially  upon  the  line  of  railroad. 

"  It  was  reported  to  me  that  field  artillery  had  little  or  no 
effect  upon  this  impromptu  fortification,  and  that  when  the 
men  charged  up  to  it,  they  could  not  find  an  entrance  ;  there- 
fore it  could  not  be  taken  without  much  loss  of  time  and  con- 
siderable cost. 

"  Major  Kinlocke  Falconer  was,  I  think,  severely  wounded 
while  experimenting  with  this  little  fortress,  which  obliged 
me  to  march  some  twenty  miles  around  it." 

This  account  differs  somewhat  from  the  one  which  I  have 
given,  but  I  think  that  General  Hood  is  slightly  in  error  in 
some  of  the  details.  He  leaves  the  impression  that  the  block- 


450  APPENDIX. 

house  was  not  captured,  while  I  know  that  it  was.  He  also 
speaks  of  it  as  an  "  impromptu  "  fortification,  which  it  was 
not,  having  been  carefully  built  by  the  Michigan  Engineers, 
and  finished  before  the  capture  of  Atlanta. 

It  may  be  proper  to  add  in  explanation  that  the  block-houses 
were  not  designed  to  defend  bridges  against  a  fully  equipped 
army,  but  only  against  cavalry  raids,  and  that  a  raiding  band 
of  cavalry  is  always  too  scantily  supplied  with  artillery  am- 
munition to  indulge  in  the  luxury  of  battering  down  a  block- 
house. 

The  most  serious  destruction  of  block-houses  occurred  in 
September,  1864,  during  a  raid  made  by  General  Forrest  on  the 
road  leading  south  from  Nashville  to  Decatur.  The  following 
account  of  this  raid  I  afterward  obtained  from  General  For- 
rest himself.  He  first  attacked  an  unfinished  block-house  near 
the  southern  end  of  the  road,  and  the  first  shell  fired  from 
his  battery  entered  the  block-house  and  injured  some  of  its 
occupants.  They  at  once  surrendered,  and  the  block-house 
was  burned.  At  the  next  block-house  he  ostentatiously  pa- 
raded the  captured  commander  of  the  first  one ;  and  on  this 
convincing  proof  that  block-houses  could  be  taken,  quite  a 
number  of  them  surrendered  without  a  fight,  and  their  bridges 
were  burned.  One  German  captain  refused  to  surrender,  but 
General  Forrest  had  with  him  several  bottles  of  a  kind  of 
Greek  fire,  and  some  of  his  men  crept  up  behind  the  railroad 
embankment,  and  suddenly  breaking  the  bottles  on  the  ends 
of  the  bridge,  set  it  on  fire,  and  it  was  destroyed.  The  gallant 
captain  and  his  command  held  their  block-house,  but  un- 
fortunately lost  the  bridge  which  it  was  to  defend. 

In  all,  General  Forrest  captured  and  destroyed  eleven  block- 
houses. 

When  General  Hood,  with  his  army,  advanced  to  Nashville, 
the  block-houses  on  the  Nashville  and  Decatur  railroad  were 
very  sensibly  abandoned.  Fortunately  for  us,  the  Nashville 
and  Decatur  railroad  was  not  our  main  line,  and  the  destruc- 
tion of  its  bridges  caused  no  serious  loss. 

From  the  time  that  the  block-houses  were  built  until  the 
close  of  the  war,  but  six  bridges  (all  small)  were  burned  on 
the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  railroad,  our  main  line  of 


APPENDIX.  451 

supply.  These  were  the  six  nearest  Nashville,  one  of  them, 
as  recorded  above,  having  been  previously  burned  by  General 
Wheeler,  and  rebuilt.  They  were  abandoned  by  order ;  but 
the  seventh,  at  Overall's  creek,  five  miles  north  of  Murfrees- 
boro,  was  ordered  to  be  held.  Its  garrison  consisted  of  about 
thirty  men  of  the  115th  0.  V.  I.,  commanded  by  Lieutenant 
H.  H.  Glosser.  Bate's  division  of  infantry  (the  same  that 
fought  the  Buzzard  Eoost  block-house),  with  a  large  force  of 
cavalry  and  three  twelve-pound  guns,  operated  in  its  vicinity 
for  two  weeks,  and  fired  seventy-two  cannon-shot  against  it. 
Once  during  this  time,  a  sortie  was  made  from  Murfreesboro, 
and  the  garrison's  supplies  of  ammunition  and  provisions  were 
replenished.  The  block-house  was  not  captured  nor  the  bridge 
burned. 

To  keep  the  block-houses  and  their  garrisons  thoroughly 
efficient,  I  organized  a  special  corps  of  block-house  inspectors, 
and  placed  at  their  head  Major  J.  B.  "Willett,  of  my  own  regi- 
ment, the  First  U.  S.  Yet.  Yol.  Engineers.  To  his  professional 
skill,  zeal,  and  efficiency,  the  excellent  results  attained  were 
mainly  due. 

In  his  Memoirs  (vol.  2,  pp.  146  and  398),  General  Sherman 
thus  alludes  to  this  system  of  railroad  defense : 

"  All  the  important  bridges  were  likewise  protected  by  good 
block-houses,  admirably  constructed,  and  capable  of  a  strong 
defense  against  cavalry  or  infantry." 

"  The  Atlanta  campaign  would  simply  have  been  impossible 
without  the  use  of  the  railroads  from  Louisville  to  Nashville, 
one  hundred  and  eighty-five  miles ;  from  Nashville  to  Chatta- 
nooga, one  hundred  and  fifty-one  miles ;  and  from  Chattanooga 
to  Atlanta,  one  hundred  and  thirty-seven  miles.  Every  mile  of 
this  '  single  track '  was  so  delicate  that  one  man  could  in  a  min- 
ute have  broken  or  moved  a  rail,  but  our  trains  usually  carried 
along  the  tools  and  means  to  repair  such  a  break.  We  had, 
however,  to  maintain  strong  guards  and  garrisons  at  each  im- 
portant bridge  or  trestle,  the  destruction  of  which  would 
have  necessitated  time  for  rebuilding.  For  the  protection  of 
a  bridge,  one  or  two  log  block-houses,  two  stories  high,  with 
a  piece  of  ordnance  and  a  small  infantry  guard,  usually  sufficed. 
The  block-house  had  a  small  parapet  and  ditch  about  it,  and 
the  roof  was  made  shot-proof,  by  earth  piled  on.  These  points 


452  APPENDIX. 

could  usually  be  reached  only  by  a  dash  of  the  enemy's  cavalry, 
and  many  of  these  block-houses  successfully  resisted  serious 
attacks  by  both  cavalry  and  artillery.  The  only  block-house 
that  was  actually  captured  on  the  main  [line]  was  the  one 
described,  near  Allatoona." 

General  Sherman  is  mistaken  about  the  piece  of  ordnance 
in  each  block-house.  He  was  too  far  in  front  to  be  familial 
with  all  these  details. 

He  describes  the  capture  of  the  block-house  near  Allatoona 
as  follows  (Memoirs,  vol.  2,  p.  149) : 

"  Before  finally  withrawing  [from  the  attack  on  Allatoona], 
General  French  converged  a  heavy  fire  of  his  cannon  on  the 
block-house  at  Allatoona  creek,  about  two  miles  from  the 
depot,  set  it  on  fire,  and  captured  its  garrison,  consisting  of 
four  officers  and  eighty-five  men." 

The  usual  garrison  of  a  block-house  was  from  twenty  to 
thirty  men. 

Besides  their  use  in  railroad  defense,  block-houses  were  freely 
employed  in  the  defenses  of  Nashville,  Murfreesboro,  Steven- 
son, McMinnville,  Chattanooga,  and  other  fortified  positions, 
occasionally  as  independent  works,  but  usually  as  citadels  or 
keeps  for  earthern  forts,  so  that  the  garrison  might  have  a 
secure  place  of  retreat  should  the  main  work  be  carried  by 
assault. 

Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Bailroad,  151  miles.  Fifty  block- 
houses were  built  on  this  road,  two  being  large  block-houses 
for  artillery.  The  majority  of  the  block-houses  had  double 
walls,  the  chief  exceptions  being  along  Crow  creek,  where  the 
probability  of  attack  by  artillery  was  very  slight.  One  block- 
house near  Nashville  was  captured  by  General  Wheeler,  three 
by  General  Hood  (one  being  the  first  mentioned  that  had  been 
rebuilt),  and  three  were  evacuated.  These  six  had  been  partly 
rebuilt  at  the  close  of  the  war. 

Nashville,  Decatur  and  Stevenson  Railroad,  200  miles.  Fifty- 
four  block-houses  were  built  on  this  road,  almost  all  of  which 
had  double  walls.  Eleven  were  surrendered  to  General  For- 


APPENDIX.  453 

rest,  in  October,  1864,  and  burned,  the  greater  number  having 
made  no  attempt  at  defense.  "When  General  Hood  marched 
north  to  Nashville,  the  remaining  block-houses,  except  three 
near  Stevenson  and  four  built  in  1865,  were  abandoned,  and 
the  majority  were  burned  by  the  enemy.  Three,  near  Decatur, 
were  not  burned,  but  they  were  probably  overlooked.  When 
the  war  closed,  a  large  number  of  the  burned  block-houses 
had  been  rebuilt  on  the  octagonal  plan,  and  work  was  under 
way  on  the  others. 

Chattanooga  and  Atlanta  Railroa  I,  137  miles.  Twenty-two 
block-houses  were  built  on  this  road,  all  of  which  had  double 
walls.  Three  of  these  were  captured  by  General  Hood's  army, 
in  October,  1864,  and  burned.  Six  others,  south  of  Dal  ton, 
were  abandoned,  by  order,  when  General  Sherman  tore  up  the 
railroad  below  Dalton,  and  left  Atlanta  for  the  sea.  The 
others  were  held  until  the  close  of  the  war. 

Chattanooga  and  Knoxville  Railroad  to  Charleston,  42  miles. 
The  only  bridge  on  this  road  (within  the  limits  of  the  De- 
partment of  the  Cumberland)  that  required  defense  was  at  the 
crossing  of  the  Hiawassee  river.  Two  block-houses  were  built 
here,  which  were  held  until  the  close  of  the  war. 

Nashville  and  Johnsonville  Railroad,  78  miles.  Twenty-three 
block-houses  were  commenced  on  this  road,  but  only  a  few  of 
them  were  finished.  When  Hood's  army  appeared  before 
Nashville,  the  road  was  abandoned  and  the  block-houses  were 
burned,  except  the  one  nearest  Johnsonville.  At  the  close  of 
the  war  twenty-five  block-houses  were  under  construction. 

Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad  to  Kentucky  line,  44  miles. 
One  single-wall  block-house  was  built  at  Edgefield  Junction. 
The  remainder  of  the  road  was  protected  by  redoubts  and 
stockades,  built  in  1862  and  1863.  No  serious  damage  was 
done  on  this  line  after  Bragg's  Kentucky  campaign. 

Nashville  and  Clarksville  Railroad,  52  miles.  This  line  began 
at  Edgefield  Junction,  went  to  the  Kentucky  State  line,  by 
the  Edgefield  and  Kentucky  Railroad,  and  thence  to  Clarks- 


454  APPENDIX. 

ville,  by  the  Memphis  Branch  of  the  Louisville  and  Nashville 
Eailroad.  It  was  opened,  as  a  supply  route,  in  1864,  but  was 
but  little  used.  It  was  designed  to  connect  at  Clarksville 
with  steamboats  on  the  Cumberland  River,  that  were  unable 
to  get  over  Harpath  shoals.  Eight  single-wall  block-houses 
were  built  on  this  line,  but  three  of  them  were  never  fully 
completed.  No  damage  was  done  to  this  road  by  the  enemy. 

CANVAS   PONTON-TRAINS. 

The  canvas  ponton-train  used  by  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland was  somewhat  peculiar.  The  ordinary  canvas  ponton 
has  long  been  in  use  in  European  armies,  especially  in  Russia, 
and  is  made  by  putting  together  a  skeleton-boat  and  drawing 
canvas  over  it.  The  usual  length  of  such  a  boat  is  twenty- 
one  feet,  and  this  is  the  length  of  the  two  side-frames.  These 
frames  are  usually  carried  on  very  long  wagons,  specially  de- 
vised for  the  purpose ;  but  as  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
had  to  campaign  in  a  country  where  the  only  dependence  was 
upon  a  single-track  railroad,  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  devise  some  way  of  carrying  their  pontons  in  the  ordinary 
army-wagon  so  as  to  avoid  the  cost  of  keeping  up  an  inde- 
pendent ponton-train,  whose  services  would  only  occasionally 
be  required. 

I  believe  that  General  Rosecrans  first  suggested  cutting  the 
frames  in  two  for  transportation,  and  uniting  them  when 
needed  for  use.  At  all  events,  when  I  became  chief  engineer  I 
found  that  one  such  boat  had  been  prepared,  and  seemed  to  do 
well.  The  two  parts  were  connected  by  keys.  After  a  care- 
ful examination,  I  decided  to  adopt  such  a  boat  for  our  army, 
but  to  replace  the  keys  by  permanent  strap-hinges  on  the  out- 
side of  the  frames.  I  sent  Captain  O'Connell,  of  the  Pioneer 
Brigade,  to  Nashville,  with  a  detachment  of  pontoniers,  to 
build  a  train  of  such  boats,  giving  him  authority  to  make  any 
additional  improvements  that  he  or  any  one  else  could  suggest. 
The  result  was  the  boat  shown  in  the  drawings  (Fig.  8), 
excepting  that  the  framing  of  the  sides  has  been  changed  so 
as  to  conform  more  to  the  usual  model.  ^Some  minor  changes 
have  also  been  made,  but  the  boat  is  in  essentials  the  same 
that  was  so  successfully  used  to  cross  General  Sherman's  army 


APPENDIX. 


455 


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FIG.  8.    FRAME  OE  HINGED  CANVAS  PONTON,  WITH  ENLARGED  VIEW  OF  HINGE, 
AND  OF  MIDDLE  BRACE. 

over  all  the  rivers  between  Chattanooga  and  Atlanta,  and 
which  afterward  accompanied  the  army  in  its  march  to  the 
sea  and  through  the  Carolinas.  It  answered  its  purpose  ad- 
mirably. So  many  persons  contributed  their  mite  toward  the 
development  of  this  boat  that  it  is  impossible  to  apportion  the 
credit  properly ;  but  I  think  that  Captain  (afterward  Major) 
O'Connell  and  Lieutenant  (afterward  Major)  Willett  deserve 
special  mention. 

General  Sherman  (Memoirs,  vol.  2,  p.  401)  thus  speaks  of 
canvas  pontons,  his  reference  to  the  hinge  showing  that  he 
had  specially  in  mind  the  pontons  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland, as  the  frames  of  the  other  canvas  ponton-train  had 
no  hinges : 

"  For  the  passage  of  rivers  each  army  corps  had  a  ponton- 
train  with  a  detachment  of  engineers,  and  on  reaching  a 
river,  the  leading  infantry  division  was  charged  with  the  labor 
of  putting  it  down.  Generally,  the  single  ponton-train 
could  provide  for  nine  hundred  feet  of  bridge,  which  sufficed ; 
but  when  the  rivers  were  very  wide,  two  such  trains  would 
be  brought  together,  or  the  single  train  was  supplemented  by 


456  APPENDIX. 

a  trestle-bridge,  or  bridges  made  on  crib-work,  out  of  the  tim- 
ber found  near  the  place.  The  pontons  in  general  use  were 
skeleton  frames,  made  with  a  hinge,  so  as  to  fold  back  and 
constitute  a  wagon-body.  In  this  same  wagon  were  carried 
the  cotton  canvas  cover,  the  anchor  and  chains,  and  a  due  pro- 
portion of  the  balks,  chesses,  and  lashings.  All  the  troops 
became  very  familiar  with  their  mechanism  and  use,  and  we 
were  rarely  delayed  by  reason  of  a  river,  however  broad. 
I.  saw  recently,  in  Aldershot,  England,  a  very  complete 
ponton-train ;  the  boats  were  sheathed  with  wood  and  felt, 
made  very  light ;  but  I  think  they  were  more  liable  to  chafing 
and  damage  in  rough  handling  than  were  our  less  expen- 
sive and  rougher  boats.  On  the  whole,  I  would  prefer  the 
skeleton  frame  and  canvas  cover  to  any  style  of  ponton  that 

I  have  ever  seen." 

MAPS. 

The  topographical  department  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land consisted  of  the  acting  topographical  engineers  on  each 
brigade,  division,  and  corps  staff',  and  the  topographical  en- 
gineers at  department  headquarters.  The  army  was  so  far 
from  Washington  that  it  had  to  have  a  complete  map  estab- 
lishment of  its  own.  Accordingly,  the  office  of  the  chief  topo- 
graphical engineer  contained  a  printing  press,  two  lithographic 
presses,  one  photographic  establishment,  arrangements  for 
map-mounting,  and  a  full  corps  of  draughtsmen  and  assist- 
ants. 

During  the  first  year  of  the  war,  maps  for  field  use  were 
reproduced  by  photography ;  but  these  maps  were  objectionable 
on  many  accounts.  Unless  a  very  fine  and  expensive  lens 
was  used  they  were  inaccurate  at  the  borders,  and  sections  of 
a  large  map  would  not  join  properly;  they  faded  when  ex- 
posed to  sunlight ;  copies  could  not  be  made  at  night  nor  on 
rainy  days ;  nor  could  a  sufficient  number  be  made  even  on 
the  best  days.  For  these  reasons  photography  was  gradually 
set  aside  for  lithography;  but  as  lithographic  stones  and 
presses  were  too  heavy  for  an  active  campaign,  they  were  left 
at  the  depot  nearest  to  the  front,  and  replaced  by  a  fac-simile 
photo-printing  device  invented  by  Captain  Margedant,  chief 
assistant.  This  consisted  of  a  light  box  containing  several 


APPENDIX.  457 

india-rubber  baths,  fitting  into  one  another,  and  the  proper  sup- 
ply of  chemicals.  Printing  was  done  by  tracing  the  required 
map  on  thin  paper  and  la}dng  it  over  a  sheet  coated  with 
nitrate  of  silver.  The  sun's  rays  passing  through  the  tissue 
paper  blackened  the  prepared  paper  except  under  the  ink 
lines,  thus  making  a  white  map  on  black  ground.  By  this 
means  copies  from  the  drawing-paper  map  could  be  made  as 
often  as  new  information  came  in,  and  occasionally  there 
would  be  several  editions  of  a  map  during  the  same  day.  The 
process,  however,  was  expensive,  and  did  not  permit  the  print- 
ing of  a  large  number  of  copies ;  therefore  these  maps  were 
only  issued  to  the  chief  commanders. 

The  map  of  Northern  Georgia,  on  which  the  Atlanta  cam- 
paign was  based,  was  made  by  first  enlarging  the  best  printed 
map  attainable,  to  the  scale  of  one  inch  to  the  mile.  This 
being  used  as  a  basis,  the  details  were  elaborated  by  cross- 
questioning  refugees,  spies,  prisoners,  peddlers,  and  any  and 
all  persons  familiar  with  the  country  in  front  of  us.  It  was 
remarkable  how  vastly  our  maps  were  improved  by  this  pro- 
cess. The  best  illustration  of  the  value  of  this  method  is  the 
fact  that  Snake  Creek  Gap,  through  which  our  whole  army 
turned  the  strong  positions  at  Dalton  and  Buzzard  Roost  Gap, 
was  not  to  be  found  on  any  printed  map  that  we  could  get,  and 
the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  this  gap  was  of  immense 
importance  to  us.  Sergeant  Finnegan,  of  the  Fourth  Ohio 
Cavalry,  had  charge  of  this  branch  of  the  office,  and  became 
exceedingly  expert  in  extracting  information  in  this  manner. 

Two  days  before  the  army  started  from  Chattanooga  on  the 
Atlanta  campaign  I  received  notice  of  the  intended  march. 
Up  to  this  moment  there  was  but  one  copy  of  the  large  map 
of  Northern  Georgia,  and  this  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
draughtsmen.  I  kept  it  back  until  the  last  moment  so  as  to 
get  on  it  the  latest  information  that  Sergeant  Finnegan  might 
be  able  to  extract  from  the  motley  crew  turned  over  by  the 
Provost-Marshal  General  for  examination. 

The  map  was  immediately  cut  up  into  sixteen  sections  and 
divided  among  the  draughtsmen,  who  were  ordered  to  work 
night  and  day  until  all  the  sections  had  been  traced  on  thin 
paper  in  autographic  ink.  As  soon  as  four  adjacent  sections 


458  APPENDIX. 

were  finished  they  were  transferred  to  one  large  stone,  and  two- 
hundred  copies  were  printed.  "When  all  the  map  had  thus 
been  lithographed  the  map-mounters  commenced  their  work. 
Being  independent  of  sunlight  the  work  was  soon  done — the 
map-mounting  requiring  the  greatest  time;  hut  before  the 
commanding  generals  left  Chattanooga,  each  had  received  a 
bound  copy  of  the  map,  and  before  we  struck  the  enemy,  every 
brigade,  division,  and  corps  commander  in  the  three  armies 
had  a  copy. 

The  copies  for  the  cavalry  were  printed  directly  on  muslin, 
as  such  maps  could  be  washed  clean  whenever  soiled  and  could 
not  be  injured  by  hard  service.  Many  officers  sent  handker- 
chiefs to  the  office  and  had  maps  printed  on  them. 

Although  our  map  became  less  and  less  accurate  as  we  ad- 
vanced south  from  Chattanooga,  it  was  still  valuable  even 
where  its  information  was  defective,  because  every  subordinate 
commander  had  the  same  map  as  the  commanding  general,  and 
therefore  knew  at  once  from  the  nature  of  his  orders  what  he 
was  expected  to  do.  If  a  road  could  not  be  found,  still  the 
general  direction  and  the  general  object  of  his  march  could  be 
divined,  and  the  spirit  of  the  general's  orders  could  be  faith- 
fully carried  out. 

I  think  that  I  am  warranted  in  saying  that  the  army  that 
General  Sherman  led  to  Atlanta  was  the  best  supplied  with 
maps  of  any  that  fought  in  the  civil  war. 


INDEX. 


ACKWORTH,  G-A.,  U.  S.  forces  at,  ii,  82. 

ADAMS,  GEN.,  driven  from  Rodgers- 
ville  by  U.  S.  forces,  i,  131.  Defeat- 
ed by  Col.  Hambright,  i,  132.  Re- 
pulsed at  Stone  River,  i,  242. 

ALABAMA,  expedition  of  Gen.  0.  M. 
Mitchell  into,  i,  130.  Gen.  J.  H. 
Wilson's  campaign  in,  ii,  347. 

ALEXANDER,  GEN.  J.  W.  S.,  charges 
upon  a  battery  at  Stone  River, 
i,  224.  Operations  of,  in  Alabama 
and  Georgia,  ii,  349. 

ALESHIRE'S  BATTERY,  i,  291. 

ALLATOONA  PASS,  the  turning  of, 
ii,  75. 

ALTAMONT,  concentration  of  Buell's 
forces  at,  i,  150. 

AMMON,  GEN.  J.,  commands  Tenth 
Brigade,  Army  of  the  Ohio,  i,  69. 
In  action  at  Shiloh,  i,  107.  Opera- 
tions of,  in  East  Tennessee,  ii,  273. 

ANDERSON  CAVALRY,  charge  of,  upon 
the  enemy,  i,  222. 

ANDERSON,  GEN.  P.,  at  battle  of  Mis- 
sionary Ridge,  i,  425. 

ANDERSON.  GEN.  ROBERT,  assigned  to 
command  Department  of  Ken- 
tucky, i,  20.  Invokes  Kentuckians 
to  arm  for  expulsion  of  rebel  in- 
vaders, i,  31.  Proclamation  of,  i, 
134.  Relieved  at  his  own  request, 
i,  31.  General  orders  of,  i,  35. 

ANDREWS,  J.  J.,  secret  expedition  of, 
to  destroy  railroad  bridges  in 
Georgia,  i,  136. 

ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND,  under  An- 
derson, i,  22.  Under  Sherman,  i, 
35.  Designation  of,  changed  to 
"Army  of  the  Ohio,"  under  Buell, 
i,  46.  Assumed  its  original  name 
under  Rosecrans,  i,  207.  Concen- 
tration of,  at  Nashville,  i,  207. 
Roster  of  organization  of,  at  battle 
of  Stone  River,  i,  281.  Re-equip- 
ment of,  at  Murfreesboro,  i,  288. 
Roster  of  organization  of,  at  the 
battle  of  Chickamauga,  i,  378. 


Thomas  assigned  to  command  ofr 
i,  394.  Attitude  and  condition  ofr 
early  in  1864,  ii,  13.  Important 
changes  made  in,  at  Chattanooga, 
ii,  28.  Strength  of,  at  Chattanooga, 
ii,  30.  Organization  of,  April,  1864, 
ii,  31.  Loss  of,  during  June,  1864, 
ii,  95.  Casualties  of,  during  the 
Atlanta  campaign,  ii,  149.  During 
the  campaign  against  Hood  in 
Tennessee,  ii,  248.  Dissolution  of, 
and  summary  of  its  achievements, 
ii,  369.  Disposition  of  its  heroic 
dead,  ii,  377.  See  also  Appendix  as 
to  organization  of,  ii,  381.  List  of 
its  officers  killed  in  battle,  or  who 
died  in  the  service,  ii,  386.  En- 
gineer service  in,  ii,  439. 

ARMY  OF  KENTUCKY,  under  Gen.  G. 
Granger,  i,  290. 

ARMY  OP  THE  OHIO,  constituted  under 
Buell,  i,  46.  Strength  of,  i,  98. 
Discipline  and  valor  of,  at  the  bat- 
tle of  Shiloh,  i,  116.  Designation 
of,  changed  back  to  "  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,"  i,  207. 

ARMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE,  arrives  at 
Chattanooga,  i,  4]0.  McPherson 
assigned  to  command  of,  ii,  24. 
Howard  succeeds  McPherson  in 
command  of,  ii,  124. 

ASHBOTH,  GEN.  A.,  at  siege  of  Cor- 
inth, i,  126. 

ATHENS,  ALA.,  occupied  by  Mitchell, 
i,  132. 

ATLANTA,  GA.,  campaign  to,  com- 
menced, ii,  44.  Advance  upon,  ii, 
109.  Siege  of,  ii,  123.  Shelling  of, 
ii,  140.  Siege  of,  raised,  ii,  140. 
Abandoned  by  Hood,  ii,  147.  Ef- 
fects of  the  fall  of,  ii,  148.  A  large 
portion  of,  destroyed  by  Sherman, 
ii,  279. 

AVERYSBORO,  battle  of,  ii,  314. 

BAIRD,  GEN.   A.,  at  Stevens'  Gap,  i, 
320.  Joins  Negley,  i,  322.  At  Chick- 
amauga,   i,    334.     At   Missionary 
(459) 


460 


INDEX. 


Ridge,  i,  428.  In  movement  toward 
Dalton,  ii,  20.  Advance  toward 
Tunnel  Hill,  ii,  26.  At  Ringgold, 
ii,  45.  At  New  Hope  Church,  ii,  82. 
Before  Kenesaw  Mountain,  ii,  88. 
Before  Atlanta,  ii,  127.  At  battle 
of  Jonesboro,  ii,  144.  At  battle  of 
Bentonville,  ii,  321. 

BAKER,  LIEUT.  COL.  M.,  killed  before 
Atlanta,  ii,  128. 

BALDWIN,  MAJ.  L.,  mortally  wounded 
at  Peachtree  Creek,  ii,  116. 

BALDWIN,  COL.  P.  P.,  at  battle  of 
Stone  River,  i,  231.  Report  of  the 
battle,  i,  264.  At  Chickamauga,  i, 
335. 

BATE,  GEN.  W.  B. ,  at  battle  of  Chick- 
amauga, i,  362.  On  Missionary 
Ridge,  i,  430.  At  Buzzard  Roost, 
ii,  49.  Driven  from  Overall's  Creek, 
ii,  223. 

BARNES,  COL.  S.  M.,  at  battle  of  Chick- 
amauga, i,  337. 

BARXET,  CAPT.,  at  battle  of  Perry- 
ville,  i,  187. 

BARTON,  GEN.,  commands  rebel  forces 
at  Cumberland  Gap,  i,  133. 

BARDSTOWN,  KY.,  camp  of  instruction 
at,  i,  72. 

BATTLE  CREEK,  Gen.  Mitchell  at,  i, 
144. 

BAUM,  GEN.,  refuses  to  surrender 
Resaca,  ii,  162. 

BEATTY,  GEX.  J.,  drives  the  enemy 

1  at  battle  of  Stone  River,  i,  261. 
At  battle  of  Chickamauga,  i,  345. 
At  Missionary  Ridge,  i,  429. 

BEATTY, GEN.  S.,  commands  Eleventh 
Brigade  in  Kentucky,  i,  71.  At 
battle  of  Stone  River,  i,  236.  At 
battle  of  Chickamauga,  i,  336. 
At  battle  of  Nashville,  ii,  229. 

BEAUREGARD,  GEN.  G.  T.,  succeeded 
A.  S.  Johnston  in  command  at 
Shiloh,  i,  108.  Sends  jubilant  dis- 
patch to  Richmond,  i,  108.  De- 
feated, i,  114.  Extract  from  report 
of  battle  of  Shiloh,  i,  125.  At 
Corinth,  i,  126.  Withdraws  his 
army,  i,  129.  Dispatches  of  to 
Hoocl  and  Cobb,  ii,  208.  To  the 
people  of  Georgia,  ii,  291.  To 
Hardee  at  Savannah,  ii,  303. 
Movements  of  at  Charleston,  ii, 
307. 

BECKET,  MAJ.  D.  C.,  killed  near  Ken- 
esaw Mountain,  ii,  92. 


BENTONVILLE,  N.  C.,  battle  of,  ii,  316. 

BIG  HILL,  engagement  at,  i,  179. 

BIG  SHANTY,  a  depot  of  supplies  for 
Sherman's  ar"my,  ii,  88. 

BLACKBURN,  DR.,  pledges  Kentucky 
to  the  rebels,  i,  10. 

BLAIR,  GEN.  F.  P.,  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  i,  426.  On  the  Knoxville 
campaign,  ii,  1.  Ordered  to  Kings- 
ton, ii,  74.  Reaches  Ackworth,  ii, 
83.  On  the  march  to  the  sea,  ii, 
278. 

BLOCK-HOUSES,  illustrations  of,  rec- 
tangular, ii,  442 ;  octagonal,  ii,  445 ; 
designs  for  artillery  block-houses, 
ii,  446, 447 ;  effectiveness  of  against 
Hood's  forces,  ii,  449.  For  railroad 
defense,  ii,  452—454. 

BLOODGOOD,  LIEUT.  COL.,  at  Peachtree 
Creek,  ii,  113. 

BOARD  OF  TRADE  BATTERY,  at  the  bat- 
tle of  Selma,  ii,  351. 

BOONE,  COL.,  raid  into  Georgia,  ii,  17, 

BOWLING  GREEX,  KY.,  capture  of  bv 
Gen.  0.  M.  Mitchell,  i,  68. 

BOYLE,  GEX.  J.  T.,  opposed  neutrality 
in  Kentucky,  i,  15.  Placed  in 
command  at  Columbia,  i,  52.  Re- 
sists Morgan  in  Kentucky,  i,  146. 

BRADLEY,  GEN.  L.  P.,  report  of  battle 
of  Stone  River,  i,  270.  At  battle 
of  Chickamauga,  i,  337.  Engage- 
ment near  Spring  Hill,  ii,  193. 

BRAGG,  GEN.  B.,  repulsed  at  Shiloh, 
i,  107.  Succeeds  Beauregard,  i, 
139.  Puts  his  army  in  motion  for 
Tennessee,  i,  140.  Invades  Ken- 
tucky, i,  158.  Strength  of,  i,  158. 
Moves  toward  Nashville,  i,  158. 
Gives  battle  at  Perry ville,  i,  186. 
Failure  of  his  campaign  in  Ken- 
tucky, i,  198.  Extract  from  report 
of,  i,  204.  Li  ne  of  battle  and  attack 
at  Stone  River,  i,  228.  Checked  at 
all  points,  i,  245.  Retreat  of,  i,  251. 
Strength  and  losses  of  at  battle  of 
Stone  River,  i,  252.  Report  of  the 
battle,  i,  255.  Evacuates  Tulla- 
homa,  i,  307.  Retreats  to  Chatta- 
nooga, 1,  308.  Evacuates  Chatta- 
nooga, i,  316.  Combination  of 
against  Negley,  i,  320.  Position 
of  and  plan  of  attack  at  Chicka- 
mauga, i,  327.  Strength  of  at 
Chickamauga,  i,  360.  Losses  of,  i. 
362.  Before  Chattanooga,  i,  38o. 
Part  of  army  driven  from  Look- 


INDEX. 


461 


out  Mountain  by  Hooker,  i,  399. 
Detaches  Longstreet's  corps,  i, 
408.  Entire  army  on  Missionary 
Eidge,  i,  425.  Defeat  of,  i,  433. 
Strength  and  loss  at  Chattanooga, 
i,  437.  Removed  from  command 
in  Georgia,  ii,  14.  Operations  of 
in  North  Carolina,  ii,  307.  At 
battle  of  Bentonville,  ii,  317. 

BRAMLETTE,  Cor,.  T.  E.,  takes  arms  to 
Camp  Dick  Robinson,  i,  22.  Moves 
to  Lexington,  i,  31. 

BRANNAN,  GEN.  J.  M.,  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  i,  333.  Chief  of  artillery, 
i,  406.  At  Missionary  Ridge,  i, 
430.  Report  of  guns  captured  on 
Atlanta  campaign,  ii,  150. 

BRECKINRIDGE,  GEN.  J.  C.,  disloyalty 
of,  in  Kentucky,  i,  6.  Entered 
Rochester  and  Bowling  Green,  i, 
71.  Demands  surrender  of  Nash- 
ville, i,  207.  At  the  battle  of  Stone 
River,  i,  227.  At  Chickamauga,  i, 
340.  On  Missionary  Ridge,  i,  425. 
Drives  Gillem  from  Bull's  Gap,  ii, 
272. 

BRIDGE'S  BATTERY,  on  Orchard  Knob, 
i,  416. 

BRIDGEPORT,  ALA.,  capture  of,  i,  131. 

BROWN,  GEN.,  cavalry  operations  of, 
in  North  Carolina,  ii,  342. 

BROWN,  LIEUT.  COL.  W.  H.  EL,  mor- 
tally wounded  at  Peachtree 
Creek,  ii,  116. 

BROWN'S  FERRY,  operations  at,  by 
Gen.  W.  F.  Smith,  i,  396. 

BROWNLOW,  COL.,  engagement  of,  at 
Sparta,  ii,  6. 

BRUCE,  COL.  S.  D.,  commands 
Twenty-second  Brigade,  Army  of 
the  Ohio,  i,  70.  Routs  a  rebel 
force,  i,  212. 

BUCKNER,  GEN.  S.  B.,  disloyalty  of, 
i,  3.  Inspector-General  of  militia 
in  Kentucky,  i,  9.  At  Camp 
Boone,  Ky.,  i,  23.  Attempt  of  to 
capture  Louisville,  i,  28.  With- 
drawal to  Bowling  Green,  i,  29. 
Surrenders  Fort  Donelson  to 
Grant,  i,  86.  At  Perry ville,  i,  192. 
Moves  against  Negley  in  Mc- 
Lemore's  Cove,  i,  320.  At  battle 
of  Chickamauga,  i,  364.  At  Mis- 
sionary Ridge,  i,  425. 

BUELL,  GEN.  D.  C.,  assigned  to  com- 
mand Department  of  the  Ohio, 
i,  46.  Early  operations  of,  in 


Kentucky,  i,  47.  Advance  of,  to 
Nashville,  i,  69.  Sent  troops  to 
Grant  'without  solicitation,  i,  85. 
Movement  of  toward  Shiloh,  i, 
100.  Reaches  Savannah,  i,  103. 
At  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  i,  109. 
Loss  of,  at  Shiloh,  i,  114.  Letters 
to  Halleck,  i,  120,  121.  Extract 
from  report  of  battle  of  Shiloh,  i, 
124.  At  siege  of  Corinth,  i,  126. 
Moving  to  support  Pope,  i,  140. 
Begins  transfers  of  command  to 
East  Tennessee,  i,  142.  Orders  his 
army  to  Murfreesboro,  i,  158.  Pre- 
pares to  offer  battle  at  Altamont, 
i,  156.  Moves  toward  Louisville, 
i,  159.  Letters  to  Halleck,  i,  162. 
Letters  to  Thomas,  i,  164-173. 
Campaign  of  Perry  ville,  i,  184. 
Loss  at  battle  of  Perryville,  i,  192. 
Dispatches  relative  to  his  removal, 
i,  200.  Short  report  of,  i,  201.  Ex- 
tract of  letters  to  Halleck,  i,  205. 
Superseded  by  Rosecrans,  i,  206. 

BUELL,  COL.  G.  P.,  at  Chickamauga, 
i,  337.  Operations  on  Lookout 
Mountain,  ii,  5.  At  Savannah,  ii, 
283.  At  battle  of  Bentonville,  ii, 
316. 

BUFORD,  GEN.  A.,  at  Duck  River,  ii, 
191. 

BULL'S  GAP,  Gillem  defeated  at,  by 
Breckinridge,  ii,  272. 

BURBRIDGE,  GEN.,  operations  of,  in 
East  Tennessee,  ii,  273. 

BURKE,  LIEUT.  COL.,  at  Stewart's 
Creek,  i,  247. 

BURNSIDE,  GEN.  A.  E.,  urged  to  co- 
operate with  Rosecians  against 
Bragg,  i,  365-367.  In  critical  po- 
sition at  Knoxville,  i,  436. 

BURNT  HICKORY,  ii,  74. 

BUSH'S  BATTERY,  at  Perryville,  i,  188. 
Two  guns  of  captured,  i,  237. 

BUSCHBECK,  COL.  A.,  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  i,  427.  Near  Dallas,  ii,  76. 

BUTTERFIELD,  GEN.  D.,  examination 
of  railroads  by,  ii,  22.  At  battle 
of  Resaca,  ii,  65.  At  New  Hope 
Church,  ii,  76.  Before  Kenesaw 
Mountain,  ii,  91. 

BUZZARD'S  ROOST,  operations  at, 
ii,  47.  Hood's  attack  of  block- 
house at,  ii,  452. 

CAMP  CLAY,  established  near  Cincin- 
nati, i,  14. 

CAIRO,  strategic  importance  of,  i,  80. 


462 


INDEX. 


CAMP  DICK  ROBINSON,  KY.,  established 
i,  16.  Efforts  to  prevent  transmis- 
sion of  arms  to,  i,  21. 

CAMP  JOE  HOLT,  established  by  Rous- 
seau, i,  16. 

CAMPBELL,  COL.  A.  P.,  expedition 
against  Wheeler,  i,  388.  Action 
of  at  Mossy  Creek,  ii,  16. 

CANBY,  GEN.  E.  R.  S.,  intercepts 
President  Davis'  order  to  Smith 
and  Magruder,  ii,  157.  Dispatch 
of,  to  Sherman,  ii,  179. 

CANDY,  COL.  C.,  near  Dallas,  ii,  76. 

CARLIN,  GEN.  W.  P.,  at  Perry ville,  i, 
191.  At  Nolensville,  i,  220.  Re- 
port of  battle  of  Stone  River,  i, 
257.  At  Chickamauga,  i,  336.  At 
Lookout  Mountain,  i,  421.  At 
Missionary  Ridge,  i,  429.  Ex- 
pedition toward  Dalton,  ii,  19.  At 
Buzzard  Roost,  ii,  49.  At  battle 
of  Resaca,  ii,  66.  At  battle  of 
Jonesboro,  ii,  144.  At  battle  of 
Bentonville,  ii,  315. 

•CARMAN,  COL.,  at  Savannah,  ii,  287. 
Extract  from  report  of  the  cap- 
ture of  Savannah,  ii,  302. 

CARTER,  GEN.  S.  P.,  ordered  to  join 
Thomas  in  Kentucky,  i,  46.  At 
battle  of  'Mill  Springs,  i,-56.  At 
Cumberland  Gap,  i,  78.  Raid  into 
East  Tennessee,  i,  216. 

CHALMERS,  GEN.  J.  R.,  demands  the 
surrender  of  Munfordsville,  i,  160. 
At  Duck  River,  ii,  191. 

CHARLESTON,  S.  C.,  evacuated,  ii,  309. 

CHARLOTTE,  N.  C.,  threatened  by 
Slocum,  ii,  301. 

•CHATTAHOOCHEE  RIVER,  Johnston  re- 
treats across,  ii,  111. 

CHATTANOOGA,  TENN.,  Negley's  de- 
monstration against,  i,  132. 
Buell's  advance  toward,  i,  139. 
Importance  of,  i,  140.  Occupied 
by  Bragg,  i,  310.  Evacuated  by 
Bragg,  i,  316.  Occupied  by  Crit- 
tenden,  i,  318.  Battles  of,  "i,  386. 
Fortifications  and  topography  of, 
406.  National  Cemetery  estab- 
lished at,  by  Thomas,  ii,  377. 

'CHATTANOOGA  AND  ATLANTA  RAILROAD, 

defenses  of,  ii,  453. 

CHATTANOOGA  AND  KLOXVILLE  RAIL- 
ROAD, defenses  of,  ii,  453. 

CHATTOOGA  MOUNTAIN,  ii,  48. 

CHEATHAM,  GEN.  B.  F.,  at  Perry  ville, 
i,  1 93.  At  battle  of  Stone  River,  i, 


227.  At  Chickamauga,  i,  335.  At 
Missionary  Ridge,  i,  427.  In  South 
Carolina,  ii,  309.  At  battle  of  Ben- 
tonville, ii,  317. 

CHERAW,  S.  C.,  entered  by  the  Seven- 
teenth Corps,  ii,  311. 

CHICKAMAUGA  CAMPAIGN,  and  battle  of, 
i,  310-385. 

CHILDS,  LIEUT.  J.  W.,  captures  rebel 
general  J.  P.  M.  Maury,  i,  136. 

CHILDS,  COL.,  i,  177. 

CHURCH'S  BATTERY,  i,  245. 

CINCINNATI,  0.,  Anderson's  head- 
quarters at,  i,  120.  Threatened 
by  Gen.  E.  K.  Smith,  i,  183. 

CLEBURN,  GEN.  P.  R.,  at  Stone  River, 
i,  227.  At  Chickamauga,  i,  337. 
On  Missionary  Ridge,  i,  423.  At 
Dalton,  ii,  21.  At  New  Hope 
Church,  ii,  79.  Killed  at  Frank- 
lin, ii,  201. 

COBB,  GEN.  H.,  routed  near  Macon 
by  Walcutt,  ii,  280.  Communica- 
tion of,  to  Wilson,  ii,  360. 

COBHAM,  COL.,  at  Lookout  Mountain, 
i,  420.  Killed  at  Peachtree  Creek, 
ii,  116. 

COBURN,  COL.  J.,  attacks  Van  Dorn, 
i,  291.  Surrenders,  i,  292.  Ex- 
peditions against  guerrilla  bands, 
ii,  6.  At  battle  of  Resaca,  ii,  68. 
Enters  Atlanta,  ii,  147. 

COCKERILL'S  BATTERY,  at  Chicka- 
mauga, i,  339. 

COGSWELL,  GEN.,  at  battle  of  Benton- 
ville, ii,  319. 

COLUMBIA,  S.  C.,  capture  and  burning 
of,  ii,  309. 

COLUMBIA,  TENN.,  occupied  by  U.  S. 
troops,  i,  131. 

COLUMBUS,  GA.,  captured  by  Wilson's 
forces,  ii,  355. 

COLUMBUS,  KY.,  occupation  of,  by 
Gen.  Polk,  i,  33. 

CONKLING,  MAJ.,  killed,  i,  181. 

CONNELL,  COL.  J.  M.,  at  London  and 
Rock  Castle  Hills,  i,  381.  At 
Chickamauga,  i,  334. 

CONRAD,  COL.,  at  battle  of  Franklin, 
ii,  198. 

COON,  COL.,  engages  the  enemy  at 
Shoal's  Creek,  ii,  188.  Charge  of 
at  battle  of  Nashville,  ii,  232. 

COOPER,  SURGEON  G.  E.,  report  of  on 
Atlanta  campaign,  ii,  150. 

COOPER,  GEN.,  at  battle  of  Nashville, 
ii,  332. 


INDEX. 


463 


CORINTH,  importance  of  position  of, 
i,  97.  Siege  and  fall  of,  i,  126. 

•CORSE,  GEN.  J.  M.,  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  i,  427.  Ordered  to  Rome, 
ii,  158.  Attacked  at  Allatoona, 
ii,  161.  Destroys  foundries,  mills, 
etc.,  at  Rome,  ii,  278. 

COUCH,  GEN.  D.  N.,  at  battle  of  Nash- 
ville, ii,  229. 

Cox's  BATTERY,  i,  243. 

•Cox,  GEN.  J.  D.,  takes  Kentucky 
regiments  to  West  Virginia,  i,  15. 
At  Lynnville,  ii,  188.  Intercepts 
Hood  near  Columbia,  ii,  189.  Re- 
pulsed enemy's  attacks,  ii,  194. 
At  battle  of  Franklin,  ii,  196.  At 
battle  of  Nashville,  ii,  229. 

CRAIGHLLL,  LIEUT.  W.  P.,  constructs 
fortifications,  i,  176. 

CRAWFISH  SPRINGS,  i,  340. 

CREIGHTON*,  COL.,  at  Lookout  Moun- 
tain, i,  420.  Killed  near  Ring- 
gold,  i,  436. 

CRITTENDEN,  GEN.  GEORGE,  in  com- 
mand of  Confederates  at  battle  of 
Mill  Springs,  i,  55. 

CRITTENDEN,  GEN.  T.  L.,  brigadier- 
general  of  Kentucky  militia,  i,  9. 
Urges  members  of  the  State 
Guard  to  enter  the  U.  S.  service,  i, 
31.  Proclamation  of,  i,  34.  As- 
signed to  command  of  Fifth  Divis- 
ion, i,  71.  Moves  to  Nashville,  i, 
72.  At  battle  of  Shiloh,  i,  109. 
At  Corinth,  i,  126.  Assigned  to 
command  of  a  corps,  i,  184.  At 
Perry ville,  i,  186.  Hotly  engaged 
at  Stone  River,  i,  242.  Report  of 
the  battle,  i,  275.  Occupies  Chat- 
tanooga and  Rossville,  i,  318.  At 
the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  i,  348. 

CROOK.  GEN.  G.,  at  Carthage,  Tenn., 
i,  290.  At  Dougherty  Gap,  i,  327. 
Expedition  against  Wheeler,  i, 
387.  Saves  Murfreesboro,  i,  389. 

CUOXTON,  GEN.  J.  T.,  at  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  i,  334.  Attacks 
Pillow  at  Lafayette,  ii,  95.  Near 
Florence,  Ala.,  ii,  170.  Covers 
movement  from  Pulaski,  ii,  189. 
At  Rally  Hill,  ii,  190.  At  battle 
of  Nashville,  ii,  229.  Operations 
of  in  Alabama  and  Georgia,  ii, 
348. 

CRUFT,  GEN.  C.,  commands  Thir- 
teenth Brigade,  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
i,  71.  Reinforces  General  Grant 


at  Fort  Donelson,  i,  72.  At  battle 
of  Richmond,  Ky.,  i,  180.  At 
battle  of  Stone  River,  i,  225.  Re- 
port of  the  battle,  i,  277.  At 
Chickamauga,  i,  336.  At  Lookout 
Mountain,  i,  417.  At  Missionary 
Ridge,  i,  428.  Expedition  toward 
Dalton,  ii,  19.  At  battle  of  Nash- 
ville, ii,  228. 

CUMBERLAND  GAP,  occupied  by  rebel 
forces,  i,  133.  Evacuated  by  Gen- 
eral Morgan,  i,  178. 

GUSHING' s  BATTERY,  at  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  i,  33^. 

CUTTER,  CAPT.,  contest  of  with  guer- 
rilla band,  ii,  6. 

DAHLGREEN,  ADMIRAL  JOHN  A.,  co- 
operates with  Sherman,  ii,  284. 

DALLAS,  GA.,  engagements  at,  ii,  76. 

DALTON,  GA.,  movement  against,  ii, 
18.  Turning  of,  ii,  44.  Captured 
by  Hood,  ii,  162. 

DANA,  GEN.  N.  J.  T.,  dispatch  to 
Sherman,  ii,  206. 

DAVIS,  PRESIDENT  JEFF.,  extract  from 
message  on  battle  of  Shiloh, 
i,  125.  Announces  "  grave  re- 
verses," ii,  10.  Disregarded  John- 
ston's suggestions,  ii,  26.  Inca- 
pacity of,  ii,  27.  Relieves  John- 
ston, ii,  113.  Confers  with  West- 
ern generals,  ii,  156.  Orders 
Smith  and  Magruder  to  co-oper- 
ate with  Hood,  ii,  157.  Capture 
of  by  Wilson's  forces,  ii,  362. 

DAVIES,  GEN.  J.  A.,  at  siege  of  Cor- 
inth, i,  J26. 

DAVIS,  GEN.  JEFF.  C.,  joins  Buell  at 
Murfreesboro,  i,  158.  At  Nolens- 
ville,  i,  220.  At  battle  of  Stone 
River,  i,  224.  Report  of  the  bat- 
tle, i,  266.  At  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga, i,  336.  Sent  to  Hooker 
at  Lookout  Mountain,  i,  401.  On 
the  Knoxville  campaign,  ii,  1.  At 
Buzzard  Roost,  ii,  49.  At  battle 
of  Resaca,  ii,  66.  Captures  Rome, 
Ga.,  ii,  73.  Assault  of,  near  Kene- 
saw,  ii,  93.  At  Peachtree  Creek, 
ii,  112.  Before  Atlanta,  ii,  128. 
Assigned  to  command  of  the  Four- 
teenth Corps,  ii,  140.  At  battle  of 
Jonesboro,  ii,  143.  On  the  march 
to  the  sea,  ii,  278.  At  Averysboro, 
ii,  314.  At  battle  of  Bentonville, 
ii,  318.  Congratulatory  order  of. 
ii-  374. 


464 


INDEX. 


DECATUR,  ALA.,  capture  of,  by  Tur- 
chin,  i,  130.  Hood's  demonstra- 
tion against,  ii,  169. 

DE  COURCY,  COL.  J.  S.,  at  Cumberland 
Ford,  i.  133.  Defeats  Stevenson,  i, 
177. 

DELPH,  J.  M.,  mayor  of  Louisville, 
commander  of  "  Home  Guard,"  i, 
11.  Demands  the  keys  of  state 
magazine,  i,  13. 

DICK,  COL.  G.  F.,at  Chickamauga,  i, 
336. 

DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  CUMBERLAND,  con- 
stituted, i,  N  22.  Designation  of, 
changed,  i,  46.  Its  original  name 
assumed,  i,  207. 

DEPARTMENT  OP  KENTUCKY,  consti- 
tuted, i,  20. 

DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  OHIO,  constituted, 
i,  46.  Discontinued,  i,  207. 

DOBBS,  COL.,  killed  at  the  battle  of 
Salem,  ii,  351. 

DODGE,  COL.  J.  B.,  at  Chickamauga, 
i,  335. 

DONALDSON,  GEN.,  garrisons  Nashville, 
ii,  206.  At  battle  of  Nashville,  ii, 
227. 

DOOLITTLE,  COL.,  at  battle  of  Nash- 
ville, ii,  240. 

DILWORTH,  COL.,  near  Kenesaw  Moun- 
tain, ii,  94.  At  Peachtree  Creek, 
-ii,  111.  At  Jonesboro,  ii,  144. 

DUFFIELD,  COL.,  in  command  at  Mur- 
freesboro,  i,  99.  Pursues  Morgan, 
i,  136.  Captures  rebel  detach- 
ments, i,  136.  Captured  at  Mur- 
freesboro,  i,  147. 

DUNHAM,  COL.,  surrenders  Munfords- 
ville,  i,  160. 

DUNLAP,  LIEUT.,  hung  as  a  rebel  spy 
at  Murfreesboro,  i,  298. 

DUMONT,  GEN.  E.,  commands  Seven- 
teenth Brigade,  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
i,  67.  In  command  at  Nashville, 
i,  99.  Routs  Morgan,  i,  136. 
Moves  against  E.  K.  Smith,  i,  184. 

EDGARTON'S  BATTERY,  captured,  i,  230. 

EDGEFIELD,  TENN.,  occupied  by  Buell, 
i,  69. 

EDIE,  COL.,  at  Jonesboro,  ii,  144. 

ELIZABETHTOWN,  KY.,  captured  by  J. 
H.  Morgan,  i,  216. 

ELLIOTT,  GI:N.  W.  L.,  on  the  Knox- 
ville  campaign,  ii,  1.  At  Athens, 

-  ii,  5.  Engagement  at  Mossy 
Creek,  ii,  16.  At  battle  of  Nash- 
ville, ii,  228. 


ELLIOTT,  LIEUT.  COL.,  finds  rebel  cav- 
alry near  Florence,  ii,  158. 

ELLSWORTH'S  BATTERY,  i,  237. 

ESTE,  CoL.'G.  P.,  at  Jonesboro,  ii, 
144. 

ESTEP'S  BATTERY,  i,  243. 

ETOWAH  RIVER,  advance  to,  ii,  71. 

ETOWAH,  DISTRICT  OP,  created,  ii,  95. 

FAYETTEVILLE,  N.  C.,  entered  by  the 
U.  S.  forces,  ii,  311. 

FEARING,  GEN.  B.  D.,  at  battle  of 
Bentonville,  ii,  316. 

FISHER,  CAPT.,  at  Perry ville,  i,  189. 

FITZGIBBON,  MAJ.,  defeats  guerrilla 
bands,  ii,  6. 

FLAT  ROCK,  GA.,  engagement  at,  ii, 
124. 

FOOTE,  COM.  A.  H.,  at  Fort  Henry, 
i,  85. 

FORT  DONELSON,  surrender  of,  i,  86. 
Transferred  to  Rosecrans'  com- 
mand, i,  288.  Attacked  by 
Wheeler,  i,  289. 

FORT  HENRY,  surrender  of,  i,  85. 
Transferred  to  Rosecrans'  com- 
mand, i,  288.  Abandoned,  i,  294. 

FORT  HEIMAN,  transferred  to  Rose- 
crans, i,  288.  Gunboat  No.  55 
captured  at  by  Forrest,  ii,  171. 

FORT  MCALLISTER,  captured  by  Ha- 
zen's  division,  ii,  284. 

FORT  TYLER,  captured  by  La  Grange, 
ii,  — . 

FOURTH  ARMY  CORPS,  formed  by  con- 
solidation of  the  Twentieth  and 
Twenty-first  Corps,  assigned  to 
Howard,  ii,  30.  Assigned  to  Gen. 
D.  S.  Stanley,  ii,  129.  Fame  and 
glory  of,  ii,  323.  See  also  Appen- 
dix, ii,  382. 

FOURTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS,  first  de- 
signation given  to  troops  in  the 
Department  of  the  Cumberland 
under  Rosecrans,  i,  207.  Desig- 
nated as  the  "Center,"  and 
Thomas  assigned  to  command 
of,  i,  210.  Palmer  succeeds 
Thomas  in  command  of,  i,  411. 
Davis  assigned  to  command  of,  ii, 
140.  Fame  and  glory  of,  ii,  323. 
See  also  Appendix,  ii,  382. 

FORMAN,  COL.  J.,  killed,  i,  252. 

FORREST,  GEN.  N.  B.,  cavalry  dash  to 
Murfreesboro,  i,  145.  Captures 
Murfreesboro,  i,  147.  Captures 
Athens,  Ala.,  ii,  163.  At  John- 
sonville,  Tenn.,  ii,  171.  Moving 


INDEX. 


465 


toward  Franklin,  ii,  191.  Held 
by  Wilson  at  battle  of  Franklin, 
ii',  198.  Defeated  by  Wilson  at 
Selma,  ii,  352. 

FOSTER,  GEN.  J.  G.,  at  Savannah,  ii, 
284. 

Fox,  CAPT.  P.  V.,  at  Brown's  Ferry, 
i,  398. 

FRANKFORT,  KY.,  secret  meeting  of 
Union  men  at,  i,  12. 

FRANKLIN,  TENN.,  battle  of,  ii,  198. 

FRENCH,  GEN.,  S.  G.,  attacks  Alla- 
tooiia,  ii,  161. 

FRY,  COL.  J.  B.,  at  battle  of  Perry- 
ville/i,  201. 

FRY,  GEN.  S.  S.,  at  Camp  Dick  Rob- 
inson,  i,  17.  Kills  Zollicoffer  at  bat- 
tle of  Mill  Springs,  i,  57.  Crosses 
river  at  Decatur,  i,  148.  At  Over- 
all's Creek,  i,  245. 

FYFFE,  COL.  J.  P.,  at  the  battle  of 
Stone  River,  i,  236. 

GALBRAITH,  COL.,  at  Fayetteville,  i, 
309. 

GARFIELD,  GEN.  J.  A.,  Eighteenth 
Brigade  organized  for,  i,  76.  Move- 
ments in  Eastern  Kentucky,  i,  76. 
Defeats  Marshall,  i,  77.  Drives 
enemy  from  Eastern  Kentucky, 
i,  78.  At  battle  of  Chickamauga, 
i,  355. 

GARRARD,  COL.  T.  T.,  at  Camp  Dick 
Robinson,  i,  17.  Sent  to  oppose 
Zollicoffer's  advance,  i,  30. 

GARRARD,  GEN.  K.,  on  right^of  Sher- 
man's army,  ii,  71.  Engagement 
of  at  Flat  Rock,  ii,  124.  At  Chat- 
tooga  Valley,  ii,  162.  At  battle  of 
Nashville,  ii,  228. 

GARESCHE,  LIEUT.  COL.,  killed,  i,  251. 

GARDENER,  GEN.  W.  M.,  routed  by 
Stoneman,  ii,  341. 

GARDNER'S  BATTERY  AT  JONESBORO,  ii, 
144. 

GAY,  CAPT.  E.,  commanding  cavalry 
brigade  at  Perry ville,  i,  185. 

GEARY,  GEN.  J.  W.,  at  Wauhatchie, 
i,  400.  At  Lookout  Mountain,  i, 
419.  At  Missionary  Ridge,  i,  428. 
Attempt  to  scale  Chattooga  Moun- 
tain, ii,  48.  NearKenesaw  Moun- 
tain, ii,  87.  At  battle  of  Resaca, 
ii,  68.  Engagements  near  Dallas, 
ii,  76.  At  Peachtree  Creek,  ii,  114. 
At  Savannah,  ii,  287.  Extract 
from  report  of  the  capture  of  Sa- 


vannah, ii,  302.  Moves  northward 
from  Savannah,  ii,  307. 

GENERAL  VIEW  AT  CLOSE  OF  1863,  ii,  8. 

GEORGIA,  expedition  to  destroy  rail- 
road in,  i,  136. 

GIBSON,  COL.  W.  H.,  report  of  battle 
of  Stone  River,  i,  264. 

GILBERT,  GEN.  C.  C.,  assigned  to  com- 
mand of  a  corps,  i,  184.  At  Per- 
ry ville,  i,  186.  Extract  from  re- 
port of,  i,  203.  Moves  to  Frank- 
lin, Tenn.,  i,  290. 

GILDERSLEEVE,  CAPT.,  captures  a 
steamer  on  Savannah  River,  ii,  282. 

GILLEM,  GEN.  A.  C.,  repulsed  at  Bull's 
Gap,  ii,  272.  Operations  of  in  East 
Tennessee,  ii,  273.  In  Tennessee 
and  North  Carolina,  ii,*338.  De- 
feats McCown,  ii,  342. 

GIST,  GEN.  S.  R.,  at  Missionary  Ridge, 
i,  425. 

GLEASON,  COL.,  before  Atlanta,'ji,  127. 

GOLDSBORO,  N.  C.,  occupied  "by  U. 
S.  forces,  ii,  322. 

GOODING,  COL,,  at  Perry  ville,  i,  190. 

GOODSPEED,  MAJ.,  at  battle  of  Nash- 
ville, ii,  238. 

GORDON,  GA.,  entered  by  Howard,  ii, 
280. 

GRACIE,  GEN.,  at  Chickamauga,  i,  353. 

GRANGER,  GEN.  G.,  at  Corinth,  i,  127. 
Defending  Cincinnati,  i,  183.  At 
battle  of  Chickamauga,  i,  253. 
Commands  Army  of  Kentucky,  i, 
290.  Drives  Van  Dorn,  i,  293.  At 
Missionary  Ridge,  i,  432.  Report 
of  the  battle,  i,  453.  On  the  Knox- 
ville  campaign,  ii,  1. 

GRANGER,  GEN.  R.  S.,  at  Decatur,  ii, 
132.  Makes  a  sortie  on  Hood,  ii, 
169, 

GRANT,  GEN.  U.  S.,  captures  Fort 
Donelson,  i,  85.  At  battle  of  Shi- 
loh,  i,  103.  Order  to  Nelson,  i,  125. 
Letters  to  Buell,  i,  124.  Extract 
from  official  report  of  battle  of 
Shiloh,  i,  125.  Second  in  com- 
mand at  Corinth,  i,  127.  Assigned 
to  command  Military  Division  of 
Mississippi,  i,  394.  First  order  to 
Thomas,  i,,  395.  Reaches  Chatta- 
nooga, 395.  Letters  and  orders 
to  Thomas  at  Chattanooga,  i,  440. 
Report  of  battle  near  Chattanoo- 
ga, i,  448.  Projected  campaign  of. 
ii,  14.  Directs  an  advance  toward 


466 


INDEX. 


Dalton,  ii,  18.  Dispatches  and 
orders  to  Thomas,  ii,  39.  Appoint- 
ed lieutenant-general,  ii,  40.  Or- 
ders to  advance  on  Georgia  cam- 
paign, ii,  45.  Extract  from  official 
report  of,  etc.,  ii,  54.  Dispatch  to 
Sherman,  ii,  120.  Dispatch  on  fall 
of  Atlanta,  ii,  153.  Advises  against 
a  backward  movement,  ii,  155. 
Discussion  of  Sherman's  projected 
inarch,  ii,  172.  Dispatches  to  Sher- 
man, ii,  173,  183,  184.  To  Halleck, 
ii,  177.  Urges  Thomas  to  attack 
Hood,  ii,  224.  On  his  way  to  Nash- 
ville to  relieve  Thomas,  ii,  235. 
Dispatches  to  Thomas  during  De- 
cember, 1864,  ii,  251,  252,  254,  257, 
259,  261,  262.  To  Halleck,  rela- 
tive to  relieving  Thomas,  ii,  253- 
255.  To  Thomas,  relating  to  Breck- 
inridge's  movements,  ii,  276,  277. 
Letters  of  to  Sherman,  relating  to 
the  march  to  the  sea,  ii,  293,  294. 
Congratulatory  order  of,  ii,  371. 

GREEN,  GEN.,  wounded  at  Wau- 
hatchie,  i,  401. 

GREEN,  MAJ.,  captured  by  Col.  Mc- 
Cook,  i,  388. 

GREENVILLE,  TENN.,  occupied  by  reb- 
els, i,  71. 

GRENSEL,  COL.  N.,  succeeds  Sill  at 
battle  of  Stone  River,  i,  232.  Re- 
port of  the  battle,  i,  269. 

GROSE,  GEN/  W.,  at  Chickamauga,  i, 
336.  At  Lookout  Mountain,  i,  419. 
At  Buzzard  Roost,  ii,  49. 

GROSVENOR,  COL.  C.  H.,  at  battle  of 
Nashville,  ii,  230. 

GROTER,  COL.  W.  W.,  fell  at  Jones- 
boro,  ii,  145. 

GUNBOATS  TYLER  AND  LEXINGTON  at 
Shiloh,  i,  107. 

GUNTHER'S  BATTERY,  i,  238. 

GUTHRIE,  COL.  JAMES  V.,  authorized 
to  raise  a  regiment,  i,  14.  Takes 
his  regiment  to  West  Virginia,  i, 
15. 

HALL,  COL.  A.  S.,  defeats  J.  H.  Mor- 
gan, i,  294. 

HALLECK,  GEN.  II.  W.,  assigned  to 
command  of  the  Western  armies, 
i,  98.  Letters  to  Buell,  i,  120,  121. 
At  Pittsburg  Landing,  i,  126.  Or- 
ganization of  army  at  Corinth, 
i,  126.  Commander-in-chief  at 
Washington,  i,  160.  Dispatch  to 


Buell,  i,  161.  Assigns  Thomas  to 
command  of  Army  of  the  Ohio,  i, 
184.  Letter  to  Buell,  i,  205.  Re- 
lieves Buell  of  command,  i,  206. 
Orders  an  advance  against  Chatta- 
nooga, i,  310.  Ordered  Burnside 
to  support  Rosecrans,  i,  387.  Au- 
thorizes Thomas  to  call  on  West- 
ern States  for  troops,  ii,  212. 
Places  officers  and  troops  at 
Thomas'  disposal,  ii,  214.  Dis- 
patches to  Thomas,  ii,  177,  178. 
Dispatch  to  Sherman,  ii,  120.  Dis- 
patch of  December  31,  1864,  to 
Thomas,  ii,  344.  Dispatches  to 
Grant  relating  to  relieving  Thomas 
at  Nashville,  ii,  253,  256.  Dis- 
patches to  Thomas,  ii,  254,  258, 
261.  Letter  to  Sherman  at  Savan- 
nah, ii,  304. 

HAMBRIGHT,  COL.  A.,  defeats  Adams 
at  Jasper,  i,  132.  In  movement 
toward  Dalton,  ii,  20. 

HAMILTON,  GEN.  S.,  at  Corinth,  i,  127. 

HAMMOND,  GEN.  J.  H.,  fight  at  Brent- 
wood,  ii,  204.  At  battle  of  Nash- 
ville, ii,  237. 

HAMPTON,  GEN.  W.,  surprises  Kilpat- 
rick,  ii,  311. 

HATCH,  GEN.,  drives  enemy  at  Shoal 
Creek,  ii,  187.  Attacked  by  Hood 
at  Lawrenceburg,  ii,  188.  Covers 
movement  from  Pulaski,  ii,  189. 
Withdraws  to  Columbia,  ii,  190. 
At  battle  of  Nashville,  ii,  231. 

HARDEE,  GEN.  W.  J.,  at  Bowling 
Green,  Ky.,  i,  41.  At  Chattanooga, 
i,  152.  At  battle  of  Perryville,  i, 
193.  At  Stone  River,  i,  227.  On 
Missionary  Ridge,  i,  427.  At  Dal- 
ton, ii,  47.  Defeated  at  Jones- 
boro,  ii,  142.  Retreats  to  Lovejoy 
Station,  ii,  146.  At  Savannah,  ii, 
283.  Letter  to  Sherman,  refusing 
to  surrender  Savannah,  ii,  298. 
Withdraws  his  forces  from  Sa- 
vannah, ii,  287.  Movements  of  at 
Charleston,  ii,  307.  Defeated  at 
Averysboro,  ii,  314.  At  battle  of 
Bentonville,  ii,  317. 

HARDING,  COL.  A.  C.,  repulses  Wheel- 
er, i,  289. 

BARKER,  GEN.  C.  G.,  assigned  to  com- 
mand Twentieth  Brigade,  in  Ken- 
tucky, i,  73.  At  battle  of  Stone 
River,  i,  225.  At  Chickamauga,  i, 


INDEX. 


467 


348.  Before  Rocky  Face  Ridge,  ii, 
47.  Assault  at  Kenesaw,  and 
mortally  wounded,  ii,  94. 

HARLAN,  JAMES,  i,  12. 

HARMAN,  COL.,  killed,  near  Kenesaw 
Mountain,  ii,  94. 

HARNDEN,  COL.,  in  pursuit  of  Davis, 
ii,  365. 

HARRIS,  COL.,  at  Perry ville,  i,  90. 

HARRIS'  BATTERY,  at  Chickamauga, 
i,  336. 

HARRISON,  COL.  T.  J.,  expeditions 
against  guerrillas,  ii,  17.  In  move- 
ment toward  Dalton,  ii,  20. 

HASCALL,  GEN.  M.  S.,  assigned  to 
command  Fifteenth  Brigade,  in 
Kentucky,  i,  72.  Position  at  Stone 
River,  i,  225.  Report  of  battle  of 
Stone  River,  i,  278.  Before  At- 
lanta, ii,  127. 

HART,  MAJ.  J.  H.,  repulsed  enemy 
at  Fort  Donelson,  i,  151. 

HARTSVILLE,  KY.,  captured  by  J.  H. 
Morgan,  i,  214. 

HAUGHTALING'S  BATTERY,  captured,  i, 
237. 

HAWKINS,  COL.  J.  G.,  killed,  i,  252. 

HAWLEY,  COL.,  at  Savannah,  ii,  282. 

HAZEN,  GEN.  W.  B.,  commands  Nine- 
teenth Brigade,  in  Kentucky,  i,  69. 
Captures  rebel  battery,  i,  112.  At 
Stone  River,  i,  224.  Report  of 
battle  of  Stone  River,  i,  277.  At 
Chickamauga,  i,  336.  At  Mission- 
ary Ridge,  i,  415.  At  New  Hope 
Church,  ii,  79.  Captures  Fort  Mc- 
Allister, ii,  284.  At  battle  of 
Bentonville,  ii,  321. 

HAZEL  GREEN,  KY.,  occupied  by  U.  S. 
troops,  i,  74. 

HECKER,  COL.,  on  the  Knoxville  cam- 
paign, ii,  2. 

HEG,  COL.  H.  C.,  at  Chickamauga,  i, 
336.  Killed,  i,  363. 

HELM,  GEN.,  killed,  i,  346. 

HESCOCK'S  BATTERY  at  Perry  ville,  i, 
187. 

HESCOCK,  CAPT.,  report  of  battle  of 
Stone  River,  i,  271. 

HILL.  COL.,  at  battle  of  Nashville,  ii, 
232. 

HINDMAN,  GEN.  T.  C.,  defeated  at 
Rowlett's  Station,  i,  66.  Threatens 
Columbia,  i,  52.  Moves  against 
Negley,  i,  320.  At  Chickamauga, 
i,  340. 


HOB  ART,  GEN.  H.  C.,  at  battle  of  Ben- 
tonville, ii,  316. 

HOBLITZELL,  CAPT.,  at  Perry  ville,  i, 
189. 

HOOD,  GEN.  J.  B.,  at  Dalton,  ii,  47. 
At  battle  of  Resaca,  ii,  68.  Cover- 
ing Marietta,  ii,  88.  Attack  of,  at 
Kulp's  house,  ii,  92.  Succeeds 
General  Johnston,  ii,  113.  De- 
feated at  Peach  tree  Creek,  ii,  115. 
Abandons  Atlanta,  ii,  147.  Cross- 
ing the  Chattahoochee,  in  move- 
ment north,  ii,  159.  Advancing 
upon  Allatoona,  ii,  161.  Demands 
the  surrender  of  Resaca,  ii,  162. 
Effect  and  object  of  movement 
north,  ii,  167.  Makes  an  attack 
on  Decatur,  ii,  168.  Withdraws 
from  Decatur,  ii,  169.  Crossing  the 
Tennessee  River,  ii,  1 70.  Strength 
of  before  Thomas,  ii,  186.  Checked 
at  Franklin,  ii,  198.  Broken  and 
routed  at  Nashville,  ii,  227-.-240. 
Fragments  of  his  army  move  to- 
ward the  Carolinas,  ii,  308. 

HOOKER,  GEN.  Jos.,  joins  army  of  the 
Cumberland,  at  Bridgeport,  i,  393. 
Defeats  Longstreet  at  Wauhatchie, 
i,  398;  At  battle  of  Lookout  Moun- 
tain, i,  417.  At  Missionary  Ridge, 
i,  429.  Assigned  to  command  of 
Twentieth  Corps,  ii,  28.  At  Snake 
Creek  Gap,  ii,  50.  Advances  to- 
ward Buzzard's  Roost,  ii,  47.  At 
battle  of  Resaca,  ii,  64.  At  New 
Hope  Church,  ii,  76.  At  battle  of 
Peachtree  Creek,  ii,  112. 

HOOVER'S  GAP,  captured  by  Wilder, 
i,  304. 

HOTCHKISS'  BATTERY,  at  Knob's  Gap, 
i,  220.  At  battle  of  Stone  River, 
i,  234. 

HOSKINS,  COL.,  skirmish  of  his  pickets 
at  Mill  Springs,  i,  48. 

HOWARD,  GEN,  0.  0.,  at  Lookout 
Creek,  i,  399.  At  Missionary  Ridge, 
i,  426.  On  the  Knoxville  cam- 
paign, ii,  1.  Assigned  to  com- 
mand of  Fourth  Corps,  ii,  28.  Ex- 
tract from  report  of,  ii,  62.  At 
battle  of  Resaca,  ii,  64.  At  New 
Hope  Church,  ii,  78.  Before  Kene- 
saw Mountain,  ii,  87.  Engagement 
near  Jonesboro,  ii,  142.  Assigned 
to  command  of  Army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee, ii,  124.  Repulses  Hood's  at- 


468 


INDEX. 


tack  before  Atlanta,  ii,  125.  On  the 
march  to  the  sea,  ii,  278.  At  Sa- 
vannah, ii,  284.  Extract  from  re- 
port of  the  capture  of  Savannah, 
ii,  301.  Movement  north  through 
the  Carolinas,  ii,  309. 

HUBBARD,  COL.,  at  battle  of  Nash- 
ville, ii,  232. 

HURLBUT,  GEN.  S.  H.,  at  battle  of 
Shiloh,  i,  104.  At  Corinth,  i,  126. 

HUNTSVILLE,  ALA.,  capture  of,  i,  130. 

INNIS,  COL.  W.  P.,  defends  La  Vergne, 
Tenn.,  i,  247. 

IRELAND,  COL.  D.,  at  Lookout  Moun- 
tain, i,  420.  At  battle  of  Resaca, 
ii,  68.  Near  Dallas,  ii,  76. 

JACKSON,  GEN.  J.  S.,  at  Perry ville,  i, 
186.  Killed,  i,  189. 

JACKSON,  GEN.  N.  J.,  at  Savannah,  ii, 
287.  At  Averysboro,  ii,  314. 

JACKSON,  GEN.  W.,  at  Duck  River,  ii, 
191. 

JOHXSONVILLE,  TENN.,  engagement  at, 
ii,  171. 

JOHNSTON,  GEN.  A.  S.,  in  command 
of  rebel  forces  at  Bowling  Green, 
i,  41.  Retreat  from  Bowling 
Green,  i,  68.  Killed  at  Shiloh,  i, 
115. 

JOHNSTON,  GEN.  J.  E.,  relieves  Bragg, 
ii,  14.  Position  and  forces  of  at 
Dalton,  ii,  21.  Extracts  from  re- 
ports of,  ii,  42,  62.  At  battle  of 
Resaca,  ii,  64.  Moves  to  Allatoona 
Pass,  ii,  73.  At  New  Hope  Church, 
ii,  78.  At  Kenesaw  and  Lost  Moun- 
tain, ii,  86.  Withdraws  across  the 
Chattahoochee,  ii,  96.  Relieved 
by  Hood,  ii,  113.  Extract  from 
official  report  of,  ii,  118.  Opera- 
tions of  against  Sherman  in  the 
Carolinas,  ii,  309,  312.  Defeated 
at  battle  of  Bentonville,  ii,  315. 
Retreats  through  Raleigh,  ii,  324. 
Surrenders  to  Sherman,  ii,  325. 

JOHNSON,  GEN.  R.  W.,  commands 
Sixth  Brigade,  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
i,  63.  Defeated  by  Morgan,  i,  151. 
At  battle  of  Stone  River,  i,  224. 
Report  of  the  battle,  i,  263.  En- 
gagement at  Liberty  Gap,  i,  304. 
At  Chickamauga,  i,  335.  At  Mis- 
sionary Ridge,  i,  429.  In  move- 
ment toward  Dalton,  ii,  20.  At 
Ringgold,  ii,  45.  At  battle  of  Re- 
saca, ii,  66.  At  New  Hope  Church, 


ii,  79.  Before  Atlanta,  ii,  127. 
Near  Columbia,  ii,  190.  At  battle 
of  Nashville,  ii,  229. 

JONES,  COL.  F.  C.,  killed  at  Stone 
River,  i,  252. 

JONES,  COL.  J.  G.,  commands  Four- 
teenth Brigade  in  Kentucky,  i,  72. 

JONESBORO,  GA.,  battle  of,  ii,  144. 

JORDAN,  COL.  T.  J.,  charges  the  rebels 
at  Thompson  Station,  i,  291. 

JUDAH,  GEN.  H.  M.,  at  Corinth,  i,  127. 

KENESAW  MOUNTAIN,  operations  near, 
ii,  86. 

KENNETT,  COL.,  enters  Huntsville,  i, 
130.  Routs  rebel  force,  i,  213.  At 
Gallatin,  i,  207.  Recaptures  a 
train,  i,  245. 

KENTUCKY,  legislature  affirms  armed 
neutrality,  i,  4.  Timidity  of  loyal 
citizens,  i,  4.  Opposition  to  seces- 
sion, i,  6.  Militia  organized  in,  i, 
8.  Recruiting  in  for  Union  and 
rebel  armies,  i,  15.  Rebel  citizens 
plan  the  removal  of  loyal  troops 
from  the  State,  i,  21.  Efforts  to 
prevent  arms  reaching  Camp  Dick 
Robinson,  i,  21.  Abandons  neu- 
trality, i,  23.  Legislature  directs 
the  Governor  to  order  Confeder- 
ate troops  out  of  the  State,  i,  24. 
Committed  to  support  of  the  Na- 
tional Government,  i,  24.  Opera- 
tions in  Eastern  Kentucky,  i,  74. 
Operations  of  armies  in,  i,  159,  218. 

KENTUCKY  LEGION,  recruit  of,  i,  16. 

KNIGHTS  OF  GOLDEN  CIRCLE,  propose 
to  control  Louisville,  i,  21. 

KILPATRICK,  GEN.  J.,  advance  toward 
Tunnel  Hill,;ii,  26.  Wounded 
near  Resaca,  ii,  64.  Engagements 
at  Fairburn  and  Love  joy,  ii,  133. 
On  march  to  the  sea,  ii,  279.  At 
Savannah,  ii,  283.  Movements  of 
in  the  Carolinas,  ii,  309.  Sur- 
prised by  Hampton,  ii,  311.  At 
Averysboro,  ii,  314.  At  battle  of 
Bentonville,  ii,  320. 

KILPATRICK,  COL.  R.  L.,  at  battle  of 
Resaca,  ii,  68.  Fifth  Ohio  near 
Dallas,  ii,  76. 

KIMBALL,  GEN.  N.,  at  New  Hope 
Church,  ii,  80.  Assault  of,  a  *,  Ken- 
esaw, ii,  94.  At  Lovejoy  Station, 
ii,  146.  At  Lynnville,  ii,  188.  At 
battle  of  Franklin,  ii,  199.  At  bat- 
tie  of  Nashville,  ii,  226. 


INDEX. 


469 


KING,  COL.  E.  A.,  killed,  i,  363. 

KING,  GEN.  J.  H.,  at  Chickamauga, 
i,  334.  At  battle  of  Resaca,  ii,  66. 

KIRBY,  COL.,  near  Kenesaw  Moun- 
tain, ii,  39. 

KIRK,  GEN.  E.  N.,  defeats  Wheeler, 
i,  213.  Position  at  Stone  River,  i, 
226.  Mortally  wounded,  brigade 
dislodged,  i,  230.  Report  of  the 
battle,  i,  265. 

KNIFE,  GEN.  J.,  at  battle  of  Resaca, 
ii,  68.  At  Kulp's  house,  ii,  91.  At 
Peachtree  Creek,  ii,  114.  At  bat- 
tle of  Nashville,  ii,  229. 

KNOB'S  GAP,  engagement  at,  i,  220. 

KNOXVILLE  CAMPAIGN,  ii,  1. 

KULP'S  HOUSE,  engagement  at,  ii,  91. 

LA  GRANGE,  COL.  O.  H.,  action  of,  at 
Mossy  Creek,  ii,  16.  Repulsed  at 
Poplar  Place,  ii,  50.  Routs  Gen. 
Lyon  in  Kentucky,  ii,  271.  Opera- 
tions of,  in  Alabama  and  Georgia, 
ii,  349.  Receives  the  surrender  of 
Montgomery,  ii,  354.  Captures 
West  Point,  Ga.,  ii,  356. 

LAIBOLDT,  COL.  B.,  at  battle  of  Perry- 
ville,  i,  187.  Report  of  battle  of 
Stone  River,  i,  270.  At  Chicka- 
mauga, i,  337.  Routs  Wheeler,  ii, 
7.  Holds  Dalton  against  Wheeler, 
ii,  131. 

LANDRUM,  LIEUT.  COL.,  defends  Cyn- 
thiana,  Ky.,  i,  146. 

LANE,  COL.,  routed  at  Franklin,  ii, 
198. 

LA  VERGNE,  cavalry  engagement  at, 
i,  247. 

LEBANON,  KY.,  captured  by  Morgan, 
i,  146. 

LEBANON,  TENN.,  Dumont  defeats 
Morgan  at,  i,  136. 

LEE,  GEN.  R.  E.,  surrender  of,  ii,  324. 

LEE,  GEN.  S.  D.,  at  Jonesboro,  ii,  142. 
At  battle  of  Bentonville,  ii,  317. 

LESTER,  COL.,  captured  at  Murfrees- 
boro,  i,  147. 

LEXINGTON,  KY.,  i,  22. 

"LEXINGTON,"  gunboat,  at  battle  of 
Shiloh,  i,  107. 

LIBERTY  GAP,  engagement  at,  i,  304. 

LIDDELL,  GEN.,  at  Chickamauga,  i, 
334. 

LINCOLN,  PRESIDENT,  first  call  for 
troops,  i,  3.  Reply  to  Magoffin's 
letter,  i,  18.  Issued  congratulatory 
order  to  Thomas  for  victory  at  Mill 
Springs,  i,  57.  War  order  No.  3,  i, 


122.  Dispatch  of,  on  fall  of  At- 
lanta, ii,  153.  At  the  suggestion 
of  Grant  issues  an  order  relieving 
Thomas,  ii,  225.  Congratulatory 
dispatch  to  Thomas  for  the  victory 
at  Nashville,  ii,  259. 

LISTER,  COL.  F.  W.,  repulses  J.  H. 
Morgan,  i,  212. 

LOGAN,  GEN.  JOHN  A.,  at  Pocotaligo, 
ii,  307.  At  Bentonville,  ii,  322.  On 
his  way  to  relieve  Thomas,  stops  at 
Louisville,  ii,  235. 

LOGIE,  COL.,  killed  at  Peachtree 
Creek,  ii,  116. 

LONG,  GEN.  E.,  charges  of,  on  Wheeler, 
i,  389.  Raid  in  East  Tennessee,  i, 
437.  On  the  Knoxville  campaign, 
ii,  2.  In  movement  toward  Dalton, 
ii,  20.  Operations  of,  in  Alabama 
and  Georgia,  ii,  347.  Charge  of,  at 
the  battle  of  Selma,  ii,  351. 

LONGSTREET,  GEN.  J.,  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  i,  343.  Defeated  at  Wau- 
hatchie,  i,  400.  Sent  against  Burn- 
side,  i,  408.  Retreats  from  Knox- 
ville, ii,  3.  Sent  to  Lee,  ii,  26. 

LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN,  held  by  Bragg, 
i,  386.  Battle  of,  i,  418. 

LOOMIS,  COL.  C.  O.,  commands  artil- 
lery in  Kentucky,  i,  68.  At  Per- 
ryville,  i,  187.  At  Missionary 
Ridge,  1,  427. 

LORING,  GEN.  W.  W.,  at  Rocky  Face 
Ridge,  ii,  52.  At  battle  of  Resaca, 
ii,  64.  Holding  Kenesaw  Moun- 
tain, ii,  88. 

LOST  MOUNTAIN,  operations  near, 
ii,  86. 

LOUISVILLE,  KY.,  citizens  raise  na- 
tional flag,  i,  2.  Loyal  citizens  elect 
mayor  of,  i,  5.  Union  club,  i,  5. 
Home  guard,  i,  11.  Primal  base 
of  supplies,  i,  140.  Organization 
of  troops  at,  i,  184. 

LOUISVILLE  AND  NASHVILLE  RAILROAD, 
defenses  of,  ii,  453. 

LOVEJOY'S  STATION,  engagement  at, 
ii,  146. 

LOWE,  COL.  W.  W.,  at  the  Etowah, 
ii,  74. 

LUM,  COL.,  at  Jonesboro,  ii,  144. 

LYON,  GEN.,  expedition  of  into  Ken- 
tucky, ii,  271.  Captured  at  Red 
Hill,  ii,  272. 

LYTLE,  GEN.  W.  H.,  at  Athens,  Ala., 
i,  132.  At  Perryville,  i,  190.  At 
battle  of  Chickamauga,  i,  340. 


470 


INDEX. 


Me  ARTHUR,  GEN.  J.,  at  battle  of 
Nashville,  ii.  228. 

McCLERNAND,  GEN.  J.  A.,  at  battle 
of  Shiloh,  i,  104.  At  Corinth,  i, 
126. 

McCooK,  GEN.  A.  McD.,  assigned  to 
command  of  Second  Division, 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  i,  63.  At  battle 
of  Shiloh,  i,  111.  At  Corinth,  i,  126. 
Assigned  to  command  of  a  corps, 
i,  184.  At  battle  of  Perry ville,  i, 
189.  Extract  from  report  of  the 
battle,  i,  203.  At  battle  of  Stone 
Eiver,  i,  224.  Eeport  of  battle,  i, 
262.  At  battle  of  Chickamauga, 
i,  348. 

McCooK,  COL.  A.  G.,  at  Peachtree 
Creek,  ii,  115. 

McCooK,  COL.  D.,  at  Perry  ville,  i, 
186.  At  the  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga, i,  361.  At  New  Hope 
Church,  ii,  80.  Assault  at  Kene- 
saw  Mountain,  ii,  93.  Mortally 
wounded,  ii,  94. 

McCooK,  GEN.  E.  M.,  expedition 
against  Wheeler,  i,  389.  Destroys 
cotton  at  Rodgersville,  i,  390.  En- 
gagement with  Longstreet,  ii,  15. 
At"  battle  of  Resaca,  ii,  67.  En- 
gagement with  Stevenson,  ii,  73. 
Cavalry  movements  in  Georgia,  ii, 
124.  At  McLemore's  Cove,  i,  327. 
Burns  Reed's  bridge,  i,  331.  Op- 
erations of  in  Alabama  and 
Georgia,  ii,  347.  Moves  to  Talla- 
hassee, Fla.,  ii,  364. 

McCooK,  GEN.  R.  L.,  assigned  to 
command  Twelfth  Brigade,  Army 
of  the  Ohio,  i,  51.  Wounded  at 
Mill  Springs,  i,  57.  Advances  to 
Athens,  i,  149.  Killed  by  guerril- 
las, i,  149. 

McCowN,  GEN.,  at  Stone  River,  i,  227. 

McGowAN,  MAJ.,  routed  enemy  at 
Duck  River,  i,  151. 

McKEAN,  GEN.  J.  J.,  at  Corinth,  i, 
126. 

McKEE,  COL.  S.,  captures  rebel  force, 
i,  212.  Killed  at  Stone  River,  i, 
242. 

MCLEMORE'S  COVE,  engagement  in, 
i,  324. 

MCMILLAN,  COL.,  at  battle  of  Nash- 
ville, ii,  232. 

McMiNxviLLE,  Reynolds'  expedition 
to,  i,  297.  Captured  by  Wheeler, 
i,  389. 


McPHERsoN,  GEN.  J.  B.,  in  command 
of  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  ii,  24. 
At  New  Hope  Church,  ii,  81.  Near 
Kenesaw  Mountain,  ii,  87.  Passes 
through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  ii,  50. 
At  battle  of  Resaca,  ii,  65.  Killed 
near  Atlanta,  ii,  117. 

MACK,  CAPT.  O.  A.,  at  Perry  ville,  i, 
186. 

MACON,  GA.,  surrendered  to  Wilson's 
forces,  ii,  357. 

MAGOFFIN,  Gov.  B.,  recommends 
arming  militia  of  Kentucky,  i,  2. 
Reply  to  President's  proclamation, 
i,  3.  Proclamation  of,  i,  7.  De- 
manded removal  of  Camp  Dick 
Robinson,  i,  17.  Letter  to  the 
President,  i,  17.  Proclamation  of 
to  rebel  authorities,  i,  33. 

MANDERSON,  COL.,  at  Orchard  Knob, 
i,  416. 

MANSOX,  GEN.  M.  D.,  assigned  to 
command  Second  Brigade,  Army 
of  the  Ohio,  i,  51.  At  battle  of 
Richmond,  Ky.,  i,  180. 

MARSHALL'S  BATTERY,  at  battle  of 
Stone  River,  i,  237. 

MASON,  COL.  R.,  surrendered'  at 
Clarks ville,  i,  151. 

MARSHALL,  GEN.  H.,  invaded  Ken- 
tucky, i,  74.  Defeated  by  Garfield, 
i,  77. 

MARTIN,  GEN.  W.,  defeated  at  Mossy 
Creek,  ii,  16. 

MATTHEWS,  COL.  STANLEY,  defeats 
Gen.  Wheeler  near  La  Vergne,  i, 
215. 

MAURY,  M.  T.,  London  Times  article 
of,  ii,  10. 

MAURY,  GEN.  J.  P.  M.,  capture  of,  i, 
136. 

MENDENHALL,  CAPT.  J.,  battery  of 
supports  Nelson,  i,  110.  At  battle 
of  Stone  River,  i,  249.  Report  of 
the  battle,  i,  280.  At  Brown's 
Ferry,  i,  397. 

MERRILL,  COL.  W.  E.,  examination 
of  railroads  by,  ii,  22.  Fortifies 
Chattanooga,  ii,  166. 

METCALFE,  COL.,  engagement  of  at 
Big  Hill,  i,  179. 

MIHALOTZY,  COL.  G.,  mortally  wound- 
ed, ii,  21. 

MILES,  COL.,  at  battle  of  Bentonville, 
ii,  316. 

MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  MISSISSIPPI, 
constituted,  i,  394. 


INDEX. 


471 


MILL  SPRINGS,  battle  of,  i,  56. 

MILLEDGEVILLE,  GA.,  entered  by 
Fourteenth  and  Twentieth  Corps, 
ii,  280. 

MILLER,  COL.  A.  O.,  charges  through 
Wheeler's  line,  i,  390.  Defeats 
rebel  brigade,  ii,.  16.  Operations  of 
in  Tennessee  and  North  Carolina, 
ii,  341.  At  the  battle  of  Selma,  ii, 
351. 

MILLER,  GEN.  J.  F.,  at  La  Vergne,  i, 
210.  Position  at  Stone  River,  i, 
225.  Charges  across  Stone  River, 
i,  250.  Report  of  the  battle,  i,  273. 
At  battle  of  Nashville,  ii,  227. 

MILLIKEN,  COL.  M.,  killed  at  battle 
of  Stone  River,  i,  244. 

MILROY,  GEN.,  drives  Bate  from  Over- 
all's Creek,  ii,  223. 

MINTY,  COL.  R.  II.  G.,  captures  rebel 
regiment,  i,  289.  Routs  rebels  at 
Unionville,  i,  290.  Charges  into 
Shelbyville,  i,  306.  Delays  Bragg 
at  Reed's  bridge,  i,  331.  At  the 
battle  of  Selma,  ii,  351.  Advances 
toward  Macon,  Ga.,  ii,  356. 

MITCHELL,  GEN.  J.  G.,  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  i,  353.  At  the  battle  of 
Resaca,  ii,  06.  At  Jonesboro,  ii, 
144.  At  Kenesaw,  ii,  93.  At  bat- 
tle of  Nashville,  ii,  237.  At  battle 
of  Bentonville,  ii,  216. 

MITCHELL,  GEN.  0.  M.,  assigned  to 
command  of  Third  Division,  Army 
of  the  Ohio,  i,  67.  Operations  of 
in  Tennessee  and  Alabama^  i,  130. 
Moves  against  Chattanooga,  i,  132. 
Organized  expedition  to  destroy 
bridges  in  Georgia,  i,  136.  At 
Athens,  i,  142. 

MITCHELL,  GEN.  R.  B.,  joins  Buell,  i, 
158.  At  Perryville,  i,  185.  In 
command  of  Nashville,  i,  217.  Ex- 
pedition of  against  Wheeler,  i,  389. 

MITCIIELLSVILLE,  a  depot  of  supplies, 
i,  211. 

MISSIONARY  RIDGE,  held  by  Bragg,  i, 
386.  Battle  of,  i,  433. 

MOCCASIN  POINT,  i,  397. 

MONROE,  COL.,  killed  at  Fannington, 
i,  392. 

MONTGOMERY,  ALA.,  surrendered  to 
Wilson's  forces,  ii,  354. 

MOORE,  COL.  A.  B.,  surrenders  to  J. 
H.  Morgan,  i,  214. 

MOORE,  COL.  J.  B.,  at  battle  of  Nash- 
ville, ii,  228. 


MOORE,  COL.  L.  P.,  at  C'atlettsburg, 
i,  74. 

MORGAN,  GEN.  G.  W.,  at  Cumberland 
Ford,  i,  133.  Demonstrations 
against  Cumberland  Gap,  i,  133. 
Evacuates  Cumberland  Gap,  i,  178. 
Operations  of  in  Kentucky,  i,  176— 
183. 

MORGAN,  GEN.  J.  D.,  in  movement 
toward  Dalton,  ii,  20.  At  Buzzard 
Roost,  ii,  49.  Before  Kenesaw 
Mountain,  ii,  93.  Before  Atlanta, 
ii,  128.  At  battle  of  Jonesboro, 
ii,  144.  At  battle  of  Bentonville, 
ii,  316. 

MORGAN,  GEN.  JOHN  H.,  assembles 
"State  Guards"  at  armory,  i,  22. 
Joins  Buckner,  i,  31.  Moving 
toward  Lebanon,  Tenn.,  i,  136. 
Cavalry  in  Kentucky,  i,  145.  De- 
feats Jordan  at  Tompkinsville — 
captures  Lebanon,  i,  145.  Re- 
pulsed by  Col.  Lister,  i,  212.  De- 
feated by  Reynolds,  i,  216.  De- 
feated by  Stanley  and  Hall,  i,  294. 
Killed  by  Gillem's  troops,  ii,  272. 

MORGAN,  COL.  T.  J.,  captures  rebel 
battery,  ii,  169.  At  battle  of  Nash- 
ville, ii,  230. 

MORTON,  CAPT.  ST.  C.,  at  Florence 
and  Decatur,  i,  142.  Posted  on 
Stone  River,  i,  225. 

MOWER,  GEN.  J.  A.,  at  Bentonville,  ii, 
322. 

MULDRAUGH'S  HILL,  captured  by  J.  H. 
Morgan,  i,  216.. 

MUNDY,  COL.,  at  Cumberland  Gap, 
i,  177. 

MUNFORDSVILLE,  capture  of  by  Bragg, 
i,  160. 

MURFREESBORO,     TENN.,     OCCUpied    by 

Gen.  A.  S.  Johnston,  i,  88.  Under 
Col.  Duffield,  i,  99.  Captured  by 
Forrest,  i,  147.  Fortified  by  Nel- 
son, i,  149.  Occupied  by  Rose- 
crans,  i,  251.  Fortification  of,  i,  288. 

NASHVILLE,  a  base  of  Confederate 
supplies,  i,  37.  Occupied  by 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  i,  97.  Under 
command  of  Dumont,  i,  99.  Held 
against  Breckinridge  by  Negley, 
i,  207.  Fortified  by  Tower,  ii,  206. 
Battle  of,  ii,  222. 

NASHVILLE  AND  CHATTANOOGA  RAIL- 
ROAD, defenses  of,  ii,  452. 

NASHVILLE,  DECATUR  AND  STEVENSON 
RAILROAD,  defenses  of,  ii,  452. 


472 


INDEX. 


NASHVILLE  AND  JOHNSONVILLE    RAIL- 
ROAD, defenses  of,  ii,  453. 

NASHVILLE    AND    CLARKSVILLE    RAIL- 
ROAD, defenses  of,  ii,  453. 

NAYLOR,  CAPT.,  on  Moccasin  Point, 
i,  421. 

NEGLEY,  GEN.  J.  S.,  commands  Sev- 
enth Brigade,  Army  of  the  Ohio 
i,  63.  Captures  Rodgersville,  Ala. 
i,  131.  Bombards  Chattanooga,  i 
132.  In  command  of  Nashville,  i, 
207.  Victory  of,  at  La  Vergne, 
i,  210.  At  battle  of  Stone  River, 
i,  224.  Report  of  the  battle,  i, 
273.  On  the  Tullahoma  cam 
paign,  i,  306.  Seizes  Cooper's  and 
Stevens'  Gaps,  i,  316.  Moves  into 
McLemore's  Cove,  i,  318.  Skillful 
movements  of  against  overwhelm- 
ing forces,  i,  322.  At  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  i,  331.  Letter  of  to 
Baird,  i,  368. 

NELSON,  GEN.  W.,  obtains  arms  for 
the  Home  Guards  of  Kentucky, 
i,  11.  Advice  to  President  Lin- 
coln, i,  12.  Made  agent  for  trans- 
mission of  arms  to  Kentucky,  i, 
12.  Assigned  to  command  of 
Fourth  Division,  Army  of  the 
Ohio,  i,  69.  Movements  in  East- 
ern Kentucky,  i,  74.  At  battle  of 
Shiloh,  i,  113.  Circular  of,  i,  123. 
At  Corinth,  i,  126.  Fortifies  Mur- 
freesboro,  i,  149.  At  battle  of 
Richmond,  Ky.,  i,  182.  Opera- 
tions of  in  Kentucky,  i,  176-183. 
NEW  HOPE  CHURCH,  engagements  at, 

ii,  76. 

NEWTON,  GEN.  J.,  at  Rocky  Face 
Ridge,  ii,  52.  At  battle  of  Resaca, 
ii,  66.  At  New  Hope  Church,  ii, 
80.  Before  Kenesaw  Mountain, 
ii,  88.  At  battle  of  Peachtree 
Creek,  ii,  113.  At  Lovejoy's  Sta- 
tion, ii,  146. 

NOLENSVILLE,  TENN.,  i,  220. 

OPDYCKE,  COL.  E.,  drives  back  enemy's 
cavalry  at  Spring  Hill,  ii,  192.  He- 
roic charge  at  the  battle  of  Frank- 
lin, ii,  200.  Brave  actions  of,  ii, 
203. 

ORCHARD  KNOB,  captured,  i,  416. 
Grant's  position  on,  i,  426. 

ORR,  LIEUT.  J.  S.,  defends  bridge  on 
N.  &  C.  R.  R.,  ii,  448. 

OSTERHAUS,  GEN.  P.  J.,  at  Lookout 
Mountain,  i,  417.  At  Missionary 


Ridge,  i,  428.     On  the  march  to 
the  sea,  ii,  278. 
OVERALL'S    CREEK,    effectiveness   of 

block-house  at,  ii,  223. 
OWEX,  COL.,  at  Munfordsville,  Ky.,  i, 

160. 
PAINE,  GEN.  E.  A.,  at  Corinth,  i,  127. 

PALMER,  GEN.  J.  M.,  at  La  Vergne,  i, 
210.  At  battle  of  Stone  River, 
i,  235.  Report  of  the  battle,  i, 
276.  At  Chickamauga,  i,  335.  At 
Missionary  Ridge,  i,  434.  Recon- 
noissance  toward  Dal  ton,  ii,  19. 
Drives  enemy  from  Tunnel  Hill, 
ii,  47.  At  battle  of  Resaca,  ii,  64. 
Before  Kenesaw  Mountain,  ii,  89. 
At  Peachtree  Creek,  ii,  111.  Be- 
fore Atlanta,  ii,  127.  Relieved  of 
command  at  his  own  request,  ii, 
128. 

PALMER,  COL.  W.  J.,  captures  two  of 
Hood's  trains,  ii,  271.  Operations 
in  Tennessee  and  North  Carolina, 
ii,  342.  Attempts  to  intercept 
Davis,  ii,  365. 

PARKHURST,  GEN.  J.  G.,  reports  men 
captured  on  Atlanta  campaign,  ii, 
150. 

PARROTT,  JOHX,  captured  and  flogged 
by  rebels,  i,  137. 

PARSONS'  BATTERY,  captured  at  Perry- 
ville,  i,  191. 

PATRICK,  LIEUT.  COL.,  engagement  qf 
at  Sugar  Creek,  i,  390. 

PAYXE,  GEX.,  expeditions  against 
guerrilla  bands,  ii,  6. 

PEACHTREE  CREEK,  battle  of,  ii,  113. 

PEMBERTOX,  COL.  J.  C.,  routed  by 
Stoneman,  ii,  341. 

PERRYVILLE,  KY.,  campaign  of,  i, 
184-206. 

PILLOW,  GEN.  G.,  attacks  Lafayette, 
ii,  95. 

PINE  MOUNTAIN,  operations  near,  ii, 
86. 

PIXXEY'S  BATTERY,  at  Perry ville,  i, 
190.  At  Nolensville,  i,  220. 

PITTSBURG  LANDING,  U.  S.  forces  at,  i, 
101. 

POCOTALIGO,  occupied  by  Howard,  ii, 
307. 

POLK,  GEN.  L.,  in  Tennessee  and 
Kentucky,  i,  23.  At  Perryville,  i, 
193.  At*  battle  of  Stone  River, 
i,  227.  Report  of  the  battle,  i,  258. 
At  Chickamauga,  i,  324.  Defends 
Rocky  Face  Ridge,  ii,  52.  At  bat- 


INDEX. 


473 


tie  of  Resaca,  ii,  65.     Position  at 

New  Hope  Church,  ii,  78.    Killed 

on  Pine  Mountain,  ii,  76. 
PONTON-TRAINS,  description  of,  ii,  454. 

Designs  of  boat  of,  ii,  455. 
POPE,  GEN.  J.,  at  siege  of  Corinth,  i, 

126. 
POST,  COL.  S.,  at  Nolensville,  i,  220. 

At  battle  of  Stone  Eiver,  i,  233. 

Report  of  the  battle,  i,  266.     Near 

Columbia,  ii,   192.     At  battle  of 

Nashville,  ii,  232. 
PREXTISS,    GEN.    B.    M.,  breaks    up 

Confederate  camp  in  Kentucky, 

i,  20.     At  battle  of  Shiloh,  i,  104. 
PRESCOTT'S  BATTERY,  at  Jonesboro,  ii, 

144. 
PRESTON,   GEN.,   at  battle  of   Stone 

River,  i,  242.     At  Chickamauga,  i, 

340. 
PRESTONVILLE,    occupied     by    rebel 

forces,  i,  74. 
PRESCOTT'S  KNOB,  Bragg  confronting 

Buell  at,  i,  161. 
PRICE,  COL.  S.  W.,  at  battle  of  Stone 

River,  i,  236. 
PRIME,   CAPT.,   sent   to  superintend 

fortifications,  i.  48.     Captured,  i, 

52. 
PRITCHARD,  COL.,  captures  Jefferson 

Davis,  ii,  365. 
PULASKI,  TENN.,  repulse  of  Forrest  at 

by  Rousseau,  ii,  164. 
RALEIGH,  N.  C.,  occupied  by  U.  S. 

forces,  ii,  322. 
RANDALL,    LIEUT.     COL.,    killed     at 

Peachtree  Creek,  ii,  116. 
RAINS,  GEN.,  at  Baptist  Gap,  i,  135. 
REED,  COL.  S.  P.,  killed,  i,  252. 
REILLY,  COL.,  at  Franklin,  ii,  199. 
RESACA,  battle  of,  ii,  64.     Surrender 

of  demanded  by  Hood,  ii,  162. 
REYNOLDS,  GEN.  J.  J.,  defeats  J.  H. 

Morgan,  i,  216.     Expedition  of  to 

McMinnville,  i,  297.     At  Chicka- 
mauga, i,  335. 

RICHMOND,  KY.,  battle  of,  i,  181. 
RINGGOLD,  GA.,  engagement  at,  i,  436. 
ROBERTS,  COL.  G.  W.,  killed  at  battle 

of  Stone  River,  i,  237. 
ROBINSON,  COL.  J.  S.,  at  Kulp's  house, 

ii,   91.     At    Peachtree   Creek,   ii, 

114.     At  battle  of  Bentonville,  ii, 

318. 

ROCK  CASTLE  HILLS,  battle  of,  i,  39. 
ROCKY  FACE  RIDGE,  ii,  47. 
RODGERSVILLE,   ALA.,  capture   of,    i, 


132.    Rebel  cotton  destroyed  at, 
i,  390. 

RODDY,  GEN.,  crosses  Tennessee 
River,  ii,  15.  Defeated  by  Upton, 
ii,  349. 

RODNEY'S  BATTERY,  at  the  battle  of 
Selma,  ii,  351. 

ROME,  GA.,  foundries,  mills,  etc.,  at, 
destroyed,  ii,  378. 

ROSECRANS,  GEN.  W.  S.,  in  command 
of  Department  of  the  Cumberland, 
i,  207.  Reorganizes  his  army,  i, 
210.  Restricts  non-military  ene- 
mies, i,  217.  Orders  a  move  against 
Bragg,  i,  218.  Defeats  Bragg  at 
Stone  River,  i,  290.  Strength  and 
loss  of,  i,  251.  Enters  Murfrees- 
boro,  i,  251.  Orders  at  and  report 
of  battle  of  Stone  River,  i,  253- 
255.  Reasons  for  not  advancing 
against  Bragg,  i,  298.  Orders  a 
forward  movement,  i,  300.  Tulla- 
homa  campaign  of,  i,  302.  Strategy 
of  successful,  i,  306.  Barriers  to 
the  advance  of,  i,  310.  Maneuvers 
to  dislodge  Bragg,  i,  213.  Crosses 
Tennessee  River,  i,  314.  At  battle 
of  Chickamauga,  i,  328.  Aggre- 
gate loss  of,  at  Chickamauga,  i,  362. 
Report  of  the  battle,  i,  377.  Aim 
of  at  Chattanooga,  i,  386.  Relieved  , 
by  order  of  the  President,  i,  394. 
Farewell  order  of,  i,  403. 

ROSENGARTEN,  MAJ.,  killed,  i,  223. 

ROSSVILLE,  occupied  by  Crittenden,  i, 
318. 

ROUSSEAU,  GEN.  L.  H.,  appointed 
brigadier-general  of  militia,  i,  11. 
Requests  authority  to  raise  U.  S. 
troops  in  Kentucky,  i,  15.  In  com- 
mand of  Fourth  Brigade  under 
Gen.  McCook,  i,  63.  Repulses  a 
charge  at  Shiloh,  i,  113.  At  Per- 
ry ville,  i,  186.  At  battle  of  Stone 
River,  i,  225.  Report  of  the  bat- 
tle, i,  272.  Operations  of  in  Ala- 
bama, ii,  110.  Arrives  at  Marietta, 
ii,  117.  Drives  Buford  from  Mur- 
freesboro,  ii,  224.  Drives  Forrest 
from  Pulaski,  ii,  164. 

RUGER,  GEN.  T.  H.,  at  battle  of  Re- 
saca, ii,  68.  Before  Kenesaw  Moun- 
tain, ii,  91.  At  battle  of  Peachtree 
Creek,  ii,  114.  At  Columbia,  ii, 
190.  At  battle  of  Franklin,  ii,  199. 

RUSSELL'S  BATTERY,  at  Chickamauga, 
i,  339. 


474 


INDEX. 


SALEM,  N.  C.,  public  property  at,  de- 
stroyed, ii,  341. 

SALT  VILLE,  VA.,  captured  and  de- 
stroyed by  Stoneman,  ii,  374. 

SALT  RIVER,  bridge  of  burned,  i,  159. 

SAVANNAH,  GA.,  capture  of,  by  the  TJ. 
S.  forces,  ii,  287. 

SELMA,  ALA.,  battle  and  capture  of, 
by  Wilson,  ii,  352. 

SCHAEFER,  COL.  F.  C.,  at  battle  of 
Stone  River,  i,  232.  Killed,  i,  243. 

SCHOEPF,  GEN.  A.,  camp  of  bom- 
barded, i,  49.  Assigned  to  com- 
mand of  First  Brigade,  Army  of 
the  Ohio,  i,  51.  Moves  toward 
Zollicoffer's  position,  i,  53.  Crosses 
river  at  Florence,  i,  148.  At 
battle  of  Perry ville,  i,  189. 

SCHULTZ'S  BATTERY,  at  Stone  River,  i, 
237. 

SCHURZ,  GEN.  C.,  at  battle  of  Wau- 
hatchie,  i,  400.  At  Missionary 
Ridge,  i,  426. 

SCHOFIELD,  GEN.  J.  M.,  relieves  Foster 
at  Knoxville,  ii,  18.  At  turning 
of  Dalton,  ii,  50.  At  battle  of  Re- 
saca,  ii,  64.  Near  Kenesaw 
Mountain,  ii,  88.  Before  Atlanta, 
ii,  127."  Assumes  command  at 
Pulaski,  ii,  172.  Operations  of,  at 
Columbia,  ii,  192.  At  battle  of 
Franklin,  ii,  196.  Dispatches  to 
Thomas  during  retreat  before 
Hood,  ii,  210-218.  Extract  from 
report  of  battle  of  Franklin,  ii, 
219.  At  battle  of  Nashville,  ii, 
226.  Extract  from  report  of  battle 
of  Nashville,  ii,  267.  At  Golds- 
boro,  ii,  322. 

SCOTT,  COL.,  rebel  cavalry  of,  at  Mun- 
fordsville,  i,  159. 

SCRIBNKR,  COL.  B.  F.,  at  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  i,  334.  At  New 
Hope  Church,  ii,  79. 

SCULLET,  LIEUT.  COL.,  defeats  Haw- 
kins, ii,  6. 

SHANE,  LIEUT.  COL.,  wounded  near 
Kenesaw,  ii,  94. 

SHEERER,  CAPT.,  at  Nolensville,  i, 
220. 

SHELBY  VILLE,  TENN.,  a  depot  of  sup- 
plies, i,  130.  Sacked  by  Wheeler, 
i,  390. 

SHEPHERD,  COL.  0.  L.,  at  battle  of 
Stone  River,  i,  238. 

SHERIDAN,  GEN.  P.  H.,  at  Perry  ville, 
i,  185.  At  battle  of  Stone  River, 


i,  224.  Report  of  the  battle,  i, 
268.  ^  At  Chickamauga,  i,  337.  At 
Missionary  Ridge,  i,  415. 

SHERMAN,  GEN.  T.  W.,  at  Corinth,  i, 
126. 

SHERMAN,  GEN.  W.  T.,  assumes  com- 
mand of  Department  of  the  Cum- 
berland, i,  31.  Relieved  by  Buell, 
i,  46.  At  battle  of  Shiloh,  i,  104. 
Arrives  at  Chattanooga,  i,  410. 
At  thejjbattle  of  Missionary  Ridge, 
i,  423.  Report  of  battle  of  Mis- 
sionary Ridge,  i,  448.  On  the 
Knoxville  campaign,  ii,  1.  As- 
signed to  command  of  Military 
Division  of  the  Mississippi,  ii,  24. 
Campaign  of  from  Chattanooga  to 
Atlanta,  ii,  25-155.  Operations  of 
from  Atlanta  to  Gaylesville,  ii, 
160-166.  March  from  Atlanta  to 
the  coast,  ii,  168-305.  Letter  to 
Gen.  Webster  a*  Nashville,  ii,  264. 
Operations  of  in  the  Carolinas,  ii, 
309-325.  Dispatch  of  to  Wilson 
at  Macon,  ii,  361.  Congratulatory 
order  of,  ii,  371. 

SHTLOH,  battle  of,  i,  106.  Rebel 
loss  at,  i,  114.  National  loss  at,  i, 
114. 

SLOCUM,  GEN.  H.  W.,  assigned  to 
command  of  Twentieth  Crops,  ii, 
141.  On  the  march  to  the  sea, 
ii,  278.  Dispatch  to  Sherman,  ii, 
179.  At  Savannah,  ii,  282.  Ex- 
tract from  report  of  the  capture 
of  Savannah,  ii,  301.  At  Averys- 
boro,  ii,  314.  At  battle  of'Ben- 
tonville,  ii,  316.  Moves  through 
Richmond  to  Washington,  ii,  325. 
Congratulatory  order  of,  iii,  374. 

SILL,  COL.  J.  W.,  commands  Ninth 
Brigade,  Army  of  the  Ohio,  i,  67. 
Captures  Stevenson,  i,  130.  Moves 
against  Kirby  Smith,  i,  184.  At 
battle  of  Stone  River,  i,  226. 
Killed,  i,  232. 

SIMONSOX'S  BATTERY,  enters  Hunts- 
ville,  i,  130.  At  Perry  ville,  i,  185. 
At  battle  of  Resaca,  ii,  67.  A  shot 
from  kills  Lieut.  Gen.  Polk,  ii,  86. 

SIRWELL,  COL.  W.,  at  Chickamauga, 
i,  348. 

SISTER'S  FERRY,  on  Savannah  river, 
ii,  307. 

SLADE,  LIEUT.  COL.,  repulses  Buford 
at  Huntsville,  ii,  164. 

SMITH,  GEN.  A.  J.,  at  Corinth,  i,  126. 


INDEX. 


475 


Defending  Cincinnati,  i,  183.     At 
battle  of  Nashville,  ii,  226. 

SMITH,  GEN.  C.  F.,  enterprise  of  a 
failure,  i,  101.  Debarks  at  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  i,  101.  At  battle 
of  Shiloh,  i,  104 

SMITH,  GEX.  E.  K.,  at  Bridgeport,  i, 
131.  Moves  to  relieve  Chattanooga, 
i,  132.  At  Knoxville,  i,  152.  Mov- 
ing to  Central  Kentucky,  i,  153. 
Defeats  Nelson,  i,  182.  Advances 
toward  Cincinnati,  i,  183. 

SMITH,  GEX.  G.  C.,  in  pursuit  of  J. 
H.  Morgan,  i,  136.  Opposes  Mor- 
gan in  Kentucky,  i,  146.  At 
Brentwood,  Tenn.,  i,  290. 

SMITH,  GEN.  M.  L.,  assault  of  at 
Fort  Donelson,  i,  86.  At  Mission- 
ary Ridge,  i,  426. 

SMITH,  GEN.  J.  E.,  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  i,  426.  At  Chattanooga, 
ii,  95. 

SMITH,  GEN.  W.  F.,  operations  of  at 
Chattanooga,  i,  396.  Success  of  at 
Brown's  Ferry,  i,  398.  Activity 
of  at  Chattanooga,  i,  421. 

SMITH,  GEN.  W.  S.,  at  Perryville,  i, 
196. 

SMITHFIELD,  N.  C.,  occupied  by  U.  S. 
forces,  ii,  322. 

SOUTH  CAROLINA,  desolate  track 
through,  ii,  312. 

SOUTHERN  STATES,  character  of  legis- 
latures of,  i,  2. 

SPALDIXG,  COL.,  successful  charge  of 
at  Nashville,  ii,  241.  ^ 

SPEED,  GEX.  JAS.,  patriotic  address 
of,  i,  2.  Appointed  brigadier- 
general  of  militia  in  Kentucky, 
i,  11. 

SPEED,  JOSHUA  F.,  i,  12. 

SPEERS,  GEN.  J.  G.,  at  Cumberland 
Ford,  i,  133.  At  Stone  River,  i,  251. 
On  the  Knoxville  campaign,  ii,  2. 
Engagement  with  Wheeler,  ii,  7. 

STAND  ART'S  BATTERY,  at  Stone  River, 
i,  240.  At  Chickamauga,  i,  339. 

STANLEY,  GEN.  D.  S.,  at  Corinth,  i, 
127.  At  battle  of  Stone  River,  i, 
224.  Engagement  of  at  Overall's 
Creek,  i,  245.  Attacks  Van  Dorn 
at  Harpeth  River,  i,  296.  Defeats 
forces  at  Middleton,  i,  297.  Cap- 
tures Wheeler's  artillery,  i,  306. 
Movements  in  Alabama,  i,  309.  At 
Buzzard  Roost,  ii,  49.  At  battle  of 
Resaca,  ii,  66.  Engagement  near 


Cassville,  ii,  72.  Before  Kenesaw 
Mountain,  ii,  88.  At  Peachtree 
Creek,  ii,  112.  Assigned  to  com- 
mand of  the  Fourth  Corps,  ii, 
124.  Before  Atlanta,  ii,  129.  En- 
gagement at  Lovejoy's  Station,  ii, 
146.  At  Pulaski,  ii,  170.  At  Co- 
lumbia, ii,  190.  Goes  with  a  brigade 
into  a  charge  at  Franklin,  ii,  200. 
Wounded  at  battle  of  Franklin, 
ii,  201.  Extract  from  report  of 
battle  of  Franklin,  ii,  221.  Takes 
Fourth  Corps  into  East  Tennessee, 
ii,  339. 

STANLEY,  COL.  T.  R.,  at  battle  of  Stone 
River,  i,  250.  Report  of  the  bat- 
tle, i,  273.  At  Chickamauga,  i, 
348.  At  Brown's  Ferry,  i,  397. 

STARKWEATHER,  COL.  J.  C.,  at  Perry- 
ville, i,  188.  At  battle  of  Stone 
River,  i,  224.  At  Chickamauga, 
i,  334. 

STANTON,  E.  M.,  dispatches  to  Grant, 
relating  to  Thomas  at  Nashville, 
ii,  260,  253.  Dispatches  to  Thomas, 
ii,  259,  262.  Directs  Thomas  to 
disregard  all  orders  except  those 
coming  from  Grant  and  himself, 
ii,  363. 

STEEDMAN,  GEN.  J.  B.,  at  Perryville, 
i,J90.  Defeats  Roddy,  i,  293.  At 
Chickamauga,  i,  353.  In  com- 
mand of  District  of  Etowah,  ii, 
95.  Drives  Wheeler  from  Dalton, 
ii,  131.  At  battle  of  Nashville,  ii, 
227. 

STEINWEHR,  GEN.  A.  V.,  at  Wau- 
hatchie,  i,  400.  At  Missionary 
Ridge,  i,  426. 

STERN,  COL.  L.,  killed,  i,  252. 

STEVENSON,  GEN.  C.  L.,  near  Baptist 
Gap,  i,  135.  Near  Cumberland 
Gap,  i,  176.  Defeated  by  De 
Courcy,  i,  177.  At  Missionary 
Ridge,  i,  427.  At  Buzzard  Roost, 
ii,  49.  At  battle  of  Resaca,  ii,  67. 

STEVENSON,  ALA.,  capture  of,  i,  130. 
Works  of  defense  constructed  at, 
i,  148. 

STEWART,  GEN.  A.  P.,  at  Chicka- 
mauga, i,  346.  At  Missionary 
Ridge,  i,  434.  At  Buzzard's  Roost, 
ii,  49.  At  Resaca,  ii,  67.  Retreats 
from  Atlanta,  ii,  147.  On  railroad 
near  Marietta,  ii,  160. 

STONE'S  BATTERY,  at  Perryville,  i, 
188. 


476 


INDEX. 


STONE  RIVER,  campaign  of,  i,  219-286. 

STONEMAN,  GEN.  G.  D.,  at  Rocky  Face 
Ridge,  ii,  52.  Movement  toward 
Macon,  and  capture,  ii,  124.  Opera- 
tions in  East  Tennessee,  ii,  273. 
Cavalry  operations  in  Tennessee 
and  North  Carolina,  ii,  337. 

STOUGHTON,  COL.,  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  i,  434. 

STRAIGHT,  COL.  A.  D.,  expedition  from 
Decatur,  i,  148.  Expedition  into 
Alabama,  i,  295.  Surrendered  to 
Forrest,  i,  296.  At  battle  of  Nash- 
ville, ii,  232. 

STRICKLAND,  COL.,  at  Franklin,  ii, 
199. 

SWALLOW'S  BATTERY,  at  Chickamauga, 
i,  336. 

TAFEL,  COL.,  surrenders  to  J.  H. 
Morgan,  i,  214. 

TENNESSEE,  importance  of  holding, 
i,  139. 

TERRELL,  GEN.,  at  Perryville,  i,  188. 

TERRELL'S  BATTERY,  at  Shiloh,  i,  112. 

THOMAS,  GEN.  GEO.  H.,  in  command 
of  Camp  Dick  Robinson,  i,  26. 
Organized  First  Brigade,  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  i,  27.  Opera- 
tions of,  in  Kentucky,  i,  30-54. 
Victory  of,  at  battle  of  Mill 
Springs,  i,  56.  Moves  his  com- 
mand to  Nashville,  i,  58.  Com- 
mands the  center  at  Corinth,  i, 
126.  In  the  movement  from  Cor- 
inth toward  Kentucky,  i,  139. 
Letters  of,  to  Buell,  i,  164-173. 
Assigned  to  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Ohio,  i,  184.  At  the  battle 
of  Perryville,  i,  186.  Report  of 
the  tattle,  i,  202.  Commands  the 
center  at  battle  of  Stone  River,  i, 
224.  Report  of  the  battle,  i,  272. 
On  the  Tullahoma  campaign,  i, 
302.  Operations  of,  in  moving 
army  over  the  mountains,  i,  310. 
Position  of,  at  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga, i,  328.  Left  chief  in  com- 
mand, i,  348.  Saved  the  army,  i, 
358.  Assigned  to  command  of 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  i, 
394.  Operations  of,  at  Chatta- 
nooga, i,  395,  ii,  13.  Assaults 
Bragg' s  center  on  Missionary 
Ridge,  i,  429.  Orders  and  reports 
of,  at  Chattanooga,  i,  445,  451. 
Suggests  movement  of  his  army 
through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  ii,  24. 


Dispatches  of  to  Grant,  ii,  40.  Ex- 
tract of  report  of,  ii,  43.  Opera- 
tion of  in  the  turning  of  Dalton, 
ii,  44.  Begins  movements  of  At- 
lanta campaign,  ii,  45.  Operations 
of  on  the  Atlanta  campaign,  ii, 
45-152.  Congratulatory  order  of, 
at  Atlanta,  ii,  153.  Ordered  north 
to  secure  communications,  ii,  159. 
Placed  in  command  of  all  troops 
not  in  Sherman's  presence,  ii,  165. 
Strength  of  army  left  with  him  to 
defeat  Hood,  ii,  186.  Dispositions 
of  to  repel  Hood,  ii,  186.  With- 
draws army  from  Franklin,  ii,  191. 
Dispatch  to  Sherman,  ii,  181.  To 
Halleck,  ii,  182.  Dispatches  from 
Nashville  in  November,  1864,  ii, 
208-218.  Extract  from  report  of 
battle  of  Franklin,  ii,  219.  Prepa- 
rations of  for  battle  of  Nashville, 
ii,  222.  Attacks  Hood  before  Nash- 
ville, ii,  227.  Routs  Hood  and 
drives  him  from  Tennessee,  ii, 
228-247.  Extract  from  report  of 
battle  of  Nashville,  ii,  266.  Dis- 
patches from  Nashville  to  Grant, 
ii,  251,  252,  254,  256,  257,  261.  To 
Halleck,  ii,  253,  255,  257,  258,  261. 
To  President  Lincoln,  ii,  260.  Gen- 
eral order  of  at  Pulaski,  ii,  265. 
Dispatches  to  Grant  in  relation  to 
East  Tennessee  movements,  ii, 
276.  Extract  from  report  of,  ii, 
344.  Dispatches  from  Clifton  and 
Eastport  to  Halleck,  ii,  345.  Dis- 
patches to  Grant  in  relation  to 
Hood's  movements,  ii,  345.  Com- 
munications of  to  Wilson,  ii,  359. 
Dispatch  to  Grant,  ii,  359.  Dis- 
patch to  Stoneman,  ii,  360.  Di- 
rected to  disregard  all  orders  ex- 
cept those  of  Grant  and  Secretary 
Stanton,  ii,  363.  Congratulatory 
order  of,  ii,  373.  Order  of,  estab- 
lishing a  national  cemetery  at 
Chattanooga,  ii,  377. 

THOMPSON,  COL.  C.  R.,  engages  For- 
rest at  Johnsonville,  ii,  171.  At 
battle  of  Nashville,  ii,  242. 

TOPPING,  LIEUT.  COL.,  mortally  wound- 
ed, i,  181. 

TOWER,  GEN.,  fortifies  Nashville,  ii, 
206. 

TRIUNE,  TENN.,  i,  221. 

TULLAHOMA  CAMPAIGN,  i,  302. 

TURCHIN,    GEN.    J.    B.,     commands 


INDEX. 


477 


Eighth  Brigade,  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
i,  67.  Occupies  Bowling  Green,  i, 
68.  Brigade  enters  Huntsville,  i, 
130.  Captures  Decatur  and  Tus- 
cumbia,  i,  130.  At  Brown's  Ferry, 
i,  397.  At  Chickamauga,  i,  336. 
Charges  and  routs  the  enemy,  i, 
355.  At  Missionary  Ridge,  i,  429. 
In  movement  toward  Dalton,  ii, 
20.  At  battle  of  Resaca,  ii,  66. 

TUSCUMBIA,  ALA.,  capture  of,  i,  130. 

TWELFTH  ARMY  CORPS,  joins  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  at  Bridgeport,  i, 
392.  See  also  Appendix,  ii,  382. 

TWENTIETH  ARMY  CORPS,  organization 
of,  see  Appendix,  ii,  381. 

TWENTY-FIRST  ARMY  CORPS,  organiza- 
tion of,  see  Appendix,  ii,  381. 

"TYLER,"  gunboat,  at  battle  of  Shi- 
loh,  i,  107. 

TYLER,  GEN.,  killed  at  West  Point, 
Ga.,  ii,  356. 

TYNDALE,  GEN.  H.,  at  Wauhatchie,  i, 
400. 

UNDERWOOD,  COL.  A.  B.,  at  battle  of 
Wauhatchie,  i,  401. 

UPTOX,  GEN.  E.,  operations  of  in  Al- 
abama and  Georgia,  ii,  347.  At 
the  battle  of  Selma,  ii,  351.  Cap- 
tures Columbus,  Ga.,  ii,  355.  At 
Augusta,  ii,  364. 

VAN  CLEVE,  GEN.  H.  P.,  at  battle  of 
Stone  River,  i,  224.  Engaged  at 
Lee  &  Gordon's  Mills,  i,  325.  At 
Crawfish  Springs,  i,  327.  At  Chick- 
amauga, i,  336. 

VANDERVEER,  COL.  F.,  at  Chickamau- 
ga, i,  334.  At  Missionary  Ridge, 
i,  429.  Advance  toward  Tunnel 
Hill,  ii,  26.  At  battle  of  Benton- 
ville,  ii,  317. 

VAN  DORN,  GEN.,  engagement  of,  near 
Spring  Hill,  i,  292. 

VAUGHAN,  GEN.,  evacuates  London, 
ii,  2. 

"VETERAN* VOLUNTEERS,"  grand  name 
of,  ii,  29. 

VON  SCHRADER,  LIEUT.  COL.  A.,  sys- 
tem  of  pickets,  i,  210.  Sent  to 
Nashville  to  organize  detached 
troops,  ii,  189. 

WAGNER,  GEN.  G.  D.,  assigned  to 
command  of  Twenty-first  Brigade, 
i,  73.  At  Perryville,  i,  192.  At 
battle  of  Stone  *River,  i,  243.  Re- 
port of  the  battle,  i,  279.  At  Mis- 
sionary Ridge,  i,  432.  Assault  at 


Kenesaw,  ii,  94.  At  New  Hope 
Church,  ii,  80.  At  Lynnville,  ii, 
188.  At  battle  of  Franklin,  ii, 
198. 

WALCTTTT,  GEN.  C.  C.,  engagement 
of,  near  Macon,  ii,  278. 

WALKER,  COL.  M.  B.,  at  Stewarts- 
boro,  i,  224. 

WALLACE,  GEN.  L.,  at  Fort  Donelson, 
i,86.  At  battle  of  Shiloh,  i,  109.  At 
Corinth,  i,  127.  Defending  Cin- 
cinnati, i,  183. 

WALLACE,  GEN.  W.  H.  L.,  at  battle 
of  Shiloh,  i,  104.  Mortally  wound- 
ed, i,  108. 

WARD,  GEN.  W.  T.,  at  battle  of  Re- 
saca, ii,  68.  At  Peachtree  Creek, 
ii,  113.  Moves  northward  from 
Savannah,  ii,  307.  At  Averysboro, 
ii,  314. 

W  ATKINS,  COL.  L.  D.,  captures  part  of 
Texas  Legion,  i,  297.  Posted  at 
Rossville,  ii,  5.  Dash  of  upon  La- 
fayette, ii,  7.  Holds  Lafayette,  ii, 
95. 

WAUHATCHIE,  battle  of,  i,  400. 

WEBSTER,  COL.,  at  Perryville,  i,  188. 

WELLS,  COL.,  attacked  at  Campbells- 
ville,  ii,  189. 

WEST  LIBERTY,  KY.,  occupied  by 
U.  S.  troops,  i,  74. 

WEST  POINT,  GA.,  captured  by  Col. 
La  Grange,  ii,  356. 

WHARTON,  GEN.  J.  A.,  raid  of  in  Ten- 
nessee, i,  388. 

WHEELER,  GEN.  J.,  defeated  by  Kirk, 
i,  213.  Defeated  by  Col.  S.  Mat- 
thews, i,  215.  Captures  Coburn, 
i,  292.  Artillery  of  captured,  i, 
306.  Expedition  of  in  Tennessee, 
i,  387.  Defeats  of,  1,  391.  De- 
feated at  Calhoun,  ii,  7.  Driven 
by  Palmer,  ii,  19.  Attack  of  on 
Dalton  repulsed,  ii,  131.  At  Savan- 
nah, ii,  285.  Operations  of  in  the 
Carolinas,  ii,  308. 

WICKLIFFE,  C.  A.,  i,  12. 

WICKLIFFE,  CAPT.,  at  Perryville,  i,  187. 

WHIPPLE,  GEN.  W.  D.,  at  battle  of 
Nashville,  ii,  230. 

WHITE,  COL.,  receives  the  surrender 
of  Macon,  ii,  357. 

WHITAKER,  GEN.  W.  C.,  at  Chicka- 
mauga, i,  353.  At  Lookout  Moun- 
tain, i,  419.  Near  Kenesaw  Moun- 
tain, ii,  89. 

WILDER,  COL.  J.  T.,  declines  to  sur- 


478 


INDEX. 


render  Munfordsville,  i,  160. 
Drives  enemy  from  Hoover's 
Gap,  i,  304.  Captures  Manchester, 
i,  306.  Delays  Bragg  at  Alex- 
ander's bridge,  i,  331.  Engage- 
ment at  Leet's  tanyard,  i,  325. 
At  Chickamauga,  i,  337. 

WILLIAMS,  GEN.  A.  S.,  at  battle  of 
Eesaca,  ii,  68.  At  New  Hope 
Church,  ii,  76.  Before  Kenesaw 
Mountain,  ii,  89.  At  Peachtree 
Creek,  ii,  114.  On  the  march  to 
the  sea,  ii,  278.  At  Savannah,  ii, 
285.  Report  of  on  the  capture  of 
Savannah,  ii,  302.  At  Averys- 
boro,  ii,  314. 

WILLIAMS,  COL.  L.  A.,  hung  as  a 
rebel  spy,  i,  298. 

WILLIAMS,  COL.  T.  D.,  killed,  i,  252. 

WILLICH,  GEN.  A.,  defeats  enemy  at 
Hewlett's  Station,  i,  65.  At  battle 
of  Shiloh,  i,  113.  At  Stone  River, 
i,  226.  At  Chickamauga,  i,  335. 
At  Missionary  Ridge,  i,  415. 

WILSON,  GEN.  J.  H.,  at  Chattanooga, 
i,  422.  Chief  of  cavalry,  Militswy 
Division  of  the  Mississippi,  ii,  192. 
At  Hart's  Cross-roads,  ii,  191. 
Covers  retirement  of  the  infantry, 
ii,  192.  At  the  battle  of  Frank- 
lin, ii,  198.  Dispatches  of  from 
Hart's  Cross-roads  and  Franklin, 
ii,  216.  Extract  of  report  of  No- 
vember 29,  1864,  ii,  221.  At  bat- 
tle of  Nashville,  ii,  222,  226.  Pur- 
sues retreating  enemy,  ii,  241. 
Cavalry  campaign  of  in  Alabama 
and  Georgia,  ii,  347.  Captures 
Selma,  Ala. ,  ii,  353.  Moves  toward 
Montgomery,  ii,  353.  Advance 
of  upon  Macon,  Ga.,  ii,  356.  Dis- 
patch of,  from  Macon,  to  Sher- 
man, ii,  361.  Suspends  operations 
in  compliance  with  the  Sherman- 
Johnston  armistice,  ii.  357. 
Adopts  measures  to  capture  Da- 
vis, etc.,  ii,  364.  Congratulatory 
order  of,  ii,  376. 

WINEGAR'S  BATTERY,  at  Kulp's  house, 
ii,  91. 

WINSLOW,  GEN.  E.  F.,  at  the  battle  of 
Selma,  ii,  352.  At  Columbus,  Ga., 
ii,  355.  Operations  of,  in  Alabama 
and  Georgia,  ii,  349. 


WITHERS,  GEN.,  at  Stone  River,  i, 
227. 

WOLF,  COL.,  at  battle  of  Nashville, 
ii,  232. 

WoriFORD,  COL.  FRANK,  organizes  First 
Kentucky  Cavalry,  i,  17.  Wound- 
ed at  Lebanon,  Ky.,  i,  136. 

WOOD,  COL.  J.,  at  battle  of  Resaca, 
ii,  68. 

WOOD,  GEN.  T.  J.,  assigned  to  com- 
mand Sixth  Division,  i,  72.  At 
battle  of  Shiloh,  i,  114.  At  Cor- 
inth, i,  126.  At  Perryville,  i,  192. 
At  Stone  River,  i,  241.  At  Chick- 
amauga, i,  347.  Drives  enemy 
from  Orchard  Knob,  i,  415.  At 
Rocky  Face  Ridge,  ii,  52.  At  bat- 
tle of  Resaca,  ii,  66.  At  New  Hope 
Church,  ii,  78.  Before  Kenesaw 
Mountain,  ii,  88.  At  Peachtree 
Creek,  ii,  112.  Wounded  at  Love- 
joy's  Station,  ii,  146.  At  battle  of 
Franklin,  ii,  199.  At  battle  of 
Nashville,  ii,  226. 

WOOD,  LIEUT.  COL.,  of  Morgan's  rebel 
command,  captured,  i,  136. 

WOODBURY'S  BATTERY,  at  Kulp'a 
house,  ii,  91. 

WOODRUFF,  COL.  W.  E.,  loyalty  of,  i, 
3.  Authorized  to  raise  a  regiment, 
i,  14.  Takes  regiment  to  West  Vir- 
ginia, i,  15.  At  Nolensville,  i,  220. 
At  battle  of  Stone  River,  i,  231. 
Report  of  the  battle,  i,  267. 

WRTGHT,  GEN.  H.  G.,  relieves  Nfil- 
son,  i,  153. 

WYNCOOP,  COL.,  Seventh  Pennsylva- 
nia Cavalry,  i,  136. 

WYTHEVILLK,  VA.,  captured  and  de- 
stroyed by  Gill  em,  ii,  274. 

YARGER,  MAJ.  J.,  wounded  near 
Kenesaw,  ii,  94. 

YOUNG,  LIEUT.  COM.,  at  Fayetteville 
with  gunboat  Eolus,  ii,  311. 

ZAHM,  COL.  L.,  at  battle  of  Stone 
River,  i,  244. 

ZOLLTCOFFER,     GEN.     F.      R.,     OCCUpieS 

Cumberland  Gap,  i,  23.  Advanced 
to  Cumberland  Ford,  i,  30.  Re- 
pulsed by  Gen.  Schoepf's  com- 
mand, i,  39.  Retreated  to  London, 
i,  39.  Issues  proclamation  to  Ken- 
tuckians,  i,  53.  Killed  at  battle 
of  Mill  Springs,  i,  57. 


• 


THE  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  SANTA  CRUZ 


This  book  is  due  on  the  last  DATE  stamped  below. 

NOV22'88    «f! 

NOV  12  1988  RffiT) 

SEP    5  '90 

- 

SEP041990REC'0 

50m-l,'69(J5643s8)2373  —  3A.1 

j 

